SNEED, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner challenges the actions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in rejecting portions of the State of Idaho’s implementation plan under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857, et seq. (Supp. 1977), and substituting therefor its own regulations.
See
40 Fed.Reg. 53584 (1975). The rejected portions of the Idaho implementation plan deal with the control of sulfur dioxide (S02) from the Idaho plant of petitioner. The petitioner’s challenge relies on several grounds. While we find in favor of the Administrator on various legal and procedural issues, we remand this proceeding to the EPA for further consideration of the technological feasibility of certain modifications of petitioner’s smelter operations which would be required by the substituted regulations.
I.
History of the Case.
Bunker Hill’s Kellogg, Idaho operations include lead and zinc smelters that emit substantial amounts of S02 gas. Some of the S02 gas presently is vented directly to the atmosphere; the remainder is treated in three acid plants — two servicing the zinc operations, and the third handling the lead smelter. There is no dispute that, as presently operated, Bunker Hill’s Idaho plant is
not meeting the federal ambient air quality standards for SO2.
The primary issue before us is what modifications Bunker Hill must make in its operations in order to satisfy the requirements of the Clean Air Act. To understand this issue the administrative proceedings culminating in this challenge will be outlined and thereafter the focus will be upon the technological feasibility of the control technology made necessary by EPA’s substituted regulations. Our disposition of this challenge will conclude with a discussion of certain other issues raised by petitioner and with our instructions pertaining to the procedure on remand to the EPA.
On January 3, 1975, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) adopted a regulation requiring Bunker Hill to “capture” 72 percent of its SO2 emissions;
the IDHW had decided, after lengthy hearings, that this percentage emission control was the maximum percentage feasible under currently available technology.
This level of emission control would be achieved through a series of specific emission limitations: (i) a 4000 parts per million (ppm) SO2 limitation on the emissions from each of Bunker Hill’s acid plants and from its zinc plant main stack, based on eight-hour averages; (ii) a 100 tons per day limitation on emissions from the lead plant main stack; and (iii) a 1200 tons per week limitation on emissions from the entire smelting complex.
Since even this level of emission control would not meet the ambient air quality standards, the Idaho plan also would require Bunker Hill to supplement its control program with whatever dispersion enhancement techniques
prove necessary to meet these standards. Bunker Hill would be held responsible for violations in the Kellogg Valley of any federal ambient air quality standard, although, in the case of the primary annual standard,
a 30-day investigation period would be provided for purposes of determining whether other undetected and uncontrolled sources might have been the actual cause of the violation, in which case Bunker Hill would not be held liable. Finally, Bunker Hill would be required to conduct research and development aimed at improving emission control techniques; as these techniques became feasible, Bunker Hill’s emission limitations would be tightened.
The EPA refused to approve Idaho’s proposed emission limitations and instead substituted standards that would guarantee 82 percent control. On the basis of a study commissioned by EPA of Bunker Hill’s operation, together with other evidence, the EPA held that 82 percent, rather than 72 percent, was the maximum level of control technologically and economically feasible for Bunker Hill. The EPA study (prepared for EPA by Mr. Tim Browder, an expert in SO2 control technology — hereinafter referred to as the Browder Study) contended that various efficiency problems presently plaguing Bunker Hill’s control process could be solved by modifying Bunker Hill’s acid plants. In particular, the Browder Study argued that adding sulfur burners to the acid plants would guarantee sustained autothermality.
Under the EPA regulations, SO2 emissions from Bunker Hill’s acid plants would not be allowed to exceed 2600 ppm on a 6-hour average;
emissions from the main lead stack would not be allowed to exceed 2000 ppm; and a 680 tons per day limitation would be imposed on the entire Kellogg operation. Since even 82 percent control would not guarantee attainment of the air quality standards, dispersion enhancement techniques would again be required. As under the Idaho provisions, Bunker Hill would be held accountable for any violations of the federal ambient air quality standards; however, the EPA made no provision for a 30-day investigation period. Again, Bunker Hill would be required to carry on a research and development program with the objective of raising over the years the level of constant emission control.
