UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BORIS TEICHMANN, Plaintiff, -against- 21-CV-5082 (LTS) NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES’ ORDER TO AMEND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff moves for pro bono counsel. By order dated June 9, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to
state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint sets forth the following facts. Plaintiff applied for retroactive disability
pension benefit payments with the New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS). According to Plaintiff, he is “legally entitled” to such payments, under “Section 605 of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law,” for the time running from December 18, 2008, through December 23, 2018. (ECF 2 ¶ III.) The assistant general counsel for NYCERS either demanded that Plaintiff provide additional documentation to support the application, or claimed that necessary documents were missing. But even after Plaintiff repeatedly submitted all the materials requested, on June 11, 2018, NYCERS denied Plaintiff’s application. (Id.) Plaintiff does not provide the reasons NYCERS gave for denying the application, but he alleges that NYCERS violated his right to due process, breached a contract, and caused him emotional distress. Beginning in 2013, Plaintiff has “had numerous court proceedings against” NYCERS in New York State Supreme Court, New York County. See, e.g., Teichmann v. NYCERS, Ind. Nos.
400140/2013, 10027/2016, 101209/2018. Publicly available state court records show that the 2018 matter, which Plaintiff filed under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, was dismissed as untimely, and that the Appellate Division affirmed that decision. See Teichmann v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 111 N.Y.S.3d 176, 2019 WL 6482102 (1st Dep’t Dec. 3, 2019) (affirming dismissal of Article 78 proceeding as untimely filed because “respondent notified petitioner of its final determination in June 2017, but petitioner did not commence this proceeding until August 2018.”), lv. denied, 35 N.Y.3d 913 (Sept. 1, 2020). Plaintiff asserts that the 2018 case was erroneously dismissed as untimely because the four-month statute of limitations period applicable to Article 78 proceedings did not apply to his breach of contract claim. Plaintiff further asserts that the dismissal on timeliness grounds was
“procured through fraud, perjury, and deception.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks the retroactive benefits and money damages. DISCUSSION A. Due process claim To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “ state actor.”1 West v. Atkins, 487
1 NYCERS is a suable entity under the New York City Charter. See, e.g., Minima v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., No. 11-CV-2191 (CBA) (SMG), 2012 WL 4049822, at *1 n.1 2012 WL 4049978 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2012). U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes the complaint as asserting a section 1983 claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. “The two threshold questions in any § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States
Constitution or federal statutes and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)); see also Hynes v. Squillance, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998) (To state a due process claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.”). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted). Where the government deprives a plaintiff of a property interest pursuant to an established procedure,2 due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of hearing is
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BORIS TEICHMANN, Plaintiff, -against- 21-CV-5082 (LTS) NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES’ ORDER TO AMEND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff moves for pro bono counsel. By order dated June 9, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to
state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint sets forth the following facts. Plaintiff applied for retroactive disability
pension benefit payments with the New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS). According to Plaintiff, he is “legally entitled” to such payments, under “Section 605 of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law,” for the time running from December 18, 2008, through December 23, 2018. (ECF 2 ¶ III.) The assistant general counsel for NYCERS either demanded that Plaintiff provide additional documentation to support the application, or claimed that necessary documents were missing. But even after Plaintiff repeatedly submitted all the materials requested, on June 11, 2018, NYCERS denied Plaintiff’s application. (Id.) Plaintiff does not provide the reasons NYCERS gave for denying the application, but he alleges that NYCERS violated his right to due process, breached a contract, and caused him emotional distress. Beginning in 2013, Plaintiff has “had numerous court proceedings against” NYCERS in New York State Supreme Court, New York County. See, e.g., Teichmann v. NYCERS, Ind. Nos.
400140/2013, 10027/2016, 101209/2018. Publicly available state court records show that the 2018 matter, which Plaintiff filed under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, was dismissed as untimely, and that the Appellate Division affirmed that decision. See Teichmann v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 111 N.Y.S.3d 176, 2019 WL 6482102 (1st Dep’t Dec. 3, 2019) (affirming dismissal of Article 78 proceeding as untimely filed because “respondent notified petitioner of its final determination in June 2017, but petitioner did not commence this proceeding until August 2018.”), lv. denied, 35 N.Y.3d 913 (Sept. 1, 2020). Plaintiff asserts that the 2018 case was erroneously dismissed as untimely because the four-month statute of limitations period applicable to Article 78 proceedings did not apply to his breach of contract claim. Plaintiff further asserts that the dismissal on timeliness grounds was
“procured through fraud, perjury, and deception.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks the retroactive benefits and money damages. DISCUSSION A. Due process claim To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “ state actor.”1 West v. Atkins, 487
1 NYCERS is a suable entity under the New York City Charter. See, e.g., Minima v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., No. 11-CV-2191 (CBA) (SMG), 2012 WL 4049822, at *1 n.1 2012 WL 4049978 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2012). U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes the complaint as asserting a section 1983 claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. “The two threshold questions in any § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States
Constitution or federal statutes and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that interest.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)); see also Hynes v. Squillance, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998) (To state a due process claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.”). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted). Where the government deprives a plaintiff of a property interest pursuant to an established procedure,2 due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of hearing is
provided before the individual is finally deprived of the property interest. Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). By contrast, a government employee’s random and unauthorized act does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available; when the government cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur, it would be impossible to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation of property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1986); Parratt v.
