Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie

439 P.2d 219, 84 Nev. 250, 1968 Nev. LEXIS 343
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 29, 1968
Docket5437
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 439 P.2d 219 (Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219, 84 Nev. 250, 1968 Nev. LEXIS 343 (Neb. 1968).

Opinion

*252 OPINION

By the Court,

Mowbray, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, affirming a ruling of the Washoe County Board of County Commissioners in denying appellant’s application for a Special Use Permit to vary the lot size requirements of the Density Zoning Provisions of Washoe County Land Use Ordinance, Article 5(E), Washoe County Ordinance No. 57.

The principal issues presented for our consideration are:

*253 (1) Is Article 33(A) of Washoe County Ordinance No. 57 1 permissible under NRS 278.020; 2 and

(2) Was the action of the Washoe County Board of County Commissioners in denying appellant’s application for the Special Use Permit arbitrary and capricious.

Appellant Coronet Homes, Inc. applied to the Regional Planning Commission of Reno, Sparks and Washoe County for a Special Use Permit, Application No. SP-34-66W, to permit variation in lot size and yard requirements under the Density Zoning provisions of the Washoe County Land Use Ordinance, Article 5(E), Washoe County Ordinance No. 57. The property involved covered approximately 163 acres and is situated west of U.S. Highway 395 and north of Huffaker Lane in Washoe County. On June 9, 1966, applicant was advised that, at a regular meeting of the Regional Planning Commission, held on June 7, 1966, its request for a Special Use Permit for density zoning had been considered by the commission and denied, together with a supporting tentative plat of a proposed golf course within the subdivision.

On June 13, 1966, appellant gave notice of appeal to the Board of County Commissioners of Washoe County. The appeal was heard on June 27, 1966. Numerous persons appeared and spoke for and against appellant’s proposal and, by unanimous vote, one commissioner abstaining, the appeal was denied.

*254 Appellant filed on August 12, 1966, a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court, seeking approval of its tentative subdivision plat and application for a special use permit. Issues were joined and, by stipulation of the parties, the transcript and minutes of the hearing before the Board of County Commissioners, with all documents and exhibits presented to the board, were submitted to the district court for decision.

The district court on March 7, 1967, rendered its decision against appellant and, on July 17, 1967, findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were entered.

Appellant’s challenge of Washoe County Ordinance No. 57 centers on the validity of Article 33 of the ordinance and, in particular, that part which provides that an applicant in seeking a special use permit must present evidence “that the use is necessary to the public health, convenience, safety and welfare and for the promotion of the general good of the community.” The Board of County Commissioners interpreted this provision, and properly so, as placing the burden of proof on the appellant. Appellant urges that such a burden, as stated in Article 33(A) of the ordinance is not permissible under NRS 278.020 and, if so, is unconstitutional for it places an unreasonable burden on the applicant for the special use permit. We do not agree. On the contrary, NRS 278.020 is clear and unambiguous in empowering the counties of the state with the authority to regulate and restrict the improvement of land and to control the location and soundness of structures built on the land. The Density Zoning Provision of the Washoe County Land Use Ordinance, Washoe County Ordinance No. 57, 3 is *255 precisely the sort of ordinance authorized by the Legislature under NRS 278.020.

In essence an application for a use permit or a variance implies a challenge to the legality of the zoning ordinance as it applies to a specific piece of property. Forest Hills Borough Appeal, 187 A.2d 166 (Pa. 1963); Colligan Zoning Case, 162 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1960); Garber Zoning Case, 122 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1956); Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 122 A.2d 65 (Pa. 1956). In other words, a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance is a natural and foreseeable outgrowth of a request for a special use permit or variance.

Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables them to more effectively meet the demands of evolving and growing communities. It must not, and cannot, be used by those officials as an instrument by which they may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a government body and its citizens can plan and build for the future — it may not, however, be used as a means to deny the future.

The days are fast disappearing when the judiciary can look at a zoning ordinance and, with nearly as much confidence as *256 a professional zoning expert, decide upon the merits of a zoning plan and its contribution to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. Courts are becoming increasingly aware that they are neither super boards of adjustment nor planning commissions of last resort. Di Santo v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 189 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1963); Joseph B. Simon & Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 168 A.2d 317 (Pa. 1961). Rather, the court acts as a judicial overseer, drawing the limits beyond which local regulation may not go, but loathing to interfere, within those limits, with the discretion of local governing bodies. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Poore, 149 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1959).

The zoning power is one of the tools of government which, in order to be effective, must not be subjected to judicial interference unless clearly necessary. For this reason, a presumption of validity attaches to a zoning ordinance which imposes the burden to prove its invalidity upon the one who challenges it. Cleaver v. Bd. of Adjustment, 200 A.2d 408 (Pa. 1964); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851 (Pa. 1958).

The oft repeated, although ill defined, limitation upon the exercise of the zoning power, requires that zoning ordinances be enacted for the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. Cleaver v. Bd.

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Bluebook (online)
439 P.2d 219, 84 Nev. 250, 1968 Nev. LEXIS 343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coronet-homes-inc-v-mckenzie-nev-1968.