Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus

486 F.2d 427, 158 U.S. App. D.C. 360, 5 ERC 1820
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedSeptember 10, 1973
DocketNos. 72-1072, 72-1079
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 486 F.2d 427 (Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 158 U.S. App. D.C. 360, 5 ERC 1820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Opinion

TAMM, Circuit Judge:

These two appeals, consolidated for purposes of argument and decision, are taken from the action of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] in setting “standards of performance” for new or modified stationary sources of pollution pursuant to the mandate of § 111 of the Clean Air Act, as amended [Act], 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970). Among the stationary sources for which standards were set are sulfuric acid plants, subject to challenge in No. 72-1072, and coal-fired steam generators, subject to challenge in No. 72-1079. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.1, et seq. Even when limited to the scope of review prescribed by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), we find that the Administrator’s action as to certain aspects of the standards must be remanded for further proceedings; as to the bulk of the standards, however, we find that the Administrator has acted properly within the scope of his authority and not in abuse of his discretion.

I.

On March 31, 1971, pursuant to the requirement of § 111 of the Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1857C-6 (1970),1 the EPA published a list of categories of stationary air pollution sources which significantly contribute to the endangerment of public health and welfare. The list included steam generators, incinerators, sulfuric [363]*363acid plants, nitric acid plants, and port-land cement plants. 36 Fed.Reg. 5931 (March 31, 1971). Thereafter, on August 17, 1971, proposed regulations were published establishing federal standards of performance for each new source category on the list. 36 Fed.Reg. 15704 (August 17, 1971). Issued concurrent with the proposed regulations were documents entitled “Background Information for Proposed New-Source Performance Standards” and “Summaries of Test Data,” which set forth the justification for the new proposed standards. In December of 1971, after receiving and evaluating more than 200 comments from interested parties,2 the EPA published final regulations, 40 C.F.R. part 60, incorporating only minor changes from the proposed regulations. 36 Fed.Reg. 24876 (December 23, 1971).

On January 21 and 24, 1972, Essex Chemical Corp., et al. (No. 72-1072), Portland Cement Association (No. 72-1073), and Appalachian Power Co., et al. (No. 72-1079), petitioned for review in this court pursuant to § 307(b)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (1970),3 challenging the standards set by the EPA for sulfuric acid plants, port-land cement plants, and coal-fired steam generators, respectively. Shortly thereafter this court issued its decision in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 462 F.2d 846 (1972), concerning a national secondary ambient air quality standard promulgated by the EPA pursuant to § 109(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (1970), wherein a remand was ordered so that the EPA might “supply an implementing statement that will enlighten the court as to the basis on which [the Administrator] reached the . . . standard .” Id. at 850. In light of the Kennecott Copper decision the EPA subsequently published a “Supplemental Statement in Connection with Final Promulgation,” 37 Fed.Reg. 5767 (March 21, 1972), in order to avoid the problems presented in Kennecott Copper and thus “ensur[e] the rapid conclusion of judicial review of the validity of the [stationary source] standards.” Id.4

II.

On June 29, 1973, another panel of this court issued an opinion remanding the record to the EPA for further proceedings regarding the standards of performance for Portland cement plants, Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 486 F.2d 375 (1973). While the records in the two cases sub judice are substantially different from that in Portland Cement and consequently engender differing conclusions as to the legality of the standards, several issues are so similar and so conclusively dealt with by the Portland Cement decision that they can be treated summarily by this court in its determinations today.

1. NEPA Impact Statement

One issue raised and extensively briefed in both No.“ 72-1072 and No. 72-1079 is the consequence of the Administrator’s failure to file an “impact statement” pursuant to § 102(2) (c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [NEPA], 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).5 Petitioners here [364]*364allege (as was alleged in Portland Cement) that the EPA, merely because it is an environmentally oriented agency, is not exempt from the NEPA provision that in “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” all Federal agencies are subject to the requirement that the responsible official file “a detailed statement . on . the environmental impact of the proposed action.” Petitioners pointedly note that an impact statement, if filed, would have required the EPA to consider factors such as alternative adverse environmental effects and cost/benefit analyses to a considerably more significant degree than that which the record shows actually occurred.

The Portland Cement panel, per Judge Leventhal, extensively analyzed the considerations pertaining to a general, limited, or non-existent exemption for the EPA from the NEPA impact statement requirements. See Portland Cement, supra, 486 F.2d 379-387. The panel concluded, leaving for another time the consideration of whether the EPA was completely exempt from the rigors of an impact statement,6 that the EPA was exempt at least in its action in promulgating the § 111 standards. The determination was founded upon a “proper” construction of the § 111 mandate that the “standard of performance” reflect “the best system of emission reduction” and require the Administrator to take into account “the cost of achieving such reduction.” As “[t]hese criteria require the Administrator to take into account counter-productive environmental effects of a proposed standard,7 as well as economic costs to the industry,” the decision that an impact statement is not required in this specific instance strikes a “workable balance between some of the advantages and disadvantages of full application of NEPA.” Id. at 385, 386. The court stated:

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Bluebook (online)
486 F.2d 427, 158 U.S. App. D.C. 360, 5 ERC 1820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/essex-chemical-corp-v-ruckelshaus-cadc-1973.