KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge.
We review a preliminary injunction entered against the former president of the Philippines, his wife, several of their associates, corporations allegedly controlled by some or all of them, and a bank where Mrs. Marcos has an account.
Facts
A. Background
On February 7, 1986, a special presidential election was held in the Philippines. There were allegations of massive fraud against the existing government and outbreaks of violence against those supporting the opposition. The precise vote count may never be known, but the official tabulation, which showed an overwhelming victory for Ferdinand Marcos, was rejected by the Philippine people. On February 25, 1986, realizing perhaps that his regime was nearing its end, Marcos and his wife left. His successor, President Corazon Aquino, was almost immediately recognized by our government as the legitimate leader of the Philippines. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
When the Marcoses arrived in Hawaii, they brought along numerous crates filled with currency, jewels, precious metals and negotiable instrumente. These crates were impounded by the United States Customs Service. Litigation began. On February 28, the Central Bank of the Philippines sued in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, seeking the return of 22 crates full of Philippine currency. On March 13, the Marcoses’ agents petitioned for a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs, seeking the release of all the crates. On March 21, the Central Bank sued for the return of all the crates or their monetary equivalent. All these actions were consolidated in Hawaii. The mandamus suit against the Commissioner of Customs was decided, on an expedited basis, against the Commissioner, then reversed by another panel of this court. Azurin v. Von Raab, 803 F.2d 993 (9th Cir.1986).
Assets allegedly belonging to the Marcoses, or held for their benefit, began to turn up around the world. The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) has begun litigation in Switzerland, state and federal courts in California, and federal courts in New York, New Jersey and Texas. In each case, the Republic is trying to recover or freeze specific assets that it regards as property of the Philippines improperly possessed or controlled by the Marcoses.
B. The Complaint
The complaint in this case was filed on June 16, 1986. Unlike the cases filed in other jurisdictions, e.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 361 (2d Cir.1986), this one does not simply seek the recovery or freezing of specific property. Instead, it alleges that during his tenure as president of the Philippines, Marcos committed depredations that enabled him to gain enormous riches at the expense of the Republic and its citizens. Raising various federal and state law claims, the Republic seeks to have all or part of this wealth returned; it also seeks $50 billion in punitive damages.
[1476]*1476The thrust of the Republic’s claim is that the Marcoses abused their authority, depriving the Philippines and its people of wealth that is rightfully theirs. Paragraph 12 of the complaint charges that “Mr. Marcos used his position of power and authority to convert and cause to be converted, to his use and that of his friends, family, and associates, money, funds, and property belonging to the Philippines and its people.” This allegation is incorporated into, and forms the basis of, every claim for relief in the complaint. In addition, plaintiff alleges as follows:
[T]he Philippines existed as a sovereign government and thus constituted a RICO “enterprise”____ Defendants conducted or participated ... in the conduct of the affairs of the Philippines through a pattern of racketeering activity____ [Complaint K1Í 28, 29(a).]
Mr. Marcos represented on countless occasions to the Philippines and its people that he was governing and would govern fairly and honestly, pursuant to his oath of office and the Constitution and Laws of the Philippines. He further made numerous and frequent declarations to his people that he had never taken money, property, or funds belonging to the Philippines or its people for his own personal use, nor that of his friends, family and associates. [Id. K 49.]
Mrs. Marcos [as Governor of Manila] made similar representations of honesty, integrity and willingness to act within and not above the laws to the people of the Philippines residing in Manila. [Id. K 50.]
[The Marcoses] intended that the Philippines and its people rely on these misrepresentations and thereby permit Mr. and Mrs. Marcos to remain in power and positions of authority. [Id. K 51.]
They further intended that the people of the Philippines would be deceived and not realize that Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, and their accomplices, family, and associates were plundering the wealth of the country to enrich themselves at the expense of the Philippines and its people. [Id.]
Plaintiff [the Republic] relied to its detriment on the representations of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, and their accomplices, by permitting them to remain in positions of power and authority for twenty years and by allowing, through ignorance, the plunder of the country. [Id. at K 52.] Mr. Marcos as President, and Mrs. Marcos as Governor of Manila, occupied positions of trust and confidence as to the government and people of the Philippines. [Id. at K 57.]
Mr. and Mrs. Marcos breached that trust and confidence by committing numerous acts of fraud, deceit, conversion, civil conspiracy, acts- of racketeering, and other unlawful acts [and that as a consequence thereof plaintiff] permitted them to remain in positions of power and to conduct the affairs of the Philippines virtually unchecked. [Id. UK 58-59.]
Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, by virtue of their position [sic] as President of the Philippines and Governor of Manila, respectively, occupied positions of trust as to the Philippines and its people. [Id. K 62.] [Before] Mr. Marcos assumed the office of President of the Philippines ... he took the Oath of Office____ By accepting the duties and obligations imposed by the oath, in consideration for the remuneration ... provided by Philippine law, Mr. Marcos entered into an implied contract with the Philippine government to use the power of the Presidency according to law, in good faith, and not for personal aggrandizement. [Id. KK 71-72.]
