BATTAGLIA, Judge.
This case presents us with the question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the motion of Petitioner, Tara M. Touzeau, for continuance of a hearing to modify child custody. We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Ms. Touzeau’s motion and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Facts
Tara M. Touzeau and Scott E. Deffinbaugh are the biological parents of Victoria, born on June 27, 1994. In 1997, Ms. Touzeau and Mr. Deffinbaugh presented to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a Child Custody, Visitation, and Child Support Agreement, which was adopted by the court and afforded the two shared legal custody of Victoria, granted Ms. Touzeau primary residential custody of their daughter, and gave Mr. Deffinbaugh liberal visitation rights. The agreement also provided that a party relocating outside of the D.C./Baltimore Metropolitan area would provide the other with at least sixty days’ advance notice.
Since entering into the Agreement, Ms. Touzeau and Mr. Deffinbaugh have had numerous skirmishes in the courts. In [657]*6571999, Mr. Deffinbaugh, through counsel, moved to enforce the agreement’s terms because he alleged that Ms. Touzeau was interfering with his mid-week visits with Victoria. The parties, both represented by counsel, were able to settle the dispute out of court by agreeing to greater visitation rights for Mr. Deffinbaugh.
In 2001, Ms. Touzeau, through counsel, petitioned to reduce Mr. Deffinbaugh’s visitation schedule, and Mr. Deffinbaugh responded by requesting that he be granted residential custody of Victoria. The court subsequently ordered a custody/visitation evaluation, the report of which stated that, although Ms. Touzeau has “done much to contribute to the disputes between the parents,” and has “little insight into how she is contributing to the problems,” a change of residential custody at this point would not be in Victoria’s best interests,” and therefore recommended that the arrangement remain constant. A three-day trial ensued, at which both parties were represented by counsel, after which the judge ultimately ordered that Victoria continue to reside with Ms. Touzeau, that the two parents continue to share legal custody, and that Mr. Deffinbaugh be granted greater visitation rights.
In 2002, Mr. Deffinbaugh, pro se, filed an emergency motion to prohibit Ms. Touzeau from withdrawing Victoria from her private school in order to home school her, to which Ms. Touzeau responded, without the assistance of counsel. The court held an emergency hearing and ordered that Victoria be returned to school. Ms. Touzeau subsequently filed a motion requesting that she be granted sole legal custody of Victoria, and a hearing was held before a master on the merits of Ms. Touzeau’s motion, at which both parties represented themselves. After hearing argument by both parties, the master recommended that Ms. Touzeau’s motion be denied, and Ms. Touzeau subsequently filed exceptions on her own to the master’s recommendations. The court agreed with and adopted the master’s recommendations and ordered that Ms. Touzeau and Mr. Deffinbaugh continue to share legal custody of Victoria, that Victoria continue to live with Ms. Touzeau, [658]*658and that Mr. Deffinbaugh continue to have liberal visitation rights.
On September 1, 2004, Ms. Touzeau informed Mr. Deffinbaugh that she and Victoria would be moving from Silver Spring to Churchton, Maryland1 in two weeks, and Ms. Touzeau and Mr. Deffinbaugh agreed to meet with a court-appointed parent coordinator on September 22 to discuss Mr. Deffinbaugh’s new visitation schedule and Victoria’s schooling. During the meeting with the coordinator, Ms. Touzeau announced that she and Victoria would be moving to Churchton on October 2, and that Victoria would be attending a new school, the Cardinal Hickey Academy, beginning October 4. The two were not able to come to any agreement as to Mr. Deffinbaugh’s new visitation schedule.
