COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, Ortiz and Senior Judge Humphreys PUBLISHED
Argued at Lexington, Virginia
TORI TURNER, ET AL. OPINION BY v. Record No. 1508-23-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS AUGUST 6, 2024 MASSIE MHP, LLC
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY Robert M.D. Turk, Judge
Kristi J. Murray (Southwest Virginia Legal Aid Society, on briefs), for appellants.
Kathryn A. Poe (John D. Eure; Bryan Grimes Creasy; Johnson, Ayers & Matthews, on brief), for appellee.
In an issue of first impression with respect to a relatively recent statute, in this appeal we
are asked to construe the intent of the General Assembly in its use of the word “willfully” in the
context of Code § 55.1-1243.1(A).
Twelve current and former tenants of a mobile home park1 sued the park’s owner, Massie
MHP, LLC, under Code § 55.1-1243.1 for willful interruption of an essential service. The circuit
court dismissed the tenants’ claims after concluding that they failed to prove Massie willfully
interrupted their water service. The tenants contend that the circuit court misapplied the
governing legal standard.
1 The tenants—Tori Turner, Barbara Bowyer, Glenn Godfrey, Kristi Morris, Jacqueline Snyder, John Vaught, Alesia Moorefield, Siera Brammer, Bridget Hite, Lori Howell, Kara Albert, and Evonne Huff—each filed separate actions, which the circuit court consolidated. BACKGROUND
Massie purchased the mobile home park in August 2022. The tenants were all then
residents of the park. The same month, Massie applied to the Montgomery County Public
Service Authority (the “utility”) for water and sewer services for the park. Massie’s application
requested that utility billing statements be sent by both mail and email. The utility recorded
Massie’s email address correctly but, due to confusion over the handwriting in the application,
recorded Massie’s mailing address incorrectly.
The utility then began sending Massie water bills at the correct email address but an
incorrect mailing address. On September 15, 2022, the utility sent Massie an invoice showing
“current” charges of $4,282.97, with a due date of October 5, 2022. The invoice stated that
“[f]ailure to pay delinquent accounts by the due date will result in termination of service,” and
listed November 5, 2022, as the “disconnect date for current charges.” On October 15, 2022, the
utility sent an invoice showing “current” charges of $8,912.29 and a total amount due of
$13,621.06. The invoice listed a “due date” of November 5, 2022, and a “disconnect date for
current charges” of December 5, 2022. Finally, on October 20, 2022, the utility sent a delinquent
utility payment notice listing a “total due” of $13,621.06 and an “amount past due” of $4,708.77.
The notice stated that the mobile home park’s water “[s]ervice will be disconnected by
November 07, 2022, or soon thereafter,” unless Massie paid the past due amount of $4,708.77
“on the business day prior to November 07, 2022.” The utility sent each of the three notices to
Massie’s correct email address and the incorrectly recorded mailing address.
On November 3, 2022, Charles Campbell, the director of the utility, called Massie’s
office and left a voicemail message requesting that Massie contact the utility regarding its
outstanding balance. In the message, Campbell told Massie that the mobile home park would
-2- “be on the cut-off list” and that the water would “be cut off if payment was not made,” but did
not specify the cut-off date.
As of November 7, 2022, Massie had not paid its bill or otherwise responded to the
invoices, delinquency notice, or Campbell’s voicemail. Still, the utility did not shut the water
off.
On November 10, 2022, Massie employee Mikelle Greenburg called the utility and spoke
with Sarah Reed, an accounting technician for Montgomery County Finance, which manages the
billing, collection, and reporting for the utility. Greenburg asked Reed to send another copy of
the October 15 invoice to the same email address which Massie had listed on its water and sewer
application, and to which the utility had sent all the previous notices and billing statements.
Reed emailed another copy of the invoice that day. In an email response the same morning,
Greenburg noted that the utility had listed an incorrect mailing address for Massie in the bill,
provided the correct address, and asked the utility to correct it. The same day, Reed replied that
she had updated the address.
Around 10:00 a.m. on November 15, 2022, the utility shut off water service to the mobile
home park because Massie had not paid the outstanding balance. Within approximately three
hours, Massie learned that the water had been shut off and paid the past due amounts in full.
Reed acknowledged by an email at 1:12 p.m. on November 15, 2022, that full payment had been
made. The utility restored water service to the park within an hour of the payment. In total, the
water was turned off for approximately four hours.
