FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH February 26, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RONALD L. THROUPE,
Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 20-1069 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER; BARBARA JACKSON; GLENN MUELLER; MARIE KLINE; and PAUL OLK,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO (D.C. NO. 1:17-CV-02293-MSK-NRN)
Nathaniel B. Smith, Law Office of Nathaniel B. Smith, New York, New York, for Appellant.
Jim Goh (Renee J. Seyko with him on the brief), Constancy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Appellees.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, EBEL, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge. Ronald Throupe, a Professor of Real Estate at the University of Denver,
brought an employment discrimination claim under Title IX against DU as well as
several faculty and staff members. Following discovery, the defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary
judgment, concluding Throupe had not presented a prima facie claim of
employment discrimination based on his sex.
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Specifically, we
conclude the district court did not err in concluding that Throupe failed to raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether he was discriminated against on the basis of his
sex.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Ronald Throupe came to the Burns School of Real Estate and Construction
Management within DU as an Associate Professor in 2007. Since his arrival,
Throupe’s research and teaching has focused on real estate, specifically appraisal,
investments, and real-estate software. Historically, he received positive reviews
for his teaching and research and was promoted to a tenured position in 2013.
During his time at DU, he has maintained a private real estate consulting practice.
In 2013, Throupe was a candidate to serve as director of the Real Estate
and Construction Management department. DU ultimately hired outside of the
-2- school, bringing in Barbara Jackson to lead the department. Jackson’s scholarship
focuses on construction management. According to Throupe, upon Jackon’s
arrival, she quickly “announced her intention of significantly reducing the real
estate portion of the school.” Aplt. App. 377. Jackson made this clear in
conversations with professors, indicating she would force some of the tenured real
estate faculty members to leave.
In May of 2014, Throupe attended a gala hosted for Burns faculty with a
former student, Mao Xue. Xue is a Chinese national who had graduated with an
MBA from DU in 2013. Both before and after the gala, Throupe maintained a
close personal and professional relationship with Xue. During her time at DU,
Xue served as a research assistant to Throupe and took much of her course work
from him. Outside of school, Xue worked for Throupe, spent extensive time with
his family, traveled with him for conferences, and was on his family’s cell phone
plan. Throupe variously described his relationship with Xue as “step-dad,”
“father-daughter,” and “sister-daughter.” Id. at 176, 193, 196. After the events
described here, he adopted her.
Prior to the gala, Defendant Marie Kline, an administrator within Burns,
told Throupe he would need to pay for Xue’s ticket. Kline indicated to Throupe
that the gala was customarily free only for faculty, staff, and their significant
others. According to Kline, Throupe then “told me [Xue] was his significant
-3- other.” Id. at 997. Throupe acknowledges saying as much, but insists this
statement was taken out of context.
After the gala, staff, faculty, and students within Burns began expressing
concerns to one another and Jackson about an inappropriate relationship between
Throupe and Xue. Some speculated they were having an affair. And some said
they had seen Throupe and Xue holding hands and being otherwise physically
affectionate. Throupe recalls four occasions on which these rumors made it back
to him. In the summer of 2014, one professor told Throupe that “everyone thinks
that you and Mao are together.” Id. at 175. At an academic conference in May of
2015, another professor, Defendant Glenn Mueller, told Throupe he had heard
Throupe had left his wife to be with Xue. In June of 2016, Defendant Paul Olk,
who serves as the Associate Dean of Burns, told Throupe he had been told that
Throupe had introduced Xue as his wife at the gala. And Throupe also said
another professor at some point made “a remark about hearing something about
[his relationship with Xue].” Id. at 176.
After spending the prior year working for Throupe, Xue returned to DU as
a Master’s student in the fall of 2014. The following spring, she served as a
graduate assistant to Throupe and took all of her course work with him. During
that quarter, Xue stopped attending classes for several weeks and also failed to
report for her work as a research assistant. In late April, Throupe contacted DU’s
-4- Director of International Student Services to express his concerns about Xue’s
immigration status given her poor attendance. Throupe subsequently met with the
Director of International Student Services and the Director of Graduate Student
Services to discuss his concerns. During this meeting, Throupe described his
relationship with Xue. He said he “financially supported her, that she was very
close with his wife and kids” and “he asked her to refer to him as her step-dad,
and not her boss, because he didn’t want anyone to get the wrong idea about their
relationship.” Id. at 196–97. Because of their personal intimacy, he also said that
once Xue had stopped attending classes, he began frequenting coffee shops she
regularly went to and questioning her friends in an effort to find her.
