OPINION OF THE COURT
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to determine whether a portion of an arbitration award should be struck down on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority. Because we find that the arbitrator’s response did not exceed the scope of the question presented, we will affirm the district court’s decision upholding the arbitration award.
I.
The facts of the case are undisputed. On or about February 7, 1992, United Parcel Service (“UPS”) discharged Thomas Varish for poor work performance. Thereafter, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 430 (the “Union”) filed a grievance on behalf of Varish under the procedures set forth in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (the “Agreement”). After UPS and the Union were unable to reach an accord with respect to Varish’s discharge, the parties submitted the dispute to the' Central Pennsylvania Area Parcel Grievance Committee (the “Joint Panel” or “Panel”)1, as required by the Agreement.
At the hearing before the Joint Panel, the Union representative presenting Varish’s case raised a Point of Order challenging UPS’s attempt to introduce into evidence notations of informal disciplinary actions previously taken against Varish. These informal actions are typically referred to as “talk-with’s” and “talk-to’s,” which are verbal reprimands or comments, or “write-up’s,” which are’ written records of reprimands or comments.2 The Panel considered the Point of Order, but could not resolve the issue. Accordingly, the Panel issued the following decision:
A Point of Order was raised and Executive Session was called. The Panel deadlocked on the Point of Order. The question is whether [UPS] may enter into the record, “talk-with’s,” “talk-to’s” or “write-up’s” which [sic] the Union had no prior knowledge.
As required by the parties’ Agreement, the parties submitted the Point of Order to an arbitrator. After hearing two days of testi-. mony and reviewing post-arbitration briefs, Arbitrator Eli Rock rendered an award and opinion in this matter. The two paragraph award reads as follows:
[140]*1401. On the general question of the admissibility of talk-to’s and the like before the Joint Panel where the Union members object, the ruling is that such material may not be admitted over the objection of the Union members.
2. In the present particular case involving employee Varish, and limited to the present submission to arbitration, the disputed material may be admitted.
In his memorandum detailing his decision, Arbitrator Rock explained his analytical process as follows:
Addressing myself to [the Point of Order], it appears to me that I have no choice, in this case but to break down the issue into the broader and general question of [UPSJ’s right to introduce “talk-with’s” and the like over the Union’s objections, and secondly [UPS]’s right to do so in the present specific ease, involving ghievant Tom Varish.
App. at 59. In the context of the question presented, ie., the admissibility of talk-to’s of which the Union had no prior knowledge, the arbitrator, in making his first “general” ruling, gave “significant weight” to the past practice of the parties. He found it to be “completely clear ... that where the Union members have opposed the admission of ‘talk-to’s,’ and have stuck to that position, such items have not been entered in the record.” (Id. at 60).3 In regard to this particular case, however, the arbitrator determined that both Varish and the Union had had prior knowledge of the talk-to’s. Id. at 61. The arbitrator found therefore in his second paragraph that the talk-to’s here should have been admitted.
UPS sought to vacate paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award, arguing that the arbitrator exeeedéd the contractual limitations on his authority by ruling on an issue not submitted for arbitration and by altering the parties’ underlying Agreement.4 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court entered an order granting the Union’s motion and denying UPS’s. This appeal followed.5
II.
We exercise plenary review of the district court’s decision resolving cross-motions for summary judgment. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1440 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 660, 121 L.Ed.2d 585 (1992).
III.
It is well settled that courts have limited power to review a labor arbitrator’s award. Where, as here, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement provides for binding arbitration in grievance proceedings, [141]*141courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an arbitrator’s award. A contrary rule would undermine the federal policy which favors settling labor disputes through arbitration. See United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 369-70, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Therefore, an arbitrator’s award will be upheld so long as it “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” Misco, 484 U.S. at 36, 108 S.Ct. at 369-70; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361, unless the award is tainted by fraud or bias or addresses matters outside the arbitrator’s authority. High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1218 (3d Cir.1989); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir.1982) (“[A]n arbitrator must not exceed his authority and dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”).
UPS raises two intertwined issues in its appeal: that paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award exceeds the scope of his authority and that it does not draw its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.6 UPS argues that we should not uphold paragraph one of the award because the arbitrator failed to confine his inquiry to the “grievance coming before him,” namely the admissibility of talk-to’s about which the Union had no prior knowledge. In UPS’s view, paragraph one of the award holds that all talk-to’s, regardless of whether the Union had prior knowledge, may not be admitted over the objection of the Union members.
In support of this interpretation, UPS cites two passages contained in Arbitrator Rock’s memorandum accompanying the arbitration award.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to determine whether a portion of an arbitration award should be struck down on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority. Because we find that the arbitrator’s response did not exceed the scope of the question presented, we will affirm the district court’s decision upholding the arbitration award.
I.
The facts of the case are undisputed. On or about February 7, 1992, United Parcel Service (“UPS”) discharged Thomas Varish for poor work performance. Thereafter, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 430 (the “Union”) filed a grievance on behalf of Varish under the procedures set forth in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (the “Agreement”). After UPS and the Union were unable to reach an accord with respect to Varish’s discharge, the parties submitted the dispute to the' Central Pennsylvania Area Parcel Grievance Committee (the “Joint Panel” or “Panel”)1, as required by the Agreement.
At the hearing before the Joint Panel, the Union representative presenting Varish’s case raised a Point of Order challenging UPS’s attempt to introduce into evidence notations of informal disciplinary actions previously taken against Varish. These informal actions are typically referred to as “talk-with’s” and “talk-to’s,” which are verbal reprimands or comments, or “write-up’s,” which are’ written records of reprimands or comments.2 The Panel considered the Point of Order, but could not resolve the issue. Accordingly, the Panel issued the following decision:
A Point of Order was raised and Executive Session was called. The Panel deadlocked on the Point of Order. The question is whether [UPS] may enter into the record, “talk-with’s,” “talk-to’s” or “write-up’s” which [sic] the Union had no prior knowledge.