On September 28, Mr. Deffinbaugh, through counsel, filed an emergency motion for modification of custody and attorney’s fees in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging that Ms. Touzeau’s divorce from her husband and relocation to Churchton constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification in the custody arrangement. In his motion, Mr. Deffinbaugh requested injunctive relief prohibiting Ms. Touzeau from relocating Victoria to Churchton, temporary primary physical custody of Victoria until a court evaluation and a hearing on his petition could be conducted, and permanent primary physical custody of Victoria. When Ms. Touzeau later moved with Victoria to Churchton, Mr. Deffinbaugh amended his motion to include a request that Ms. Touzeau be held in contempt of court for restricting his access to Victoria through the relocation. Ms. Touzeau, proceeding pro se, responded by filing a petition for an emergency order and counter-petition to modify custody requesting tie-breaking authority with respect to legal custody of Victoria to enable her to relocate Victoria to Churchton and [659]*659to enroll her in a new school. She also amended her initial petition, after she moved, to include a request that Victoria’s visitation schedule with Mr. Deffinbaugh be altered so that Victoria no longer would be required to visit with her father during the school week because of the length of the commute. An expedited scheduling conference was set for September 30, 2004, at which Mr. Deffinbaugh appeared with counsel and Ms. Touzeau appeared pro se. The judge ordered that another custody/visitation evaluation be conducted, the results of which were to be announced at a January 21, 2005 settlement conference, and set a custody modification hearing for February 8, 2005.
The parties convened before a master at the January 21 settlement conference and were presented with the results of the court-ordered Custody/Visitation Evaluation Report. The evaluator recommended that Mr. Deffinbaugh be granted both residential and legal custody of Victoria and that Ms. Touzeau be consulted on major decisions with regard to Victoria and that she be granted liberal visitation. On January 28, 2005, Ms. Touzeau filed a motion for continuance of the February 8 custody modification hearing, alleging that, in light of the court evaluator’s “unfounded recommendations,” she was attempting to obtain pro bono counsel. The motion was denied.
At the custody modification hearing, convened on February 8, 2005, Mr. Deffinbaugh appeared with counsel and Ms. Touzeau appeared pro se. Before the proceedings began, Ms. Touzeau renewed her request for a continuance, and the following dialogue ensued:
THE COURT: I’m going to hear your motion to continue, and then whatever happens with that will either be heard by someone today or whenever they get to it or—
MS. TOUZEAU: Okay. With regards to the, I’m sorry.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MS. TOUZEAU: Okay. With regards to the continuance. I filed a continuance following our pre-trial conference in light of the unwarranted findings and recommendations of the Court evaluator’s report. That was on January 21, 2004.
[660]*660The master recommended at that time, because I was pro se, that I should seek counsel in light of the findings. I filed a motion for continuance. It was opposed by plaintiff and for the fact that it was considered a delaying tactic and it was denied. However, I have taken many steps even before to try to secure pro bono representation through, I tried to go through the legal aid bureau and they said they would only be able to even evaluate it if I got a continuance, which was denied. Last Thursday I met with Stephen Cullen of Miles and Stockbridge, he’s a partner and the director of pro bono services for Miles and Stockbridge and he is willing to represent me on a pro bono basis, but was unable to file a line of appearance because he already had another commitment at today’s hearing date. I have an affidavit from Mr. Cullen.[2] May I approach?
THE COURT: I don’t need that.
MS. TOUZEAU: You don’t?
THE COURT: No. Go ahead.
MS. TOUZEAU: So I would like to request a continuance in light of the fact that this is a serious nature regarding my daughter, so that I may be able to proceed with counsel.
THE COURT: All right. What I’d like to do is to decide the continuance issue first and then we’ll see where we go [661]*661after that, but I definitely want to figure out whether it’s going to be heard today or not. All right. Anything else on your motion to continue?
MS. TOUZEAU: No.
Mr. Deffinbaugh responded that he was opposed to a continuance because of the urgency of the matter and argued that Ms. Touzeau had ample time to obtain counsel and that the request was nothing more than a delay tactic. Ms. Touzeau responded:
MS. TOUZEAU: Okay. I think it needs to be also pointed out to the Court that at the pre-trial conference, which was January 21st, is the first time we were even orally presented with the recommendations and findings. They vastly differed from the Court evaluator’s report that had been done just a few years previous. And, in addition to that, I only received from the Court evaluator the full report five business days ago. And it is very clear from that report that Victoria’s wishes are being considered.
