CADWALADER, J.
In December last, a convention of delegates, whose election had been provided for by the Legislature of South Carolina, proclaimed her independence of the Constitutional Government of the United States. This revolutionary attempt has been followed by similar acts of such conventions in ten other States. The eleven States are contiguous. A revolutionary Constitutional Confederation has been organized in them under the usurped authority of these conventions, with a co-operation, or acquiescence, of those administering the former State Governments. Incidental hostilities against the United States, including the capture of some of their forts, have been followed by organized opposing hostilities and counter hostilities on so large a scale, that the present proportions of the contest resemble those of a general war. In the prosecution of the naval hostilities on the [480] part of the United' States, one of their frigates, on the 12th of May last, off Charleston, South Carolina, captured this vessel, then on a voyage from Liverpool to Charleston. She was brought for adjudication into this district, where a libel, praying her condemnation as a prize, has been filed on behalf of the United States. The material averments of the libel, which is more special in its form than has been usual in prize cases, are, that she attempted to violate the blockade of Charleston, and that she is the property of insurgents, traitors, and public enemies. If she is confiscable on the latter ground, the question of blockade will not arise.
A claim, with a prayer of restitution, has been exhibited on behalf of her alleged proprietors, who are described in the claim as of the city of Charleston, in the State of South Carolina, and citizens of the United States. They are thus, by their own showing, commercial residents of South Carolina. The question which thus arises, independently of that of the blockade, is whether, in the present .hostile relation of South Carolina, a resident of that State can sustain a proprietary claim of restitution in a prize court of the United States.
The points upon which this question depends are to be ascertained, not from reasons which may have been assigned, or opinions entertained, by the naval captors, nor from orders which they may have received from the President, or from the Navy Department, nor from the President’s proclamations, but from the allegations and proofs in the cause according tO' the rules of proceeding of the Court.
One of the purposes of naval warfare is to diminish the power of hostile governments, or of other hostile organizations, by the indiscriminate maritime.capture of the private property of all persons residing in places within hostile dominion, or in permanent or temporary hostile occupation. The capture and confiscation of such property, by destroying or suppressing the maritime trade of such places, diminishes their wealth, and thus reduces the power of their hostile rulers. The liberation of the property when captured, [481] whether the individual residents who owned it are personally well or ill affected in feeling’ towards the government of the captors, would restore its value in wealth to the hostile place.
In prize courts, therefore, the property of every such resident, when captured at sea, has usually been regarded as confiscable. (3 Rob. 18, 26, 27, 28, and Appendix, B., p. 8.) The rule applies, though he may owe a duty of allegiance to the captor’s government, and may, while in the hostile place, have been perfectly loyal in his own feeling and conduct. After the declaration of war against England, in 1812, a citizen of the United States, residing in England, before any knowledge of the war, shipped merchandise for the United States, which, .having been captured on the voyage, was condemned as prize. The Supreme Court, said: “Although he cannot be considered an enemy, in the strict sense of the word, yet he is deemed such with reference to the seizure of so much of his property concerned in the trade of the enemy, as is connected witli his residence. It is found adhering to the enemy. Although not criminally so unless he engages in acts of hostility.” (The Venus, 8 Cranch, 280.) If, on receiving information of the war, he had returned to the United States, leaving in England merchandise bought by him before the war, and it had afterwards been shipped for transmission to him, it would, if captured on the voyage, have been confiscable as English property. This appears from the cases of Escott, (1 Bos. & Pul. 349, 350, in the note; 1 Rob. 203; 8 D. & E. 557; 16 Johns. 459, 460,) and the Lady Jane, (1 Rob. 202; 8 D. & E. 557). Those predatory maritime hostilities which the law of war sanctions, could not be prosecuted with effect if this rule were not applied with inexorable rigor.