As required by the parties’ Agreement, the parties submitted the Point of Order to an arbitrator. After hearing two days of testi-. mony and reviewing post-arbitration briefs, Arbitrator Eli Rock rendered an award and opinion in this matter. The two paragraph award reads as follows:
[140]*1401. On the general question of the admissibility of talk-to’s and the like before the Joint Panel where the Union members object, the ruling is that such material may not be admitted over the objection of the Union members.
2. In the present particular case involving employee Varish, and limited to the present submission to arbitration, the disputed material may be admitted.
In his memorandum detailing his decision, Arbitrator Rock explained his analytical process as follows:
Addressing myself to [the Point of Order], it appears to me that I have no choice, in this case but to break down the issue into the broader and general question of [UPSJ’s right to introduce “talk-with’s” and the like over the Union’s objections, and secondly [UPS]’s right to do so in the present specific ease, involving ghievant Tom Varish.
App. at 59. In the context of the question presented, ie., the admissibility of talk-to’s of which the Union had no prior knowledge, the arbitrator, in making his first “general” ruling, gave “significant weight” to the past practice of the parties. He found it to be “completely clear ... that where the Union members have opposed the admission of ‘talk-to’s,’ and have stuck to that position, such items have not been entered in the record.” (Id. at 60).3 In regard to this particular case, however, the arbitrator determined that both Varish and the Union had had prior knowledge of the talk-to’s. Id. at 61. The arbitrator found therefore in his second paragraph that the talk-to’s here should have been admitted.
UPS sought to vacate paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award, arguing that the arbitrator exeeedéd the contractual limitations on his authority by ruling on an issue not submitted for arbitration and by altering the parties’ underlying Agreement.4 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court entered an order granting the Union’s motion and denying UPS’s. This appeal followed.5
II.
We exercise plenary review of the district court’s decision resolving cross-motions for summary judgment. See Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1440 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 660, 121 L.Ed.2d 585 (1992).
III.
It is well settled that courts have limited power to review a labor arbitrator’s award. Where, as here, the parties’ collective bargaining agreement provides for binding arbitration in grievance proceedings, [141]*141courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an arbitrator’s award. A contrary rule would undermine the federal policy which favors settling labor disputes through arbitration. See United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 369-70, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Therefore, an arbitrator’s award will be upheld so long as it “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” Misco, 484 U.S. at 36, 108 S.Ct. at 369-70; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361, unless the award is tainted by fraud or bias or addresses matters outside the arbitrator’s authority. High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1218 (3d Cir.1989); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir.1982) (“[A]n arbitrator must not exceed his authority and dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”).
UPS raises two intertwined issues in its appeal: that paragraph one of the arbitrator’s award exceeds the scope of his authority and that it does not draw its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.6 UPS argues that we should not uphold paragraph one of the award because the arbitrator failed to confine his inquiry to the “grievance coming before him,” namely the admissibility of talk-to’s about which the Union had no prior knowledge. In UPS’s view, paragraph one of the award holds that all talk-to’s, regardless of whether the Union had prior knowledge, may not be admitted over the objection of the Union members.
In support of this interpretation, UPS cites two passages contained in Arbitrator Rock’s memorandum accompanying the arbitration award. First, UPS points to a passage in which Arbitrator Rock states that “[t]he Union panel members could in a specific future case simply object to the introduction of ‘talk-to’s’ as such, without regard' to the prior processing or handling of such material, and given the above past practice [of the Joint Panel] and the weight that I have given to it, this would be sufficient to bar the introduction of such material.” App. at 61. UPS argues that, in using this language, the arbitrator ruled on the admissibility of all talk-to’s, whether or not the Union had had prior knowledge of them, and therefore the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.
UPS also points to references in Arbitrator Rock’s memorandum to objections raised by “Union panel members” (App. at 60-61) as evidence that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. UPS properly contends that the question presented to Arbitrator Rock- did not involve objections raised by union panel members, but rather by union members appearing before the panel.7
A review of Arbitrator Rock’s award, however, persuades us that the award did not exceed the scope of his authority and that thereby, pursuant to Article 48, Section 2 of the parties’ agreement, the award drew its essence from the agreement. To begin with, it is crucial to consider the arbitrator’s award in light of the question presented. Accordingly the arbitrator’s award should be read to address only those talk-to’s of which the Union did not have prior knowledge and only those objections raised by Union members.
Additionally, UPS’s interpretation of paragraph one of the award is not suggested by the language of the award itself. In drawing the inference that paragraph one exceeds the scope of the question presented, UPS relies solely upon the language contained in the arbitrator’s accompanying opinion. The Supreme Court, however, has clearly held that ambiguity in an opinion accompanying an award is not a reason for determining that an award is unenforceable as beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s authority. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, [142]*142598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Instead, when an award does not apparently exceed the scope of the parties’ submission, it will be affirmed, regardless of inferences that may be drawn from the accompanying opinion. Id. Such an award will, of course, be enforceable only to the extent it does not exceed the scope of the parties’ submission. Thus, given two reasonable interpretations of the award, only that which is within the authority of the arbitrator will be enforceable.
In the instant case, the arbitrator’s award, on its face, does not contain any language indicating that it extends beyond the scope of the question presented. Rather, paragraph one is logically read as a direct response to the parties’ submission, pertaining only to talk-to’s about which the Union had no prior knowledge.8 Accordingly, the award is not beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s authority under the parties’ Agreement.
The judgment of March 24, 1994, will be affirmed.