Based on this meeting, each Director contacted DU’s Title IX investigator
to express concerns about Xue. When administrators reached out to Xue, she told
them “I’m fine.” Id. at 229. The Directors also informed Jackson about the
meeting. Jackson then met with Throupe in early May. After this meeting, she
contacted Associate Dean Olk and the Dean of Burns. In an email to both deans,
Jackson wrote “[t]here’s a serious issue with Ron Throupe.” Id. at 1051. She said
Throupe “is fully aware of everyone’s concern about this relationship but
constantly retorts that he’s like a step-father to [Xue]. His behavior is totally out
of line and now apparently something has happened in the relationship.” Id. She
concluded, “Ron believes he has done nothing but help this girl, but his behaviors
-5- have been totally unprofessional and inappropriate, his father/daughter views
perverted, and his obsession out of control.” Id.
The Title IX investigator and DU’s Manager of Equal Employment had a
follow-up meeting with Throupe in early June. At this meeting, Throupe again
described his relationship with Xue. He also expressed that he and Xue “don’t
feel safe in Burns anymore. We feel rumored.” Id. at 176. After the meeting, he
sent an email to the Manager of Equal Employment formally reporting a hostile
work environment. When Throupe later asked whether any actions had been
taken in response to his report, the investigator told Throupe his claim “did not
result in any formal investigation by the Office of Equal Employment.” Id.
at 234.
In the fall of 2015, Jackson emailed Human Resources, asking whether
Throupe had been told to cease his interactions with Xue. Human Resources told
Jackson that it had not communicated with Throupe because it had not found any
policy violations warranting formal action. Jackson then reached out to Olk and
together they decided Throupe should not have any ongoing professor-student
relationship with Xue. Olk issued Throupe a written warning in November of
2015, stating “the College is unable to allow you to continue your relationship
with Ms. Xue related to her student status at this University,” and “you should not
interact with Ms. Xue or any other students in a manner that creates a conflict in
-6- your role as a faculty member at the University.” Id. at 324. The letter went on
to explain “it would be extremely difficult for you to evaluate Ms. Xue
impartially.” Id. at 323. And it ended by laying out the path forward: “any
failure to stop interacting with Ms. Xue immediately related to University
business of any kind will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including
termination of your employment.” Id. at 324.
Throupe maintains that Jackson continued to harass him even after the
written warning. Specifically, Jackson assigned Throupe unfavorable course
schedules in both 2016 and 2017, resulting in more teaching preps and less
desirable class assignments. At the same time, she gave more favorable course
schedules to other male faculty members within the department. Throupe also
recalled a scheduling meeting in 2017 during which Jackson yelled at Throupe.
B. Procedural Background
In September of 2017, Throupe initiated a sex discrimination suit under
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 against DU, Jackson, Olk,
Kline, and Mueller. 1 Throupe’s complaint also included state law claims for
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After discovery
ended, the defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, claiming Throupe
1 Xue initially was a party to the suit, but she filed a stipulated motion for dismissal with prejudice prior to summary judgment.
-7- had failed to raise triable issues on all his claims. In his response, Throupe
argued “[w]hen Defendant Jackson arrived as chair, she announced her intention
of significantly reducing the real estate portion of the school” and “[f]rom that
ensued a campaign to make Throupe leave.” Id. at 377. According to Throupe,
Jackson used his relationship with Xue as a pretext for advancing her
departmental agenda.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Although
Throupe had dedicated little space in his briefing to arguing any theory of sex
discrimination, the district court identified two theories of sex discrimination in
Throupe’s argument: that the defendants created a hostile work environment and
engaged in disparate treatment against him. But the court determined that
Throupe had failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under
either of these theories. Having dismissed Throupe’s sole federal claim, the
district court declined to consider the remaining state law claims due to lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the standard articulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Under
Rule 56(a), summary judgment is proper if the record shows “there is no genuine
-8- issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Sanderson v. Wyo. Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute is genuine “if there is
sufficient evidence so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either
way.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, if
the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence supporting a necessary element of
his claim, the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See
Celotex Corp v. Cattret, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1984).
