Snell, J.
— The issue here is whether a residence property owned by plaintiff-church furnished tO' and occupied by its “Director of Christian Education and Minister of Music” as part of his compensation is exempt from taxation under section 427.1 (9), Code of Iowa 1958. From a denial of exemption by the City Assessor, the Des Moines Board of Review and the District Court, plaintiff appeals.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Des Moines, Iowa, plaintiff herein, is a Lutheran Church of the Missouri Synod entirely supported by voluntary contributions of its members. It is governed by a Board of Elders on a local level and it is to this board that its ministers render reports.
Plaintiff is an Iowa corporation not for profit and is the owner of the residence property involved herein.
Pastor Paul G-. Stephan is the duly ordained and installed [199]*199pastor of the plaintiff-church serving under a Solemn Call extended to him through plaintiff-church.
Elmer B. Koester, thoroughly trained and educated for the teaching ministry and consecrated to the service of the church, but not ordained for preaching, also serves the church under a similar Solemn Call dated January 30, 1957. Mr. Koester was officially called to the office of Director of Christian Education and Minister of Music, and upon his acceptance of the call and installation became bound to the service of the church in a manner comparable to that of the ordained and installed pastor.
The church through the Solemn Call became obligated to pay Mr. Koester an annual salary, and in addition thereto, certain participation in the Synod pension plan, social security, a car allowance, and a suitable residence.
Although he is not ordained, Mr. Koester is a full-time servant of the church. We adopt the word “servant” from the testimony of a member of the Board of Elders.
Mr. Koester does not preach but he has charge of the teaching ministry in the congregation and in some situations his work overlaps the work of the pastor. His position is referred to by interchangeable synonymous terms. He is called Director of Christian Education, Minister of Religion, Minister of Music, Teacher of Religion, and Teacher of Christian Education. He acts as organist and director of the choirs, conducts devotional exercises, teaches religious classes and imparts religious doctrine. The superintendent of Sunday school is responsible to the congregation, but is under the direction of the Minister of Religion.
As part of his compensation Mr. Koester receives the use of a residence property owned by the church and located near but not on the church grounds.
Although the pastor as a member of the preaching ministry and Mr. Koester as a member of the teaching ministry serve in different capacities, each is a “servant” of the church bound by comparable vows to its service.
I. The exemption statute with which we are concerned here relates to property and its use and not to religious or academic titles or lines of demarcation among “servants” of the church.
[200]*200For the purposes of this case and the controlling statute we do not consider the difference in status or work of the ordained preaching minister and the consecrated teaching minister to be of any significance. There is no reference to either in the statute.
Mr. Koester and his family occupy as their home a residence owned by the church. He meets with congregational members and clergy in his home and maintains an office on the premises. There is nothing in the record to distinguish this residence from any parsonage, manse, rectory or parish house owned by any church for the use of its pastor. How much other property plaintiff church may own does not appear.
II. It is not for the courts to say what property should or should not be exempt from taxation. That is the prerogative of the legislature. It is not our province to- pass upon the policy, wisdom, advisability or justice of a statute. The remedy for unwise or oppressive legislation within constitutional bounds is not to be found in the courts but by appeal to the legislature. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 746, 108 N.W.2d 365. It is our duty to determine the legislative intent from what the legislature has said and done. The only legitimate purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. If a real question of construction does arise the interpretation of the statute is for the courts.' Clarion Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 252 Iowa 500, 507, 107 N.W.2d 553; Iowa Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hoepner, 252 Iowa 660, 663, 108 N.W.2d 55.
Statutes exempting property from taxation must be strictly construed. If there is any doubt upon the question, it must be resolved against the exemption and in favor of taxation; The burden is upon one claiming exemption to show that the property falls within the exemption statute. National Bank of Burlington v. Huneke, 250 Iowa 1030, 1035, 98 N.W.2d 7; Community Drama Association of Des Moines v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 252 Iowa 854, 862, 109 N.W.2d 23.
III. Section 427.1, Code of Iowa, provides:
“The following classes of property shall not be taxed:
[201]*201«# * #
“9. All grounds and buildings used by * * * religious institutions and societies solely for their appropriate objects * * *" and not leased or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit.” * *
Comparable provisions have appeared as a part of our statutory law since the Code of 1873 and are expressive of an even earlier policy of encouragement of morality and knowledge as necessary to good government and the welfare of mankind.
Granting the soundness of the concept from which various exemption statutes were conceived, the growth in extent and value of property not on the tax rolls has necessitated a serious reappraisal by those charged with the responsibility of fixing and administering public policy.
