Trascher v. Eagle Indemnity Co. of New York

48 So. 2d 695, 1950 La. App. LEXIS 731
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 13, 1950
Docket19522
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 48 So. 2d 695 (Trascher v. Eagle Indemnity Co. of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trascher v. Eagle Indemnity Co. of New York, 48 So. 2d 695, 1950 La. App. LEXIS 731 (La. Ct. App. 1950).

Opinion

48 So.2d 695 (1950)

TRASCHER
v.
EAGLE INDEMNITY CO. OF NEW YORK et al.

No. 19522.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans.

November 13, 1950.

*696 Stanley A. Baron, New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellee.

Henry G. Neyrey, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants and appellant.

McBRIDE, Judge.

This is a suit for damages sustained by Mrs. Rose Trascher Davis, on December 6, 1947, in a collision between her automobile and the automobile of Dr. Homer D. Barber, on South Claiborne and Napoleon Avenues. Mrs. Davis, who claims the sum of $25,000.00 for personal injuries and damages to her automobile, has directed her suit against Dr. Barber and Eagle Indemnity Company of New York, his liability insurer.

After the accident, Dr. Barber moved to the State of Mississippi, and service was had upon him, as a nonresident, through the Secretary of State of Louisiana, in accordance with Act No. 86 of 1928, as amended. He was eliminated from the case when his exception to the service made upon him was maintained.

This matter was first tried below in March, 1949, and plaintiff recovered judgment against the insurer for the sum of $7,500.00, from which said defendant appealed to this court. Subsequently, it developed that the stenographer had lost the shorthand note books containing some of the testimony taken in the case, and upon joint motion of counsel for both parties, we reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for a trial de novo.

*697 The matter was retried in January, 1950, and the judge below again eliminated Dr. Barber and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $7,500.00 against the insurance company, and again said defendant has appealed. Plaintiff has timely answered the appeal, and prays that the judgment be increased to $10,000.00, which is the limit of the liability of the insurance company under its contract with Dr. Barber.

At the time of the accident, Mrs. Davis was alone in her car, and in the other car, which was being driven by Dr. Barber's wife, were four passengers, two of whom were infants. There is a sharp dispute as to exactly where the automobiles collided. Mrs. Davis testified that shortly before the accident, she had left her home on State Street to drive to a restaurant on the downtown-lake corner of South Claiborne and Napoleon Avenues. Each of the avenues is a wide thoroughfare having two lanes for vehicular traffic, separated by a neutral ground. She insisted that she came down South Claiborne, crossed Napoleon, and then, at General Pershing Street, which is one block farther down, she turned left towards the lake, and then into the uptown bound traffic lane of South Claiborne Avenue. She then proceeded up South Claiborne, with the intention of turning right into Napoleon Avenue and parking in front of the restaurant, but upon reaching the intersection of Napoleon Avenue, she stopped at the corner in obedience to the traffic light which was showing red against her, and while she was waiting for a favorable light change, her car was violently struck from its rear by the Barber automobile.

Mrs. Barber and one of her passengers testified that the Davis car was not stopped at the corner, but was parked double at the side entrance of the restaurant on South Claiborne Avenue, which is some distance from the corner, and that Mrs. Davis appeared to be waiting for someone who was inside the restaurant.

As per his written reasons for judgment, the trial judge found as a fact that the Davis automobile was stopped at the corner waiting for the light change, and from a reading of the testimony, we are convinced that this finding is correct. But, be that as it may, the point is relatively unimportant, as will be hereafter seen.

The severity of the impact between the two cars is also a disputed question. The front part of the Barber automobile was driven directly into the rear of the Davis car, and we can not believe that the blow was as slight as Mrs. Barber and her witnesses would have the court believe. Dr. Barber's automobile was towed from the scene, as it was damaged to such an extent that it could not be moved under its own power, and from the nature of the physical damage sustained by both cars, there is no question whatever in our minds that the impact was a heavy one. The Barber car was damaged to the extent of about $300.00, and the proven damages sustained by the Davis car amounted to $278.40.

As we have said, just where the Davis car was located when struck is of no moment, because, according to Mrs. Barber's own testimony, she observed it when she reached General Pershing Street, one block away, and there was ample opportunity for her to have stopped her car completely, long before reaching the Davis car. Her story is that she was travelling at a moderate rate of speed, and that upon seeing the Davis car she attempted to apply her foot brake, but it did not hold, and that when she applied the service or emergency brake, it also failed, and there was a perceptible odor of smoke.

It is strenuously argued that Mrs. Barber was not at fault, because her automobile was afflicted with a latent defect. The testimony shows that the automobile was a 1947 Mercury, which had been purchased less than three months before, and that it had been driven only between 2000 and 3000 miles. Mrs. Barber disclaims any prior knowledge of any defect in the car, and states that she had no reason to believe that any existed, and that she did not learn of the defectiveness of the brakes until just at the moment when she reached General Pershing Street and attempted to make the stop, and that the accident *698 was unavoidable. She maintains that shortly before the collision she had driven the car through the business section of the city, which necessitated frequent stops being made, and that on the occasions of those stops the brakes worked perfectly, and continued to function properly up until the time she neared the Davis car, and that it was only when she applied them at this point that they went out. The last time the brakes of the car had been inspected was in Rochester, Minnesota, in October of 1947, two months or so before the accident.

There is authority for the proposition that the driver of a motor vehicle is not responsible for latent defects in his car, where he exercises reasonable care in having the car inspected. However, for that doctrine to be a valid defense, the proof submitted must be so strong as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis with reference to the cause of the accident, except that it resulted solely from the alleged defects. Hassell v. Colletti, La.App., 12 So.2d 31.

Appellant can gain no comfort from the doctrine, as we do not think it should be applied here. Although Mrs. Barber postulates that the brakes failed because of a latent mechanical imperfection, there is no proof whatever in the record in that regard, save her unsupported statement that the brakes would not work when she called upon them. The automobile was repaired after the accident, but for some reason undisclosed to us, the mechanic who did the work was not produced as a witness, and there is no expert testimony showing that the brakes were not in working order, or that it was necessary to repair the brakes. We think the mechanic would have been the proper party to testify as to those details, because he certainly was in a superior position to have thrown light upon the whole matter.

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Bluebook (online)
48 So. 2d 695, 1950 La. App. LEXIS 731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trascher-v-eagle-indemnity-co-of-new-york-lactapp-1950.