MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 18 2018, 9:16 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK Indiana Supreme Court purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals and Tax Court collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy P. Broden Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Matthew B. MacKenzie Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Timothy M. See, July 18, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1712-CR-2930
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1608-F1-14
Friedlander, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 1 of 7 [1] Between November of 2015 and July of 2016, Tina Russell; her children L.R.,
R.R., and B.J.; Shavon Richardson; her children T.R., T.R., and J.R.; and
Timothy See lived together at several locations in Lafayette. Russell’s and
Richardson’s children called See “papaw[,]” and Russell’s children did not refer
to any other individual by that name. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 92. Russell was familiar
with See as he had raised her when she was little, and See would often watch
hers and Richardson’s children while the women were at work.
[2] Once, while See was watching the six-year-old L.R., he brought L.R. into the
bedroom. See and L.R. were not wearing any clothes, and See touched L.R.’s
penis. L.R. described a penis as a “thing” and described See’s as “hairy.” Id. at
54. As See was touching L.R.’s penis he also touched his own penis until he
ejaculated. After See ejaculated, he told L.R. to keep what had occurred a
secret.
[3] On August 17, 2016, the State charged See with two counts of Level 1 felony
child molesting for molesting L.R., one of which was later amended to a Level
4 felony. The State also charged See with two counts of child molesting as
Level 1 and Level 4 felonies pertaining to B.J., Level 4 felony child molesting
pertaining to J.T., and Level 4 felony child molesting pertaining to one of
Richardson’s children with the initials T.R. On July 12, 2017, See moved to
sever the counts filed in his case pursuant to Indiana Code 35-34-1-12 (1981),
arguing that all charges pertaining to each alleged victim should be tried
separately. The State filed an objection to See’s motion, alleging that the four
separate victims in the instant case were siblings, the offenses were committed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 2 of 7 while See was providing childcare for the victims, the crimes were of a similar
character and occurred in the same location, and a severance of the offenses
would cause undue trauma for the young victims who would have to testify
multiple times regarding offenses against themselves and against others to
which they were witnesses. On September 5, 2017, the trial court denied See’s
motion to sever, noting that (1) both parties conceded See was not entitled to
severance as a matter of right pursuant to Indiana Code 35-34-1-1(a) (1994) as
the charges were not joined solely on the grounds of similar character and (2)
the operative facts were sufficiently connected to justify joinder. The trial court
also considered the appropriateness of discretionary severance pursuant to
Indiana Code 35-34-1-11(a) (1981) and declined to do so.
[4] See proceeded to a jury trial on all counts on October 10, 2017, and was
convicted of molesting L.R. as charged in amended Count IV, while three other
charges were dismissed pursuant to directed verdicts and two of the three
submitted to the jury resulted in acquittal. See admitted his status as a habitual
offender. On November 17, 2017, the trial court sentenced See to ten years of
incarceration for the Level 4 felony child molesting conviction, enhanced six
years by virtue of his habitual offender status.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence [5] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence
nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 1995).
We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable inferences
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 3 of 7 to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that viewpoint
there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that See was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the
conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720 (Ind. 1993). “[I]t is precisely
within the domain of the trier of fact to sift through conflicting accounts of
events. Not only must the fact-finder determine whom to believe, but also what
portions of conflicting testimony to believe.” In re J.L.T., 712 N.E.2d 7, 11
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[6] In order to convict See of Level 4 felony child molesting, the State was required
to establish that he, “with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, perform[ed]
or submit[ted] to any fondling or touching, of either [L.R. or himself], with
intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either [L.R. or himself.]” Ind.
Code § 35-42-4-3 (2015). See contends only that the State produced insufficient
evidence to sustain a finding that he was the perpetrator, citing L.R.’s testimony
that he did not see his “papaw” seated in the courtroom. Following this
testimony, however, L.R. stated that while he lived with “papaw Tim[,]” he
had seen him without his clothes on. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 53. L.R. then confirmed
that “papaw” touched L.R.’s penis, that he was in “papaw[’s]” bedroom when
that occurred, that “papaw” was not wearing clothes, that “papaw’s” penis
looked hairy, that “yellow stuff” came out of “papaw’s” penis, and that
“papaw” told L.R. to keep the event a “secret.” Id. at 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.