B. Legal Standards
1. Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 prohibits discrimination
“on the basis of sex” in educational programs or activities receiving federal
funding. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). This includes employment discrimination in
federally funded educational programs. Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307,
1315 (10th Cir. 2017).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also prohibits an employer from
discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under Title VII, a plaintiff can prove discrimination
-9- in several different ways, including proof of a hostile work environment or
disparate treatment. Though Throupe has not brought any claims under Title VII,
“[c]ourts have generally assessed Title IX discrimination claims under the same
legal analysis as Title VII claims.” Gossett v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for
Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2001). We do so here.
2. Burden-shifting Framework
We apply the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when
assessing a motion for summary judgment on a claim of sex discrimination.
Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972)). Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the plaintiff has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. The burden then moves to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. Summary judgment will
be granted if the plaintiff cannot prove the employer’s articulated reasons are
pretextual. Id.
3. Hostile Work Environment
A hostile work environment claim is “composed of a series of separate acts
that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.” Nat. R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 531 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). To overcome summary
judgment on this claim, the plaintiff must show (1) he was discriminated against
-10- because of his sex, and (2) that the discrimination was sufficiently severe or
pervasive such that it altered the terms or conditions of his employment.
Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1174. An employer can be held liable if its employees
create a hostile work environment and “it knew or should have known about the
conduct but failed to stop it.” Bertsch v. Overstock.com, 684 F.3d 1023, 1027
(10th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900
F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018).
To maintain a claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
was discriminated against because of a protected status, like sex. The plaintiff’s
sex need only be a “motivating factor” in the unlawful employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). To show the defendant was motivated by the plaintiff’s
sex, a plaintiff may point to acts of harassment that are “facially sex based.”
Sanderson, 976 F.3d at 1174. Also, facially sex-neutral conduct can “support a
finding of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim
when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory
conduct.” Id. If a jury could reasonably infer the conduct was related to the
plaintiff’s sex, “then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference
should be drawn.” Id. While it is generally the jury’s role to determine if such
acts were based on the plaintiff’s sex, id., summary judgment is appropriate if the
plaintiff has not presented a triable issue of fact about the defendant’s motive.
-11- A plaintiff can also state a sufficient claim if he presents evidence that the
discrimination was motivated by his “failure to conform to stereotypical gender
norms.” McBride v. Peak Wellness Ctr., Inc., 688 F.3d 698, 711 (10th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that “[r]emarks at work that are
based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part” but
“stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that the employer actually relied
on gender in making its decision”).
Beyond evidence of the defendant’s motive, the plaintiff must offer
evidence that the defendant’s conduct was so severe or pervasive as to alter the
terms or conditions of employment. Proof of either severity or pervasiveness can
serve as an independent ground to sustain a hostile work environment claim.
Lounds, 812 F.3d at 1222. To make this determination, we look to the “totality of
the circumstances” and “consider such factors as the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666
F.3d 654, 664 (10th Cir. 2012).
We assess this element both objectively and subjectively. It is not enough
that the plaintiff perceived the conduct to be severe or pervasive. Rather, the
-12- plaintiff must “show that a rational jury could find that the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Sanderson,
976 F.3d at 1176. So, “the run-of-the mill boorish, juvenile, or annoying behavior
that is not uncommon in American workplaces is not the stuff of a Title VII
hostile work environment claim.” Morris, 666 F.3d at 664. And “a few isolated
incidents” of discriminatory conduct does not make the harassment pervasive. Id.
at 666.
Again, whether the conduct was severe or pervasive is typically a question
for the jury, but we can affirm a district court’s grant of summary judgment when
the plaintiff fails to make this showing. See, e.g., id.
4. Disparate Treatment
To overcome summary judgment on a claim of disparate treatment, the
plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) the victim belongs to a class protected by
Title VII, (2) the victim suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the
challenged action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. EEOC v. PVNF, LLC, 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007).
An adverse employment action “is a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1316 (internal quotation marks omitted). But a “mere
-13- inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities does not qualify as an
adverse action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the third element, a plaintiff can raise an inference of discrimination by
showing differential treatment. For example, it is sufficient to show that the
employer treated the plaintiff differently from similarly situated employees who
are not part of the plaintiff’s protected class. Id. at 1318. An employee is
similarly situated if he “shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same
standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar
relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.” Id.
