David A. Vaudt and Jeanie K. Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: March 8, 2024
• Docket: 23-0482
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 23–0482

Submitted December 14, 2023—Filed March 8, 2024

DAVID A. VAUDT and JEANIE K. VAUDT,

Appellants,

vs.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Appellee,

and

FREDESVINDO ENAMORADO DIAZ, DENICE ENAMORADO, PREMIER CREDIT UNION, STATE OF IOWA, CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY UNIT, and DELMY BONILLA,

Defendants. __________________________________

FREDESVINDO ENAMORADO DIAZ and DENICE ENAMORADO,

Third-Party Plaintiffs,

NICHOLAS M. CECERE and BARBARA A. CECERE, as Co-Trustees of THE NICHOLAS M. CECERE REVOCABLE TRUST and THE BARBARA A. CECERE REVOCABLE TRUST,

Third-Party Defendants.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Adria Kester, Chief

Judge.

Property owners appeal dismissal of their boundary-by-acquiescence and

adverse-possession claims. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. 2

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J.,

and Waterman, Mansfield, McDermott, and May, JJ., joined. McDonald, J., filed

an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Ryan G. Koopmans (argued) of Koopmans Law Group LLC, Des Moines,

and William J. Lorenz of Moore, McKibben, Goodman & Lorenz, LLP,

Marshalltown, for appellants.

Scott A. Hall (argued) of Carney & Appleby, PLC, Des Moines, for appellee. 3

OXLEY, Justice. In what started as a boundary dispute between neighbors, David and

Jeanie Vaudt (the Vaudts) initiated action in this case by filing a petition to quiet

title against their new neighbors, Fredesvindo Enamorado Diaz and Denice

Enamorado (the Enamorados). The petition stated two causes of action:

boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. Wells Fargo—the holder of

the Enamorados’ mortgage—filed a motion to dismiss the claims as barred by

the one-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b), which

applies to actions that arise out of transfers of property by a trustee. The district

court concluded that Heer v. Thola, 613 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)

required it to agree with Wells Fargo, and it granted the motion. As explained

below, we agree with the Vaudts that Heer should be overruled.

I.

The Vaudts purchased their home in August of 1991 and have resided

there since. Twenty-three years ago, the Vaudts cultivated a landscape barrier

along the east border of their property that is marked by trees, bushes, and

mulch. In more recent years, they have hired professional services to help main-

tain the landscaping. The Enamorados purchased the neighboring property in May of 2021 and had the property surveyed in July with the intention of in-

stalling a swimming pool and a fence. When they received the survey results,

they discovered the landscaped area bordering the Vaudts’ property was en-

croaching onto theirs. Based on the results, the Enamorados disputed the land-

scaped area as beyond the true western boundary line, and the Vaudts filed their

petition to quiet title on June 27, 2022. Count I alleged a claim of boundary by

acquiescence, pursuant to Iowa Code section 650.14 (2022), and Count II

brought an action for adverse possession. 4

Relevant to this appeal, the Enamorados purchased their property through

a trustee’s deed, which was recorded on June 3, 2021. The district court

determined the Vaudts’ June 27, 2022 claims were time-barred by the one-year

statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 614.15(5)(b). See Iowa Code

§ 614.14(5)(b) (precluding claimants from bringing an adverse claim arising “by

reason of” a transfer of property held in trust against a good faith purchaser

more than one year after the date of the trustee’s deed). The district court was

sympathetic to the Vaudts’ argument that their claims arose from the conduct

of the Enamorado’s predecessors in interest—specifically their actions of

acquiescing in the landscaping as defining the boundary between the

properties—and therefore did not “arise out of” the transfer of the property via

trustee’s deed. But the court concluded it was bound by our decision in Heer v.

Thola, 613 N.W.2d 658, where we held the one-year statute of limitations applied

to a similar boundary-by-acquiescence claim.

On appeal, the Vaudts ask us to overrule Heer because its interpretation

of section 614.14(5) constitutes manifest error. Wells Fargo urges us to reaffirm

Heer, asserting that the general assembly intended to provide special protection

to property transferred from a trust. We consider the parties’ respective argu- ments.

II.

We review rulings on motions to dismiss for correction of errors at law.

Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 2020). Issues of statutory

interpretation are also reviewed for correction of errors at law. Bank of Am., N.A.

v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Iowa 2014).

The Vaudts brought two claims: one for boundary by acquiescence and

one for adverse possession. “The doctrine of acquiescence in a boundary is to be distinguished from a claim to property based upon adverse possession.” Nichols 5

v. Kirchner, 40 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 1949); see also Thompson v. Schappert,

294 N.W. 580, 582 (Iowa 1940) (reiterating that the doctrines of boundary by

acquiescence and adverse possession “are by no means the same though the

terms are not infrequently used as if synonymous”). A claim for adverse posses-

sion establishes ownership in property if the claimant can “show hostile, actual,

open, exclusive and continuous possession, under claim of right or color of title

for at least ten years.” Nichols, 40 N.W.2d at 16. Boundary by acquiescence “is

the mutual recognition by two adjoining landowners for ten years or more that a

line, definitely marked by fence or in some manner, is the dividing line between

them.” Sille v. Shaffer, 297 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1980); see also Iowa Code

§ 650.14 (“If it is found that the boundaries and corners alleged to have been

recognized and acquiesced in for ten years have been so recognized and acqui-

esced in, such recognized boundaries and corners shall be permanently estab-

lished.”). “The object of these [boundary dispute] proceedings is to establish cor-

ners and lines, and not the title or right of possession of adverse claimants.”