But, as you know, the Court evaluator’s report is not non-party and not non-adversarial and she has not been appointed a Guardian Ad Litem, which should have been and is appropriate at this point, considering the fact that they are taking into consideration her views.
Additionally, and more importantly, the recommendations of the Court evaluator are highly, are gathered from just hearsay and double hearsay and triple hearsay and her findings are unwarranted and have no factual basis. So it’s very important for my daughter’s best interest for us to continue this so I can proceed with representation in order, because of this obstacle that has been unjustly thrown into the mix of things five business days ago. This isn’t a scrambling tactic, Your Honor, this is a valid request based on the circumstances of the findings of the report that are unwarranted. And in the best interest of my daughter and considering that no Guardian Ad Litem has been appointed for her, I think that that’s necessary and another reason why this should be continued.
[662]*662* * *
THE COURT: [Counsel for Mr. Deffinbaugh’s] point, Ms. Touzeau, is that since September you’ve known that this was at issue and you could have sought counsel whether retained with money or a pro bono attorney, you had that much time.
MS. TOUZEAU: I understand that, and in terms of with money, I’m not in a financial position to pay for counsel. I still have legal debt from the time we were in a three-day trial, two hearings ago.
THE COURT: But you had that situation beginning in September.
MS. TOUZEAU: I understand that. And I was actually, I’ve gone through Montgomery County. I was speaking to Legal Aide Bureau before we actually heard, before we actually came to the, it was actually on the 21st is when we were here getting the oral recommendations, the summary and I had already been in contact with them.
But, as you know, it is very difficult, most particularly in custody cases, to secure pro bono representation. And it was only by a Godsend that last Thursday I found Stephen Cullen who is partner and the director of pro bono services at Miles and Stockbridge, who was willing to come in. But he was already committed today and I have an affidavit from him saying where he is, saying he is willing to represent me on a pro bono basis.
The trial judge subsequently denied Ms. Touzeau’s request for a continuance, stating:
THE COURT: It seems to me that Ms. Touzeau had plenty of time as this case was pending to seek and be able to find someone perhaps to represent her in this. It’s a crisis that I think unfortunately has been generated by Ms. Touzeau waiting until the very last to seek counsel.
So the Court’s ruling on the renewed oral motion to continue is denied.
The custody modification hearing proceeded with Ms. Touzeau representing herself. She called various witnesses: the pas[663]*663tor of her church, who also founded the Cardinal Hickey Academy, who testified to Victoria’s acclimation to the Academy and to Ms. Touzeau’s relationship with both her own family and with Victoria; Ms. Touzeau’s mother and her aunt, both of whom testified to Ms. Touzeau’s and Victoria’s family life and mother-daughter relationship. Ms. Touzeau also testified on her own behalf regarding her maternal abilities and the fact that Churchton was located within the Washington/Baltimore metropolitan area; cross-examined each of Mr. Deffinbaugh’s two witnesses, Mr. Deffinbaugh and his wife, and introduced ten exhibits into evidence comprised of a copy of the Cardinal Hickey Academy’s philosophy and mission statement; the report of the court-ordered custody/visitation evaluation conducted in 2001; the transcript of the 2002 hearing before the master; the separation agreement between Ms. Touzeau and her husband; a host of e-mails between Ms. Touzeau and Mr. Deffinbaugh regarding Victoria’s visitation schedule; driving directions from Mapquest from Ms. Touzeau’s former residence in Silver Spring to her new residence in Churchton, from Mr. Deffinbaugh’s residence to Ms. Touzeau’s previous residence in Silver Spring, and from Mr. Deffinbaugh’s residence to Ms. Touzeau’s new residence in Churchton; a computer printout from a website, e.Podunk.com, listing Churchton as within the Baltimore metropolitan area, and Victoria’s report card from her new school.