Bunker Hill focuses its attack on the EPA’s determination that Bunker Hill can feasibly achieve 82 percent emission control. First, it argues that the EPA was bound by the contrary conclusion of the IDHW that only a 72 percent control level is feasible. Second, even assuming that the EPA was free to reconsider the question of the maximum feasible control level, Bunker Hill argues that the EPA’s determination was “arbitrary and capricious” and was marred by
various procedural irregularities. Bunker Hill also attacks the EPA’s decision to eliminate the 30-day review period provided for in the original Idaho regulations.
Our study of the administrative record cast considerable doubt on whether the sulfur burner system proposed in the Browder Study, a necessary element in EPA’s proposed 82 percent emission control standard, is indeed technologically feasible.
In particular, Bunker Hill’s principal expert witness contended that sulfur burners could not track, or be coordinated with, the wide fluctuations in SO2 concentration that plague Bunker Hill’s smelter gases. Mr. Browder failed to respond fully and satisfactorily. However, because of the complexity of the technological issues involved and the importance of clearly establishing the deficiencies in the Administrator’s deliberations before remanding the regulations, we requested a supplemental brief from the EPA clarifying Browder’s sulfur burner proposal;
a reply brief was requested from Bunker Hill and both parties were allowed to augment the record.
The EPA was also granted permission to file a response to Bunker Hill’s reply brief.
In reviewing administrative regulations, the courts generally are forbidden from conducting a full-fledged and independent evidentiary hearing.
See, e. g., Independent Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz,
526 F.2d 228, 239 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied,
424 U.S. 966, 96 S.Ct. 1461, 47 L.Ed.2d 733 (1976). Neither can the courts uphold regulations on the basis of post-hoc rationalizations offered by the agency.
See, e. g., Local 814, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB,
546 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Bradley v. Weinberger,
483 F.2d 410, 414-15 (1st Cir. 1973).
See generally Camp v. Pitts,
411 U.S. 138,142-43, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 420-21, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). But in the often difficult task of reviewing administrative regulations, the courts are not straight jacketed to the original record in trying to make sense of complex technical testimony, which is often presented in administrative proceedings without ultimate review by nonexpert judges in mind. Here, the augmenting materials were merely explanatory of the original record. No new rationalization of the SO2 regulations was offered by the EPA. Instead, the augmenting materials clarified a dispute that we felt was less than clear from the original record and were clearly admissible.
Despite this clarification in dealing with a technical subject with respect to which we are not experts and ever mindful of our limited authority in reviewing the Administrator’s actions, we nonetheless reluctantly are compelled, on the basis of the record as augmented, to conclude that the Administrator has not “exercised a reasoned discretion” in concluding that the Browder sulfur burner proposals, and hence an 82 percent emission control standard, are technologically feasible.
See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,
158 U.S.App. D.C. 308, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (1973),
cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921, 94 S.Ct. 2628, 41 L.Ed.2d 226 (1974). We must, therefore, remand to the EPA for further proceedings.
II.
Maximum Feasible Control Technology.
The importance of the technological feasibility of the Browder sulfur burner
proposals has its source in the fact that cases in this and other circuits have established that the national ambient air quality standards must be met, to the maximum extent possible, by constant emission controls (such as acid plants augmented or not by sulfur burners); dispersion enhancement techniques (such as tall stacks) are to be used only in a supplemental role where necessary to meet the air quality standards.
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train,
526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied,
425 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 1665, 48 L.Ed.2d 176 (1976);
Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. EPA,
523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1663, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974),
reversed in part on other grounds sub nom., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
421 U.S. 60, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975). The Clean Air Act, as interpreted by these cases, requires pollution sources to achieve the highest emission control level that is technologically and economically feasible.
Id.
Conversely, the EPA cannot require a level of control technology that is technologically and economically infeasible. Thus, if the Browder sulfur burner proposals are technologically feasible, their use is required because only then will constant emission controls be in use to the maximum extent possible. If not, their use cannot be required.
A.
EPA’s Ability to Reexamine State Determinations of Feasibility.
Bunker Hill, however, argues that the technological feasibility of constant emission controls is fixed by the Idaho state plan. Thus, it insists that EPA cannot require the implementation of the Browder sulfur burner proposals because Idaho, by not requiring their implementation, has conclusively established their technological infeasibility.
We disagree.