Cuthbertson v. Locke, 30 N.W. 13, 14 (Iowa 1886) (rejecting a statute of limita-

tions defense to a boundary-by-acquiescence claim).

The district court correctly identified Heer, 613 N.W.2d 658, as the con- trolling law in this case, and we begin our analysis by discussing that decision.

In Heer, a landowner sold two acres of his property to his daughter, Mary Heer,

and transferred his own homestead into a revocable trust, presumably for estate

planning purposes. Id. at 659. They placed, and later removed, a fence in the

area of the boundary between the two properties. Id. After the landowner died,

Heer, the trustee of her father’s revocable trust, sold the homestead to Robert

Thola. Id. Two years later, Thola learned the purported boundary was off by

twenty-two feet compared to a survey of the property. Id. at 659–60. Heer brought a claim to establish the boundary line based on acquiescence, which the district 6

court granted. Id. On appeal, Thola argued that the claim was time-barred by

the one-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 614.15(5)(b). Id. While

the Heers acknowledged that over a year had elapsed since the property’s trans-

fer by trustee’s deed, they argued that section 614.14(5) did not apply because

their claim did not “arise by reason of a transfer” by a trustee. Id.

Based on its interpretation of the statutory language, the Heer court re-

jected the plaintiff’s argument and concluded that their claim was time-barred

by section 614.14(5). The court reasoned: “If it had not been for the trustee’s

deed, this case would never have arisen. We hold the Heers’ claim ‘ar[ose] . . . by

reason of’ the trustee’s deed and was therefore barred at the time they filed their

claim.” Id. (alteration and omission in original). The dissent in Heer concluded

that section 614.14(5)(b) did not apply because the plaintiff’s claim arose not by

reason of the trustee’s deed but “by conduct and consent of two adjoining prop-

erty owners or their predecessors in interest.” Id. at 663 (Cady, J., dissenting).

The dissent asserted that the majority’s holding was “contrary to the basic oper-

ation of a statute of limitations” because its analysis ignored the legal connection

imposed by the phrase “arising . . . by reason of” and erroneously applied the

statute to any claims that could be factually traced in a “but for” sense to a trustee’s deed. Id.

The Vaudts do not dispute that their boundary-by-acquiescence claim is

controlled by Heer. Rather, the Vaudts ask us to overrule Heer as contrary to the

plain language of Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b). We do not take that request

lightly. Stare decisis is a “venerable doctrine” that requires “the highest possible

showing that a precedent should be overruled before taking such a step.” McElroy

v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d

164, 180 n. 1 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)); see also State v. 7

Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Iowa 2008) (“The doctrine of stare decisis coun-

sels caution before we overturn prior precedent of this court.”). That said, “[s]tare

decisis does not prevent the court from reconsidering, repairing, correcting or

abandoning past judicial announcements when error is manifest, including error

in the interpretation of statutory enactments.” McElroy, 703 N.W.2d at 395 (quot-

ing Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)). We there-

fore begin by determining whether Heer erroneously interpreted section

614.14(5)(b).

“[O]ur starting point in statutory interpretation is to determine if the lan-

guage has a plain and clear meaning within the context of the circumstances

presented by the dispute.” McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010).

“When the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not

search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute . . . .” State v. Iowa

Dist. Ct., 902 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d

60, 62 (Iowa 1999)). In construing statutory language, “we look to the language

chosen by the legislature and not what the legislature might have said.” Ramirez-

Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 878 N.W.2d 759, 770 (Iowa 2016). “In determining

the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue, we take into consideration the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same statute

and other provisions of related statutes.” In re Est. of Franken, 944 N.W.2d 853,

859 (Iowa 2020). “If the statute is unambiguous, we do not search for meaning

beyond the statute’s express terms.” State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Iowa

2018). In applying these principles of law, we conclude that Heer incorrectly in-

terpreted the language “by reason of” in section 614.14(5)(b) and erroneously

applied the one-year statute of limitations to a boundary-by-acquiescence claim.

Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b) provides a one-year statute of limitations for certain actions involving claims involving real estate when the property is 8

held by a trust and subsequently transferred by the trustee to a third party.

Specifically, it provides:

An action based upon an adverse claim arising on or after Janu- ary 1, 2009, by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee, or a purported trustee, shall not be maintained either at law or in equity, in any court to recover or establish any interest in or claim to such real estate, legal or equitable, against the holder of the record title to the real estate, legal or equitable, more than one year after the date of recording of the instrument from which such claim may arise.