C. Analysis
Our analysis begins and ends at the first step in the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Summary judgment is appropriate on Throupe’s claim if he cannot
establish each of the elements for a prima facie case of either of his theories of
discrimination. Here, he has failed to raise a triable fact about whether the
defendants discriminated against him because of his sex. This failure sinks both
his hostile work environment and disparate treatment claims. Moreover, for his
hostile work environment claim, Throupe has not shown that any of the alleged
discrimination was severe or pervasive.
-14- 1. Hostile Work Environment
Throupe identifies a handful of occurrences which he insists constitute a
hostile work environment: the spreading of rumors about his relationship with
Xue, being subjected to a Title IX investigation, receiving the written warning,
being assigned a less desirable teaching schedule, and being yelled at by Jackson
on at least one occasion. Of this conduct, only the Title IX report appears to be
facially sex-based. 2
Throupe cites deposition testimony from Barbara Jackson to prove he was
discriminated against because of his sex. When Jackson was asked why she felt
she needed to report Throupe’s behavior to the Title IX office, she said it was
2 While rumors involving sexual conduct may be motivated by the plaintiff’s sex, the mere fact that the rumors involve speculations about an affair does not necessarily lead to this inference. See, e.g., Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, City and Cty. of Denver, 397 F.3d 1300, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (refusing to regard a letter alleging the plaintiff was having an affair was based on her sex because “the letter critiques both Ms. Duncan and Chief Michaud for the alleged affair rather than singling out Ms. Duncan on the basis of her gender”); see also Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding the plaintiff had not shown evidence of sex discrimination because rumors about an affair involved both a female employee and male superior and the talebearers were of both genders).
Although at least some of the rumors here involved speculation that Throupe and Xue were having an affair, Throupe has not provided any evidence supporting the inference that the rumors were motivated by his sex. Rather, the record indicates the rumors circulated because of his own characterizations of the relationship, see, e.g., Aplt. App. 175 (calling Xue his “significant other” prior to the gala), and actions, see, e.g., id. at 289 (spending all his time with Xue at a conference where it was customary for faculty to bring their spouses).
-15- because “it’s a male faculty member. It’s a female student. And [the Title IX
office] to me was the place that I knew to take . . . the concerns that were being
brought to my attention.” Aplt. App. 679. Throupe says the discriminatory intent
could not be any clearer. He was reported for a Title IX violation because he is
“a male faculty member.” Id.
Throupe cherry-picks Jackson’s statement and strips it of important context.
Jackson made her statement when describing why she felt it was appropriate to
report Throupe and Xue’s relationship to the Title IX office. The mere fact that
Jackson viewed Throupe’s conduct as reportable does not support the inference
that she discriminated against him based on his sex. Nothing in the record
indicates Jackson would have treated any differently a female professor who
maintained a deeply personal relationship with a male student. And Throupe’s
own counsel acknowledged during oral argument that it was appropriate to report
Throupe initially for a Title IX investigation based on the way he described his
relationship with Xue. See Oral Arg. at 15:00–15:30, Throupe v. University of
Denver, et al. (2021) (conceding that “DU unequivocally had an obligation to
investigate these concerns”). That Jackson described Throupe as a “male
professor” in this context does not raise a triable issue of fact about the
defendants’ motivation.
-16- Seeing the writing on the wall, Throupe tries to re-frame his argument as a
claim of sex stereotyping. For the first time on appeal, he argues the defendants’
actions were driven by a stereotypical vision of how a male professor should
interact with his female students. First, we conclude that Throupe has forfeited
this theory of sexual stereotyping. One would search in vain for any reference to
a case supporting this theory in Throupe’s briefing before the district court. We
will not consider an argument that was not fully briefed and decided by the
district court. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir.
2011) (“It is the significant but limited job of our appellate system to correct
errors made by the district court in assessing the legal theories presented to it, not
to serve as a second shot forum where secondary, back-up theories may be
mounted for the first time.”) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations
incorporated).
Even if Throupe did not forfeit the stereotyping argument, this theory fails.
Throupe insists “an older man was being targeted for false charges by his
superiors based on a salacious and long-standing rumor about having an affair
with a younger woman driven by stereotypical thinking about the ‘proper roles’
and conduct of men and women in the workplace.” Aplt. Br. at 26–27. But this
bald assertion does not relieve Throupe of the burden of citing evidence to
support this theory. None exists here.
