Ultradent Products, Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc.

924 F. Supp. 1101, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1969, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6571, 1996 WL 255324
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedMay 10, 1996
DocketCivil 95-C-163 W
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 924 F. Supp. 1101 (Ultradent Products, Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ultradent Products, Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1101, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1969, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6571, 1996 WL 255324 (D. Utah 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO STRIKE, MOTION TO DISMISS, AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

WINDER, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on various motions filed by Plaintiff and Defendants which were argued on April 25,1996. At (he hearing, plaintiff Ultradent Products, Inc. was represented by H. Ross Workman, Thomas R. Vuksiniek, and Todd E. Zenger and defendants Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc. and Rodney F. Ogrin were represented by H. Dickson Burton and Allen C. Turner. The court has carefully considered all pleadings, memoranda, and other materials submitted by the parties. The court has further considered the law and facts relevant to the parties’ motions. Now being fully advised, the court enters the following memorandum decision and order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ultradent Products, Inc. (“Ultra-dent”) is a manufacturer of dental products including bleaching compositions for use in whitening teeth. Ultradent has marketed such a composition under the product name Opalescence® since 1990. Defendant LifeLike Cosmetics, Inc. (“Life-Like”) also manufactures and sells dental bleaching compositions. Defendant Rodney F. Ogrin (“Ogrin”) is the president and sole owner of Life-Like. Because Life-Like and Ogrin are so closely associated with one another in this litigation, they will be collectively referred to in this opinion as “Life-Like” unless otherwise noted.

On February 21, 1995, Ultradent brought this action alleging Life-Like willfully infringed its rights held under United States Patents numbers 5,098,303 (“the ’303 patent”), 5,234,342 (“the ’342 patent”), and 5,376,006 (“the ’006 patent”), and seeking remedies pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281, and 283-85. Ultradent is the assignee for each of these three related patents, initially issued to Dan E. Fischer. The ’303 and ’342 patents cover methods for bleaching teeth, and the ’006 patent covers methods and compositions for dental bleaching. Ultradent also alleged that Life-Like infringed its registered trademark. On September 15, 1995, Ultradent amended its complaint to add Ogrin as a defendant. Ultradent later withdrew the trademark infringement claim as part of a settlement with Life-Like.

Life-Like subsequently filed a counterclaim against Ultradent seeking declaratory judgments of invalidity of Ultradent’s patents and of noninfringement of Ultradent’s patents by various dental bleaching formulations. Life-Like also asserted a counterclaim against Ultradent for attempted monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act. In addition to its counterclaims, LifeLike asserted in its answer a number of affirmative defenses against Ultradent’s infringement claims, including invalidity of Ultradent’s patents and inequitable conduct by Ultradent during its prosecution of the three patents in suit.

Both Ultradent and Life-Like have filed a number of pretrial motions. Those motions addressed in this memorandum decision and order are: (1) Ultradent’s Motion for Claim Interpretation Under Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. in Connection with the Pending Motions for Summary Judgment; (2) Ultradent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Infringement; (3) Ogrin’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Invalidity Under 35 U.S.C. § 102; (4) Ultradent’s *1105 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Defense Under 35 U.S.C. § 102; (5) Ultradent’s Motion to Strike Life-Like’s Affirmative Defense of Inequitable Conduct; (6) Ultradent’s Motion to Dismiss Life-Like’s Counterclaim of Attempted Monopolization; and (7) Life-Like’s Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer and Counterclaims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.CivJP. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991).

Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Gonzales v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir.1991). 1 The nonmoving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

In considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court does not weigh the evidence but instead inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence presented, could return a verdiet for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827, 112 S.Ct. 97, 116 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991). 2 Finally, all material facts asserted by the moving party shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party. D.Utah R. 202(b)(4).

In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true.

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924 F. Supp. 1101, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1969, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6571, 1996 WL 255324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ultradent-products-inc-v-life-like-cosmetics-inc-utd-1996.