Iowa Code § 614.14(5)(b). The statute is directed at “action[s] based upon an

adverse claim arising on or after January 1, 2009, by reason of a transfer of an

interest in real estate by a trustee.” Id. The statute defines “adverse claims” to

include “a claim that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an inter-

est in the real estate.” Id. § 614.14(3). While the Vaudts’ claims might fit within

this definition of an adverse claim to the extent they claim an interest in the

Enamorados’ property, section 614.14(5) does not broadly apply to all adverse

claims. The first sentence of the provision adds a qualifier: it applies only to those

“adverse claim[s] arising on or after January 1, 2009, by reason of a transfer” of

the real estate by the trustee. Id. § 614.14(5)(b). The last sentence of the provision

reinforces this qualifier by tying the one-year limitation period to “the date of recording of the instrument from which such claim may arise.” Id. (emphasis

added). This last sentence makes clear that the claim must arise from the in-

strument, i.e., the trustee’s deed, the recording of which triggers the one-year

limitation period. See Ramirez-Trujillo, 878 N.W.2d at 770 (explaining that a stat-

ute must be assessed in “in its entirety rather than isolated words or phrases to

ensure our interpretation is harmonious with the statute as a whole”).

In Heer, the court rejected the Heers’ argument—that their claim arose from Thola’s and his predecessor’s prior actions of acquiescing in the boundary, 9

not from the trustee’s transfer of the deed—based on its understanding that es-

tablishing a boundary by acquiescence is not self-executing, such that “judicial

intervention is a requirement for establishing title by acquiescence.” 613 N.W.2d

at 661 (majority opinion). This statement reveals two fundamental flaws that

distorted the court’s reasoning. First, there is no such thing as “title by acquies-

cence.” Rather, the doctrine is “boundary by acquiescence,” and it merely estab-

lishes the boundary between two adjoining parcels; it does not disturb title to

property as the Heer court suggested. See Cuthbertson, 30 N.W. at 14 (“The ob-

ject of these [boundary dispute] proceedings is to establish corners and lines,

and not the title or right of possession of adverse claimants.”). Second, the court’s

focus on the need for judicial intervention led it to reason that but for the trus-

tee’s deed, “this case would never have arisen.” Heer, 613 N.W.2d at 662 (em-

phasis added). But that’s not the causal connection required by section 614.14.

By identifying a “claim arising . . . by reason of a transfer of an interest in real

estate by a trustee,” the statute requires a connection between the claim and the

trustee’s transfer, not merely between the “case” and the trustee’s transfer, as

the Heer court found. Cf. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571, 582–83

(Iowa 2004) (recognizing that “the phrase ‘arising out of’ in the context of [under- insured motorist] provisions of an insurance policy . . . requires something less

than the traditional concept of ‘proximate cause’ . . . [but] something more than

the mere fact that the vehicle was the situs of the injury”). The Heers’ boundary-

by-acquiescence claim arose in 1983, ten years after the relevant parties had

acquiesced in the boundary line for a period of ten years. See Heer, 613 N.W.2d

at 661 (explaining the timing); see also Iowa Code § 650.14 (establishing the

requirements for proving a boundary-by-acquiescence claim). Whether or not the

Heers had sought to enforce the claim, that claim could not have “aris[en] . . . by 10

reason of a [trustee’s] transfer” by warranty deed in 1994 because it already ex-

isted. Rather, section 614.14 is more narrowly focused on claims specifically

arising “by reason of” the trustee’s transfer, such as claims concerning the trus-

tee’s affidavit, their authority to transfer, or homestead rights triggered when a

homestead is conveyed.

The Heer court’s interpretation is also contrary to the basic operation of a

statute of limitations where it bars a cause of action based on acts, i.e., the filing

of a trustee’s deed, that did not give rise to the legal elements of the claim. See

51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 75, West (database updated Feb. 2024)

[hereinafter 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions] (“The substance of a cause of

action, rather than its form, determines the appropriate statute of limitations

which applies to a particular case.”). Generally, the statute of limitations period

begins to run when a cause of action accrues. See id. § 126. “A claim ordinarily

accrues, thereby triggering the relevant limitations period, when a plaintiff has

a complete and present cause of action.” Id. § 128; see also Hallett Constr. Co. v.

Meister, 713 N.W.2d 225, 232–33 (Iowa 2006) (explaining that claim for recovery

of real property did not arise until tenant refused to vacate property after termi-

nation of tenancy because that is when the occupancy became adverse rather than permissive); K & W Elec., Inc. v. State, 712 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2006)

(“Generally, a claim accrues when ‘the wrongful act produces injury to the claim-

ant.’ ” (quoting Scott v. City of Sioux City, 432 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 1988))).

Whether or not this litigation (the “case” as identified by the Heer court)

would have occurred but for the trustee’s filing of the deed has no bearing on

determining the applicability of a statute of limitations provision. “A statute of

limitations must only apply to the particular actions it recites, and no others.”

Heer, 613 N.W.2d at 663 (Cady, J., dissenting). Therefore, even if the case would not have been brought but for the transfer of property by trustee’s deed, the 11

plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when the underlying elements of the claim oc-

curred. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d. Limitations of Actions § 126. The last sentence of

section 614.14(5)(b) gives effect to (and thereby reinforces) this causal connection

between a statute of limitations and accrual of the particular claim to which it

applies by tying the one-year limitation period to “the date of recording of the

instrument from which such claim may arise.” Iowa Code § 614.14(5)(b) (empha-

sis added). This sentence clarifies that such claims must arise from the recording

of the trustee’s deed because the recording is what triggers the one-year limita-

tion period. See MidWestOne Bank v. Heartland Co-op, 941 N.W.2d 876, 885

(Iowa 2020) (“When the statute sets forth the triggering event, ‘[t]here is no sug-

gestion or hint in [the statute’s] language that the legislature intended that we

impose a different commencement date for the limitation period . . . .’ ” (altera-

tions and omission in original) (quoting Schultze v. Landmark Hotel Corp.,

463 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Iowa 1990))). The Heer court failed to appreciate the statute

in its entirety.