The complaint also alleges that during Marcos’ rule, he and his wife converted and caused to be converted property worth $1.55 billion belonging to the Philippine government and its citizens. Most of this, approximately $1.5 billion, allegedly went into Swiss bank accounts; four million dollars went to buy a house in Beverly Hills; some $800,000 went into two bank accounts at Lloyds Bank in California; and property worth $7 million is in the Hawaii crates.
Only Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos are charged with having participated in all of these transactions. Defendants Ramon Azurin and Gregorio Araneta are alleged to have been the Marcoses’ agents for bringing the crates of money and jewelry into Hawaii. Defendants Antonio Floriendo, Diosdado Ordonez, Calno Holdings N.V., Krodo Properties N.V., and Al Djebel Corp. (collectively the “minor defendants”) partic[1477]*1477ipated only in the acquisition and holding of the Beverly Hills property. Lloyds Bank was named as a defendant only because it held the two accounts in the name of Mrs. Marcos. There are no specific allegations of wrongdoing against Ancor Holdings, Inc.
On this foundation, the Republic strives to build eleven claims. Only the first three, based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), are grounded on federal law; the remainder are pendent. The first RICO claim charges the Marcoses and the minor defendants with conducting a RICO enterprise, consisting either of the Philippine government itself or, alternatively, of an association-in-fact made up of the defendants with an existence apart from the racketeering activity in which they allegedly engaged. The specific activities alleged are: (a) the transfer, by mail and wire, of converted funds, which the Republic claims amounted to mail or wire fraud; (b) the transportation of the crates to Hawaii, which the Republic claims was the knowing transportation of stolen goods in foreign commerce; (c) the acquisition of the Beverly Hills property by Calno (later transferred to Krodo and Al Djebel) with funds that the Republic claims were stolen, and so known to be by all the defendants involved; (d) the knowing concealment of stolen goods moved in foreign commerce; and (e) the sale of a deed of trust to the Beverly Hills property (part of Calno’s disposition of the property) knowing that the deed was stolen or taken by fraud.
The second federal claim charges investments of funds produced by racketeering into two “enterprises”: the Beverly Hills property and the Lloyds Bank accounts. The third claim alleges a conspiracy among the defendants to conduct the RICO enterprise and invest the funds.
The remainder of the complaint propounds various state law theories of recovery on the same allegations of fact. They include, in particular, requests that the court impose a constructive trust on the disputed assets and require an accounting of the defendants.
C. District Court Proceedings
The Republic moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the transfer of property held anywhere in the world by or on behalf of the Marcoses. On June 25, 1986, the district court granted the injunction. It held that RICO established a basis for federal jurisdiction and the pendent causes of action entitled the Republic to an injunction. The court based the preliminary injunction on the pendent claims for constructive trust and accounting, finding that the Republic had a substantial likelihood of prevailing. It also found that the Marcos-es’ alleged propensity to move assets would irreparably harm the Republic if the injunction were not granted. The Republic had made no attempt to win an attachment of any assets and the district court held that it was not required to do so.
Defendants appeal, raising four major contentions. First, they argue that the district court had no jurisdiction over this action. They contend that the RICO claims are so remote as to be frivolous. Second, they argue that even if plaintiff has made a colorable claim sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the district court abused its discretion by issuing the injunction. They argue that the plaintiff’s case is just too weak, particularly when their likely affirmative defenses are considered, to support a finding that it will probably succeed on the merits. Third, defendants argue that the injunction was improvidently granted because the Republic will not sustain irreparable harm if the injunction is dissolved, the Marcoses having agreed to a freeze of their assets for the Republic to litigate the case in the Philippines. Finally, defendants contend that, in any case, the injunction — covering the Marcoses’ property worldwide — is far too broad, sweeping in a multitude of assets that have no connection to the pendent state law claims.
Discussion
A district court may grant a preliminary injunction when the movant demonstrates probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury. San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1473 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986). Where the balance of relative hardships “tips decidedly toward the plaintiff,” however, “the plaintiff need not show as robust a likelihood of success on the merits.” Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir.1978), cert. dis[1478]*1478missed, 441 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2065, 60 L.Ed.2d 667 (1979). As often noted, preliminary injunctions may be issued at any point on a continuum along which the likelihood of success varies inversely with the potential of harm to the plaintiff. Id. In this case, the district court based its decision to grant a preliminary injunction on its conclusion that the Philippines had a substantial likelihood of success on both its RICO and pendent state claims, and that there was a “substantial danger” of irreparable harm. The court made no findings on the balance of relative hardships necessary to support an injunction at the opposite end of the spectrum.
The grant of a preliminary injunction may be reversed if the district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Sierra OnLine, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir.1984). Legal issues underlying the preliminary injunction decision are reviewed de novo. International Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1986).