[7] Although L.R. claimed that his “papaw” was not in the courtroom when asked
to identify him, L.R.’s testimony is clear that it was “papaw” who molested
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 4 of 7 him, and that L.R. was responding to questions about “papaw Tim.” Id. at 51,
53. Russell confirmed that her children, including L.R., called See “papaw”
and that there was nobody else her children referred to as “papaw[.]” Id. at 92,
97. The jury was free to evaluate the testimony presented and determine which
testimony to believe, as well as which portions of conflicting testimony to
believe. See J.L.T., 712 N.E.2d at 11. Here, the State presented sufficient
evidence to allow the jury to determine that “papaw” was See.
2. Severance of Charges [8] While conceding that he was not entitled to have his charges severed as of right,
See contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his severance
motion. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a):
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MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 18 2018, 9:16 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK Indiana Supreme Court purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals and Tax Court collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy P. Broden Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Matthew B. MacKenzie Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Timothy M. See, July 18, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1712-CR-2930
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1608-F1-14
Friedlander, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 1 of 7 [1] Between November of 2015 and July of 2016, Tina Russell; her children L.R.,
R.R., and B.J.; Shavon Richardson; her children T.R., T.R., and J.R.; and
Timothy See lived together at several locations in Lafayette. Russell’s and
Richardson’s children called See “papaw[,]” and Russell’s children did not refer
to any other individual by that name. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 92. Russell was familiar
with See as he had raised her when she was little, and See would often watch
hers and Richardson’s children while the women were at work.
[2] Once, while See was watching the six-year-old L.R., he brought L.R. into the
bedroom. See and L.R. were not wearing any clothes, and See touched L.R.’s
penis. L.R. described a penis as a “thing” and described See’s as “hairy.” Id. at
54. As See was touching L.R.’s penis he also touched his own penis until he
ejaculated. After See ejaculated, he told L.R. to keep what had occurred a
secret.
[3] On August 17, 2016, the State charged See with two counts of Level 1 felony
child molesting for molesting L.R., one of which was later amended to a Level
4 felony. The State also charged See with two counts of child molesting as
Level 1 and Level 4 felonies pertaining to B.J., Level 4 felony child molesting
pertaining to J.T., and Level 4 felony child molesting pertaining to one of
Richardson’s children with the initials T.R. On July 12, 2017, See moved to
sever the counts filed in his case pursuant to Indiana Code 35-34-1-12 (1981),
arguing that all charges pertaining to each alleged victim should be tried
separately. The State filed an objection to See’s motion, alleging that the four
separate victims in the instant case were siblings, the offenses were committed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 2 of 7 while See was providing childcare for the victims, the crimes were of a similar
character and occurred in the same location, and a severance of the offenses
would cause undue trauma for the young victims who would have to testify
multiple times regarding offenses against themselves and against others to
which they were witnesses. On September 5, 2017, the trial court denied See’s
motion to sever, noting that (1) both parties conceded See was not entitled to
severance as a matter of right pursuant to Indiana Code 35-34-1-1(a) (1994) as
the charges were not joined solely on the grounds of similar character and (2)
the operative facts were sufficiently connected to justify joinder. The trial court
also considered the appropriateness of discretionary severance pursuant to
Indiana Code 35-34-1-11(a) (1981) and declined to do so.
[4] See proceeded to a jury trial on all counts on October 10, 2017, and was
convicted of molesting L.R. as charged in amended Count IV, while three other
charges were dismissed pursuant to directed verdicts and two of the three
submitted to the jury resulted in acquittal. See admitted his status as a habitual
offender. On November 17, 2017, the trial court sentenced See to ten years of
incarceration for the Level 4 felony child molesting conviction, enhanced six
years by virtue of his habitual offender status.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence [5] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence
nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 1995).