As we explained, boundary by acquiescence “is the mutual recognition by

two adjoining landowners for ten years or more that a line, definitely marked by

fence or in some manner, is the dividing line between them.” Sille, 297 N.W.2d at 381; see also Petrus v. Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co., 61 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1953)

(“Acquiescence to the establishment of a boundary line must be by both adjoin-

ing landowners. It involves notice or knowledge of the claim of the other party.”).

Therefore, a boundary-by-acquiescence claim arises from the conduct and con-

sent of two adjoining property owners. That one of the adjacent properties is

subsequently transferred by a trustee’s deed simply has no relevance to the ele-

ments of the claim. In other words, there is no inherent legal connection between

the underlying cause of action and the trustee’s deed to support the Heer court’s application of section 614.14(5)(b) to a boundary-by-acquiescence claim. 12

Wells Fargo counters that section 614.14 deliberately gives preferential

treatment to trusts because their unique characteristics entitle them to special

considerations under the law. Therefore, they argue that section 614.14 is a title-

clearing statute intended to clear all adverse claims that might exist against real

property when the property is held in trust and subsequently transferred by the

trustee. We acknowledge that Iowa Code section 614.14 does provide special

rules for real estate transferred by a trust. It grants to a “bona fide purchaser

. . . for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim” all rights in

the property held by the trustee and the trust beneficiary “free of any adverse

claim” where the purchaser relies on the affidavit required to be recorded by the

trustee with the instrument of transfer. Iowa Code § 614.14(1), (2). The trustee

must state under oath that the real estate at issue was properly conveyed to the

trust and that he is the current trustee with authority to enter the transaction

at issue “free and clear of any adverse claims.” Id. § 614.14(2). The statute allows

the trustee to record the affidavit in the land records in lieu of recording the full

trust instrument establishing the trustee’s authority, which would also reveal

other information contained in the trust instrument that the trust grantor would

prefer to keep private. See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 713, 729 (2006) (discussing

privacy concerns accompanying disposition of property through a will, which

becomes public information when admitted to probate, and the use of trusts to

protect such disclosure, identifying Iowa Code § 614.14 among state statutes

allowing trustees to record affidavits without disclosing dispositive trust

provisions to the public). The statute also imposes warranties from the trustee

to the transferee related to the validity of the trust and the trustee’s transfer of

the trust’s property. Iowa Code § 614.14(4). 13

But this special treatment does not mean the statute of limitations in sub-

section (5) is a title-clearing statute barring all prior claims against the property.

Considering “the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same statute

and other provisions of related statutes,” Franken, 944 N.W.2d at 859, we note

that other provisions in the Iowa Code serve a title-clearing function. “Marketable

title statutes are ‘statutes designed to shorten the period of search required to

establish title in real estate and give effect and stability to record titles by ren-

dering them marketable and alienable—in substance to improve and render less

complicated the land transfer system.’ ” Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry,

620 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (quoting Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. City of

Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Iowa 1970)); see also Siedel v. Snider, 44 N.W.2d

687, 688 (Iowa 1950) (“The terms merchantable, mark[e]table, clear, perfect,

good, as applied to title, are generally considered as synonymous.”). Iowa has a

marketable record title act. See Iowa Code § 614.31. We have recognized that

section 614.31 “established a forty-year marketable record title: ‘Any person who

has an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or

more, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest . . .

subject only to the matters stated in section 614.32.’ ” Fencl, 620 N.W.2d at 812 (omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Iowa Code § 614.31). Once a

forty-year marketable title is established, by statute, it “operates to extinguish

any interest, ‘the existence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event or

omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title . . . ,’ subject,

however, to the matters stated in section 614.32.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code

§ 614.33). Section 614.33 expressly extinguishes claims arising from “act[s],

transaction[s], event[s] or omission[s]” that are more than forty years old, i.e.,

that predate the root of title. Id. 14

Section 614.17 is also a “marketable title act known as the ten-year act.”

Id. at 813. It bars “[a]n action based upon a claim arising or existing prior to

January 1, 1980,” asserting an interest in real property against a title holder in

possession if a statement of the claim was not filed with the county recorder by

July 1, 1992. Iowa Code § 614.17(1). Section 614.17A governs such actions filed

after July 1, 1992, and precludes “claim[s] arising more than ten years earlier or

existing for more than ten years” against a title holder in possession if the title

holder has “held chain of title for more than ten years,” id. § 614.17A(1), unless

the claimant files a statement of the claim with the county recorder “within ten

years of the date on which the claim arose or first existed,” id. § 614.17A(2).

Where section 614.33 bars all claims after forty years, section 614.17A bars all

claims against a title holder in possession of the property that are more than ten

years old unless the claimant files a statement of the claim within ten years of

its accrual. See Franken, 944 N.W.2d at 856 (“Generally speaking, ‘[section

614.17A] bars actions to recover or establish interests in or claims to real estate

in two situations: if the claim arose more than ten years previously, or if a ten-

year extension period expired without the claimant filing a statement triggering

an additional ten-year extension.’ ” (quoting In re Est. of Hord, 836 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2013))).