I.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The defendants contend that the Republic’s RICO claims are so frivolous that they cannot form the basis of jurisdiction in the district court. But we view jurisdictional claims under an exceedingly generous standard at this stage of the proceedings. As we stated in Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir.1983), “the complaint must fulfill only two criteria: (1) it must ‘claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United States,’ and (2) the claim must not be ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, 457 U.S. 15, 21 n. 6 [102 S.Ct. 2202, 2206 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 639] (1982) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681, 682-83 [66 S.Ct. 773, 775, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939] (1946)).”
While generous, this standard is not toothless. We regularly uphold the dismissal of claims where they are so insubstantial that the district court plainly lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.1980); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.1974). However, we deem claims insubstantial only where the law is clear or where a plaintiff has persistently failed to allege an essential element. Under this narrow standard, we cannot conclude that all the RICO claims made by plaintiff here are frivolous. The law is neither so clear, nor are the allegations of the complaint so patently and irremediably defective, that we can say with confidence that plaintiff has failed to establish a colorable basis for jurisdiction in the district court. Assuming the truth of the matters alleged in the complaint, as we must, we find all of the elements of a RICO violation: the existence of a criminal enterprise, Complaint 111128, 29(b); the conduct of its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, id. 111129(a), 29(c), 30; and injury caused thereby, 1132. Plaintiff’s complaint seems to allege at least prima facie RICO violations by the Marcoses.1
Where, as here, plaintiff’s claim is based upon transactions that take place fully or partly outside the United States, we must make one further inquiry: whether our law was meant to reach the conduct in question insofar as it is extraterritorial in nature. See, e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 355 (9th Cir.1973); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir.1977). Here the alleged thefts by Mr. Marcos and his confederates took place in the Philippines and quite probably that conduct cannot be reached by U.S. law. However, plaintiff does not base its claim directly upon the alleged thefts in the Philippines. Its claim is based upon conduct that it charges took place in the United States: mail fraud and transportation of stolen property across international borders in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 2314, 2315.
[1479]*1479Assuming that the property in question is in fact stolen, the charged acts — all of which took place within the United States — would clearly violate U.S. law. Again, assuming that the allegations of the complaint are true, the violations appear to be sufficient predicate acts under RICO. When all is said and done, it may well prove otherwise. But at this early stage of the proceedings, where predicate acts are alleged to have been committed within the United States, we cannot say that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs RICO claims.
II.
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
A.
This is a highly unusual case. The current government of a friendly foreign nation is pursuing that nation’s former ruler, seeking to litigate in our courts the legality of his actions during more than 20 years in office. While Mr. Marcos had the title of president he was, in the words of Rafael Fernando, the West Coast representative of the Philippine Commission on Good Government, “the dictator of the Government of the Philippines and personally controlled the said government.” Declaration of Rafael Fernando in Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause (Fernando) U 7. During much of Mr. Marcos’ tenure in office, he governed by decree under a regime of martial law. Id. As plaintiff alleges, during this time the Marcoses were able “to conduct the affairs of the Philippines virtually unchecked.” Complaint H 59.
A few of Marcos’ alleged misdeeds, as charged in the complaint and the Fernando declaration, may amount to nothing more than common fraud or theft accomplished without the exercise of governmental authority. But the vast majority of the allegedly illegal acts are quite different in character; they are activities that Marcos could only have undertaken pursuant to his powers as President of the Philippines: expropriation of private property; creating public monopolies; “granting] government favors, contracts, licenses, loans, and other public benefits.” Fernando 118. In this regard, perhaps the most telling aspect of plaintiff’s case is its first claim for relief. Plaintiff there alleges that “the Philippines existed as a sovereign government and thus constituted a RICO ‘enterprise’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)” and that “[defendants conducted, or participated directly or indirectly in the conduct of the affairs of the Philippines through a pattern of racketeering activity____” Complaint 111128, 29. Plaintiff is thus claiming that the Philippine government headed by Marcos was a criminal enterprise under U.S. law.2
Moreover, plaintiff presents issues that are different in character, not merely in degree, from the normal case brought under RICO and the various state causes of action. Thus, paragraph 72 of the Complaint puts squarely in issue the manner in which Mr. Marcos discharged his responsibilities as President of the Philippines. Citing the oath of office Mr. Marcos took in 1965, plaintiff charges that he “entered into an implied contract with the Philippine government to use the power of the Presidency according to law, in good faith, and not for personal aggrandizement.” Paragraph 73 then charges that “Mr. Marcos breached this contract.”
Paragraph 51 of the complaint charges that Mr. and Mrs. Marcos made numerous misrepresentations “to the Philippines and its people,” with the result that they were allowed “to remain in power and positions of authority.” Paragraph 52 charges that “[pjlaintiff relied to its detriment on [these misrepresentations], by permitting them to remain in positions of power and authority for twenty years and by allowing, through ignorance, the plunder of the country.” Mr. Fernando, in his declaration, charges that the “amounts purloined by Mr. Marcos are of such significance as to affect the general economic conditions of the Republic of the Philippines and its people.” Fernando 1t 8.