We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable inferences
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 3 of 7 to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that viewpoint
there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that See was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the
conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720 (Ind. 1993). “[I]t is precisely
within the domain of the trier of fact to sift through conflicting accounts of
events. Not only must the fact-finder determine whom to believe, but also what
portions of conflicting testimony to believe.” In re J.L.T., 712 N.E.2d 7, 11
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[6] In order to convict See of Level 4 felony child molesting, the State was required
to establish that he, “with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, perform[ed]
or submit[ted] to any fondling or touching, of either [L.R. or himself], with
intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either [L.R. or himself.]” Ind.
Code § 35-42-4-3 (2015). See contends only that the State produced insufficient
evidence to sustain a finding that he was the perpetrator, citing L.R.’s testimony
that he did not see his “papaw” seated in the courtroom. Following this
testimony, however, L.R. stated that while he lived with “papaw Tim[,]” he
had seen him without his clothes on. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 53. L.R. then confirmed
that “papaw” touched L.R.’s penis, that he was in “papaw[’s]” bedroom when
that occurred, that “papaw” was not wearing clothes, that “papaw’s” penis
looked hairy, that “yellow stuff” came out of “papaw’s” penis, and that
“papaw” told L.R. to keep the event a “secret.” Id. at 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.
[7] Although L.R. claimed that his “papaw” was not in the courtroom when asked
to identify him, L.R.’s testimony is clear that it was “papaw” who molested
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 4 of 7 him, and that L.R. was responding to questions about “papaw Tim.” Id. at 51,
53. Russell confirmed that her children, including L.R., called See “papaw”
and that there was nobody else her children referred to as “papaw[.]” Id. at 92,
97. The jury was free to evaluate the testimony presented and determine which
testimony to believe, as well as which portions of conflicting testimony to
believe. See J.L.T., 712 N.E.2d at 11. Here, the State presented sufficient
evidence to allow the jury to determine that “papaw” was See.
2. Severance of Charges [8] While conceding that he was not entitled to have his charges severed as of right,
See contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his severance
motion. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a):
(a) Whenever two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses. In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense considering: (1) the number of offenses charged; (2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and (3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.
[9] Moreover:
[i]f […] offenses have been joined because the defendant’s underlying acts are connected together, we review a trial court’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 5 of 7 ruling on a severance motion for an abuse of discretion. […] If the operative facts establish a pattern of activity beyond mere satisfaction of the statutory elements, such as that multiple crimes have been committed with a common victim, modus operandi, and motive, a defendant is not entitled to severance of charges as of right. When reviewing discretionary denial of a motion to sever, we must consider whether severance was required in order to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence after reviewing subsections 1–3 of Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-11(a). […] We will reverse denial of a discretionary severance motion only for clear error.
Robinson v. State, 56 N.E.3d 652, 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (case citations
omitted), trans. denied. See must also show “that in light of what actually
occurred at trial, the denial of a separate trial subjected him to such prejudice
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for
severance.” Hunt v. State, 455 N.E.2d 307, 312 (Ind. 1983).
[10] Under the circumstances of this case, even if we assume that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to sever the charges against See, he cannot
establish that he was prejudiced thereby. Of the three charges submitted to the
jury, See was convicted of one and acquitted of two. Not only is that a strong
indication that the jury was not confused by the character of the evidence, “it
has long been the law of this state that acquittal of charges from one joined
offense makes the misjoinder unavailable for reversal of the judgment.” Harvey
v. State, 719 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Myers v. State, 92 Ind.
390, 395 (1883)). See has failed to establish that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to sever the charges against him.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 6 of 7 [11] Judgment affirmed.
[12] Pyle, J., and Barnes, Sr. J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1712-CR-2930 | July 18, 2018 Page 7 of 7