It has been thus applied, with regret, in cases of the temporary hostile occupation of places by an invading force, and in other cases of hardship where the intentions of the parties were such as might have entitled them to indulgence. During the war of our Independence, in the course of the [482] hostilities between France and England, some of the British West India possessions, including Grenada, were captured by the French, and held by them under temporary subjection. The hope constantly entertained by the British public, and by the Islanders, who were “still British in principle and affection, and many of them by actual residence,” was that these islands would soon revert to the British dominion. The previous British monopoly of their trade under the restrictive colonial system, had made them dependent upon Great Britain for supplies of absolute necessity. The French partiality for their own islands induced them to withhold such supplies. In this necessitous condition of the sufferers, the question stated in an English prize court was, “whether it was so unlawful for a British subject to send supplies to the British plantations in the Grenada Islands, whilst under the misfortune of a temporary subjection to the French, as that a confiscation of the supplies so sent should be the just and legal consequence of his misconduct.” An intended supply of provisions owned in, and shipped from, Ireland, having been captured on the voyage, this question was answered in the affirmative. The British Privy Council affirmed, on appeal, a sentence confiscating the cargo as constructively French property, notwithstanding its actual Irish ownership. (The Bella Guidita, 1 Rob. 207 to 209, and 209, 210 in the note; 8 D. & E. 559; 16 Johns. 460; see 4 Wheaton, 254; 2 Gallison, 501; 9 Howard, 615; 1 Dodson, 451.) The result would, of course, have been the same if the cargo had, when shipped, been owned by the parties in Grenada whose wants were to have been supplied, and this though they had, in affection, been the most loyal subjects of the British Crown. (The Hoop, 1 Rob. 198, The Lady Jane, Ib. 202.)
If, during an organized hostile contest like the present, against an established Government, rules of decision different from those which have been stated prevailed in the prize courts of such a Government, it could not effectively prosecute maritime hostilities to suppress rebellion or insurrection. [483] The question is whether any different rules of public law determine the question of confiscability during such a contest.
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CADWALADER, J.
In December last, a convention of delegates, whose election had been provided for by the Legislature of South Carolina, proclaimed her independence of the Constitutional Government of the United States. This revolutionary attempt has been followed by similar acts of such conventions in ten other States. The eleven States are contiguous. A revolutionary Constitutional Confederation has been organized in them under the usurped authority of these conventions, with a co-operation, or acquiescence, of those administering the former State Governments. Incidental hostilities against the United States, including the capture of some of their forts, have been followed by organized opposing hostilities and counter hostilities on so large a scale, that the present proportions of the contest resemble those of a general war. In the prosecution of the naval hostilities on the [480] part of the United' States, one of their frigates, on the 12th of May last, off Charleston, South Carolina, captured this vessel, then on a voyage from Liverpool to Charleston. She was brought for adjudication into this district, where a libel, praying her condemnation as a prize, has been filed on behalf of the United States. The material averments of the libel, which is more special in its form than has been usual in prize cases, are, that she attempted to violate the blockade of Charleston, and that she is the property of insurgents, traitors, and public enemies. If she is confiscable on the latter ground, the question of blockade will not arise.
A claim, with a prayer of restitution, has been exhibited on behalf of her alleged proprietors, who are described in the claim as of the city of Charleston, in the State of South Carolina, and citizens of the United States. They are thus, by their own showing, commercial residents of South Carolina. The question which thus arises, independently of that of the blockade, is whether, in the present .hostile relation of South Carolina, a resident of that State can sustain a proprietary claim of restitution in a prize court of the United States.
The points upon which this question depends are to be ascertained, not from reasons which may have been assigned, or opinions entertained, by the naval captors, nor from orders which they may have received from the President, or from the Navy Department, nor from the President’s proclamations, but from the allegations and proofs in the cause according tO' the rules of proceeding of the Court.
One of the purposes of naval warfare is to diminish the power of hostile governments, or of other hostile organizations, by the indiscriminate maritime.capture of the private property of all persons residing in places within hostile dominion, or in permanent or temporary hostile occupation. The capture and confiscation of such property, by destroying or suppressing the maritime trade of such places, diminishes their wealth, and thus reduces the power of their hostile rulers. The liberation of the property when captured, [481] whether the individual residents who owned it are personally well or ill affected in feeling’ towards the government of the captors, would restore its value in wealth to the hostile place.