-17- Throupe maintains deposition testimony from his colleague, Professor
Mueller, supports his stereotyping theory. During his deposition, Mueller was
asked whether he believed it was inappropriate for Throupe to constantly spend
time with Xue at an academic conference. Mueller said he believed it was. But,
Mueller said, he would not have viewed Throupe and Xue’s conduct as
inappropriate had Xue been a male student.
But Throupe, again, strips Mueller’s statement of its context. Mueller was
asked about the amount of time Throupe and Xue spent together at an academic
conference. He explained it was customary for professors to bring their spouses
to the conference. Given that background, he viewed it as inappropriate for
Throupe to be spending all his time at the conference with a female student. It
was the fact that Throupe and Xue were of opposite sexes—not that Throupe was
a man—driving Mueller’s perceptions. The only stereotyping defendants appear to
have engaged in is about how any professor should interact with his or her
students, particularly those of the opposite gender.
Without any evidence to support his assertion that the defendants
discriminated against him because of his sex, none of the aforementioned
sex-neutral conduct raises an inference that Throupe was treated a certain way
because he is a man. The rumors were spread and Title IX investigation
performed because of his own characterization of the relationship. The written
-18- warning was premised on concerns about the professor-student dynamic at play,
not the fact that Throupe is male. And, in Throupe’s own words, he was
mistreated because of Jackson’s pedagogical vision for the department, not his
sex. See Aplt. App. 377 (“When Defendant Jackson arrived as Chair, she
announced her intention of significantly reducing the real estate portion of the
school, which would have required firing at least five real estate professors . . . .
From that ensued a campaign to make Throupe leave.”) (emphasis added).
Though Throupe’s failure to show that any discrimination was based on his
sex would be enough to end our inquiry, we also agree with the district court that
the conduct at issue was neither severe nor pervasive. We do not doubt that the
defendants’ actions must have been personally painful for Throupe. But none of
the conduct Throupe identifies rises to the level of severity required for a hostile
work environment claim. We have found conduct sufficiently severe to overcome
summary judgment in only particularly threatening or humiliating circumstances.
See, e.g., Morris, 666 F.3d at 667 (describing instances where we have found the
element of severity met, including assault and the physical groping of body parts).
The problematic conduct Throupe points us to also does not raise a triable
issue of pervasiveness. While rumors and speculations circulated from 2014
through 2016, Throupe was personally made aware of rumors about his
relationship with Xue on only four occasions. The Title IX investigation required
-19- Throupe to perform a single interview and his counsel conceded at oral argument
that this was warranted. And he received the written warning, which did nothing
to alter the terms or conditions of his employment. The warning simply informed
Throupe he needed to stop engaging with Xue in a professor-student capacity due
to concerns about the relationship compromising his impartiality as a teacher.
These isolated incidents, viewed in the aggregate, do not raise a triable issue of
pervasiveness. 3 See Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th
Cir. 1997) (finding that five separate incidents of sexually-oriented, offensive
comments over a sixteen month span was not pervasive). This is far from the
“steady barrage” of discriminatory conduct necessary to establish pervasiveness.
Morris, 666 F.3d at 666 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Disparate Treatment
Given our analysis above, we can quickly dispatch Throupe’s disparate
treatment claim. Throupe has failed to raise any inference of discrimination. He
3 While we must consider the entirety of the record in making this determination, we do not simply have to accept Throupe’s claim that all the discriminatory conduct he identifies was part of the same hostile work environment. “To determine whether these acts are part of the same hostile work environment . . . [we look] at the type of these acts, the frequency of the acts, and the perpetrator of the act.” Duncan, 397 F.3d at 1309. Here, Throupe has not provided any evidence linking the scheduling conflicts to his relationship with Xue or his sex. Furthermore, Throupe was not singled out for this unfavorable scheduling. As Throupe himself acknowledges, such actions were part of a larger initiative by Jackson to push real estate professors out of the department.
-20- has provided no evidence that a similarly-situated female professor would be
treated differently. Rather, the record reflects that Throupe had male colleagues
within the department who were also treated poorly in an effort to make them
leave. But he also had male colleagues who were given more favorable
assignments by Jackson. Without any evidence raising an inference of sex
discrimination, Throupe’s disparate treatment claim must fail.
III. Conclusion
Not all offensive or hurtful conduct within the workplace is actionable
under Title VII or Title IX. Throupe has not provided any evidence that he was
singled out for mistreatment because of his sex. And his own theory of the case
before the district court—that he was targeted due to departmental
politics—belies this claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to
grant summary judgment.
-21-