The tenants filed claims seeking recovery of damages2 under Code § 55.1-1243.1 of the
Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“VRLTA”) for Massie’s “willful” interruption of
2 Pursuant to Code § 55.1-1243.1, which became effective on July 1, 2021, a tenant who prevails is entitled to “(i) the actual damages sustained by him; (ii) statutory damages of $5,000 or four months’ rent, whichever is greater; and (iii) reasonable attorney fees.” -3- their water service. The case proceeded to a bench trial in the circuit court. Several of the
tenants testified that their water had been shut off without warning on November 15, 2022, and
that the lack of water had obstructed them from performing certain housekeeping functions,
routine hygiene maintenance, and proper childcare. Campbell and Reed also testified, explaining
the efforts they had made to communicate with Massie about the outstanding bill. When the trial
judge asked whether Massie was informed that the water would be cut off on November 15 if it
failed to pay the bill before that date, Campbell admitted, “I don’t think that was relayed to
anybody who may have been on that list that day.”
Massie’s Operations Manager, Deandre Singleton, acknowledged that the utility had sent
the bills to the email address Massie had listed in its application, and he did not deny that Massie
had received the emails. Singleton testified, however, that he did not personally receive the
emails and did not know whether anyone else in the company had received them. Singleton did
not explain why Massie did not respond to the bills and delinquency notice that the utility sent
before November 10. Nor did he explain why Massie failed to pay the bill between November
10 and November 15. But he testified that Massie never intended to interfere with the tenants’
water service. When asked whether Massie had “purposefully not pa[id] the bills so that they
would go into default to have the water cut off,” Singleton replied, “No.”
After taking the matter under advisement, the circuit court issued a letter opinion and
later entered judgment for Massie. Noting that the VRLTA does not define the term “willful”
and that no court had interpreted the word as it is used in Code § 55.1-1243.1, the circuit court
applied the definition of “willful” the Supreme Court of Virginia enunciated in Etherton v. Doe,
268 Va. 209, 213-14 (2004) (addressing a claim of “willful and wanton negligence”). The circuit
court found there was “no dispute that despite verbal and email warnings from [the utility]
regarding the possibility of a water shut-off, [Massie] failed to pay the outstanding balance until
-4- approximately three hours after the [utility] followed through on its warnings of a water
shut-off.” But the court also found that the tenants presented no evidence that Massie
“intentionally or maliciously acted to discontinue [their] utility service.” Thus, the circuit court
concluded that Massie merely “acted negligently in its failure to timely pay the utility invoices
related to its recently acquired mobile home property.” The circuit court held that Massie’s
actions did “not rise to the level of willfulness envisioned by [Code § 55.1-1243.1].”
Accordingly, it dismissed the actions with prejudice.
On appeal, the tenants argue that the circuit court identified the correct legal standard—
“willful”—but erroneously applied the standard by imposing an intentionality requirement to
Massie’s conduct, and by concluding that Massie’s interruption of their water services was merely
negligent.
ANALYSIS
When a circuit court decides a case without a jury, the judgment “will be set aside only if
‘it appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.’” Callison v. Glick, 297 Va. 275, 287 (2019) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). In such a case, we
“review all factual findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing part[y] below,” but “[t]he
circuit court’s application of law to facts . . . is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 287-88. Additionally,
“[w]hether a lower court has correctly defined and applied a legal standard is a question of law
reviewed de novo,” Alexandria City Pub. Schs. v. Handel, 299 Va. 191, 196 (2020), as are
“issues of statutory interpretation,” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 149, 162 (2023).
Code § 55.1-1243.1 provides a right of action by which a tenant “shall recover” damages
from his landlord upon presenting “evidence establishing that his landlord has willfully and
without authority from the court . . . interrupted or caused the interruption of an essential service
to the tenant.” Essential services under the VRLTA include “heat, running water, hot water,
-5- electricity, and gas.” Code § 55.1-1200. Massie concedes that its failure to pay the water bill
caused the four-hour interruption of water service to the tenants. Thus, the only issue is whether
the circuit court correctly concluded that Massie did not “willfully” cause the interruption. As
noted, the VRLTA does not define the word “willfully” for determining liability under Code
§ 55.1-1243.1, and neither our Supreme Court nor this Court has previously construed this
statutory term in the context in which it is used here.
When construing a statute, “our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislative intent, which ‘is initially found in the words of the statute itself.’” Chaffins v. Atl.
Coast Pipeline, LLC, 293 Va. 564, 568 (2017) (quoting Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Hill,
254 Va. 88, 91 (1997)). “When, as here, a statute contains no express definition of a term, the
general rule of statutory construction is to infer the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of
the language used.” Matzuk v. Price, 70 Va. App. 474, 483 (2019) (quoting Jones v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Moll, 295 Va. 497, 504 (2018)). To find the ordinary and plain meaning
of a word, “courts can look to dictionary definitions,” Davenport v. Util. Trailer Mfg., 74
Va. App. 181, 196 (2022); Tomlin v. Commonwealth, 302 Va. 356, 372 (2023) (“To discover the
plain and ordinary meaning of everyday language, we consult general-purpose dictionaries.”), or
“pertinent analysis in prior case[s],” Eley v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 158, 165 (2019).
