Lawrence v. Haygood

159 So. 2d 533, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 2228
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 16, 1963
DocketNo. 6021
StatusPublished

This text of 159 So. 2d 533 (Lawrence v. Haygood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lawrence v. Haygood, 159 So. 2d 533, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 2228 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is a tort action arising out of an automobile accident which occurred in the City of Baton Rouge in the morning of October 9, 1961. As liability is now admitted, the sole question before us is that of quantum. The Trial Judge awarded the plaintiff the sum of $3,500.00 for personal injuries together with the sum of $928.83 for special damages from which judgment he has appealed.

The Trial Judge rendered written reasons for judgment, part of which read as follows:

“Plaintiff has a history of considerable pre-existing back disability and was retired from the U. S. Air Force due to his back disability. Plaintiff has had previous surgery consisting of laminectomies at various levels in the lumbar spine with excision of a disc at L-2, L-3 interspace on the right, and also at L-4, L-5. In addition, he developed osteomyelitis in L-l, L-2 in-terspace, secondary to excision of the [534]*534herniated intervertebral disc at L-2, and as a result has had a fusion of the first and second lumbar vertebrae. (Tr. 39). The first injury to plaintiff’s back was in October or November of 1944 (Tr 77). The back was later re-injured in the service. (Tr. 78). In October 1956 while hospitalized from amebiosis, plaintiff was examined and the defects of the L-2, L-3 level of the spine were discovered. Surgery was performed in February 1957 (Tr 79). Subsequently another operation was performed and then herniated disc at the L-4, L-5 Level was discovered. Upon being transferred to another hospital, the case was diagnosed as an inflamation or osteomyelitis of the spine. Plaintiff continued to have minor spasms (Tr 81). It was at this point that plaintiff visited Dr. J. Willard Dowell, orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Dowell testified that he first examined plaintiff on January 12, 1960, some 21 months prior to the accident in question. At the time plaintiff was wearing a long back brace, (Tr 29), and was complaining of a severe back pain. Dr. Dowell examined plaintiff and had x-rays taken of the lumbosacral spine. Dr. Dowell diagnosed the difficulty as resulting from tenderness over the lumbar spine (Tr 29). Dr, Dowell did not see plaintiff again until October 9, 1961, the date of the accident. During the treatment immediately following the accident, plaintiff was placed in traction, but had difficulty tolerating it. The traction was later removed. Plaintiff was placed on muscle relaxants, and given medicine for the relief of pain. He developed some gastro-intestinal symp-tims in the early part of the treatment, and was referred to Dr. C. B. Luikart, Jr., a specialist in internal medicine. Plaintiff’s back pain decreased during his hospital stay, but his progress was quite slow. Dr. Dowell testified that during plaintiff’s hospital stay from October 9 to October 29, 1961, he suffered much pain. (Tr. 31). Dr. Dowell re-examined plaintiff on May 11, 1962, a few days prior to the trial and found that he was walking at that, time rather stiffly. Examination at that time revealed that he had tenderness-over his back muscles at the lumbar level and that he had muscle spasm (Tr. 33). Dr. Dowell was unable to testify whether plaintiff’s condition had improved between the date of the first examination in January 1960, and the-date of the examination made immediately after the accident in October 1961. (Tr. 30). However, the medical opinion was to the effect that every time Dr. Dowell had examined plaintiff he was disabled (Tr. 33). Dr. Dowell! could not give a prognosis as to plaintiff’s recovery. (Tr. 33).
“Dr. Dowell testified that when he first saw plaintiff on January 12, I960, he had a ‘severe disability.’ (Tr 37).. Dr. Dowell testified that, assuming-plaintiff had been injured in the- accident, he was of the opinion that plaintiff had a ‘reinjury’ (Tr 36) ; that although he could not state to what extent he was reinjured, yet he was disabled as far as any useful activity was. concerned (Tr 37). The medical testimony did not show how much of the-present condition was due to the injury received in the accident (Tr 37), but there was testimony that the pre-exist-ing condition was ‘aggravated by this-accident’ (Tr 37). Dr. Dowell further-testified that the disability was severe in January 1960, and although he didn’t examine plaintiff again until the date of the accident, yet it was possible for plaintiff to have made a recovery from the severe disability as it was in January 1960 (Tr 38). The accident produced no fracture or dislocation-(Tr 42).
“Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Dowell on nine separate occasions after the accident. The medical testimony was to the effect that a person in the condi-[535]*535tion of plaintiff was very susceptible to injury (Tr 40). Dr. Dowell further testified that the disability in January 1960 was permanent; that his accident increased disability, but could not state whether the aggravation would be permanent or temporary (Tr 52). At the time of the trial the disability was total, and plaintiff was unable to work and carry on useful activities.
“The medical experts further testified that plaintiff would require future medical examinations and drugs indefinitely. The medical examinations will have to be made every month or two, or if the condition improved every three to six-months (Tr 48), however, even if plaintiff had not had the accident there still would have been future medical examinations, but these would have been at longer intervals than will now be required (Tr 50). Plaintiff is still under medical treatment, and continues to have pain.
“Dr. Luikart, specialist in internal medicine, testified that he had treated plaintiff on October 14, 1961 for abdominal pain caused by an acute gastritis and esophagitis (inflamation of the stomach and esophagus). This condition was casually connected with the accident occurring on October 9, 1961 and produced considerable pain. Dr. Luikart testified that although the pain was considerable when he first examined the patient, that within a day or two plaintiff responded to treatment and the pain was eased considerably.
“The plaintiff remained in the hospital from October 9 until October 28, 1961, returned home and remained in bed for a week to a week and a half, was in a wheelchair for one month, and since the accident has been wearing a brace. Plaintiff will continue to undergo pain and muscle" spasm, ánd will have to sleep on a board for an indefinite time. However, plaintiff had worn a brace be■fore the accident.
“Defendant’s counsel in their brief has very honestly and gallantly cited the case of Rachel vs. Bankers and Shippers Insurance Company, 146 So.2d 426, as follows:
“ 'We think that the plaintiff is entitled to recover for this additional medical expense and the additional pain, suffering, and discomfort to be endured by reason of the extraction of the remainder of his teeth and by reason of his being required to wear full dentures. However, in making-such award, we will take into consideration the poor condition of the plaintiff’s teeth prior to the accident.
“ '(3) A tortfeasor must take his victim as he finds him. The tort-feasor is responsible for all the natural and responsible consequences of his wrong, even though the consequences of the tort are made much more serious or harmful by reason of a pre-existing physical defect or weakness of the injured person.
“ ‘See: Shaffer v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 La. 158, 165 So. 651; Humphries v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., La.App.

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Related

Rachal v. Bankers & Shippers Insurance Company
146 So. 2d 426 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1962)
Trascher v. Eagle Indemnity Co. of New York
48 So. 2d 695 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1950)
Humphries v. Delta Fire & Casualty Company
116 So. 2d 130 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1959)
Warren v. Fidelity Mutual Insurance Company
99 So. 2d 382 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1957)
Shaffer v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.
165 So. 651 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1936)

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Bluebook (online)
159 So. 2d 533, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 2228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lawrence-v-haygood-lactapp-1963.