[1480]*1480Plaintiffs case is a ringing indictment of Mr. Marcos’ conduct as President of the Philippines during his 20 years in office. As such, it challenges not merely individual misdeeds or indiscretions but the very way in which Mr. Marcos wielded governmental power, retained that power and ran the Philippine government. This raises a variety of serious and sensitive questions about the ability of our courts to adjudicate this issue, and the propriety of their doing so. In effect, we must consider whether our courts are the appropriate forum for adjudicating what appears to be at least in part a political dispute between the Philippines’ current government and its former ruler.
B.
Our jurisdiction in this case is based solely on RICO, a statute that does not authorize the court to grant injunctive relief. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1336, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987). Thus, as the district court properly recognized, if an injunction is to be issued at all, it must be on the basis of the pendent state claims. Nevertheless, probability of success on the RICO claims is not entirely irrelevant. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the court’s power to render meaningful relief after a trial on the merits. 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2947 (1973). If the federal claims are exceedingly weak, or subject to meritorious affirmative defenses, they are likely to succumb to a motion to dismiss or an early motion for summary judgment. In that event, the pendent state claims may well be subject to dismissal also. See, e.g., Kelley v. IBEW, 803 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir.1986); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 541 F.2d 226, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 1327, 51 L.Ed.2d 593 (1977) (court may not reach out to decide state law claims if court and litigants have not already spent considerable time and effort on the case).
For purposes of our discussion, we need not, however, differentiate between the state and federal causes of action because all of plaintiff’s claims hinge on certain key allegations of the complaint. See pp. 1474-75, supra. Although these allegations are made in elaborate detail, they have one common nucleus: Plaintiff is claiming that the Marcoses (with the help of their confederates) acquired substantially all of their wealth illegally. Thus, in order to establish the requisite predicate acts in the United States for purposes of RICO — mail fraud, wire fraud, transportation of stolen property — plaintiff must be able to show that the assets in question were in fact stolen or that the transactions involving wire and the mails involved property to which neither the Marcoses nor their confederates were legally entitled. Similarly, to establish a constructive trust under California law, plaintiff must show that the property in question was gained by “fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act.” Cal.Civ.Code § 2224 (West App.1987). To be entitled to an accounting, plaintiff must show that the defendants acquired the assets by fraud. K. King & G. Shuler Corp. v. King, 259 Cal.App.2d 383, 396, 66 Cal. Rptr. 330, 338 (1968). If plaintiff cannot show that the property was obtained illegally, all of its claims — state and federal — will fail.
While plaintiff has made sweeping allegations of illegality, it has not attempted to match particular illegal acts with specific property in California or elsewhere. Instead, plaintiff relies on what it calls a “net worth” analysis to show that virtually all of the Marcoses’ wealth was acquired illegally. Plaintiff asserts that Marcos had a net worth of $60,000 in 1966, a year after taking office; it claims that he now has a net worth over $1.5 billion. In the meantime, Marcos earned (and declared on his tax returns) income of some $337,000 from his salary as President of the Philippines. Plaintiff therefore argues that practically everything the Marcoses own must have been stolen and therefore belongs to the Philippines.
Plaintiff seeks to bolster this net worth analysis with the Fernando declaration. In his declaration, Mr. Fernando asserts that the Marcos presidency was marked by “widespread purloining of funds and properties which were and are the property of the Philippine government.” Fernando 118. Describing the illegal activity, Mr. Fernando states:
The said taking of Government properties was effected by a range of tech[1481]*1481ñiques, including but not limited to accepting payments, bribes, kickbacks, interests in business ventures, and other things of value in exchange for the grant of government favors, contracts, licenses, franchises, loans, and other public benefits; expropriating outright private property for the benefit of persons beholden to or fronting for Mr. Marcos, the said expropriation being at times effected by violence or the threat of violence or incarceration; arranging loans by the Philippine Government to private parties beholden to and fronting for Mr. Marcos; direct raiding of the public treasury; diverting loans, credits and advances from other governments intended for use by the Philippine Government; creating public monopolies placed in the hands of persons beholden to and fronting for Mr. Marcos. The said actions of the defendants were in violation of the laws of the Republic prohibiting malversation and corrupt practices.
Fernando 118. Mr. Fernando provides no direct evidence to support this litany of offenses; his only knowledge of these “facts” comes from “countless newspaper and firsthand accounts” relating them. Id.
In order to succeed under its “net worth” theory, plaintiff must show that tracing is unnecessary because practically all of the Marcoses’ wealth was obtained illegally. Plaintiff's theory breaks down if Marcos can show that he acquired a substantial portion of his wealth legally or if the court is unable to adjudicate the legality or illegality of a substantial portion of Marcos’ acquisitions. In that case, plaintiff would have the burden of linking up specific acts of illegality with specific property, something plaintiff has not attempted.