The Clean Air Act requires that the Administrator disapprove any state implementation plan that he “determines” fails to meet any of the requirements of 42 U.S. C.A. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (Supp.1977). One of. these requirements is the maximum feasible use of constant control systems. No argument has been suggested for why, on the one hand, the Administrator can examine some state findings in reviewing a state implementation plan (e. g., a finding that the plan assures the attainment of the various ambient air quality standards) but, on the other hand, be bound by state findings of feasibility or infeasibility. The Clean Air Act requires that the Administrator “determine” that a state plan meets
all
of the requirements of section 1857c-5(a)(2) before approving the plan, and one of these requirements is the maximum feasible use of constant control systems. Bunker Hill’s reading would reduce EPA’s approval of the Idaho implementation plan to a rubber stamp, a result which, we are certain, Con
gress did not intend.
To the extent that the recent district court opinion in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train,
424 F.Supp. 1217, 1231 (D.Nev.1976) (holding that the Administrator was bound by a state finding of economic infeasibility)
suggests to the contrary, we believe it to be in error.
B.
Review of the EPA’s Feasibility Findings.
Although EPA is not bound by Idaho’s determination of technological feasibility, its rejection of the state plan must not be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
See Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,
522 F.2d 1186, 1192-93 (3rd Cir. 1975),
vacated on other grounds,
427 U.S. 902, 96 S.Ct. 3185, 49 L.Ed.2d 1196 (1976),
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646, 655 (1st Cir. 1974). Moreover, from
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train,
526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied,
425 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 1665, 48 L.Ed.2d 176 (1976), it is clear that, before requiring 82 percent control, the Administrator was required to find that this level of emission control
is
economically and technologically feasible
for Bunker Hill
to achieve. In reaching this determination, the Administrator must have exercised “reasoned discretion.”
Portland Cement Ass’n, supra,
at 402. The Administrator’s finding must have been “based on a consideration of the relevant factors” and not “a clear error of judgment.”
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415-16, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823-824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).
The technological feasibility of the EPA standards for Bunker Hill is dependent on a finding that sulfur burners are technologically capable of curing the problems of fluctuating SO2 concentrations facing Bunker Hill. The feasibility of Browder’s sulfur burner proposal could have been established in two ways. First, EPA could have located contemporary examples of sulfur burners being used to cure a similar problem in a similar context. Second, even if the proposed sulfur burner system was not in current use, EPA could have relied on expert testimony demonstrating that sulfur burners under present technology can cure Bunker Hill’s SO2 concentration problem. This second method of establishing technological feasibility, however, carries a significant burden of proof. The demonstration of feasibility must not be based on a “subjective understanding of the problem or ‘crystal ball inquiry.’ ”
Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
158 U.S. App.D.C. 360, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (1973),
cert. denied,
416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1991, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974). The expert testimony must clearly demonstrate that the technology is available and must answer cogent criticisms of opposing experts. The proposed technology must not be “at a level that is purely theoretical or experimental”.
Id.
at 433-34. On the basis of the record before us, we cannot say that the Browder sulfur burner proposal is other than “purely theoretical or experimental.”
1.
Bunker Hill’s Problem.
To validate this view it is necessary that the manner in which Bunker Hill operates
be described in some detail. Its problem fundamentally is whether, given its operational necessities, the 2600 ppm acid plant limitation can be met.
A significant percentage of current SO2 emissions from Bunker Hill’s lead and zinc smelters is controlled through the use of their three acid plants. These acid plants convert SO2 into SO3 and ultimately into sulfuric acid, which can either be sold or neutralized. A necessary element to this catalytic process is heat, which can be provided, at least in part, by circulating back the heat given off by the transformation process itself.
The more concentrated the gas being converted the more heat will be given off by the transformation process. If the gas stream being emitted into the acid plant has a sufficient SO2 concentration, then the heat given off by the transformation process will be sufficient in itself to run the transformation process almost indefinitely. This condition of operation is known as autothermality.