In contrast to these title-clearing provisions, the claims to which the stat-

ute of limitations in section 614.14(5)(b) applies are more limited. Rather than

applying broadly to “actions . . . to recover or establish any interest in or claim

to such real estate,” Iowa Code § 614.17A(1); see also id. § 614.17(1), section

614.14(5) applies to “[a]n action based upon an adverse claim arising on or after

January 1, 2009, by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee.”

(Emphasis added.) Sections 614.33 and 614.17A are triggered by the mere pas- sage of time since the claim accrued, not “by reason of” a specific transaction 15

like the transfer by the trustee identified in section 614.14. This comparison to

other title-clearing statutes reveals the import of the statutory language “arising

. . . by reason of a transfer” by the trustee. These statutes also reveal that the

legislature knew how to draft the statute to bar any claim brought after a period

of time, had that been its intent. Cf. Farmers Coop. Co. v. DeCoster, 528 N.W.2d

536, 538–39 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam) (holding that when a statute with respect

to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a

similar statute tends to show a different intent existed).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Heer erroneously interpreted

the plain language of section 614.14(5)(b) to improperly eliminate certain

boundary-by-acquiescence claims using reasoning that distorts the

acquiescence doctrine. Our court is unanimous on this point, and the partial

dissent resists solely on stare decisis grounds, suggesting we limit Heer’s

application to boundary-by-acquiescence claims and allow only the Vaudts’

adverse-possession claim to proceed. The distinction between claims for adverse

possession and boundary by acquiescence is murky enough, see, e.g., 11 C.J.S.

Boundaries § 144, West (database updated Aug. 2023) (describing boundary by

acquiescence as “conceptually similar” but “mutually exclusive of adverse possession”); Lynn Foster & J. Cliff McKinney, II, Adverse Possession and

Boundary by Acquiescence in Arkansas: Some Suggestions for Reform, 33 U. Ark.

Little Rock L. Rev. 199, 200 (2011) (“Is boundary by acquiescence a sort of

‘adverse possession light,’ serving as a substitute for parties who cannot prove

adverse possession of contiguous property?”), and we see no need to further

muddy the waters and limit the Vaudts’ potential remedies by perpetuating

Heer’s errors. Heer is overruled to the extent it held the statute of limitations in

section 614.14(5)(b) applies to claims like the Vaudts’, which arose from events unrelated to the neighboring property’s transfer by trustee’s deed. 16

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the

Vaudts’ claims and remand for further proceedings.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. All justices concur except McDonald, J., who files an opinion concurring

in part and dissenting in part. 17

#23–0482, Vaudt v. Wells Fargo

MCDONALD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I take no issue with the court’s conclusion that Heer v. Thola, 613 N.W.2d

658 (Iowa 2000) (en banc), is erroneous, but the mere fact that a statutory

precedent is erroneous is not a sufficient ground to overrule the precedent. “Stare

decisis alone dictates continued adherence to our precedent absent a compelling

reason to change the law.” Book v. Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d

576, 594 (Iowa 2015). A compelling reason “require[s] the highest possible

showing that a precedent should be overruled.” Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp.,

913 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Iowa 2018) (quoting McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385,

394 (Iowa 2005)). That showing has not been made in this case. I would decide

this case based on precedent and affirm Heer’s holding that section 614.14(5)(b)

bars the plaintiffs’ boundary-by-acquiescence action.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere means “to stand by the thing decided

and not disturb the calm.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1411 (2020)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). In Iowa, the doctrine of stare decisis is

controlling substantive law and not just a policy preference, rule of thumb, or

best practice. Other than constitutional cases, see Garrison v. New Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67, 83 (Iowa 2022) (stating “[s]tare decisis has limited

application in constitutional matters” (alteration in original) (quoting Goodwin v.

Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 649 (Iowa 2019) (McDonald, J., concurring

specially))), the law of stare decisis holds that courts must follow controlling

precedents and not that courts should follow or may follow controlling

precedents. See Trinity Lutheran Church v. Browner, 121 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa

1963) (“The rule of stare decisis has its basis in something stronger than the

thought that the courts should follow hide-bound precedent . . . .”). The law of stare decisis holds that “when the courts have fully and fairly considered a 18

proposition and have decided it, only the most pressing reasons should require,

or in fact even permit, an opposite holding.” Id.

Stare decisis as law—as a rule of decision in nonconstitutional cases—has

been the law of this state since its founding. In one of its earliest decisions, this

court concluded it would adhere to the precedents of the territorial supreme

court on “questions growing out of the statute.” Doolittle v. Shelton, 1 Greene

272, 273–74 (Iowa 1848). Since the Doolittle v. Shelton decision in 1848, this

court has repeatedly held that stare decisis requires adherence to precedent.