The plain, ordinary, and everyday meaning of “willful” is “done deliberately: not
accidental or without purpose: INTENTIONAL.” Willful, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1981). See also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/willful (last visited Aug. 2, 2024) (“done
deliberately: INTENTIONAL”). This definition is also consistent with the construction of the
term as it has been used in other statutory contexts. Generally, “[c]onduct is ‘willful’ when it is
intentional.” Suffolk City Sch. Bd. v. Wahlstrom, 302 Va. 188, 223 (2023) (quoting RF & P
-6- Corp. v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 320 (1994)). The word “willful” denotes “an act which is
intentional, knowing, or voluntary.” Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Va. 286, 293 (1997)
(analyzing the word “willful” in an insurance contract provision requiring insured to cooperate
with its insurer).
Our Supreme Court has further explained that the word “intentional” as it pertains to
“willful” action applies differently in civil statutes than it does in criminal statutes. “Intent in a
civil context only requires that a person intended his actions; there is no requirement that the
person have knowledge that his actions were wrongful.” Osman v. Osman, 285 Va. 384, 391
(2013). “Civil use of the term [willful], . . . typically presents neither the textual nor the
substantive reasons for pegging the threshold of liability at knowledge of wrongdoing.” Id. (first
alteration in original) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007)); see Suffolk
City Sch. Bd., 302 Va. at 223 (analyzing whether public officials “willfully” and “knowingly”
violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act because Code § 2.2-3714(A) required that a
violation be both “willfully and knowingly made” (emphasis added)).
Furthermore, when deciding whether an actor’s conduct is “willful” in civil contexts
courts consistently conclude that “[i]ll will is not a necessary element.” Benedict-Miller v. Va.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 73 Va. App. 679, 694 (2021) (quoting Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 239
Va. 572, 581 (1990)) (analyzing whether a teacher had committed “willful misconduct” under
Code § 63.2-1511(C), which imposes liability on school personnel for abuse or neglect of
children); e.g., Curtis v. Highfill, 298 Va. 499, 506 (2020) (“‘Ill will is not a necessary element’
of willful and wanton conduct.” (quoting Infant C., 239 Va. at 581)); see also Dep’t of Prof. &
Occupational Regulation v. Abateco Services, Inc., 33 Va. App. 473, 476, 479-81 (2000)
(holding, with respect to an employer’s violation of a safety or health provision of Title 40.1,
“[a]n employer’s good faith belief is irrelevant to the question of whether an employer ‘willfully’
-7- violated the law”), aff’d upon rehearing en banc, 35 Va. App. 644 (2001). Rather, the plaintiff
need only show that “[the actor] was conscious of his conduct, and conscious, from his
knowledge of existing conditions, that injury would likely or probably result from his conduct.”3
Benedict-Miller, 73 Va. App. at 693 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va.
654, 660 (1934)).
Consistent with these principles, courts determining willfulness in the civil context
distinguish between the actor’s intent concerning his actions and his intent concerning the result
of his actions. Only the former intent is necessary to find the conduct willful. See Infant C., 239
Va. at 582 (“An actor guilty of willful and wanton conduct intends his act, but not the resulting
harm.”). An actor’s conduct may be willful “‘even though he hopes or even expects that his
conduct will prove harmless,’” if he “‘realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that
there is a strong probability that harm may result’ from his actions.” Benedict-Miller, 73
Va. App. at 694 (quoting Infant C., 239 Va. at 582-83).
Against this backdrop, we conclude that to establish that the landlord “willfully . . .
interrupted or caused the interruption of an essential service to the tenant,” the tenant must show
that the landlord intentionally committed an act or omission that the landlord knew or should
have known from the circumstances had a “strong probability” of interrupting or causing the
interruption of an essential service to the tenant. Code § 55.1-1243.1; see Benedict-Miller, 73
Va. App. at 694 (quoting Infant C., 239 Va. at 583). “Ill will is not a necessary element” of
liability under Code § 55.1-1243.1, so the tenant need not show that the landlord specifically
intended to interrupt the essential service. Benedict-Miller, 73 Va. App. at 694 (quoting Infant
3 By contrast, “when used in a criminal statute [willful] generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.” Lambert v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 360, 363 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933)). -8- C., 239 Va. at 581). However, the tenant must adduce evidence that the act or omission that
caused the interruption was intentional rather than merely inadvertent or negligent. Cf. Code
§ 55.1-1239 (providing remedies to a tenant where “the landlord willfully or negligently” fails to
supply an essential service (emphasis added)).