After Ms. Touzeau and counsel for Mr. Deffinbaugh gave their closing arguments, the trial judge iterated that:
One of the comments, one of the paragraphs that’s been read and re-read, is the one in the December 20, 2001 evaluation which is [Ms. Touzeau’s] Exhibit 2 on page 10. The full paragraph states ‘Mrs. Touzeau does not seem to understand that Victoria needs her father to be involved in her life on his own terms, not just when she finds it convenient or acceptable. The parties appropriately have joint custody, yet she had numerous times made decisions unilaterally which are debatable as to whether they were in Victoria’s best interest. She has little insight into how she is contributing to the problems and she seems to have [664]*664difficulty accepting that she cannot control what goes on when Victoria is with her father. Her propensity to become upset has been very upsetting to the child who desperately wants to please her and her father both. Her decision to stop Victoria’s counseling with the school counselor, even temporarily, is a concern.’
* * *
In reading that paragraph and listening to the testimony that I have heard today and what has transpired since that time, I do not believe that there has been any change in that opinion or that conclusion.
4: * *
Having taken into account the best interest of Victoria and, frankly, this is a reluctant decision because I do think that there are a number of positive things about Ms. Touzeau and the efforts that she has taken on behalf of her daughter, but I cannot ignore what I believe is a pattern of behavior of eliminating her father, Victoria’s father from Victoria’s life in her efforts to control Victoria regardless of what Mr. Deffinbaugh believes or perceives as being the correct approach, totally disregarding any input by Mr. Deffinbaugh and particularly the cessation of counseling after it had been court ordered, after it had been recommended in 2001.
Mr. Deffinbaugh was awarded both residential and legal custody of Victoria, and Ms. Touzeau was granted liberal visitation rights.
Ms. Touzeau, through the same pro bono counsel who was unable to attend the hearing, noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unpublished opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial judge’s denial of both Ms. Touzeau’s pretrial motion for a postponement and her renewal of that motion on the day of the hearing. The court based its holding on the fact that, despite having had four months to prepare for the custody modification hearing, [665]*665Ms. Touzeau waited until the last moment to Tile a motion for a postponement, having filed the motion only eleven days before the scheduled trial date. The Court of Special Appeals also concluded that the fact that the parties were not presented with the results of the custody/visitation evaluation until two weeks before the hearing did not require that a continuance be granted because they had been informed at the September scheduling conference that the results would be available to them in January. The court also determined that the trial judge correctly denied Ms. Touzeau’s request lor a continuance because of the policy established by the Administrative Order of the Court of Appeals for Continuances,3 instructing that counsel should not expect continuances of proceedings in cases in which counsel accepted employment after having already scheduled a proceeding on the same date in another case.4
[666]*666We granted Ms. Touzeau’s petition for writ of certiorari to address the following issue:
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Touzeau’s request for a continuance of a contested hearing so that she could be represented by counsel.
Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 391 Md. 114, 892 A.2d 477 (2006).
Discussion
Ms. Touzeau contends that, because the hearing to modify custody implicated her fundamental right to parent, she had a due process right under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be represented by counsel at the hearing, which was abrogated by the denial of her motion for continuance. Ms. Touzeau also argues that, in light of that fundamental right, and the fact that she was surprised by the adverse findings of the custody/visitation evaluation, of which she was informed only two weeks prior to the hearing to modify custody, “justice required” under Maryland Rule 2-508(a) that the trial judge grant her continuance to enable her to obtain pro bono counsel. Moreover, she maintains that she had made a concerted effort to obtain counsel, as evidenced by the affidavit she attempted to move into evidence at the hearing, and that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to consider her affidavit. Further, Ms. Touzeau asserts that because she was utilizing pro bono representation the trial judge should have been more lenient in his decision of whether to grant her continuance. She alleges that the record clearly demonstrates that she was unable to effectively represent herself and therefore counsel was needed to protect her custodial rights.
Conversely, Mr. Deffinbaugh posits that Ms. Touzeau has no constitutional right to counsel in a contested custody case and, therefore the trial judge was not required to grant her motion. Mr. Deffinbaugh also claims that, based upon Ms. Touzeau’s level of education, experience in the court system, and the urgency of the matter to be addressed at the hearing, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Ms. [667]*667Touzeau’s motion. Mr. Deffinbaugh argues that Ms. Touzeau’s requested continuance completely ignores the prejudice that a delay would have caused to himself and Victoria, and that such prejudice required that the request for a continuance be denied. He asserts that, under Maryland Rule 2-508, the decision to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is uniquely situated to evaluate the facts and make an informed determination of whether justice requires the continuance, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in this case.