In prize courts, therefore, the property of every such resident, when captured at sea, has usually been regarded as confiscable. (3 Rob. 18, 26, 27, 28, and Appendix, B., p. 8.) The rule applies, though he may owe a duty of allegiance to the captor’s government, and may, while in the hostile place, have been perfectly loyal in his own feeling and conduct. After the declaration of war against England, in 1812, a citizen of the United States, residing in England, before any knowledge of the war, shipped merchandise for the United States, which, .having been captured on the voyage, was condemned as prize. The Supreme Court, said: “Although he cannot be considered an enemy, in the strict sense of the word, yet he is deemed such with reference to the seizure of so much of his property concerned in the trade of the enemy, as is connected witli his residence. It is found adhering to the enemy. Although not criminally so unless he engages in acts of hostility.” (The Venus, 8 Cranch, 280.) If, on receiving information of the war, he had returned to the United States, leaving in England merchandise bought by him before the war, and it had afterwards been shipped for transmission to him, it would, if captured on the voyage, have been confiscable as English property. This appears from the cases of Escott, (1 Bos. & Pul. 349, 350, in the note; 1 Rob. 203; 8 D. & E. 557; 16 Johns. 459, 460,) and the Lady Jane, (1 Rob. 202; 8 D. & E. 557). Those predatory maritime hostilities which the law of war sanctions, could not be prosecuted with effect if this rule were not applied with inexorable rigor.
It has been thus applied, with regret, in cases of the temporary hostile occupation of places by an invading force, and in other cases of hardship where the intentions of the parties were such as might have entitled them to indulgence. During the war of our Independence, in the course of the [482] hostilities between France and England, some of the British West India possessions, including Grenada, were captured by the French, and held by them under temporary subjection. The hope constantly entertained by the British public, and by the Islanders, who were “still British in principle and affection, and many of them by actual residence,” was that these islands would soon revert to the British dominion. The previous British monopoly of their trade under the restrictive colonial system, had made them dependent upon Great Britain for supplies of absolute necessity. The French partiality for their own islands induced them to withhold such supplies. In this necessitous condition of the sufferers, the question stated in an English prize court was, “whether it was so unlawful for a British subject to send supplies to the British plantations in the Grenada Islands, whilst under the misfortune of a temporary subjection to the French, as that a confiscation of the supplies so sent should be the just and legal consequence of his misconduct.” An intended supply of provisions owned in, and shipped from, Ireland, having been captured on the voyage, this question was answered in the affirmative. The British Privy Council affirmed, on appeal, a sentence confiscating the cargo as constructively French property, notwithstanding its actual Irish ownership. (The Bella Guidita, 1 Rob. 207 to 209, and 209, 210 in the note; 8 D. & E. 559; 16 Johns. 460; see 4 Wheaton, 254; 2 Gallison, 501; 9 Howard, 615; 1 Dodson, 451.) The result would, of course, have been the same if the cargo had, when shipped, been owned by the parties in Grenada whose wants were to have been supplied, and this though they had, in affection, been the most loyal subjects of the British Crown. (The Hoop, 1 Rob. 198, The Lady Jane, Ib. 202.)
If, during an organized hostile contest like the present, against an established Government, rules of decision different from those which have been stated prevailed in the prize courts of such a Government, it could not effectively prosecute maritime hostilities to suppress rebellion or insurrection. [483] The question is whether any different rules of public law determine the question of confiscability during such a contest.
In this contest, the purpose of the revolted Confederates is to establish their independence of the Constitutional Union, and the purpose of the United States to maintain this Union inviolate.
The States which compose the Constitutional Union are not, with reference to it, either foreign or independent States. The several States are, it is true, independent of one another. They are also independent of the Government of the United States, except for such purposes as the Constitution specifies. But, for all the specific purposes for which it was adopted, the States are, with reference to the United States, dependent and subordinate, and not foreign States. In the Constitution, the word “foreign,” occurring in five clauses of the original instrument, and once in the amendments, is always used in Such a sense as to exclude its applicability to a State of the Union, or to anything appertaining to one. The States, therefore, though for some purposes foreign to one another, are for all national purposes embraced in the Constitution, united under a Government which is both independent and supreme. (6 Cranch, 136; 6 Wheaton, 381; 2 Peters, 590; 12 Peters, 720; 21 Howard, 517.)