We note, without addressing them, defendants’ numerous challenges to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s prima facie case.3 We turn instead to what we consider to be the heart of this case: plaintiff’s assertion, and the district court’s assumption, that all of the Marcoses’ wealth must have been stolen. Specifically, we consider whether plaintiff’s multitudinous claims of illegality can all be adjudicated by the district court or whether, as Marcos strenuously contends, they are subject to dismissal under the related act of state and political question doctrines. If we determine that a substantial portion of Marcos’ conduct is likely to be shielded by one or both of these doctrines, plaintiff's net worth theory would collapse, and with it its probability of success on the merits, at least insofar as its case is now framed.
C.
In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S.Ct. 83, 84, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897), the Court pronounced concisely the act of state doctrine: “Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.” See also Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, 599 (N.Y.App.Div.1876) (“by the universal comity of nations and the established rules of international law, the courts of one country are bound to abstain from sitting in judgment on the acts of another government done within its own territory”). Although the doctrine has been modified in the intervening years, Underhill still expresses its essence as it is applied in our courts today.4
As the Court explained in Ban-co Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 84 S.Ct. 923, 938, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964), the doctrine has “ ‘constitutional’ underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and imple[1482]*1482ment particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations.” The doctrine, as developed by precedent, expresses a strong sense that in questioning the validity of foreign acts of state the judiciary may hinder this country’s international diplomacy and “embarrass the United States in the eyes of the world.” International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982).5
Plaintiff’s case implicates the act of state doctrine in its most fundamental sense. In order to resolve plaintiff’s various claims against Marcos, the court will have to adjudicate whether Marcos’ actions as President were lawful under Philippine law. A number of the acts plaintiff challenges are purely governmental ones, such as expropriation of property and creation of public monopolies. These were not merely the acts of Ferdinand Marcos, private citizen, while he happened to be president; they were an exercise of his authority as the country’s head of state and, as such, were the sovereign acts of the Philippines. As the Second Circuit recently noted, to the extent that “Marcos’s wealth was obtained through official expropriation decrees or public monopolies,” they were public acts. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 359.6
Moreover, resolution of various issues raised by plaintiff could interfere with the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of our government or otherwise entangle the judiciary in foreign affairs. Thus, it could well embarrass the United States for the court to hold, as plaintiff would have us do, that a foreign government that the United States recognized and considered its ally for many years, with which it entered into various treaties and otherwise had extensive dealings, was actually a criminal enterprise under our law. Also, this litigation may not be concluded for years. It is, therefore, difficult to predict what effects the court’s ruling will have on the political situation in the Philippines or on our relations with that country at that time. Our decision will be relatively innocuous only if it is in favor of the plaintiff, if our government’s attitude toward the Philippines is unchanged and if the current Philippine government is still in power.
Plaintiff nevertheless advances a variety of arguments to the effect that this doctrine is not applicable. We consider each of its contentions in turn.
1. Plaintiff first argues that, in the words of the district judge, “the court is [not] going to be asked to decide anything about the affairs of the government of the Philippines. The question is what did Mr. Marcos do with the assets and the property and the money that he shouldn’t have done.” Trans. June 16, 1986, at 19, E.R. at 84. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985); and Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1985). Both cases were libel suits by officials of foreign governments challenging news reports alleging that they had engaged in misconduct in the course of doing their jobs. Both officials denied committing the misconduct and the only question presented was whether they had in fact done so. In holding that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable, the DeRoburt and Sharon courts noted that validity of the acts was not at issue since everyone agreed that the acts, if committed, were illegal.7 The cases therefore resolved [1483]*1483themselves into a simple dispute about whether DeRoburt and Sharon in fact did what they were reported to have done. As the court noted in Sharon, “[t]he issue in this litigation is not whether such acts are valid, but whether they occurred.” 599 F.Supp. at 546.
Our case is quite different. At issue is not merely whether Marcos did what he is alleged to have done, but whether it was legal for him to do so as the country’s dictator. Or, to put the matter somewhat differently, plaintiff cannot establish that the Marcoses obtained all of their wealth illegally without calling into question the legality of many of Mr. Marcos’ acts as President of the Philippines. Unlike the DeRoburt and Sharon courts, the district court here would have to pass on the validity of Mr. Marcos’ acts, not merely determine whether he committed them.8
2. Plaintiff next argues that the act of state doctrine is inapplicable because Marcos’ acts, to the extent they were illegal under Philippine law, were ultra vires and therefore not “public acts ... [undertaken] in the exercise of governmental authority.” Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1867, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976) (opinion of White, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., and Burger, C.J.) (emphasis in original).9 This argument proves too much. Since the act of state doctrine prohibits inquiry into the legality of official governmental acts, such acts surely cannot be official only if they are legal. This theory, if accepted, would emasculate the act of state doctrine.
In Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.1940), the court rejected a similar request by a Spanish bank, backed by Spain’s current government, seeking to set aside a transfer of silver bullion by an official of the country’s prior government. Banco de España argued that the former Minister of Finance had been selling the silver in violation of Spanish law. The court refused to second-guess the legality of the Finance Minister’s action, noting as follows:
It should make no difference whether the foreign act is, under local law, partially or wholly, technically or fundamentally, illegal. No such distinction may be gleaned from the cases. So long as the act is the act of the foreign sovereign, it matters not how grossly the sovereign has transgressed its own laws.