Maryland Rule 2-508 governs requests for continuances and states in pertinent part:
(a) Generally. On motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may continue a trial or other proceeding as justice may require.5
[669]*669We have not specified what the phrase “as justice may require” means, but have said that the decision to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Absent an abuse of that discretion we historically have not disturbed the decision to deny a motion for continuance. Greenstein v. Meister, 279 Md. 275, 294, 368 A.2d 451, 462 (1977); Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15, 28, 320 A.2d 266, 273 (1974); Butkus v. McClendon, 259 Md. 170, 173, 269 A.2d 427, 428 (1970). We have defined abuse of discretion as “discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Jenkins v. City of College Park, 379 Md. 142, 165, 840 A.2d 139, 153 (2003) (emphasis not included). See also Garg v. Garg, 393 Md. 225, 238, 900 A.2d 739, 746 (2006) (“‘The abuse of discretion standard requires a trial judge to use his or her discretion soundly and the record must reflect the exercise of that discretion. Abuse occurs when a trial judge exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when he or she acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.’ ”) quoting Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96, 825 A.2d 1008, 1015 (2003); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312, 701 A.2d 110, 118-19 (1997) (“There is an abuse of discretion ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court,’ or when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’ An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,’ or when the ruling is ‘violative of fact and logic.’ ”) (citations omitted).
We have found that it would be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to deny a continuance when the continuance was mandated by law, see Mead v. Tydings, 133 Md. 608, 612, 105 A. 863, 864 (1919), or when counsel was taken by surprise by an unforeseen event at trial, when he had acted diligently to prepare for trial, Plank v. Summers, 205 Md. 598, 604-05, 109 [670]*670A.2d 914, 916-17 (1954), or, in the face of an unforeseen event, counsel had acted with diligence to mitigate the effects of the surprise, Thanos v. Mitchell, 220 Md. 389, 392-93, 152 A.2d 833, 834-35 (1959).
We had the opportunity to address the circumstance in which a continuance was mandated by statute in Mead v. Tydings, supra, in which we stated that, while normally the decision regarding a continuance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, when explicitly required by statute, the approval of a continuance was mandatory. Id. at 612, 105 A. at 864. In the present case, there was no statute or rule requiring that the trial judge grant Ms. Touzeau’s motion for continuance.
We recognized that due diligence combined with surprise could justify a continuance in Plank v. Summers, supra, which was a case on remand to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County from this Court for the sole purpose of determining the value of hospital and medical services rendered to the plaintiffs. In Plank, the plaintiffs issued a subpoena duces tecum to the authorities at a naval hospital, requesting medical records and directing “that the records should be accompanied by ‘someone who would be familiar with where these records were kept and that they were kept in the regular course of business’.” Id. at 604, 109 A.2d at 916. The Navy, nevertheless, sent an individual unfamiliar with the records. When the plaintiffs sought to have their medical records admitted into evidence, the defendants objected to their admission on the grounds that a proper foundation had not been laid. The trial judge sustained the objection, and the plaintiffs subsequently requested, and were denied, a continuance. We reversed the trial judge’s denial of the continuance, noting that the plaintiffs’ counsel had exercised reasonable diligence in preparing for trial, that he clearly had been surprised by the Navy’s failure to send the medical records with the appropriate officer, and that he could not have anticipated that the Navy would disregard the instructions in the subpoena duces tecum, and held that:
[671]*671[I]n some exceptional situations, refusal to grant a continuance has been held to be reversible error. In the instant case we think the appellants were virtually denied their day in court under the mandate. The transcript of the former trial could not supply the evidence as to the precise nature and extent of the treatment. To try the case without this basic evidence was like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet left out. We think the ruling was prejudicial and amounted to an abuse of discretion under the circumstances.
