United States Ex. Rel. Lowry & Planters Compress Co. v. Allen

203 U.S. 476, 27 S. Ct. 141, 51 L. Ed. 281, 1906 U.S. LEXIS 1611
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 10, 1906
Docket56
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 203 U.S. 476 (United States Ex. Rel. Lowry & Planters Compress Co. v. Allen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Ex. Rel. Lowry & Planters Compress Co. v. Allen, 203 U.S. 476, 27 S. Ct. 141, 51 L. Ed. 281, 1906 U.S. LEXIS 1611 (1906).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McKenna

delivered the opinion of the court.

.This is a petition for mandamus filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, requiring the" Commissioner of Patents to direct the board of examiners in chief to reinstate and take jurisdiction of the appeal of petitioners from the decision of the primary examiner, refusing to dissolve an interference between a patent granted to him and an application for a patent by one William L. Spoon. The Supreme Court granted the. mandamus. Its judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

The question in the case is, whether the rule of the Patent Office which denies an appeal from a ruling of a primary examiner, upon motion to dissolve an Interference, is contrary to the Revised Statutes, and therefore void. . Rule 124 provides that “from a decision of a primary examiner affirming the patentability of the claim or the applicant’s right to make the same, no appeal' can be taken.”

Plaintiffs in error attack the rule as inconsistent with the sections of the Revised Statutes which provide for interference^. These sections are inserted in the margin. 1

*479 The facts are as follows: Lowry was granted a patent for a bale of fibrous material January 29, 1897. An interference was declared between his patent and application of one William Spoon, to which interference Lowry was made a party. He *480 moved to dissolve the interference upon the ground, among others, that Spoon’s press was inoperative. The primary examiner granted the motion and Spoon appealed to the board of examiners in chief, who confirmed the decision’. Upon petition of Spoon the Commissioner of Patents remanded the case to the primary examiner for further consideration, and the latter^ officer, upon the fifing of additional affidavits, decided that Spoon’s application disclosed an operative device. From this decision an appeal' was taken to the board of examiners in chief, which was dismissed, by that board for want' of jurisdiction. Thereupon Lowry petitioned the Commissioner to direct the board to issue an appeal. The petition was denied, the Acting Commissioner remarking:

“The rule prohibiting an appeal from a, decision upon a motion holding that a party has the right to make the claim of the issue is in accordance with the practice which has prevailed in this office for many years and has the support of all decisions of the courts which have been rendered on the subject. There seems to be no reason for regarding it as inconsistent with the statute. It seems very clear that the decision in this case is not a final adverse decision, since it is not a ruling that Lowry is not entitled to his patent. That is a matter which may be determined in the. further proceedings, and, therefore, it is clear that the decision relates to a mere interlocutory matter.
“The petition is denied.”

Lowry filed another petition, appealing to the Commissioner “in person,” to direct the board of examiners in chief to entertain his appeal. The petition was considered and denied. In .passing on the petition the Commissioner said:

“ Under the express provisions of Rule 124 there is no appeal to the examiners in chief from such decision rendered on an interlocutory motion. It is believed that there is nothing in that rule inconsistent with law, and that, therefore, it has the force of law. The right of appeal in interferences given in general terms in the statute is a very different thing from the *481 right of appeal on all motions in the interference. To permit appeals on motions would multiply litigation and extend the proceedings in interferences beyond all reasonable limits. It would work great hardship to parties. The appellate tribunals of this office are no more required to give cases piecemeal consideration than are the appellate courts. The whole case should be ready for appeal when the appeal provided for by the statute is taken.
«2* «if tp 'n ^ ^
“ It is to be particularly noted that -there has been no decision as to the rival claims of the. parties to this interference. It has not been decided which party is entitled to the patent. If it should at any time be decided that Spoon is entitled to the patent, Lowry will have the right of appeal, but until such final decision is rendered the statute gives him no right of appeal.
“It would seem upon general principles of law that Lowry could then present for determination by his appeal any question which in his opinion vitally affects the question' which party is entitled to the patent. The only ground upon which he can reasonably claim the right of appeal on this motion is that the question vitally affects his claimed right to a patent, and if it does that, he can raise' it at final hearing and contest it before the various appellate tribunals, including the Court of Appeals.
“The refusal to permit the present appeal on motion is therefore not a denial of an opportunity to have the matter reviewed by the several appellate tribunals mentioned in the statute.”

And further: “No good reason is seen for changing the provisions in Rule 124 here in controversy, which was adopted and approved by a long line of Commissioners of Patents, among whom have been some of the ablest patent lawyers in the country, and which rule has been acquiesced in by patent attorneys practicing before the office for the last quarter of a century.”

*482 There is quite a sharp controversy between the parties as to the effect of the ruling of the Commissioner. Plaintiffs in error are apparently convinced that the ruling of the primary examiner involves a fundamental right which, if not decided on his appeal, will be forever foreclosed to him for review. A different view is expressed by defendant in error. However this may be, we think the question in the case is in quite narrow compass. The statutes involved are not difficult of interpretation. The determining sections are 482, 483, 4904 and 4909. Plaintiffs in error put especial stress upon sections 482 and 4909. Section 482 provides for the appointment of examiners in chief, “whose duty it shall be, on the written, petition of the appellant, ■ to revise and determine upon the validity of the adverse decisions of examiners ... in interference cases.” Sections 4906, 4909 provide that “every party to an interference, may appeal from, the decision of the primary examiner . ■ . . in such case to the board of examiners in chief. . . . ” The contention is that this section gives the right of appeal unreservedly and any limitation of it by a rule is void. Such might not be the result, even-if there was no qualification of those sections in other-sections. As said by the Commissioner, “the right of appeal in interferences given in general terms in the statute is a very different thing from the right of appeal on all motions in the interference.” It certainly could not have been the intention to destroy all distinctions in procedure.. But- we are not left/ to inference. The statute is explicit. It limits the declaration of interferences to the question'of priority of invention.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States
389 U.S. 191 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Fischer v. United States
38 C.C.P.A. 143 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1951)
Anderson v. Walch
152 F.2d 975 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1946)
Josserand v. Taylor
138 F.2d 58 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1943)
W. F. & John Barnes Co. v. International Harvester Co.
51 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Illinois, 1943)
Gilbert v. General Motors Corporation
133 F.2d 997 (Second Circuit, 1943)
In re Lyon
86 F.2d 824 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1936)
Herthel v. Dubbs
65 F.2d 138 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1933)
Headley v. Bridges
48 F.2d 938 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1931)
Fessenden v. General Electric Co.
10 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. New York, 1930)
Fekete v. Robertson
17 F.2d 335 (D.C. Circuit, 1927)
Dunkley Co. v. Central California Canneries
7 F.2d 972 (Ninth Circuit, 1925)
United States ex rel. Young v. Stump
292 F. 354 (Fourth Circuit, 1923)
Norling v. Hayes
37 D.C. App. 169 (D.C. Circuit, 1911)
United States ex rel. Newcomb Motor Co. v. Moore
30 App. D.C. 464 (D.C. Circuit, 1908)
Westinghouse v. Hien
159 F. 936 (Seventh Circuit, 1907)
Johnson v. Mueser
29 App. D.C. 61 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1907)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
203 U.S. 476, 27 S. Ct. 141, 51 L. Ed. 281, 1906 U.S. LEXIS 1611, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-lowry-planters-compress-co-v-allen-scotus-1906.