See, e.g., State v. Flores, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 293936, at *5 (Iowa

Jan. 26, 2024) (“Stare decisis alone dictates continued adherence to our

precedent . . . .” (quoting Book, 860 N.W.2d at 594)); Est. of Farrell v. State,

974 N.W.2d 132, 137 (Iowa 2022) (stating stare decisis requires adherence to

precedent); McTaggart & Sons v. White, 136 N.W.2d 296, 296 (Iowa 1965) (“The

rule of stare decisis, et non quieta movere, requires an affirmance.”);

Rockafellor v. Gray, 191 N.W. 107, 110 (Iowa 1922) (“Just what would be our

ruling on this question, if it were one of first impression, we do not need to

determine. We regard the question as settled by our previous decisions, and are

bound by the rule of stare decisis.”); Waterhouse v. Johnson, 189 N.W. 669, 670 (Iowa 1922) (“Whether our previous decisions are strictly correct in principle is

fairly debatable. The writer hereof is quite skeptical thereon. But we are

foreclosed from reopening that question.”); Goodnow v. Wells, 38 N.W. 172, 173

(Iowa 1888) (per curiam) (“There are members of the court who think the cited

case was incorrectly decided, but under the well-settled rule of stare decisis they

think we must adhere thereto . . . .”).

It is important to understand that the rule of stare decisis applies largely

without regard to the content or soundness of the original decision. Stare decisis commands that this court follow controlling precedent not because it is correct 19

but because it is the considered judgment of our predecessors. It is a rule of

authority and not reason. It is the provenance of the decision and not its merit

that requires us to follow it. See Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and

Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 121, 123–24 (2018). It is the

law of precedent—the constraining function of precedent on future

decision-makers—that allows the opinions of judges to “be called law rather than

will, rules rather than results.” In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 484

(Iowa 1995) (en banc) (Ternus, J., dissenting) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook,

Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422, 422 (1988)).

The law of stare decisis thus sometimes requires this court to adhere to

precedent that is erroneous or suboptimal. See, e.g., Grosvenor v. Henry, 27 Iowa

269, 272 (1869) (“And, whatever doubts some of the judges may entertain as to

that case, they deem this a proper case for the application of the maxim

stare decisis.”); Davison & True v. Davenport Gas-Light & Coke Co., 24 Iowa 419,

424 (1868) (“[A]nd although the court, as now constituted, might not be entirely

agreed, were the question now presented for the first time, yet since it has been

heretofore decided, we are content to obey the doctrine of stare decisis.”). That is

a natural consequence of the rule of stare decisis. As a rule of decision, stare decisis does work only when a later court thinks a precedent was wrongly

decided. See State v. Sewell, 960 N.W.2d 640, 651 (Iowa 2021) (Appel, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Stare decisis, of course, is not at

work unless you believe that the underlying decision was wrongly decided.”). If

this court now thinks a precedent was rightly decided, stare decisis is

unnecessary to justify following the precedent. See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC,

576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (“Indeed, stare decisis has consequence only to the

extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up.”). The consequence of stare decisis, properly 20

understood, is its power to ensconce incorrect or suboptimal decisions as law.

The doctrine “reflects ‘a policy judgment that “in most matters it is more

important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled

right.” ’ ” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, (1997) (quoting Agostini v. Felton,

521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)); see Clark v. Hyman, 7 N.W. 386, 389 (Iowa 1880) (“It

is even of more ‘importance that a rule should be fixed and stable, than that it

should be strictly just.’ ”).

There are exceptions to the otherwise ironclad law of stare decisis. See

Youngblut v. Youngblut, 945 N.W.2d 25, 43–45 (Iowa 2020) (discussing the law

of stare decisis and its exceptions). These exceptions can be thought of as the

law of overruling. One of those exceptions permits a court to overrule a decision

where the decision was not only wrong but egregiously wrong. Over the years,

this court has articulated this threshold standard of wrongness in a variety of

ways. This court can overrule a decision where “error is manifest.” Garrison,

977 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting McElroy, 703 N.W.2d at 395). The challenged decision

can be overruled only where “palpably wrong.” Cover v. Craemer, 137 N.W.2d

595, 599 (Iowa 1965); Lemp v. Hastings, 4 Greene 448, 450 (Iowa 1854).

Or “palpably erroneous.” State v. Machovec, 17 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa 1945). Or “clearly erroneous.” State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d at 859 (Iowa 2017).

Or “demonstrably erroneous.” Garrison, 977 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Goodwin v.

Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 649 (Iowa 2019) (McDonald, J., concurring

specially)).

However articulated, the threshold showing of wrongness that permits this

court to overrule a prior decision must be more than mere disagreement with the

prior case. See Johnston v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 958 N.W.2d 180, 185–86 (Iowa

2021). Mere disagreement “is not the type of ‘manifest’ error or ‘compelling reason’ that supports overruling our precedent.” Id. at 186 (quoting Bd. of Water 21

Works Trs. v. Sac Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890 N.W.2d 50, 61–62 (Iowa 2017)).

This court does not overturn cases “merely because we might have come to a

different conclusion.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Iowa 2014)

(quoting State v. Bruce, 795 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011)). “Revisiting settled

precedent whenever four justices of this court find prior cases ‘unpersuasive’

leads to serious and troubling repercussions. Too many long-settled rules are

put back into play. This subverts the goals served by the doctrine of

stare decisis.” State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 515 (Iowa 2014) (Waterman, J.,

dissenting).