Id. at 605, 109 A.2d at 917 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
We also recognized another “exceptional situation” as a basis for a finding of abuse of his discretion when the judge denied a continuance in Thanos v. Mitchell, supra. In that case, plaintiffs counsel was informed on the Friday before the Monday trial date that his client was incapable of attending the trial due to mental illness. In response, plaintiffs counsel immediately notified both the opposing counsel and the trial judge of his client’s illness, and when the trial was called on Monday, requested a continuance and presented two medical affidavits in support thereof. The trial judge denied the request. We reversed the trial judge’s ruling and emphasized that the affidavits, which made it clear that the plaintiff was not capable of attending the proceeding, also indicated that the “[Plaintiff] would be available within a reasonable time (a different situation would be presented if her illness were permanent or the prognosis was for a lengthy disability).” Id. at 392, 152 A.2d at 835. Moreover, we noted that the plaintiff had not yet testified and that her testimony was material to the proceedings. Id. at 393, 152 A.2d at 835.
Subsequent to Thanos, we had occasion to iterate that a request for continuance must reflect that the basis for the delay will be obviated within a brief period of time. In King v. Mayor of Rockville, 249 Md. 243, 238 A.2d 898 (1968), Mrs. King requested a continuance six days before trial and in support thereof submitted a letter from her doctor stating that “the day before she had had ‘an acute episode of atrial fibrillation and aggravation of her Heart Failure’ and that she [672]*672could not appear in court ‘until further convalescence.’ ” Id. at 246, 238 A.2d at 900. Observing that “[i]t appears to the Court that the elderly defendant may never be well enough to attend Court,” the trial judge denied Mrs. King’s motion for continuance. Id. We affirmed the trial judge’s ruling, emphasizing that availability within a reasonable, rather than a protracted, period of time is an important consideration in a continuance decision. Id. In the present case, neither Ms. Touzeau, nor her proffered affidavit,6 proposed when her pro bono counsel would be available. In fact, consistent with the Administrative Order for Continuances, supra, counsel should not have expected a continuance, but rather should have made every effort to secure the presence of a partner or associate from his large firm to act in one of his conflicting cases in his stead.
We also have declined to overrule the trial judge’s denial of a motion for continuance where the moving party has failed to demonstrate due diligence to mitigate the effects of what was alleged to be a surprise. In Hughes v. Averza, 223 Md. 12, 161 A.2d 671 (1960), Barbara Hughes and two of her siblings filed a notice of caveat to their father’s will alleging, among other things, fraud and forgery. During the trial, the caveators requested a continuance in order to engage a handwriting expert, and the trial judge denied their request, which we affirmed. We noted that the caveators were well aware of their need to retain a handwriting expert in advance of the hearing, and thus, “[tjhere was no element of surprise and if [the caveators] needed an expert, they should have employed him before trial.” Id. at 18, 161 A.2d at 675. We concluded that “[u]nder such circumstances there is no doubt that the failure of trial counsel to adequately prepare for trial was not [673]*673a ground for a continuance or postponement.” Id. at 19, 161 A.2d at 675.
In another case where we affirmed the denial of a motion for continuance, Butkus v. McClendon, supra, Mrs. Butkus had requested a continuance seven days before the date set for trial in order to depose a witness, claiming that the witness did not agree to testify on Mrs. Butkus’s behalf until thirty days before the trial date and that Mrs. Butkus was not able to locate a reporter to conduct the deposition. The trial judge denied the motion. We differentiated the Plank and Thanos situations from that of Mrs. Butkus, explicating that “[t]he difference between those cases and the one before us is significant, especially as to the double-barreled elements of surprise and diligence.” Id. at 174, 269 A.2d at 429. We emphasized the lack of diligence on Mrs. Butkus’s counsel’s part in attempting to secure the witness’s deposition, stating:
[E]ven if we overlook the seven preceding years, the plaintiffs’ lawyer knew of [the witness’s] availability at least thirty days before trial, a remarkable glimmer of hope that should have dictated immediate action. However, they failed to utilize the quickest means available to secure her testimony. With the exception of their initial contact, the appellants’ attorneys communicated with each other by mail rather than telephone. When they slowly came to the realization that the court reporter there could not do the job, they still had seven days in which to make other arrangements; instead they elected to wait for the court’s ruling on their motion for continuance. But even when this was denied on February 14 they had at least three full days before trial in which to act. The lawyer was not confronted with the temporary and uncorrectable illness of his own client but just the inability of one court reporter to dispose of a brief deposition. Yet there was no attempt to contact another reporter in Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia who could accompany him on a one day excursion to Pennsylvania and have a deposition ready for trial.