At Bunker Hill, there are frequent periods during which the three acid plants cannot operate autothermally. During these periods, either SO2 must be vented from the smelters directly to the atmosphere, or the acid plants must be operated at abnormally low efficiencies (resulting in emissions significantly greater than 2600 ppm). None of Bunker Hill’s three acid plants can achieve autothermality immediately upon start-up of operations because the gas initially emitted from the operations is very low in SO2 concentration. According to Bunker Hill’s principal expert, Mr. J. R. Donovan, the feed gases to all three acid plants are plagued by “relatively large” fluctuations in SO2 concentration, hindering autothermality. Joint Appendix
[J.A.] 1131. These difficulties particularly trouble the acid plant servicing the lead sintering process (hereinafter referred to as the “lead-smelter acid plant”). The sintering machine conveyor belt is stopped and started several times a day. During the stopped period, which is typically one or two hours, lead concentrate remaining on the belt continues to smolder, producing a low level of SO2 emission. When the sintering machine is restarted, a strong but widely fluctuating SO2 gas stream is produced that can continue for extended periods of time. J.A. 991-92; Respondent’s First Supplemental Brief, at 2-4.
EPA does not dispute the significance of these efficiency problems, at least with respect to the lead-smelter acid plant.
See
Respondent’s First Supplemental Brief, at 8-9. However, on the basis of the Browder Study, EPA contends that these problems can be solved and a more efficient operation obtained by various modifications in the acid plants, in particular the addition of sulfur burners.
2.
Feasibility of Sulfur Burners.
The Original Record:
The Browder Study concluded that the problem of fluctuating SO2 content could be successfully overcome by the use of sulfur burners. J.A. 742-43, 745. Bunker Hill’s expert, Mr. J. R. Donovan, strongly disagreed in a series of rebuttal comments. In particular, according to Donovan, sulfur burners
“can only be used where by-product SO2 gas streams contain a relatively low concentration of SO2 which may vary to some small degree, but typically not to the extent experienced at Bunker Hill’s facilities. The major purpose of using auxiliary sulfur burning facilities in such plants is to increase SO2 concentration to levels which can be handled readily in sulfuric acid plants and/or to increase sulfuric acid production to meet market needs.
“In
Bunker Hill’s
case, fluctations [sic] of SO2 concentration in feed gases supplied to the acid plants are relatively large, to the extent that control of an auxiliary sulfur burning facility such as this one EPA has in mind will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. At times when S02 concentration in feed gases is high, it may be necessary to shut down the proposed auxiliary sulfur facilities, or to substantially increase production capacity of the existing acid plants by other equipment modifications. Should shutdown of an auxiliary sulfur burner be required, there will inevitably be some increase in emissions during shutdown and startup, beyond what would be experienced if sulfur burning facilities were not installed.” J.A. 1131— 32.
In summary, according to Donovan, sulfur burners have been used successfully to upgrade weak SO2 concentrations (with minor fluctuations in strength) but have never been used, and, given current technology, probably cannot be used, to even out wide fluctuations in SO2 streams, the problem presented by the Bunker Hill operations.
See
J.A. 524, 1131-33.
The original record nowhere contains a reasoned refutation of Donovan’s objections. Nor does it contain anything approaching an adequate demonstration of the feasibility of sulfur burners.
Brow
der’s principal but inadequate rebuttal to Donovan consisted of a list of 37 acid plants that purportedly use sulfur burners. J.A. 832-33. However, as Bunker Hill pointed out, only three of the plants shown on the list service nonferrous smelters. And there is no indication that any of the acid plants on the list confront the same apparent problems of SO2 feed concentration as Bunker Hill’s acid plants.
As Donovan admitted in his own testimony, sulfur burners are used on acid plants; the issue presented by Donovan is whether sulfur burners have been used on a plant similar to Bunker Hill’s plants.
See
J.A. 561. Browder’s list is meaningless without any discussion of the analogousness of the acid plants listed to the problem confronted.
Bunker Hill also cast considerable doubt on the reliability of the list. According to Bunker Hill, two of the three acid plants listed as servicing nonferrous smelters are nonexistent and the remaining acid plant does not use sulfur burners. J.A. 1109-11. EPA did not reply to this critique.
EPA, however, subsequently supplemented the Browder list with a claimed addition
al example of an acid plant utilizing sulfur burners. According to letters from the State of Montana, “[t]wo sulfur burners are being installed in the East Helena Lead Smelter.” J.A. 1016;
see also
J.A. 1025,1163. However, there is again no indication that the East Helena facility is a relevant analogy; relevance cannot simply be presumed. There is no evidence in the original record that the East Helena smelter is plagued by the same wide fluctuations in SO2 concentration as the Bunker Hill operations. What evidence there is in the original record indicates that sulfur burners are being installed at East Helena for a totally different purpose than the purpose for which the Browder study recommends their installation.
