Tidewater Oil Co. v. POORE

149 A.2d 636, 395 Pa. 89
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 16, 1959
DocketAppeals, 54 and 59
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 149 A.2d 636 (Tidewater Oil Co. v. POORE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tidewater Oil Co. v. POORE, 149 A.2d 636, 395 Pa. 89 (Pa. 1959).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Musmanno,

Viewed from an airplane in midflight, a “tank farm” looks like a field dotted with neat, dignified mushrooms. Visited on the ground, however, a tank farm looks exactly like what it is — a succession of mastodonic, metallic tanks filled with liquids and gases of an inflammable and explosive character. The tanks under consideration in this case, 9 to 40 in number, were designed to measure from 40 to 48 feet in height, 70 to 120 feet in diameter, and calculated to hold from 1,334,000 to 4,032,000 gallons of gasoline and petroleum products, each. It would not take much imagination to see, in several formidable rows of tanks of this character, a potential combined Johnstown’s Flood and Dante’s Inferno, in the event of any mishap which, despite every precaution, is always within the awesome realm of possibility.

The Tidewater Oil Company, with the prospect of erecting and installing such tanks, purchased, through *91 its agent, Simon and Company, the Longbotham Farm * of 62 acres in Upper Chichester Township, Delaware County. The tract is open farm land, well drained, excellently suited for home construction and located within an area zoned “A Residential.” Agents for The Tidewater Oil Company applied to the Board of Upper Chichester Township to have the zoning classification of the Longbotham Farm changed from “A” Residence to “C” Industrial. The change was refused. An attempt was then made to obtain a permit from the township building inspector to accomplish the same end, and this request was also declined. An appeal followed to the township zoning board of adjustment, and again the answer was No. Undaunted, Tidewater now appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, and here perseverance was rewarded. The court of common pleas reversed the decision of the zoning board. The Commissioners of Upper Chichester Township filed exceptions to the order and decree; they argued before a court en banc, and Tidewater still held its decision. Tidewater’s long-contested-for victory, however, was a Pyrrhic one because the township commissioners, also persevering, have appealed to this Court which, now, under the established facts and the applicable law, decides, for reasons which will soon be outlined, to reverse the decision of the court of common pleas, thus saving Upper Chichester Township from the invasion of the Tidewater tanks. An appeal was also taken by the owners of adjacent or nearby properties who had intervened in the court below.

The Delaware County court, in reversing the zoning board of Upper Chichester Township, said: “The contention of the appellants, that the refusal of the *92 Board to permit petroleum storage (which is permissible in a “0” Industrial District on their property) is unconstitutional, arbitrary and unreasonable and in abrogation of their legal rights, is a valid contention in the considered opinion of the Court.”

In upholding Tidewater’s contentions, the court did not specify on which particular ground it built its decision. It did not say whether it found the zoning orders unconstitutional or whether it concluded that the action of the board was arbitrary, unreasonable, and in abrogation of legal rights. The opinion supporting and explaining the decision, however, would rather suggest that the court paid little heed to the argument of unconstitutionality, and based its reversal squarely on the proposition that it disagreed with the township authorities as to whether the Tidewater tanks would be good or bad for the Township. The court said that there already existed a large area in the western part of Upper Chichester Township zoned for industrial use and that Tidewater’s property “is situated practically in the. geographical center of other properties now zoned industrially.”

While we do not regard this point as the deciding feature in the case, as will be seen, we may say en passant that the record does not bear out the lower court’s conclusion about the geographical center of a supposed industrialized area in Upper Chichester Township. The court probably so opined because some of the exhibits in the case seem to show that the Tidewater tract at its narrowest point is wedged in between vacant Sun Oil land which is zoned industrial and the Sinclair property which is zoned industrial and contains a tank farm. But it is to be noted that the distance between the Sun Oil land and the Sinclair property, even at this narrow point, is 2700 feet. A tract of rural land over a half mile wide is considerable ter *93 rain to industrialize simply because it happens to touch two other properties zoned industrial, especially where the tract rests in a setting of homes, farms, and vacant land.

Some of the principles enunciated in the lower court’s opinion are sound, and we do not intend to depart from them. In this connection, however, we call attention to the truism that the law is a mosaic and that the whole picture on any given subject cannot be gained until one’s vision encompasses the entire mural dedicated to that topic. In reviewing the action of the board of adjustment, the lower court’s jurisdiction was limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the board’s findings of fact and whether the record was free from mistake of law; also whether there was any abuse of discretion. (Lindquist Appeal, 364 Pa. 561; Edwards Zoning Case, 332 Pa. 188).

Instead of limiting itself to such a scope of review, the lower court pointed out that the Sun Oil Company and the Sinclair Refining Company already occupy a large area zoned for industrial use in the western part of Delaware County and that “The Township Commissioners by their legislative enactment have, in the opinion of the Court, created an industrial trend in the area which it is now too late to stop.” Whether that trend actually exists or not may be disputed, but, in any event, it is for the township to decide whether, if the trend exists, it should be halted. In addition to its large manufacturing areas, Delaware County is blessed with beautiful home and farm land. The local authorities probably reasoned that industry was creeping up too close to this home land, menacing the health and welfare of its people, and threatening it with large ungainly depots and ponderous machinery, crushing out the rural beauty and scenic harmony of their town *94 ship. They wished to prevent what they foresaw. There is always a point before a threatened collapse materializes, when something may be done to prevent the break. It may well be that if the legendary additional straw had not been loaded on to the camel’s back, that proverbial dromedary might have lived out a long life, with vertebrae intact, its hump upright and proud of the part it played in helping to transport the world’s burdens.

But, discussion of an industrial trend, and whether it should be stopped, is more academic than practical because we do not see in the record the engulfing industrialization which appeared to have overawed the court below. However, even if we accept its hypothesis, this does not mean that that creeping glacier of industrialization could not be stopped. To accept the court’s reasoning would be to say that no municipality has the power to limit an encroaching imperilment.

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Bluebook (online)
149 A.2d 636, 395 Pa. 89, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tidewater-oil-co-v-poore-pa-1959.