2 Conduct is undertaken in accordance with established state procedures when, for example, it is “pursuant to a statute, code, regulation, or custom” or is the result of a decision made by a high-ranking official with “final authority over significant matters,” see Viteritti v. Inc. Vill. of Bayville, 918 F. Supp. 2d 126, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. City of New York Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 152 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010)). Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-43 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 220-31 (1986); see also Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 882 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]here is no constitutional violation (and no available § 1983 action) when there is an adequate state postdeprivation procedure to remedy a random,
arbitrary deprivation of property or liberty.”). Courts in the Second Circuit have repeatedly held that “the availability of post- deprivation Article 78 proceedings in the NYCERS pension context is generally constitutionally adequate process even where the process internal to NYCERS was not wholly adequate, or where the plaintiff failed to timely file an Article 78 [petition]” in the appropriate state court. See King v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 595 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order, collecting cases); Campo v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 843 F.2d 96, 101-03 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that an Article 78 proceeding provides an adequate post- deprivation remedy for persons challenges the curtailment of pension benefits by NYCERS). It is not clear from the complaint what type of process Plaintiff received or why his
application was denied. Plaintiff thus does not provide sufficient facts for the Court to determine whether his claim arises under an established state procedure or a random and unauthorized act. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to provide additional facts in support of a due process claim. See Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that district courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects). B. State law claims Plaintiff asserts breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which arise under state law. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Because it is not clear whether Plaintiff can state a federal claim, the Court will determine
at a later stage whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’ l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)). C. Motion for pro bono counsel The factors to be considered in ruling on an indigent litigant’s request for counsel include the merits of the case, Plaintiff’s efforts to obtain a lawyer, and Plaintiff’s ability to gather the facts and present the case if unassisted by counsel. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, the merits are “[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172.
Because it is too early in the proceedings for the Court to assess the merits of the action, Plaintiff’s motion for counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal at a later date. CONCLUSION The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 21-CV-5082 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an
appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. SO ORDERED. Dated: June 28, 2021 New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____CV_______________ (Include case number if one has been Write the full name of each plaintiff. assigned)
AMENDED -against-
COMPLAINT
Do you want a jury trial? ☐ Yes ☐ No
Write the full name of each defendant. If you need more space, please write “see attached” in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed above must be identical to those contained in Section II.
NOTICE The public can access electronic court files. For privacy and security reasons, papers filed with the court should therefore not contain: an individual’s full social security number or full birth date; the full name of a person known to be a minor; or a complete financial account number. A filing may include only: the last four digits of a social security number; the year of an individual’s birth; a minor’s initials; and the last four digits of a financial account number. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. I. BASIS FOR JURISDICTION Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction (limited power). Generally, only two types of cases can be heard in federal court: cases involving a federal question and cases involving diversity of citizenship of the parties. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a case arising under the United States Constitution or federal laws or treaties is a federal question case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a case in which a citizen of one State sues a citizen of another State or nation, and the amount in controversy is more than $75,000, is a diversity case. In a diversity case, no defendant may be a citizen of the same State as any plaintiff. What is the basis for federal-court jurisdiction in your case? ☐ Federal Question ☐ Diversity of Citizenship A. If you checked Federal Question Which of your federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated?
B. If you checked Diversity of Citizenship 1. Citizenship of the parties Of what State is each party a citizen? The plaintiff , , is a citizen of the State of (Plaintiff’s name)
(State in which the person resides and intends to remain.) or, if not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, a citizen or subject of the foreign state of . If more than one plaintiff is named in the complaint, attach additional pages providing information for each additional plaintiff. If the defendant is an individual:
The defendant, , is a citizen of the State of (Defendant’s name)
or, if not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, a citizen or subject of the foreign state of . If the defendant is a corporation: The defendant, , is incorporated under the laws of the State of and has its principal place of business in the State of or is incorporated under the laws of (foreign state) and has its principal place of business in . If more than one defendant is named in the complaint, attach additional pages providing information for each additional defendant.
II. PARTIES A. Plaintiff Information Provide the following information for each plaintiff named in the complaint. Attach additional pages if needed.
First Name Middle Initial Last Name
Street Address
County, City State Zip Code
Telephone Number Email Address (if available) B. Defendant Information To the best of your ability, provide addresses where each defendant may be served. If the correct information is not provided, it could delay or prevent service of the complaint on the defendant. Make sure that the defendants listed below are the same as those listed in the caption. Attach additional pages if needed. Defendant 1: First Name Last Name
Current Job Title (or other identifying information)
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code Defendant 2: First Name Last Name
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code Defendant 3: First Name Last Name
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code Defendant 4: First Name Last Name
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code III. STATEMENT OF CLAIM Place(s) of occurrence:
Date(s) of occurrence: FACTS: State here briefly the FACTS that support your case. Describe what happened, how you were harmed, and what each defendant personally did or failed to do that harmed you. Attach additional pages if needed. INJURIES: If you were injured as a result of these actions, describe your injuries and what medical treatment, if any, you required and received.
IV. RELIEF State briefly what money damages or other relief you want the court to order. V. PLAINTIFF’S CERTIFICATION AND WARNINGS By signing below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that: (1) the complaint is not being presented for an improper purpose (such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation); (2) the claims are supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument to change existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. I agree to notify the Clerk's Office in writing of any changes to my mailing address. I understand that my failure to keep a current address on file with the Clerk's Office may result in the dismissal of my case. Each Plaintiff must sign and date the complaint. Attach additional pages if necessary. If seeking to proceed without prepayment of fees, each plaintiff must also submit an IFP application.
Dated Plaintiff’s Signature
Telephone Number Email Address (if available)
I have read the Pro Se (Nonprisoner) Consent to Receive Documents Electronically: ☐ Yes ☐ No If you do consent to receive documents electronically, submit the completed form with your complaint. If you do not consent, please do not attach the form.