According to the owner of the East Helena facility, the sulfur burners are being installed due
“to the uncertainty of fuel supply in the area. [Sulfur burners] will minimize outside energy requirements during periods when the sinter machine is down for maintenance. The burner also is necessary to minimize acid plant corrosion resulting from shutdown and start-up during the severe climactic conditions in the Helena area. The sulfur burner will assure a grade of gas to the acid plant permitting continued autothermal operation and will add slightly to the acid produced from the metallurgical process.” J.A. 1025.
And, of course, all must admit that the fact that sulfur burners are being
installed
at a lead smelter does not prove that the sulfur burners are feasible means of meeting the problems of Bunker Hill’s lead smelter emissions.
Browder also attempted to support his proposal by arguing that various acid plant manufacturers have recommended or installed sulfur burners. Browder claimed that Monsanto had “previously installed sulfur burners in acid plants with fluctuations weak gas [sic]” and that “one is being installed for AMAX in Pennsylvania, at this time.” J.A. 791. But no supporting evidence was presented.
And again there is no discussion of whether these purported installations are relevant analogies. Browder also stated his “understanding” that Lurgi, a builder of sintering machines, rec
ommends the use of sulfur furnaces “when the Lurgi Sintering Machine is shut down, and to upgrade the gas of low concentrations.” J.A. 790. Even if this “understanding” were to be substantiated, which it is not in the record before us, there is no indication that Lurgi recommends the use of sulfur furnaces to even out large fluctuations in S02 gas as is being proposed by EPA in this instance.
In summary, there was no evidence in the original record demonstrating that sulfur burners are presently utilized by acid plants with similar input problems to those confronted by Bunker Hill. None of the acid plants cited by EPA as using sulfur burners were claimed to be, let alone shown to be, analogous to Bunker Hill’s acid plants. Furthermore, considerable doubt was cast on the validity of many of the purported examples of sulfur burner use. EPA made no attempt through detailed expert testimony to demonstrate that the S02 concentration problems outlined by Donovan could be overcome. Thus, on the basis of the original record, we would be forced to conclude that to require Bunker Hill’s acid plants to meet a 2600 ppm emission limitation would be arbitrary and capricious.
The Augmented Record:
As noted above, because of the apparent deficiencies in the Administrator’s proof of technological feasibility, we requested a supplemental brief from the EPA clarifying and elaborating on Browder’s sulfur burner proposals.
The EPA was also permitted to augment the record. EPA’s brief virtually concedes that the East Helena smelter is not a relevant analogy in evaluating the feasibility of Browder’s sulfur burner proposal.
See
Respondent’s Second Supplemental Brief, at 12-14.
And no evidence
was presented documenting any case where sulfur burners have been or are being used to cure fluctuation problems similar to those encountered at Bunker Hill.
However, EPA introduced a letter from Mr. Browder to the EPA detailing his sulfur burner proposal, including what he asserts are feasible automatic and manual methods of adjusting sulfur burners to even out widely fluctuating SO2 concentrations. Letter from Tim J. Browder to Kenneth A. Lepic, submitted by respondent in augmentation of the record, at 4-7.
Material submitted by Bunker Hill in augmentation of the record, however, casts significant doubt on the feasibility of the specific sulfur burner system proposed in Mr. Browder’s letter to the EPA. According to Mr. J. B. Rinckhoff, a Supervising Process Engineer for Davy Powergas, Inc., Browder’s “proposed control method of measuring fluctuations in SO2 content and gas volume and adjusting sulfur burning rates to produce a more uniform gas stream are impractical and unworkable.” Affidavit of J. B. Rinckhoff,
supra,
at 5. Moreover, according to Mr. Rinckhoff, the proposed system would have to burn sulfur with a range of from 0 to 100 tons-per-day in order to even out the wide SO2 concentration fluctuations at Bunker Hill. This required range of operation would pose further serious, and possibly unsolvable, problems since (i) “no sulfur nozzle exists capable of covering that range,” (ii) such a range would produce “large amounts of excess heat” that would be difficult if not impossible to remove from the system,
and (iii) the furnace specified by Mr. Browder in his letter “is suitable only for a 10 ton-per-
day operation.”
Id.
at 5-6, 7-10.