The contest is thus an internal war, as distinguished from one of those hostile contests between established and mutually recognized governments, which are called foreign wars. The several acts which, in the respective Conventions of the revolted States, instituted the revolutionary movement, have been called Ordinances of Secession. The States in which these ordinances of attempted secession were promulgated, have also been called Seceded States. These phrases might mislead if the revolutionary character of the movement called Secession were excluded from its definition. The phrase, a Seceded State, might then imply that the attempted secession had been consummated, either in fact or in law. A careless use of the phrase, right of revolution, has often con[484] founded its meaning, and that of the phrase, power of revolution. A revolution must have been consummated as an act of power before the question of its rightfulness can be judicially considered.
Therefore the result alone of this intestine war is to determine whether the power exists. Its existence or nonexistence appears to be the sole question in the contest. Even governments which are not parties in such a contest cannot, without violating rules of public law, recognize the existence of a right of revolution in any case in which its assertion has not already been sustained by a sufficient power to vindicate and establish it effectively. (7 Howard, 1.) If the authority of an established government has been suspended in a part of its territory by insurgents, who have temporarily substituted a revolutionary government in it, other governments which are not parties to the contest cannot, without a breach of international decorum, declare precipitately that the case is that of civil war, as distinguished from rebellion or unorganized war. But if civil war, in truth, is its leg-al character, such other governments may lawfully treat the revolted insurgents, not as mere pirates or outlaws, but as entitled, in the war, to the same immunities as ordinary belligerants in a foreign war. This was done by the Government of the United States in the case of the revolted Spanish-American colonists when the proper time for deciding upon it arrived. But, in cases of revolutionary civil war, governments not parties to the contest cannot, without violating the rules of public law, institute conventional, or diplomatic, or other friendly relations with revolutionary governments, until their permanence has been established, either through their complete belligerent success, or through the old government’s acquiescence, or continued inaction, or hopeless belligerent feebleness. Under this head of diplomacy many complicated questions between the representatives of superseded powers and foreign governments have arisen. But such disputable questions do not arise in judicial tribunals of the former governments. Neither the power [485] nor the right of revolt against a government can be asserted in its own courts. In England, the didactic essays and forensic arguments in support of the revolution of 1688 have been based upon its consummation as well as upon its asserted justice. The judicial opinions in support of it were, at its date, founded entirely upon its consummation. The technical reasoning on which they rested was, at first if not at last, quite as refined as it was practical. A criterion of the consummation of a revolution effected by the forcible deposition of an English king had been that the courts of law within the realm were no longer held in his name. The death of a king- had, until the statute 1 Ed. 6, ch. 7, discontinued all pending proceedings in these courts. (7 Co. 29, 30.) His deposition by force had, when consummated, the same consequence, in this respect, as his death. (Year B. 10 Ed. 4, fol. 13 (a,) or 49 H. 6, pl. 1, Bl. Com. I., 249.) Records in the Fcedera show that a reigning king, when he crossed the sea, had usually deputed a viceroy to- administer the government of England until his return; and a record in Rastall (544 (b) pl. 8, see Skin. 271) shows that when this was omitted, the king’s absence from the realm had, in the discontinuance of process, the same effect as his death. When James II, in December, 1688, crossed the sea without making any delegation of an authority to administer the government in his absence, the argument of the supporters of the revolution was that, as the courts of justice could not be lawfully held, he had abdicated the government, and that the throne was therefore vacant when the new king and queen afterwards accepted the crown. A former crown lawyer was afterwards removed by the new government from his office, for questioning the soundness of this argument, and refusing to carry it out in one of its practical consequences. (12 St. Tr. 1269, 1270.) It received the sanction of judicial opinions-, and was confirmed by declaratory legislation. (Skin. 271, 3 Mod. 252, 253; 1 W. & M. St. 1 c. 4, and 1 W. & M. St. 2 c. 1, 3 Lev. 283, 2 Ventr. 185, 193, 197.) In the next century, our Declaration of Independence, [486] and the belligerent success of this revolutionary movement, established the transformation of British colonies into sovereign States. Our own judicial tribunals, of course, dated this change of government from the time at which it was proclaimed. But British, tribunals do not recognize it as having occurred until the subsequent pacification.