Id. at 175, 269 A.2d at 429. We concluded that “there was no element of surprise here and that there was no reason why [674]*674[Ms. Butkus] could not have maintained frequent contact with [the witness] concerning her willingness to testify.” Id. at 174, 269 A.2d at 429. See also Fontana v. Walker, 249 Md. 459, 464, 240 A.2d 268, 271-72 (1968) (holding no abuse of discretion where trial judge failed to grant a continuance sua sponte where there was no element of surprise); Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 366-67, 174 A.2d 149, 150-51 (1961), (holding no abuse of discretion in denying motion for a continuance and subsequent motion for new trial where there was no element of “mistake or surprise”), overruled on other grounds, Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 612 A.2d 1294 (1992).
Our reticence to find an abuse of discretion in the denial of a motion for continuance has not been ameliorated, nor have we found it to be an “exceptional situation,” when the denial has had the effect of leaving the moving party without the benefit of counsel. In Cruis Along Boats, Inc. v. Langley, 255 Md. 139, 257 A.2d 184 (1969), the defendant requested a continuance the day before trial because one of his counsel, Mr. Blatt, was scheduled to be in court in another matter on the trial date. The trial judge refused to grant a continuance and, on appeal, the defendant argued that the denial of his motion constituted a denial of his constitutional right to have effective assistance of counsel because Mr. Blatt was his primary counsel in the matter. Id. at 142, 257 A.2d at 186. We held that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling because defendant had at least four days’ notice that Mr. Blatt would not be available, and therefore the defendant “should have made other arrangements, perhaps adopting the suggestion of the trial judge that an associate of Mr. Blatt’s ... firm handle the trial.” Id. at 142-43, 257 A.2d at 186. See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Nationwide Const. Corp., 244 Md. 401, 407, 224 A.2d 285, 288 (1966) (affirming the trial judge’s denial of the defendants’ motion for continuance made the morning of the day set for trial on the ground that counsel had a scheduling conflict with another proceeding, and the denial resulted in the defendants’ lack of representation at trial); Clarke Baridon, Inc. v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 218 [675]*675Md. 480, 482-83, 147 A.2d 221, 222 (1958) (affirming entry of summary judgment by default against defendant where defendant’s attorney requested a continuance in absentia on the date set for hearing because of a scheduling conflict with another case).
Ms. Touzeau distinguishes the case before us from these latter cases and posits that her circumstances warrant a reversal of the denial of her motion for continuance because she was surprised by the results of the evaluation and because she acted with due diligence in securing pro bono counsel, thus bringing her motion within the holdings of Plank and Thanos. We disagree. The present case is differentiated primarily because it was expedited as a consequence of the immediate impact that Victoria’s relocation had on her relationship with Mr. Deffinbaugh. Ms. Touzeau’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument before this Court that the continuance requested was not merely for one day, but for a protracted period of time to enable him to become familiar with the case and to prepare for the hearing. Such a delay would have completely obviated the expedited nature of the proceedings.
Further, unlike the plaintiffs in Plank and Thanos, this case lacks the elements of surprise and due diligence. The parties had been notified in September that within four months a custody evaluation would be undertaken and completed and that a hearing would be held, unless a settlement could be achieved. Although Ms. Touzeau’s asserts that she was ambushed by the unfavorable custody/visitation evaluation results, contested custody proceedings are adversarial proceedings and therefore unfavorable results cannot be deemed “surprising” per se. Moreover, Ms. Touzeau clearly was cognizant of the significance of the custody/visitation evaluation, the results of which she was advised to anticipate during the September scheduling conference. She had prior experience with unfavorable custody/visitation evaluation results; the 2001 custody/visitation evaluation, which the trial judge partially relied upon in this proceeding, also was not favorable to her. Despite this experience, the record shows a lack of diligence on Ms. Touzeau’s part to secure counsel for the [676]*676February hearing to modify custody; she stated on the record at the February hearing that she had made no attempt to obtain counsel until after the settlement conference on January 21, only two weeks before the custody hearing and some four months after Mr. Deffinbaugh filed his emergency motion for modification of custody and attorney’s fees, even though she was advised in September to anticipate receiving the report on January 21, 2005.