The current trend throughout the country as shown by recent decisions is to curb and restrict exemptions such as we have here. Adherence to what is now the majority rule would deny exemption to the property involved on the ground that a residence is a place in which to live and as such is not used solely for religious purposes.
There is merit in the argument and in the majority rule. Except for a situation we consider binding on us we might find the argument persuasive. We have, however, a situation that is unique.
In 1877 under an almost identical statutory provision this court considered a situation so similar as to make the pronouncements controlling.
In The Trustees of Griswold College v. The State of Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 282, 26 Am. Rep.
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Snell, J.
— The issue here is whether a residence property owned by plaintiff-church furnished tO' and occupied by its “Director of Christian Education and Minister of Music” as part of his compensation is exempt from taxation under section 427.1 (9), Code of Iowa 1958. From a denial of exemption by the City Assessor, the Des Moines Board of Review and the District Court, plaintiff appeals.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Des Moines, Iowa, plaintiff herein, is a Lutheran Church of the Missouri Synod entirely supported by voluntary contributions of its members. It is governed by a Board of Elders on a local level and it is to this board that its ministers render reports.
Plaintiff is an Iowa corporation not for profit and is the owner of the residence property involved herein.
Pastor Paul G-. Stephan is the duly ordained and installed [199]*199pastor of the plaintiff-church serving under a Solemn Call extended to him through plaintiff-church.
Elmer B. Koester, thoroughly trained and educated for the teaching ministry and consecrated to the service of the church, but not ordained for preaching, also serves the church under a similar Solemn Call dated January 30, 1957. Mr. Koester was officially called to the office of Director of Christian Education and Minister of Music, and upon his acceptance of the call and installation became bound to the service of the church in a manner comparable to that of the ordained and installed pastor.
The church through the Solemn Call became obligated to pay Mr. Koester an annual salary, and in addition thereto, certain participation in the Synod pension plan, social security, a car allowance, and a suitable residence.
Although he is not ordained, Mr. Koester is a full-time servant of the church. We adopt the word “servant” from the testimony of a member of the Board of Elders.
Mr. Koester does not preach but he has charge of the teaching ministry in the congregation and in some situations his work overlaps the work of the pastor. His position is referred to by interchangeable synonymous terms. He is called Director of Christian Education, Minister of Religion, Minister of Music, Teacher of Religion, and Teacher of Christian Education. He acts as organist and director of the choirs, conducts devotional exercises, teaches religious classes and imparts religious doctrine. The superintendent of Sunday school is responsible to the congregation, but is under the direction of the Minister of Religion.
As part of his compensation Mr. Koester receives the use of a residence property owned by the church and located near but not on the church grounds.
Although the pastor as a member of the preaching ministry and Mr. Koester as a member of the teaching ministry serve in different capacities, each is a “servant” of the church bound by comparable vows to its service.
I. The exemption statute with which we are concerned here relates to property and its use and not to religious or academic titles or lines of demarcation among “servants” of the church.
[200]*200For the purposes of this case and the controlling statute we do not consider the difference in status or work of the ordained preaching minister and the consecrated teaching minister to be of any significance. There is no reference to either in the statute.
Mr. Koester and his family occupy as their home a residence owned by the church. He meets with congregational members and clergy in his home and maintains an office on the premises. There is nothing in the record to distinguish this residence from any parsonage, manse, rectory or parish house owned by any church for the use of its pastor. How much other property plaintiff church may own does not appear.
II. It is not for the courts to say what property should or should not be exempt from taxation. That is the prerogative of the legislature. It is not our province to- pass upon the policy, wisdom, advisability or justice of a statute. The remedy for unwise or oppressive legislation within constitutional bounds is not to be found in the courts but by appeal to the legislature. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 746, 108 N.W.2d 365. It is our duty to determine the legislative intent from what the legislature has said and done. The only legitimate purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. If a real question of construction does arise the interpretation of the statute is for the courts.' Clarion Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 252 Iowa 500, 507, 107 N.W.2d 553; Iowa Hardware Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hoepner, 252 Iowa 660, 663, 108 N.W.2d 55.
Statutes exempting property from taxation must be strictly construed. If there is any doubt upon the question, it must be resolved against the exemption and in favor of taxation; The burden is upon one claiming exemption to show that the property falls within the exemption statute. National Bank of Burlington v. Huneke, 250 Iowa 1030, 1035, 98 N.W.2d 7; Community Drama Association of Des Moines v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 252 Iowa 854, 862, 109 N.W.2d 23.
III. Section 427.1, Code of Iowa, provides:
“The following classes of property shall not be taxed:
[201]*201«# * #
“9. All grounds and buildings used by * * * religious institutions and societies solely for their appropriate objects * * *" and not leased or otherwise used with a view to pecuniary profit.” * *
Comparable provisions have appeared as a part of our statutory law since the Code of 1873 and are expressive of an even earlier policy of encouragement of morality and knowledge as necessary to good government and the welfare of mankind.