In 1794, in an English court, composed of most eminent judg-es appointed by a special commission, a leading counsel having observed “that a people had a right to alter their government,” the Court said: “That proposition, under certain circumstances, may be true; but it ought not to have been introduced into a court of justice bound to administer the law of the existing Government and to suffer no innovation upon it.” (24 St. Tr. 1371.) The Supreme Court of the United States have often said, in effect, that the consideration of political questions, belongs, in the first instance, to other departments of the government than the judicial. When such questions are not involved immediately in the treaty-making power, and are not affected by any provision of the Constitution, or legislation of the government, they may, so far as its foreign relations are concerned, be determinable, to some extent, conformably with established rules of public law, by the President, through diplomatic intercourse or otherwise. But no. question as to any political relation of the government of the Constitutional Union to one of the States, can be determined by the President, in any mode, for any purpose whatever.
None of'the departments., or organs of the government, can ever lawfully recognize the existence of a right in one of the States to secede from this Union independently or distinguishably from a power to consummate such a revolution by hostile force; and no. question as to the existence of such a power, as distinguished from right, can be entertained in the judicial or in any executive department of the government. To which of its departments the consideration of such a question, if it should ever arise, might belong, is not the present inquiry. That secession, so called, is neither more [487] nor less than attempted, as distinguished from consummated revolution, has been sufficiently shown.
The foregoing remarks do not suffice to define the legal character of the contest in question. It is a civil war, as distinguished from such unorganized intestine war as occurs in the case of a mere insurrectionary rebellion.
Civil war may occur where a nation without an established government is divided into opposing hostile factions, each contending for the acquisition of an exclusive administration of her government. If a simple case of this kind should occur at this day, the governments of nations, not parties to the contest, might regard it as peculiarly one of civil war. As between the contending factions, themselves, however, neither could easily regard their hostile opponents in the contest otherwise than as mere insurgents engaged in an unorganized rebellion. Thus, in the language, of Sir M. Hale, every success of either party would subject all hostile opponents of the conquerer to the penalties of treason. A desire to prevent the frequency of such a result was the origin of the rule of law, that allegiance is due to any peaceably established g'overnment, though it may have originated in usurpation. The Statute of 11 H. 7, c. 1, (A. D. 1494,) excusing an English subject who has yielded obedience, or has even rendered military service, to a ruler who was king in fact, though not in law, was declaratory of a previous principle of judicial decision. (Br. Treason pl., 10, cites 9 E. 4, 12, should be 9 E. 4, fol. 1, b. pl. 2; Hawkins Bk., 1, ch. 17, sects. 10 to 16; Foster, 188, 396 to 403; 3 Inst. 7.) It has already been stated that a king, in whose name justice was administered in the courts of law, was usually regarded as in actual possession of the government.
Civil war of another kind occurs where an organized hostile' faction is contending against an established government whose laws are still administered in all parts of its territory, except places in the actual military or naval occupation of insurgents or their adherents. In such a case, the question has been, whether a place in the actual military occupation [488] of the revolutionary faction, or of its adherents, may, under the law of war, be treated by that government as if the contest was a foreign war, and the place occupied by public enemies. In the case of a maritime blockade of such a place, the affirmative of this question was decided in England in the year 1836. It had previously been so decided by the Supreme Tribunal of Marine at Lisbon. (3 Scott, 201; 2 Bingh. N. C., 781.)
