Thurman v. Pruitt Corp.

442 S.E.2d 849, 212 Ga. App. 766, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1252, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 380
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedMarch 16, 1994
DocketA93A2200
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 442 S.E.2d 849 (Thurman v. Pruitt Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thurman v. Pruitt Corp., 442 S.E.2d 849, 212 Ga. App. 766, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1252, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinions

Beasley, Presiding Judge.

The executor of the estate of Dentis Thurman, and Mrs. Dentis [767]*767Thurman individually, brought suit against the Pruitt Corporation doing business as Fort Oglethorpe Nursing Home, alleging professional malpractice resulting in the death of the decedent, and a violation of OCGA § 31-8-126 (a). Plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their complaint for failure to file a legally sufficient affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) to support their claim of professional malpractice. We reverse.

Plaintiffs’ decedent died on February 1, 1991, and the complaint was filed on February 1, 1993, a Monday. Although it referenced an attached expert’s affidavit, it was not filed until two days later. The affidavit had been executed and notarized on February 1. In its initial responsive pleading, defendant asserted as a ground for dismissal plaintiffs’ failure to file a contemporaneous affidavit.1 On March 5, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the same ground, also asserting insufficiency of the filed affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 in that it both fails to show that affiant is “an expert competent to testify” and that it fails to state a sufficient factual basis for a specific negligent act or omission.

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ attorney attached her affidavit explaining that the expert’s affidavit had been prepared prior to filing the lawsuit but was filed late by mistake. The trial court permitted it under § 9-11-9.1 (e). Accord St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Nease, 259 Ga. 153 (1), fn. 3 (377 SE2d 847) (1989) (decided prior to the enactment of subsection (e)).

On March 12, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) and submitted for filing a second affidavit prepared by the same affiant on March 11. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ proffer of the second affidavit based on Edwards v. Vanstrom, 206 Ga. App. 21, 22 (1) (424 SE2d 326) (1992), in which we held that a second affidavit which had not been prepared and in plaintiffs’ possession prior to the date the first affidavit was filed failed to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. The court herein considered only the contents of the first affidavit, found it legally insufficient and dismissed the complaint. Appellees did not cross-appeal from the court’s ruling that the affidavit was timely per extension under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), so that issue is not subject to review.

1. Plaintiffs enumerate error only with respect to the trial court’s ruling that the affiant is incompetent as an expert, which rendered the first affidavit insufficient under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). The court’s rejection of the second affidavit under Edwards, supra, is not enumerated as error, so that ruling stands.

The cause of action for professional malpractice was predicated [768]*768on allegations that defendant “failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care, diligence and skill ordinarily employed by nursing homes under similar situations and like surrounding circumstances [which] caused and contributed to [decedent’s] injuries.” The specific negligent acts alleged, as described in the affidavit, are failure to care for decedent’s feet and legs after his hip was broken, causing gangrene; weight loss due to inadequate feeding; insufficient changing of old linen; lack of support hose; subjection to cold showers and long periods of sitting in a chair, all of which constituted below-standard nursing care. It was alleged in the complaint that as a result of defendant’s failure to provide adequate care, decedent developed gangrene, which ultimately caused his death. The theory is that of respondeat superior arising from acts and omissions requiring the exercise of professional skill and judgment by professional members of defendant’s staff. See generally Dozier v. Clayton County Hosp. Auth., 206 Ga. App. 62, 65 (3) (424 SE2d 632) (1992).

Affiant is a licensed, registered nurse with specialized training in enterostomal therapy2 and is employed by Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. as an employee health nurse. According to her affidavit, her graduate course qualified her as a specialist in wound treatment. She averred: “As a practicing registered nurse, I am familiar with the standards of care applicable to nurses and support staff with regard to nursing care of residents in skilled nursing facilities or nursing homes.” The question is whether this qualifies her as “competent to render an opinion about the standard of care of other members of the medical profession,” which she may do so “long as [her] opinion concerns a common area of expertise.” Tye v. Wilson, 208 Ga. App. 253, 254 (430 SE2d 129) (1993). Her opinion concerned the standard of care administered to the decedent by defendant nursing home through its nursing staff. Considering the nature of the challenged acts and omissions, the affiant is prima facie qualified according to her training and experience to give her opinion as an expert.

This is not among those cases in which the affiant is not competent to testify, absent a showing of overlapping expertise, because she is a member of a school of medical practice other than that to which the defendant belongs. See Hewett v. Kalish, 210 Ga. App. 584 (436 SE2d 710) (1993), cert. granted (Case No. S94G0201, January 21, 1994), and cases cited therein.

2. For the same reason, the trial court also erred in dismissing the distinct claim of liability under OCGA § 31-8-126 (a). It provides a cause of action for damages against a long-term care facility for fail[769]*769ure to provide certain rights guaranteed under OCGA § 31-8-100 et seq., known as the “Bill of Rights for Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities.”

“In the context of a nursing home, over and above the contractual obligation the nursing home assumed to take care of its residents, the State has imposed a statutory obligation for it to exercise ‘reasonable care and skill.’ OCGA § 31-8-108. . . . The general standard of care required of a nursing home is that degree of care, skill, and diligence usually exhibited by such homes generally in the community. ... In order to recover, [plaintiffs] had to show that [defendant] failed to do something which a reasonable person, guided by the above considerations which ordinarily regulated the conduct of affairs of a nursing home, would have done, or ought to have done, and failed to perform such responsibility.” Assoc. Health Systems v. Jones, 185 Ga. App.

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Thurman v. Pruitt Corp.
442 S.E.2d 849 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
442 S.E.2d 849, 212 Ga. App. 766, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1252, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thurman-v-pruitt-corp-gactapp-1994.