Granting the soundness of the concept from which various exemption statutes were conceived, the growth in extent and value of property not on the tax rolls has necessitated a serious reappraisal by those charged with the responsibility of fixing and administering public policy.
The current trend throughout the country as shown by recent decisions is to curb and restrict exemptions such as we have here. Adherence to what is now the majority rule would deny exemption to the property involved on the ground that a residence is a place in which to live and as such is not used solely for religious purposes.
There is merit in the argument and in the majority rule. Except for a situation we consider binding on us we might find the argument persuasive. We have, however, a situation that is unique.
In 1877 under an almost identical statutory provision this court considered a situation so similar as to make the pronouncements controlling.
In The Trustees of Griswold College v. The State of Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 282, 26 Am. Rep. 138, two residence properties owned by a college and a church were occupied respectively by a professor in the college and a Bishop who was rector of the church. The question presented was the same as is now before us. Were the residences devoted solely to the appropriate objects of the college and the church? The court said “The true inquiry should be not what is actually necessary, but what is proper and appropriate to effectuate the objects of the institutions.” The court held that under the provisions of the statute the residence properties so used were exempt.
[202]*202That the problem was troublesome is shown by the fact that the decision was by a divided court with a vigorous dissent.
The majority opinion concludes with these prophetic words of invitation:
“We agree with counsel for appellee, that public policy demands that non-taxpaying property should not be increased; but our duty is to construe the valid acts of the legislature in this class of cases, as in all others, as we find them, and by proper rules of interpretation. If it be the legislative will that the exemption of this class of property be further restricted than it now is, that will can easily be expressed in appropriate legislation.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature has not accepted the invitation to change the interpretation of its own express policy and under that construction of legislative policy church parsonages have been exempt from taxation for over 85 years. By legislative silence the construction has been approved. It is not for us to now change what has been accepted as the legislative intent for so many years.
The Griswold case has been cited and followed consistently and states the Iowa rule to date.
IY. 21 C. J. S., Courts, section 187, says:
“Under the stare decisis rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. * * *
“It is a well established general rule that, where a principle of law has become settled by a series of decisions, it is binding on the courts and should be followed, in similar cases, or, as otherwise expressed, the principle so settled forms a precedent for the guidance of the courts in similar cases.
“The courts are slow to interfere with the principle announced by the decision, and it may be upheld, even though they would decide otherwise were the question a new one, or equitable considerations might suggest a different result, and although it has been erroneously applied in a particular ease. In determining a case the court is not concerned with what the law ought to be, but its sole function is to declare what the law, applicable to [203]*203the facts of the case, is. A fortiori courts will not depart from an established rule of law to meet a particular case of supposed hardship.”
In section 214 it is said:
“This rule is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change the law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be exercised solely by the legislature.”
As was said in City of Cherokee v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 199 Iowa 727, 736, 202 N.W. 886, “the case is controlled by the rule of stare decisis.”
In Swan Lake Consolidated School District v. Consolidated School District of Dolliver, 244 Iowa 1269, 1276, 58 N.W.2d 349, it is said:
“It is true the law should not be, and is not, static; it should grow and develop with economic, political and cultural conditions which surround it. This, however, does not mean that it should not generally be definite and settled. The rule of stare decisis has its basis in something stronger than the thought that the courts should follow hidebound precedent without regard to justice or equity. It derives from the consideration that when the courts have fully and fairly considered a proposition and have decided it, only the most pressing reasons should require, or in fact even permit, an opposite holding. Lawyers and clients have a right to know what the law is, and to order their affairs accordingly. Some cynic has said that ‘consistency is the vice of little minds.’ If we now accede to the urging of the defendant here and overrule the Truro case, we will surely have demonstrated that we are free from any such taint.”
We think the rule of stare decisis is controlling here. The legislature having accepted an interpretation of its- own intent for over 85 years it is not now appropriate for us to attribute to the statute a different meaning.
[204]*204Under Iowa law of long- standing the residence property in the case at bar is exempt from taxation.
"We repeat the hrvitation extended to the legislature in 1877 and paraphrase what was then said by saying, if it be the legislative will that this class of property be subject to taxation that will can easily be expressed in appropriate legislation.
The case is reversed and remanded to the district court for the entry of a decree in accordance herewith. — Reversed.
Garfield, C. J., and Peterson, Thornton and Stuart, JJ„ concur.
Thompson, Hays, Larson and Moore, JJ., dissent.