Id., at 444. See also Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249-50 [1484]*1484(2d Cir.) (rejecting attack on Nazi confiscation based on failure to comply with German law), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772, 68 S.Ct. 88, 92 L.Ed. 357 (1947).10
Plaintiff argues, however, that Mr. Marcos’ actions were not the sovereign acts of the Philippines because they were not authorized by Philippine law. Banco de Espana rejected this very argument:
[Banco de España] contends that the acts, if they took place, were unlawful under Spanish law, that under Spanish law an illegal act by a public officer strips him of his official cloak and makes his act a private one, and that such a “private” act cannot be deemed governmental. But this is only a variation of the argument we have just rejected. By a “governmental act” is meant no more than a step physically taken by persons capable of exercising the sovereign authority of the foreign nation. The officials of the then-recognized Spanish government possessed such authority. If they purported to act in their official capacity, that physical fact precludes us from examining the validity of their acts under local law. The Spanish local law as a whole is of no concern to us, and it follows that we may not employ one doctrine of that law — that the illegal act of a public officer is deemed a private act — in order to gainsay the physical occurrence of an official act by an officer of the Spanish government.
114 F.2d at 444. Cf. West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir.1987) (court should, as a matter of comity, “presume that Mexican officials are acting in a manner consistent with the requirements of Mexican law”).
As plaintiff admits, Mr. Marcos was the country’s ruler for some two decades. He clearly was “capable of exercising the sovereign authority” of the Philippines during that time. In Underhill v. Hernandez, the Court noted that the act of state doctrine “[cannot] be confined to lawful or recognized governments____ The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force as a matter of fact.” 168 U.S. at 252, 18 S.Ct. at 84.11 This would seem to apply a fortiori to Mr. Marcos, who was the recognized head of the Philippine government throughout the relevant period. See DeRoburt, 733 F.2d at 703 (approving dismissal of third amended complaint because allegations, inter alia, that defendant falsely accused the president of Nauru of making secret and illegal loans to the Marshall Islands “clearly call into play the acts [sic] of state doctrine”); West, 807 F.2d at 828 (“[t]he public capacity of the actors involved ... may serve to trigger the act of state doctrine”).
3. Plaintiff advances the somewhat related argument that the act of state doctrine does not apply because the acts in question were not in the “public interests” of the Philippines, having been undertaken by Mr. Marcos for venal, immoral or selfish [1485]*1485purposes. The dissent agrees with plaintiff, apparently arguing that acts done by an official “for his own private personal gain” are unofficial acts which may be scrutinized by this court.12 Nelson Dissent at 1492-93.
Of course, not everything a public official does is an official act; to the extent Mr. Marcos engaged in actions as a private citizen, he is subject to suit like anyone else. See DeRoburt, 733 F.2d at 704. Thus, if he entered the public treasury at gunpoint and walked out with money or property belonging to the Philippines, he would not be protected by the act of state doctrine. However, if he gained access to the public monies by statute, decree, resolution, order, or some other “governmental act” as president, the act of state doctrine would be triggered. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 693-95, 96 S.Ct. at 1860-61; West, 807 F.2d at 828; Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 469, note 3 (TentDraft No. 7, 1986).
Once the acts in question are identified as governmental in character, our courts have uniformly refused to question the integrity or nobility of the reasons underlying them. See, e.g., Clayco Petrol. Corp. v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1983) (refusal to inquire whether foreign government’s award of oil concession motivated by bribery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 703, 79 L.Ed.2d 168 (1984). “[Sjuch inquiries by this court into the authenticity and motivation of the acts of foreign sovereigns would be the very sources of diplomatic friction and complication that the act of state doctrine aims to avert.” Occidental Petrol. Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92, 110 (C.D.Cal.1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 272, 34. L.Ed.2d 221 (1972), quoted with approval in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S.Ct. 156, 78 L.Ed.2d 144 (1983).
The governmental acts of a country’s chief executive necessarily reflect complex political and policy choices. That one of the motives behind a particular governmental act may have been selfish, or that it was intended to serve otherwise improper ends, does not make that act any less a pronouncement of the sovereign or render it any less entitled to respect as such from other government. See West, 807 F.2d at 828; Restatement § 469, comment 7. It would greatly weaken the act of state doctrine if parties could put in question the validity of official government acts simply by attacking the motives of the government officials who undertake them.
4. Plaintiff next advances the argument that, whatever force the act of state doctrine may have when it is invoked by the government of the country whose actions are questioned, it has little or no force here, where it is the Philippines itself that is asking us to look into the actions of its former dictator.13 The acquiescence of [1486]*1486the country’s current government, and the fact that the actions in question were taken by a government no longer in power, do have a bearing on the application of the act of state doctrine. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court hinted that this might be a relevant consideration, 376 U.S. at 428, 84 S.Ct. at 940, and one other court has so intimated. See Marcos, 806 F.2d at 359.