Under the law of stare decisis, for this court to overrule a statutory

precedent, the challenged decision must be outside the range of legal discretion

afforded to the prior decision-makers. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and

Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4–8 (2001). Stated

differently, this court can overrule a statutory precedent only where the prior

decision amounted to an abuse of the prior court’s interpretive discretion given

the relevant legal materials and rules. See id. at 5. This threshold showing of

wrongness is closely analogous to the standard of review this court applies to

review of an agency’s interpretation of law where the agency was vested with interpretive authority. When an “agency has been clearly vested with the

authority to interpret a statute, then a court may only disturb the interpretation

if it is ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.’ ” Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr.,

813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Iowa Code

§ 17A.19(10)(l) (2007)). The constitution vests this court with the authority to

interpret statutes. Why should the current members of this court treat the

considered decisions of their predecessors with less deference than an agency

decision? The law of stare decisis says that we should not. 22

Even when the prior decision is sufficiently wrong to permit overruling, the

law of stare decisis demands that this court consider countervailing reasons to

nonetheless adhere to the precedent. The law of stare decisis requires there be

“special justification[]” to overrule an erroneous decision. Burnett v. Smith,

990 N.W.2d 289, 308 (Iowa 2023) (Christensen, C.J., concurring) (explaining

there must be “special justifications beyond the belief that [precedents] were

wrongly decided to warrant overruling them”); Short, 851 N.W.2d at 515–16

(Waterman, J., dissenting). Over the years, this court has articulated the

standard in different ways. There must be “compelling reason[s].” Book,

860 N.W.2d at 594. Or “cogent reasons.” State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 854

(Iowa 2019) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 180 (Iowa 2004)

(Cady, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc.,

880 N.W.2d 699, 708 & n.3 (Iowa 2016)). Or “the most cogent circumstances.”

Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013). Or “only

the most pressing reasons.” Trinity Lutheran, 121 N.W.2d at 135 (quoting Swan

Lake Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Consol. Sch. Dist. of Dolliver, 58 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa

1953)). Or where there is a “great and imperious necessity.” Remey v. Iowa Cent.

Ry., 89 N.W. 218, 227 (Iowa 1902). However articulated, the standard imposes upon this court a high threshold for overruling a statutory decision even when

the decision was outside the range of legal discretion.

Even assuming Heer was manifestly erroneous, palpably erroneous,

demonstrably erroneous, clearly erroneous, etc., I cannot conclude that Heer is

one of the rare statutory precedents that should be overruled. In reaching that

conclusion, I first note it is irrelevant that Heer was issued by a divided court. A

decision of a divided court must be followed as controlling law:

The only door of argument open to the appellant is to seek the overruling of the opinion in the [prior case]. The fact that the 23

decision was close and doubtful is urged by the appellant as a reason for its overruling. Such reason is not adequate. We were under the same duty of original decision whether the case were close and doubtful or otherwise. There are strong practical reasons why we should not be swift or willing to overrule a decision which has been arrived at after full consideration and without inadvertence or misunderstanding. As a precedent it has become a practical verity; and no less such because it is doubtful, or deemed so. It became at once a beacon to trial judges and a rule for the decision of other cases. To treat a question thus settled as still open is to convert the beacon into a will-o’-the-wisp and to destroy, quite, the force and effect of the law of precedent as a guide to the rights of litigants. And this is no less true even though the decision shall have been rendered by a divided court. Divided opinion in arriving at a decision is not uncommon or inappropriate. But after decision the court ceases to be divided thereon and becomes unanimously obedient to the precedent. If the judicial rule were otherwise it would subject all precedents to a rediscussion and reconsideration with every change in the personnel of the court. Such a course would be quite intolerable.

Goodman v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 255 N.W. 667, 668 (Iowa 1934). The idea

that a split opinion “is more readily assailable than a unanimous opinion . . . is

untenable.” State v. Grattan, 256 N.W. 273, 273–74 (Iowa 1934). “It is highly

essential to the public weal that judgment be stable. It is just as essential that

judicial precedents be stable. One cannot obtain without the other. The fact that

the decision . . . was reached by a less number of judges than the whole does not of itself furnish any reason whatever for repudiating it.” Id.

Beyond that, there are several countervailing considerations that lead me

to conclude Heer should not be overruled. The doctrine of legislative

acquiescence counsels against overruling Heer. “[W]e presume the legislature is

aware of our cases that interpret its statutes.” Earley v. Bd. of Adjustment,

955 N.W.2d 812, 819 (Iowa, 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. New

London Cmty. Sch. Dist., 848 N.W.2d 347, 355 (Iowa 2014)). “When many years

pass following such a case without a legislative response, we assume the legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation.” Id. (quoting New London, 848 24

N.W.2d at 355). Once enough time has passed, “the power to change the law as

interpreted . . . [is] one to be exercised solely by the legislature.” In re Vajgrt,

801 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Soward,

650 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Iowa 2002)).

Heer was decided twenty-four years ago, and the legislature has not

signaled any disagreement with the decision. In similar circumstances, we have

concluded that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence required affirmance of an

unchallenged precedent. In Cunningham v. Welde, a precedent announcing a

“rule of property” had “passed unchallenged by the legislature” for seventeen

years. 9 N.W. 304, 304 (Iowa 1881). We adhered to the decision, explaining it

was the “most fitting occasion for the application of the salutary maxim,

stare decisis.” Id. In Gard v. Little Sioux Intercounty Drainage District, we

concluded that the passage of nine years since the challenged precedent was a

sufficient amount of time to conclude the matter was “settled by the court” and

“tacitly accepted by the legislature.” 521 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Iowa 1994). In State v.