Nevertheless, Ms. Touzeau asserts that, even if she is deemed not to have presented those “exceptional situations” in which we found an abuse of discretion in the denial of a continuance, she had a right to be represented by counsel because the proceedings implicated the right to parent, a right that we recognized to be fundamental. See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 and J9711031, 368 Md. 666, 669-70, 796 A.2d 778, 780 (2002). We have said that the right to parent is fundamental even in custody disputes. See McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 353, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (2005). The fundamental nature of the right to parent, however, does not necessarily implicate the range of due process protections statutorily afforded to parents in Child In Need of Assistance (“CINA”) proceedings and involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. See Maryland Code (1974, Repl.Vol.2002), Section 3-813 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (affording indigent parents counsel in Child In Need of Assistance proceedings); Maryland Code (1999, 2004 Repl.Vol.), Section 5-323 of the Family Law Article (affording indigent parents counsel in involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings). Even in the two latter situations, we heretofore have declined to require the full panoply of constitutional due process protections to litigants, as afforded to defendants in criminal cases. See In re Blessen H., 392 Md. 684, 705-08, 898 A.2d 980, 993-95 (2006) (holding that a personal dialogue with a parent was not required prior to her waiver of a contested CINA adjudicatory hearing because she was not entitled to the same constitutional due process protections afforded a party facing confinement).
[677]*677Apparently, however, Ms. Touzeau also is asking that we afford parties seeking pro bono representation a higher standard of scrutiny in our review of a denial of motion for continuance. She contends that the standard would be consistent with this Court’s adoption of Rule 6.1(a) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that “[a] lawyer has a professional responsibility to render pro bono publico legal service,” and Maryland Rule 16-903, which requires that all attorneys practicing law in Maryland annually file a Pro Bono Legal Service Report. These rules, however, do not embody distinctions between retained and pro bono attorneys; the fact that Ms. Touzeau was seeking a continuance in order to utilize pro bono counsel does not distinguish her situation from those cases in which we have affirmed the denial of continuances when retained counsel was unavailable, such as Fontana v. Walker, 249 Md. 459, 463, 240 A.2d 268, 271 (1968). In that case, the Fontanas’ counsel withdrew from the case the day before the hearing. Acknowledging that the Fontanas’ interests would have been better protected had they been represented by counsel at the hearing, we noted that “the unfortunate position in which the [Fontanas] find themselves is partially attributable to their inability or unwillingness to retain counsel at the hearing in the court below.” Id. at 463, 240 A.2d at 271. We affirmed the trial judge’s denial of the continuance, emphasizing that:
The granting or denial of a continuance or postponement is within the sound discretion of the trial court. This rule applies even where the ground for the requested continuance is withdrawal of movant’s counsel from the proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted). The only distinction between Fontana and the case at hand is the fact that in Fontana the moving party was unrepresented because of the withdrawal of retained counsel, while in the present case Ms. Touzeau was unrepresented because of the temporal unavailability of pro bono counsel. Were we to adopt Mrs. Touzeau’s duality, we would be elevating the rights of litigants who utilize pro bono counsel over the rights of litigants who retain counsel, thereby [678]*678creating two distinct classes of litigants in our courts. We decline to do so.
In the case sub judice, Ms. Touzeau has failed to demonstrate that she experienced an unforeseen circumstance in the contested custody proceedings that she reasonably could not have anticipated and that she acted with due diligence to mitigate the consequences of not being represented by counsel at the hearing to modify custody. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Ms. Touzeau’s motion for continuance and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.