There is some reason for this. Where the country’s current government seeks an adjudication of these matters, there is obviously less of a possibility that our pronouncements will embarrass our relations with that government.14 But, just as the position of our own executive branch is not dispositive on the issue, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762, 92 S.Ct. 1808, 1810-11, 32 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972); Marcos, 806 F.2d at 358, so can we not give dispositive effect to the pronouncement of a foreign sovereign, particularly one with a stake in the current litigation. Banco de Espana, 114 F.2d at 444. Embarrassment of our relationship with a foreign government is, after all, only one reason underlying the act of state doctrine. As the court stated in Sabbatino, there are others. 376 U.S. at 427-37, 84 S.Ct. at 940-45. While the acquiescence — indeed anxious invitation — of the current Philippine government allays one concern, it heightens others, making us leery of judicial involvement in this dispute.
We cannot shut our eyes to the political realities that give rise to this litigation, nor to the potential effects of its conduct and resolution. Mr. Marcos and President Aquino represent only two of the competing political factions engaged in a struggle for control of the Philippines.15 While the struggle seems to be resolving itself in favor of President Aquino, this may not be the end of the matter.16 Only four years ago, the tables were turned, with Mr. Marcos in power and Mrs. Aquino and her husband in exile in the United States. While we are in no position to judge these things, we cannot rule out the possibility that the pendulum will swing again, or that some third force will prevail. What we can say with some certainty is that a pronouncement by our courts along the lines suggested by plaintiff would have a substantial effect on what may be a delicate political balance, as would a contrary pronouncement exonerating Mr. Marcos.
Moreover, litigation proceeds at its own pace and the answer, whatever it may be, may well come at a time most inopportune from the point of view of our foreign policy as it is then conceived.17 Judicial pronouncements that can have such effects surely implicate “the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.” Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28, 84 S.Ct. at 940. Absent express encouragement from the political branches of our government,18 see, e.g., [1487]*1487Jimenez, 311 F.2d at 558, we are reluctant to embark upon such an endeavor. As the Second Circuit recognized with respect to this controversy, “the plaintiffs claims necessarily require determinations that will directly and significantly affect American foreign relations.” Marcos, 806 F.2d at 352.
The dissent argues that we may not consider the foreign relations consequences of this litigation because “the executive branch has clearly spoken on the question of potential embarrassment to the United States.” Nelson Dissent at 1496. This assertion is based on statements made by the Second Circuit in Marcos, noting that the government had filed a statement supporting jurisdiction in that case, as well as in a case before the Court of International Trade. See Marcos, 806 F.2d at 356-57, 357 n. 3. The dissent deduces that the executive branch would take the same position in all other cases between the Philippines and the Marcoses, including ours. We are reluctant to accept this generalization.
In the first place, we do not know precisely what the executive branch said in those cases, nor the rationale for its position. No documents were filed by the State Department in our case and we do not have copies of those filed elsewhere. All we know about the State Department’s position comes from the opinion of the Second Circuit. We find that characterization far too nebulous to permit sweeping inferences about the position of the executive branch. Other than emphasizing the importance of our relations with the Philippines, the Declaration of Undersecretary of State Armacost “refers to the establishment of the official Presidential Commission on Good Government headed by former Philippine Senator Jovito Salonga and to the United States’ agreement to receive Senator Salonga at a diplomatic level.” Id. at 357 n. 3. The Second Circuit then concludes: “Undersecretary Armacost asserted that the Aquino government will view the United States’ actions on this matter as an important indicator of the future course of our bilateral relations and stated that it is in the foreign policy interests of ple United States to honor the Philippine government’s requests at the earliest possible time.” 806 F.2d at 357 n. 3 (emphasis added). Since the Armacost Declaration was not addressing the Second Circuit litigation but a case before the Court of International Trade, we find it impossible to deduce what “matter” Undersecretary Armacost refers to and what action is expected of the United States. Equally ambiguous is the reference to the “Philippine government’s requests” mentioned by Armacost. Since we do not know the context in which the Armacost declaration was filed, we have no way of knowing what Armacost was referring to. His mention of the Philippine Commission on Good Government gives us a hint, however. In the papers filed before us is a copy of one of President Aquino’s executive orders which sets forth the charter of that commission:
The Commission on Good Government is hereby authorized to request and appeal to foreign countries wherein any such assets or properties may be found to freeze them and otherwise prevent their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance, concealment or liquidation by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees, pending the outcome of appropriate proceedings in the Philippines to determine whether such assets or properties were acquired by such persons through improper or illegal use of funds belonging to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks, or financial institutions or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
President of the Philippines, Exec.Order No. 2 at 3 (March 12, 1986) (emphasis added). We assume that the requests to which Mr. Armacost refers are those mentioned in the commission’s charter, namely for foreign governments to freeze assets of the Marcoses while the matter of ownership is litigated in the Philippines. That is [1488]*1488precisely what happened in the Second Circuit.19
The Second Circuit case is materially different from ours in ways that are highly relevant to the application of the act of state doctrine. See n. 25 infra. Most significant, in that case “the district court will not be asked to try the basic issues accusing President Marcos of unlawful takings,” 806 F.2d at 361, since such matters are to be determined in the Philippines. In our case, these matters would be litigated here.20
5. Finally, we consider it significant that such law as there may be to apply in determining whether Marcos’ actions were legal is that of a foreign nation. As the Court noted in Sabbatino, “[a]n inquiry by United States courts into the validity of an act of an official of a foreign state under the law of that state would ... be exceedingly difficult____” 376 U.S. at 415 n. 17, 84 S.Ct. at 933 n. 17. Moreover, it is not the Philippines’ private law we would be interpreting, but important aspects of its public law. The question of whether Mr. Marcos properly invoked martial law, or whether he exercised it properly, if it has an answer in Philippine law at all, is no doubt of considerable importance and sensitivity to that country and its people. So is Mr. Marcos’ invocation of presidential immunity under Article VII, Section 17 of the Philippine Constitution in force at the time Mr. Marcos was president,21 a provision that, apparently, has been carried forward into the current constitution. Were we to answer this latter question, it would be as if Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), defining the immunity of American presidents, had been decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. As Sabbatino noted, such a determination “if wrongly made, would be likely to be highly offensive to the state in question.” 376 U.S. at 415 n. 17, 84 S.Ct. at 933 n. 17.