Iowa District Court, we applied the doctrine of legislative acquiescence to uphold

a decision only eight years old. 902 N.W.2d 811, 818 (Iowa 2017). In

Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp., we affirmed a statutory precedent when “eight years ha[d] passed without a legislative response altering these sections, which we

embrace[d] as the legislature’s acquiescence to our statutory interpretation of

these Code sections.” 913 N.W.2d 235, 249.

I am aware of only one case in which this court overruled precedents

interpreting a statute after more than twenty years of legislative silence. In

State v. Davis, 944 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 2020), this court overruled

twenty-one-year-old precedents interpreting restitution statutes. Id. at 646–47.

Within days, the legislature, almost unanimously, passed a law amending the relevant statutory provisions and abrogating our overruling decision. See 2020 25

Iowa Acts ch. 1074, § 69 (codified at Iowa Code § 910.1(1), (2), (4), (7), (8), (9)

(2021)); State v. Hawk, 952 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa 2020) (explaining the

legislature changed the law “within days of Davis”). As Davis demonstrates, the

court should leave long-standing statutory precedents alone.

Related to the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is the statutory

reenactment and statutory amendment rule. The statutory reenactment rule

holds that reenactment of a statute incorporates any settled interpretations of

the statute, and the statutory amendment rule holds that amendment of a

statute without overruling the contested decision manifests assent to the court’s

interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 651

(Iowa 2021) (declining to overrule case where legislature amended statute at

issue without overruling decision); Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d at 574 (holding that

precedent should be followed where legislature reenacted statute “without

attempting to disturb the holding”); Fitzgerald v. Hale, 78 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Iowa

1956) (“Moreover, there is a rule of statutory construction that when a statute

has received a judicial construction and is substantially reenacted, such

construction may be regarded as having been adopted by the legislature.”);

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 74, West (database updated Feb. 2024) (stating that legislative acquiescence rule “may become significant . . . where the statute has

been amended, but no change has been made that affects the court’s

interpretation”).

The statutory amendment rule counsels against overruling Heer. In 2008,

the legislature amended the specific subsection at issue in this case, section

614.14(5)(b), without attempting to disturb the holding of Heer. See 2008 Iowa

Acts ch. 1119, §§ 12, 13 (codified at Iowa Code § 614.14(1), (5), (6) (2009)). In

2009, the legislature again amended section 614.14 without disturbing the holding of Heer. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 52, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 614.14(6) 26

(2011)). Stare decisis requires adherence to our prior decision where, as here,

“the general assembly has reenacted or repeatedly amended the statutory

provision in question without disturbing our previous interpretation.”

Welch v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 801 N.W.2d 590, 599–600 (Iowa 2011); see

Brewer-Strong, 913 N.W.2d at 249 (affirming prior decision where legislature

amended related statutory provisions but “declined to make any changes” to the

Code sections at issue).

A final consideration counsels against overruling Heer. Even where a

precedent may be sufficiently wrong to permit this court to overrule it, this court

generally does not do so when the precedent involves real property. In the “area

of real property,” certainty of the law “is of paramount importance.” Est. of

Cawiezell v. Coronelli, 958 N.W.2d 842, 848 (Iowa 2021); see Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their

acme in cases involving property . . . .”); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Deihl, 296

N.W. 385, 388–89 (Iowa 1941) (stating that when a case involves a “rule of

property,” “[t]he desirability of adhering to established precedent in such a

matter is apparent”). In cases involving real property and title to land, “[i]t is only

in rare instances that courts feel justified in overruling such a decision.” Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 296 N.W. at 389. “[I]f each new set of judges

consider[ed] themselves at liberty to overthrow the doctrines of their

predecessors, our system of jurisprudence . . . would be the most fickle,

uncertain, and vicious the civilized world has ever seen . . . .” Remey, 89 N.W. at

227. “[R]ules of property, which should be as steadfast as the hills, would, but

for the rule of stare decisis, become as unstable as the waves . . . .” Id. When this

court interprets a statute involving real property, “the court should continue to

enforce the rule previously adhered to, even though the judges may think it erroneous in theory . . . leaving it to the legislature alone to make the needed 27

reform.” Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv.

L. Rev. 409, 415 (1924) (footnote omitted).

This case is not one of those rare instances in which we should reverse a

case of statutory interpretation involving real property and title to land. Heer has

been settled law for almost a quarter century. The legislature has made no effort

to abrogate or in any way address the decision. To the contrary, the legislature,

fully aware of this court’s precedent, amended the exact statutory provision at

issue in Heer without addressing Heer. Because the legislature has had ample

opportunity to amend the statute and has not done so, this court should abide.

“The rule stare decisis is one of the most sacred in the law.” Clark, 7 N.W. at 389.

The law of stare decisis recognizes that the law should progress in an orderly

and principled fashion but not “over the dead bodies of slain and discarded

precedents.” Gosek v. Garmer & Stiles Co., 158 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Iowa 1968).

Thus, while I agree with the court that Heer was wrongly decided, I would not

overrule it. In my view, stare decisis requires we affirm the district court’s ruling

that the plaintiffs’ special action to establish a boundary by acquiescence is

barred by section 614.14. As the plaintiffs have requested, however, I would not

extend Heer to bar their very different adverse possession claim. I thus respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.