In the opinion of Grotius, Demosthenes had, in the case of the Thracian Chersonese, correctly stated the rule of public law to be that, wherever judicial remedies are not enforceable by a government against its opponents, the proper mode of restoring its authority is war. (De Jur. Bel. et P. Proleg., § 23.) The opinion of Grotius has given to this case, in which the views of Demosthenes prevailed at Athens, the force of a modern precedent. The Chersonese was a dependency of Athens when other parts of Thrace were under the dominion of Macedonia. The city of Cardia, in the Chersonese, resisted the Athenian authority. Deiopeithes, the Athenian commander in the Chersonese, was prevented from reducing the Cardians to submission through the interference of Philip of Macedón— then professedly at peace with Athens. — who sent a military force to their assistance. Deiopeithes, considering this measure an act of hostility on the part of Philip, at once, without waiting for instructions from Athens, invaded and ravaged parts of Macedonian Thrace. Philip complained to the Athenians of this, conduct of Deiopeithes. Demosthenes, in sustaining it, avoided assuming a defensive position as to the previously intended subjugation by Deio-peithes, of the Cardians, but incidentally justified it upon reasons which would have sanctioned the prosecution of hostilities against them on the same footing as if the war had been, as to them, a foreign one. Dismissing from consideration the charges against persons whom the judicial administration of the laws could reach, and who might, at any time, be judicially prosecuted, he contrasted their case [489] with that of those whom the laws could, not thus reach, saying' that attempts to enforce like remedies against them would only disorder and confuse the administration of the public affairs. “Against those whom the laws cannot reach,” said he, “we must proceed as we oppose our public enemies, by levying armies, equipping and setting afloat navies, and raising contributions for the prosecution of hostilities.” So an English statesman in a parliamentary debate upon a judicial question, said in the year 1696: — -“You must provide for the Government, and when you cannot do it by course of law, then armies must do it when the courts are shut.” (Speech of Harley, in Fenwick’s Case, 13 St. Tr., 706.)
This doctrine is of obvious applicability to civil war of a third kind, which occurs where the exercise of an established Government’s jurisdiction, has been revolution-arily suspended in one or more territorial districts, whose willing or unwilling submission to the revolutionary rule prevents the execution of the suspended Government’s laws in them, except at points occupied by its military or naval forces. The present contest exemplifies a civil war of this kind. It was also, with specific differences, exemplified in the respective contests which resulted in the independence of the United Netherlands and of the United States.
The particular consideration of the legal character of the contest in question may be prefaced by a reference to a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, where a collision having occurred between the judicial powers of the Union, and of one of the States, Judge Johnson, who concurred in the Court’s judgment, said: “The General Government must cease to exist whenever it loses the power of protecting itself in the exercise of its constitutional powers. Force which acts upon the physical powers of man, or judicial process which addresses itself to his moral principles or his fears, are the only means to which Governments can resort in the exercise of their authority. The former is happily unknown to our Constitution, except as far as it shall be sanctioned by the latter. But, let the latter be obstructed in [490] its progress by an opposition which it cannot overcome, or put by, and the resort must be to the former, or Government is no more.” (1 Wheaton, 363.)
Within the limits of two of the States in which so called Ordinances of Secession have been proclaimed, the execution of the laws of the United States has not been wholly suppressed. They are enforceable in the Western judicial district of Virginia, and perhaps in the adjacent Eastern district of Tennessee. In the other nine States which profess to have seceded, including" South Carolina, those laws are not at present enforceable any where.
The Constitution of the United States prohibits the enactment by Congress of a bill of attainder, and secures, in all criminal prosecutions, to the accused, the right to a speedy public trial by jury, of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district must have been previously ascertained by law. Therefore, if a treasonable or other breach of allegiance is committed within the limits of one of these nine States, it is not at present punishable in any Court of the United States. This was practically shown in a recent case. (Greiner’s Case, ante, p. 451) War, is consequently, the only means of self-redress to which the United States can, in such a case, resort for the restoration of the constitutional authority of their Government.
The rule of the common law is, that, when the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the courts of justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists, and hostilities may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the Government were foreign enemies invading the land. The converse is also regularly true, so that when the courts of a government are open it is ordinarily a time of peace. But though the courts be open, if they are. so- obstructed and overawed that the laws cannot be peaceably enforced, there might, perhaps, be cases in which this converse application of the rule would not be admitted. (1 Knapp, 346, 360, 361; 1 Hale, P. C. 347; Co. Litt. 249, b.)
[491] The present case is one in which the courts are in the strongest sense closed. That such a war as the present should be restricted in the modes of its prosecution, within limits more narrow than foreign wars, would frustrate its purpose, and place the former established government on an unequal footing with its hostile opponents. The doubt heretofore suggested has been, whether the former government has not, in such a contest, greater belligerent privileges than in a foreign war. By a treaty between England and the States General, their merchant vessels might, when England was at war, carry her enemies’ goods without their being liable to capture. In the war of American Independence, it was decided in an English prize court that this treaty did not exempt the ships and goods of rebellious Americans, carried in Dutch merchant vessels, from conhs-cability. (The Aletta, cited 1 Hay and M. 13.)