Although the EPA argues in response that the Browder proposal would actually only have to meet a 0 to 25 tons-per-day range, it is impossible to resolve this dispute on the basis of the augmented record before us.
Given these significant and unresolved criticisms of the Browder proposal, a remand to the EPA for further consideration of the feasibility of its standards becomes necessary.
Even read in the deferential light required of a reviewing court, the record before us merely establishes that Browder’s sulfur burner proposal might work. As we noted above, this is not enough. The record must establish that the required technology is feasible, not merely
possibly
feasible. Approval of EPA’s standards on the basis of this record would seriously risk closing down a major smelting operation on the strength of a showing that does no more than demonstrate that the technology on which EPA relies is only “theoretical or experimental”.
3.
Extent to Which the 2600 ppm Standard Would Be Met Assuming the Feasibility of the Sulfur Burners.
Our remand provides an opportunity for the EPA to clarify an additional area of uncertainty which would exist even had EPA succeeded in establishing adequately the feasibility of Browder’s sulfur burner proposal. It concerns the percentage of time the proposal would enable Bunker Hill to meet the 2600 ppm standard. According to the original Browder Study, the modifications proposed by the Study, if feasible, would “produce equivalent average stack losses of [1500-2000] ppm for most of the time.” J.A. 729. In later portions of the original record, Mr. Browder translates “most of the time” to mean 85 percent-plus of the time. J.A. 769, 775. It is unclear from these statements, however, whether the Browder Study modifications would guarantee that Bunker Hill could meet the 2600 ppm standard
all of the time,
as required by the EPA regulations.
Clarifying materials submitted by EPA in augmentation of the record have not resolved this uncertainty. According to an affidavit submitted by Mr. Browder,
“When speaking of the likelihood that a piece of equipment will achieve operating levels within a given range, it has always been my practice to treat such likelihood as referring to levels above and below the mean point in the range. . [W]ere I dealing with the statistical likelihood that a piece of equipment would achieve operating levels outside of the given range, it would be my practice to treat such statistical likelihood as referring to both the possibility of exceeding the given range as well as falling short of such range. . . . Thus, assuming again that the range in question was 1,500 to 2,000, if I predicted that values outside of the range would occur 15 percent of the time during routine operating, my prediction would mean that
l}h
percent of time [sic] values could be expected to exceed 2,000 and 7V2 percent of the time they could be expected to fall short of 1,500.”
Affidavit of Tim J. Browder, submitted by respondent in augmentation of the record, at 3.
Prom this and other statements of Mr. Browder, the EPA concludes that Brow-der’s modifications “would, in a more or less gaussian (or bell-like) distribution, achieve such emissions levels [1500-2000 ppm] at the Bunker Hill acid plants in excess of 85% of the operating time.” Respondent’s First Supplemental Brief, at 28. Thus, “the likelihood of exceeding the 2600 ppm limitation would be less than .01%, excluding prolonged malfunction periods. This is as close to a guarantee of achieving the emission limit as any piece of equipment can be expected to come.”
Id.
We agree with EPA that it need not show that its standards can be met 100 percent of the time. Given the possibility of mechanical failure, etc., a showing that the standards can be met 99 percent-plus of the time is sufficient.
Furthermore, assuming that Browder’s guarantees are valid, we would agree with EPA that the measure for performance has been met. However, doubts are raised by Bunker Hill as to whether Mr. Browder’s interpretation of his earlier statements is consistent with the proposals that he is making. According to Donald A. McCaughran, a Professor of Biological Statistics at the University of Washington Center for Quantitative Sciences:
“In order to [transform the present pattern of emissions] into one that is
‘more or less gaussian’ and has 85 percent of the emissions within the range of 1500 to 2000 ppm, certain physical changes would have to occur, which EPA apparently overlooked . . .. [T]he installation of Mr. Browder’s sulfur burner not only would have to eliminate effectively all emissions above 2600 ppm, but also would have to eliminate all emissions below about 1200 ppm . . . . To suppose that the sulfur burner would eliminate those emission levels below 1200, raising them to the range 1500 to 2000 ppm, is to make a supposition in conflict with Mr. Browder’s position, for I do not understand him to be stating that his proposal would eliminate low emissions, but only that it would reduce high ones. It is thus obvious that Mr. Browder’s claim that following installation of a sulfur burner the acid plant ‘would exhaust SO2 within . . . the 1500 to 2000 ppm range ... 85 percent (plus) of the operating time’ cannot be correct.” Affidavit of Donald A. McCaughran, submitted by petitioner in augmentation of the record, at 5-6.