D.
In International Association of Machinists, we noted that “[t]he act of state doctrine is similar to the political question doctrine in domestic law.” 649 F.2d at 1358; see also Sharon, 599 F.Supp. at 547. Questions that appear to implicate one doctrine are sometimes best resolved by reference to the other. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 2857, 61 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979).
Thus, even if we put to one side the foreign affairs implications of any decision an American court may reach on the merits, and even if our own political branches were to pronounce their willingness for us to hear the case, we would still be faced [1489]*1489with the intractable problem of adjudicating the essentially political questions raised by plaintiffs complaint.
These problems lie at the very heart of the Republic’s case. Plaintiff asserts that “[o]n September 21, 1972 [Mr. Marcos] declared martial law. From and after the declaration of martial law, Mr. Marcos was the dictator of the Government of the Philippines and personally controlled the said government.” Fernando 117. In adjudicating plaintiff’s claims, our courts would have to determine the legality of the actions of a foreign head of state, exercising dictatorial powers under a reign of martial law. It is hard to imagine what judicially manageable standards the courts could apply in making such a determination. A dictator is a ruler holding absolute authority; he is generally subject to no legal constraints, only physical and political ones.22 Martial law constitutes the suspension of civil authority and invocation of rule by decree of a military commander.23
If, in adjudicating this dispute, the court were to accept plaintiff’s characterization, it is difficult to see what law to apply to Mr. Marcos’ actions. By its nature, dictatorial rule is arbitrary and unrestrained by legal authority; martial law is a suspension of the normal rule of law. Offensive as such absolute government may be to our sense of justice, no legal restraints can prevail against dictatorial power. A dictator can do whatever he can get away with. A court of law in this country simply cannot second-guess how that power is exercised. See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 254, 18 S.Ct. at 85.
Plaintiff is in no better position if it seeks to challenge Mr. Marcos’ invocation of martial law and assumption of dictatorial power. Again, there are no judicially manageable standards for us to apply in second-guessing that decision. Just as we cannot second-guess the outcome of an election, or the success of a revolution in a foreign country, see id. at 252-53, 18 S.Ct. at 84-85, so can we not adjudicate whether Mr. Marcos was within his rights in asserting dictatorial control over the Philippines starting in 1972.
We must take as given that Mr. Marcos was the country’s president, that he was recognized as its head of state by our government,24 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 311, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918), and that, as plaintiff so bluntly admits, he and his wife were “permitted ... to remain in positions of power and to conduct the affairs of the Philippines virtually unchecked.” Complaint 1159. Whether the Philippine people so permitted the Marcoses to rule them out of ignorance, because they were misled, because they considered it to be in their self-interest, or because they were powerless to do otherwise, is something we do not know and have no way of finding out. It is simply beyond the capacity of our courts to adjudicate.
E.
In light of these considerations, we hold that the district court erred in concluding [1490]*1490that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its state claims, or its federal claims for that matter. To succeed under those claims as they are now presented, plaintiff would have to establish that practically all of Mr. Marcos’ wealth was stolen. In light of plaintiff’s own claims and assertions, we believe that it will be unable to do so because, as to many of the assets in question, adjudication will be barred by the act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine or both. Since plaintiff has not sought to trace specific assets to specific alleged misdeeds, the exclusion of large portions of Mr. Marcos’ wealth from adjudication will defeat plaintiff’s net worth analysis, and with it, its case. In these circumstances, we cannot even say that the Republic has the “fair chance of success on the merits” needed to remand for a balancing of the hardships. See Benda, 584 F.2d at 315.25
Conclusion
The order granting the preliminary injunction is reversed and the preliminary injunction is ordered vacated. The case is remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. To avoid duplication of effort, the panel retains jurisdiction over any further appeals in this case.