United States ex rel. Brown v. BankUnited Trust 2005-1

235 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 2017 WL 395296, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12357
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 30, 2017
DocketCase No. 14-cv-22855-GAYLES
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 235 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (United States ex rel. Brown v. BankUnited Trust 2005-1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Brown v. BankUnited Trust 2005-1, 235 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 2017 WL 395296, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12357 (S.D. Fla. 2017).

Opinion

ORDER

DARRIN P. GAYLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Rela-tors’ Second Amended Complaint [ECF-No. 228] (the “Joint Motion”), filed by Defendants BankUnited Financial Corporation (“BUFC”); BankUnited, N.A. (“BankUnited”); PricewaterhouseCoópers LLP (“PwC”); 1 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (‘Wells Fargo”); 2 Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Company, N.A. (“Wells Fargo Delaware”); 3 U.S. Bank, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”); 4 Bank of New York Mellon Corporation [1347]*1347(“BNY Mellon”); 5 Wilmington Trust Company; 6 Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC (“Carringon”); JPMorgan Chase. & Co. (“JPMorgan”); EMC Mortgage LLC $%/a EMC Mortgage Corporation (“EMC”); 7 Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Inc. '(“SAMI IF); 8 Humberto L. Lopez; Ramiro' A. Ortiz; and Alfred R. Camner, as well as on supplemental motions to dismiss and supplemental memoranda in support of motions to dismiss filed by various Defendants individually.9 The Court has reviewed the operative Complaint and exhibits attached thereto, the parties’ briefs, and thev applicable law and is otherwise fully advised in the premises;

The Relators in this case, Susan Brown and David Stone (the “Relators”), bring this qui tam action claiming violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729-33, and several state and local false claims acts, arising from alleged fraud and false claims orchestrated by BUFC, its affiliated companies, and the other Defendants. The Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal False Claims Act claims, as they are barred by that Act’s public disclosure bar. Because the Court agrees with».the Defendants, the Joint Motion to Dismiss shall be granted. Moreover, because the Court declines;;to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over , the state and local false claims act claims, the action shall be dismissed in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

1. The Failure of BankUnited FSB

BankUnited FSB (“BUFSB”) was a Miami-based savings and loan that was originally established as a state-chartered de novo institution (under the name United Savings Association) in 1984. Compl. Ex. A10 at 40 (Office of Inspector General, Dep’t of Treasury, Safety and Soundness-. Material Loss Review of Bank United, FSB (2010)) (“OIG Report”). In 2000, the Federal Reserve Bank decided to reduce interest fates for member banks to borrow funds to near-zero percent. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17.'Following the Fed’s decision, the banking industry “began to zealously [1348]*1348and feverishly originate, securitize, and sell” option adjustable rate mortgage loans (“option ARM”). Id. ¶ 18; OIG Report at 40. An option ARM is an adjustable rate mortgage with several possible payment options; these options usually include (1) paying an amount that covers both principal and interest, (2) paying an amount that covers only interest, or (3) paying a minimum amount that does not even cover interest. What Is an Option or Paymentr-Option ARM?, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ askcfpb/102/what-is-an-option-or-payment-option-arm.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). In the third option, the unpaid interest is added to the principal loan balance—a process otherwise known as negative amortization.

Beginning in 2004, BUFSB heavily increased its emphasis on option ARMs. See OIG Report at 40. In 2003, option ARMs had totaled only five percent of BUFSB’s assets. Id. at 41. By March 2008, option ARMS totaled ññy-one percent of its assets ($7.3 billion). Id. at 42. At their peak, ninety-one percent of BUFSB’s option ARMs were negatively amortized—in other words, ninety-one percent of BUFSB’s borrowers had elected to make payments that were less than the monthly interest accruing on their loans. Id.

As with many banks in the United States during this period of time, these lending practices soon became unsustainable for BUFSB. In December 2007, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), following an examination of BUFSB, concluded that the level of problem residential loans in BUFSB’s portfolio was continuing to increase rapidly, with no indication that it would begin to subside. Id. at 41.11

BUFSB discontinued producing option ARMs in May 2008. Id. at 42. Two months later, the OTS expressed concern to BUFC—BUFSB’s holding company— about BUFC’s ability to continue to service its significant accumulated debt and to successfully access capital markets in light of its significant asset quality issues. Id. On July 24, 2008, the OTS issued a memorandum of understanding to BUFC, requiring it to raise a minimum of $400 million. Id. at 40, 42. That same day, the OTS also issued a memorandum of understanding to BUFSB requiring it to, inter alia, terminate its negative-amortization and reduced-documentation lending programs. Id. at 42. The OTS determined that BUFSB was in an unsafe and unsound condition due to the deterioration in its portfolio of nontraditional mortgage loans, the concentration of risk associated with the portfolio, and the resultant need for significant additional capital. Id.

On August 4, 2008, OTS officials held a conference call to discuss BUFSB’s status and the appropriate supervisory and enforcement response. Id. at 42-43. The officials also discussed the willingness of BUFSB’s management to infuse capital from BUFC to offset a loss for the quarter ending June 30, 2008. The OTS senior deputy director instructed that the infusion of capital should be backdated to June 30, 2008, and that BUFSB should amend its thrift financial report accordingly. Id. at 43. So, on August 11, 2008, BUFC filed Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which included a press release and examination for the [1349]*1349quarter ending June 30, 2008. Id. The 8-K announced that BUFC “strengthened [BUFSBJ’s capital ‘through an $80 million capital contribution’ ”—in essence, reflecting the backdated capital contribution that had been directed by the OTS senior deputy director. Id. On August 25, 2008, BUFC filed a Form 10-Q with the SEC for the quarter ending June 30, 2008, which also reflected the backdated capital contribution, stating that, effective June 30, 2008, BUFC had contributed $80 million in additional capital to BUFSB. Id. at 44.

BUFSB’s decline continued rapidly. While in July 2008, BUFSB had met the regulatory standard for a well-capitalized designation (the highest capital classification), by January 30, 2009, when BUFSB filed its thrift financial report for the quarter ending December 31, 2008, it met the standard of-“critically undercapitalized”— the lowest capital classification.12 The OTS sent a prompt corrective action notice regarding BUFSB’s critically undercapital-ized status to the board of BUFSB on February 10th, requiring that the institution submit a capital restoration plan. Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
235 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 2017 WL 395296, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-brown-v-bankunited-trust-2005-1-flsd-2017.