Given the possible inconsistency in Mr. Browder’s interpretation of his 85 percent-plus guarantee,
the EPA should clarify upon remand the percentage of the time that Browder’s proposals will ensure Bunker Hill’s meeting the 2600 ppm standard.
C.
Procedural Irregularities.
Bunker Hill also argues that the proposed EPA standards must be remanded because of various procedural irregularities. Bunker Hill complains that the EPA failed to reveal several important documents in the record until after the EPA had promulgated its questioned regulations, thus denying Bunker Hill the opportunity to inspect and comment. Bunker Hill’s charges on their face are quite serious in light of the fact that most of the complained-of documents deal with the feasibility of sulfur burners — the rebuttal comments of Browder, the list of acid plants purportedly using sulfur burners, and the exhibits showing East Helena’s intention to utilize sulfur burners in its new acid plant.
We believe, however, that our order allowing the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the feasibility issue and to augment the record has cured these procedural errors. Bunker Hill has had an opportunity to comment on the materials that they argue were excluded from their view below and to submit rebuttal materials. Thus, we find it unnecessary to consider further Bunker Hill’s procedural arguments.
However, the EPA should be reminded that “adherence to proper prescribed procedure is the soundest route to a correct substantive result.”
Ethyl Corp.
v.
EPA,
541 F.2d 1, 94 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
See also International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus,
155 U.S.App.D.C. 411, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring). Greater attention to the procedural rights of petitioner perhaps might have forestalled the necessity of this appeal.
HL
The 30-Day Investigation Period.
Bunker Hill also objects to EPA’s disapproval of Idaho’s provision for a 30-day investigation period following a violation in the Kellogg Valley of the primary annual ambient air quality standard. Under the Idaho regulations, the period would be used to determine whether other undetected and uncontrolled sources might have been the actual cause of the violation.
See
p. 1291,
supra.
EPA’s proposal, on the other hand, would make Bunker Hill liable for any violation of the standard and no formal opportunity to prove that it was not the cause of the violation would be available. We believe EPA’s decision to eliminate the investigation period as reasonably necessary for the EPA’s proper enforcement of the ambient air quality standards represents an exercise of reasoned discretion.
Section 1857c-5(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act requires that the EPA Administrator, before approving any portion of a state implementation plan, determine that the plan will meet the ambient air quality standards; this determination must include the adequacy of enforcement procedures. As noted by the EPA in its disapproval of the 30-day investigation period, it is extremely difficult to determine who is responsible for a violation of the ambient air quality standard where dispersion enhancement techniques are being used to meet the standards. Because of this difficulty,
“it is reasonable to condition the use of [dispersion enhancement techniques] on the assumption of responsibility for violations of the ambient standards by a source which is overwhelmingly responsible for the emissions in a particular area. Bunker Hill contributes approximately 99.8 percent of the SO2 emissions in the Kellogg Valley [sic], . . . EPA believes that the 30-day review provision might allow Bunker Hill to avoid the legal responsibility which it must assume if an unpredictable system such as [dispersion enhancement techniques] is to be a method of air pollution control.” 38 Fed.Reg. 53587 (1975).
This strikes us as sensible; therefore, EPA’s decision to eliminate the review period is not arbitrary or capricious.
IV.
Procedure on Remand.
Finally, we turn to the procedure on remand. We begin by noting that our remand is limited to the technological feasibility of the proposed EPA standards. Because we find it necessary for the EPA to consider further the technological feasibili
ty of its standards, we do not reach Bunker Hill’s objections as to economic feasibility.
After further consideration of the question of the technological feasibility of the proposed EPA standards, EPA can either affirm its present standards or issue new limitations. Whatever standards are set by EPA, however, must be supported by an adequate demonstration of their feasibility. This court will retain jurisdiction and Bunker Hill will be free to appeal the new regulations if it believes they are not supported by the administrative record.
Bunker Hill urges that it should have an opportunity upon remand to cross-examine EPA’s experts on the technological feasibility of Browder’s sulfur burner proposals. We agree. The type of administrative procedure due in a particular case turns on the nature of the issues presented.
Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm’n.,
137 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 420 F.2d 577, 589 n. 36 (1969). Fairness may dictate cross-examination on crucial issues, even though a strict reading of the APA does not.
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin,
145 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (1971) ;
see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,
149 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (1972) . In particular, cross-examination may be necessary if a “proceeding involves specific issues of critical importance that cannot be adequately ventilated” by normal procedures.
Thompson
v.
Washington,
162 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 497 F.2d 626, 641 n. 48 (1973);
see O’Donnell v. Shaffer,
160 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (1974). Here, the issue upon remand is of a highly complex and technical nature; cross-examination will help crystalize the varying contentions of the experts and help guarantee that both parties’ experts are responsive to criticisms and counterarguments. Cross-examination of the witnesses will also aid this court in reviewing the new regulations should an appeal be brought.
We also recognize, however, that the present dispute has already lasted more than four years and has seriously delayed implementation of the goals of the Clean Air Act in the Kellogg Valley. All parties are anxious for a quick but fair resolution of the questions involved. An expedited remand and review process, therefore, is required. We instruct the EPA to enter its final order in this matter within six months, after giving Bunker Hill an opportunity to cross-examine its technical experts ánd at least 30 days to comment on the evidence on which EPA intends to rely. If Bunker Hill is dissatisfied with the Administrator’s final action, it shall have ten days to file its objections with this court. An accelerated briefing schedule would then be set.
REMANDED.
On Petition for Rehearing
The Administrator’s petition for rehearing has been carefully considered by this
court. We have been mindful during our deliberations of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.Law 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), subsequent to the filing of our opinion in this case.
We find nothing in the 1977 Amendments or otherwise to alter our position that national ambient air quality standards must be met, to the extent possible by constant emission controls. Whatever doubt there may have been about the correctness of that position was eliminated by the 1977 Amendments.
See
Section 301, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. To the extent a state plan does not require such controls it may be modified by the Administrator to bring it into line with this basic necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c)(1). We express no opinion with respect to the effect, if any, of section 123 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 on the operations of the Bunker Hill Company.
In our opinion we indicated that the Administrator could mandate a particular constant emission control when it was technologically and economically feasible. Because we were unable on the basis of the record before us to conclude that the Administrator’s required constant emission control was technologically feasible, rather than “purely theoretical or experimental,” we remanded the case for further consideration of the issue of technological feasibility and did not address Bunker Hill’s objections as to economic feasibility. The Administrator, in his petition for rehearing, urges us to delete economic feasibility as a consideration in determining whether a particular constant emission control is possible. He insists that this deletion is required by the 1977 Amendments. We recognize that this contention is not without force. However, we believe it better at the present time to defer any consideration of this issue. For present purposes it is sufficient to recognize that the’ issue is an open one and that our opinion must be read as modified to the extent such recognition so requires it to be. Our remand, therefore, remains, as before, limited to the technological feasibility of the proposed EPA standards.
The Administrator in his petition for rehearing also contends that our opinion imposes on him the burden of designing and engineering the control technology modification needed by a source to comply with an emission limitation. Moreover, he insists that our opinion suggests that the burden of persuasion is upon him to show that a specific control technology is technologically and economically feasible. In our opinion we do not focus on burden of proof issues. We reviewed the actions of the EPA in rejecting the State of Idaho’s plan in accordance with the usual standards of review employed by courts in reviewing actions by administrative agencies. Such actions must reflect an exercise by the administrator of “reasoned discretion” and not a “crystal ball inquiry.” We held, and on this rehearing do not depart from that holding, that the Browder sulfur burner proposal on the basis of the present record is purely theoretical and experimental. It follows from that holding that the Administrator’s action in rejecting the state plan on the basis of the Browder proposal did not reflect an exercise of “reasoned discretion” and thus was arbitrary and capricious. We said no more than this is our opinion.
The Administrator’s petition for rehearing raises many interesting additional issues regarding the effect of the 1977 Amendments which we decline to pursue. To do so in the present setting of this case would involve our rendering an advisory opinion. This we cannot do.
The Administrator’s petition for rehearing, except as indicated herein, is denied. The sixth-month period within which the EPA is required to enter its final order in this matter shall commence with the date this order is filed.