In this case, the tenants first argue that the circuit court misapplied the legal standard by
improperly requiring them to prove that Massie intended to interrupt their services. We do not
agree that the circuit court did so. The tenants appear to assume that because the circuit court noted
in its letter opinion that it “did not hear any evidence that [Massie] intentionally or maliciously acted
to discontinue [the tenants]’ utility service,” the circuit court based its decision solely on that
finding. Of course, neither the text of the statute nor the ordinarily understood definition of
“willful” requires malice as a component, and if the circuit court had based its decision solely on the
lack of malice, it would have erred in doing so. However, it is clear from its context that the circuit
court’s statement was in the nature of a simple observation in its broader analysis of all the evidence
and the circuit court expressly considered the entire body of evidence and made additional factual
findings; including that Massie paid the bill immediately upon learning the water had been cut off.
The circuit court clearly did not end its analysis of “willfulness” upon finding that Massie did not
maliciously interrupt the water service, and the totality of the record makes it clear the circuit court
did not rest its judgment solely on that finding. “[W]e will not fix upon isolated statements of the
trial judge taken out of the full context in which they were made and use them as a predicate for
holding the law has been misapplied.” Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 (1977).
Thus, we disagree with the tenants that the circuit court misapplied the legal standard it had
correctly identified.
The tenants further argue that the circuit court erred because the evidence was sufficient
to support a finding of willfulness. Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Massie, we
-9- cannot conclude that the circuit court’s judgment was “plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” Callison, 297 Va. at 287 (quoting Code § 8.01-680); RF & P Corp., 247 Va. at 318.
Clearly there is “no dispute that despite verbal and email warnings from [the utility]
regarding the possibility of a water shut-off, [Massie] failed to pay the outstanding balance until”
the water was finally shut off. Yet the tenants produced little evidence explaining why Massie
failed to pay the bill. Despite having the burden of proof to establish Massie’s intent, the tenants
asked both the circuit court and this Court to speculate that because Massie knew about the water
bill, its failure to pay it must have been deliberate. Other than noting the uncontested failure to
pay the bill, they point to no evidence supporting such an inference. A rational fact finder could
just as reasonably attribute the failure to inadvertence, or even incompetence, which as noted
above, is not sufficient without more to establish “willfulness.”
The only Massie employee who testified—Singleton—stated that he was unaware of the
email notices and did not know if anyone else at the company received them. No evidence
established who at the company was responsible for monitoring the email account, who was
responsible for paying bills, who knew or should have known about the bills, and what actions
were or were not taken internally to pay the outstanding balance. The circuit court was left to
guess about who or what caused the failure to pay the water bills. Considering that Massie paid
the bill within hours of learning the water had been shut off, the circuit court could reasonably
conclude as it apparently did, that the failure to pay the water bill was the result of
miscommunication or negligence, rather than an intentional act or omission.
Even if we were to indulge in the speculation urged by the tenants by assuming Massie’s
failure to pay was intentional, the evidence in the record does not clearly establish that Massie
knew or should have known that not paying the bill would likely result in the utility cutting off
the water on November 15. The September 15 invoice listed a cut-off date of November 5, the
- 10 - October 15 invoice listed a cut-off date of December 5, while the October 20 delinquency notice
listed a cut-off date of November 7. Confusingly, the delinquency notices did not explain the
discrepancies, and in any event, the utility did not cut the water off on any of the dates specified
in any of its bills or other correspondence.
Furthermore, on November 10, when Reed and Greenberg spoke on the phone, the two
cut-off dates the utility had listed in its notices to Massie had passed without the utility cutting
off the water, yet Reed did not alert Greenberg that there was a new cut-off date. The utility may
have decided internally that the cut-off date would be November 15, but there is no evidence that
the utility provided Massie with that information. After months without communication, the
parties were apparently in the process of resolving the issue when the utility cut off the water less
than a week after the November 10 phone call. While it would not have relieved them of their
contractual obligation, Massie employees might reasonably have expected to have more time to
pay the outstanding bill, given the utility’s lack of enforcement and the nature of the phone call
and emails exchanged between Reed and Greenberg. Given the record before us, we cannot say
it would be plainly wrong for the circuit court to conclude that Massie employees could
reasonably have doubted the existence of a strong probability that the water would be cut off on
November 15.
“A trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and on appeal, we must view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party at trial.” Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147 (1994).
Based on the record before us, we hold that the circuit court was not plainly wrong in concluding
- 11 - that the tenants failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Massie willfully caused
the interruption in water service. Callison, 297 Va. at 287 (quoting Code § 8.01-680).4
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
4 We do not foreclose the possibility that failure to pay a bill for an essential service could constitute a willful interruption of that service in certain circumstances. But given the sparse evidentiary record concerning the circumstances of Massie’s failure to pay the bill, the circuit court’s conclusion that the tenants failed to prove that the interruption of the tenants’ water service was willful was not “plainly wrong.” Callison, 297 Va. at 287 (quoting Code § 8.01-680). - 12 -