[358]*358Brickley, J.
These cases involve the question whether this Court’s decision in Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), interpreting the name and retain provision of the dramshop act, is to be given retroactive application.
In Burns, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 26, 1981, alleging that plaintiff’s decedent died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile collision with Richard Piornack, II. Plaintiff also alleged that appellees Vincent Carver and Brian Chase, owners of Jock’s Pub, were liable for serving intoxicating beverages to Piornack in violation of the dramshop act, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993. On May 21, 1982, plaintiff executed a "Release and Settlement of Claim” with Piornack. The agreement provided that in exchange for $20,000 Piornack was to be "retained” in the action, but released from all liability. Following this Court’s decision in Putney, appellees moved for and were granted summary judgment. On February 18, 1983, we granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 887 (1983).
In Tebo, plaintiff filed her complaint on January 17, 1977. She alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of a collision with an automobile driven by Edward Havlik. An amended complaint was filed, naming as defendants Steven Brimmer and Gerald Forbes, owners of the Long Branch Bar, and Fred Denter, owner of the Oakley Liquor Bar, predicating their liability on the provisions of the dramshop act. On August 4, 1977, plaintiff and Havlik entered into a "Covenant Not to Levy Execution on Judgment in Pending Action”, under which Havlik was released of all liability in excess of $50,000, but he was expressly "retained” in the action. Denter’s motion for summary judgment on [359]*359the grounds that plaintiff had failed to retain Havlik as required by the dramshop act was denied on December 7, 1978. Denter subsequently brought a motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from submitting evidence of any damages for which plaintiff received compensation under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. The trial court granted this motion and was reversed on interlocutory appeal. 109 Mich App 413; 311 NW2d 372 (1981). Putney was decided while Denter’s application for leave to appeal was pending. Denter moved for summary judgment in this Court pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7). We granted leave to appeal to consider both the motion for summary judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 887 (1983).
In Putney v Haskins, supra, p 188, this Court construed the "name and retain” provision of the dramshop act. We found in the statutory language a legislative mandate that the allegedly intoxicated person be "retained as an interested party defendant until the litigation [is] concluded”. Only by requiring the allegedly intoxicated person to remain at risk could the name and retain provision’s purpose of preventing fraud and collusion be completely fulfilled. As we stated:
"One of the ways the 'name and retain’ provision prevents fraud and collusion is by ensuring that the defendant will have a direct financial stake in personally testifying, examining witnesses, and arguing that he did not act in a negligent manner. Once the defendant’s liability is fixed and limited, he has no incentive to produce witnesses or testimony tending to prove that he was not 'visibly intoxicated’ on the date in question. The dramshop defendant may have much more difficulty in identifying, locating, and obtaining favorable testimony from the defendant’s friends or acquaintances who observed him at relevant times.”
[360]*360The agreements in the present cases obviously do not retain the allegedly intoxicated persons within the meaning of the dramshop act. Liability has been'fixed. If Putney is deemed to be retroactive, plaintiffs’ actions must be dismissed.
Although it has often been stated that the general rule is one of complete retroactivity, this Court has adopted a flexible approach.1
" 'It is evident that there is no single rule of thumb which can be used to accomplish the maximum of justice in each varying set of circumstances. The involvement of vested property rights, the magnitude of the impact of decision on public bodies taken without warning or a showing of substantial reliance on the old rule may influence the result.’ Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961) (opinion of Justice Edwards in which Justices Talbot Smith, T. M. Kavanagh and Souris concurred).
"The benefit of flexibility in opinion application is evident. If a court were absolutely bound by the traditional rule of retroactive application, it would be severely hampered in its ability to make needed changes in the law because of the chaos that could result in regard to prior enforcement under that law.” Placek v City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 665; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
Appreciation of the effect a change in settled law can have has led this Court to favor only limited retroactivity when overruling prior law. Thus, when the doctrine of imputed negligence was overruled in Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), the decision was applied only to the case before the Court and to pending and future cases. When the doctrine of charitable im[361]*361munity was overruled in Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), the retroactive effect of the decision was limited to the parties before the Court. Even where statutory construction has been involved, this Court has limited the retroactivity of a decision when justice so required. See Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981); Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590; 274 NW2d 392 (1979).
The question before us is whether our interpretation of a statute should be applied retroactively to the statute’s effective date. In Putney, we found the clear import of the statute to be to require the plaintiff to name and retain the allegedly intoxicated person at risk. Were Putney a case of first impression in the Michigan courts, we would hold that the statutory language gave plaintiffs no reason to believe that the settlements entered into would comply with the "retain” portion of the statute. Putney, however, was not a case of first impression in the Michigan courts.
In Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507; 245 NW2d 111 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 827 (1977), the plaintiff was struck by an automobile and brought suit against the driver and the bar owners who allegedly served the driver while he was visibly impaired. Four days prior to trial, the plaintiff entered into an "Indemnification Agreement”, under which the driver’s liability was limited to $19,000. The driver was expressly "retained” in the action. In analyzing the effect of this agreement on the plaintiff’s action against the bar owners, the court looked to the purpose of the name and retain provision as stated by the Court of Appeals in Salas v Clements, 57 Mich App 367; 226 NW2d 101 (1975), rev’d 399 Mich 103; 247 [362]*362NW2d 889 (1976), to avoid collusion and perjury. Extrapolating from that purpose, the Court stated:
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[358]*358Brickley, J.
These cases involve the question whether this Court’s decision in Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), interpreting the name and retain provision of the dramshop act, is to be given retroactive application.
In Burns, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 26, 1981, alleging that plaintiff’s decedent died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile collision with Richard Piornack, II. Plaintiff also alleged that appellees Vincent Carver and Brian Chase, owners of Jock’s Pub, were liable for serving intoxicating beverages to Piornack in violation of the dramshop act, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993. On May 21, 1982, plaintiff executed a "Release and Settlement of Claim” with Piornack. The agreement provided that in exchange for $20,000 Piornack was to be "retained” in the action, but released from all liability. Following this Court’s decision in Putney, appellees moved for and were granted summary judgment. On February 18, 1983, we granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 887 (1983).
In Tebo, plaintiff filed her complaint on January 17, 1977. She alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of a collision with an automobile driven by Edward Havlik. An amended complaint was filed, naming as defendants Steven Brimmer and Gerald Forbes, owners of the Long Branch Bar, and Fred Denter, owner of the Oakley Liquor Bar, predicating their liability on the provisions of the dramshop act. On August 4, 1977, plaintiff and Havlik entered into a "Covenant Not to Levy Execution on Judgment in Pending Action”, under which Havlik was released of all liability in excess of $50,000, but he was expressly "retained” in the action. Denter’s motion for summary judgment on [359]*359the grounds that plaintiff had failed to retain Havlik as required by the dramshop act was denied on December 7, 1978. Denter subsequently brought a motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from submitting evidence of any damages for which plaintiff received compensation under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. The trial court granted this motion and was reversed on interlocutory appeal. 109 Mich App 413; 311 NW2d 372 (1981). Putney was decided while Denter’s application for leave to appeal was pending. Denter moved for summary judgment in this Court pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7). We granted leave to appeal to consider both the motion for summary judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 887 (1983).
In Putney v Haskins, supra, p 188, this Court construed the "name and retain” provision of the dramshop act. We found in the statutory language a legislative mandate that the allegedly intoxicated person be "retained as an interested party defendant until the litigation [is] concluded”. Only by requiring the allegedly intoxicated person to remain at risk could the name and retain provision’s purpose of preventing fraud and collusion be completely fulfilled. As we stated:
"One of the ways the 'name and retain’ provision prevents fraud and collusion is by ensuring that the defendant will have a direct financial stake in personally testifying, examining witnesses, and arguing that he did not act in a negligent manner. Once the defendant’s liability is fixed and limited, he has no incentive to produce witnesses or testimony tending to prove that he was not 'visibly intoxicated’ on the date in question. The dramshop defendant may have much more difficulty in identifying, locating, and obtaining favorable testimony from the defendant’s friends or acquaintances who observed him at relevant times.”
[360]*360The agreements in the present cases obviously do not retain the allegedly intoxicated persons within the meaning of the dramshop act. Liability has been'fixed. If Putney is deemed to be retroactive, plaintiffs’ actions must be dismissed.
Although it has often been stated that the general rule is one of complete retroactivity, this Court has adopted a flexible approach.1
" 'It is evident that there is no single rule of thumb which can be used to accomplish the maximum of justice in each varying set of circumstances. The involvement of vested property rights, the magnitude of the impact of decision on public bodies taken without warning or a showing of substantial reliance on the old rule may influence the result.’ Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961) (opinion of Justice Edwards in which Justices Talbot Smith, T. M. Kavanagh and Souris concurred).
"The benefit of flexibility in opinion application is evident. If a court were absolutely bound by the traditional rule of retroactive application, it would be severely hampered in its ability to make needed changes in the law because of the chaos that could result in regard to prior enforcement under that law.” Placek v City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 665; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
Appreciation of the effect a change in settled law can have has led this Court to favor only limited retroactivity when overruling prior law. Thus, when the doctrine of imputed negligence was overruled in Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), the decision was applied only to the case before the Court and to pending and future cases. When the doctrine of charitable im[361]*361munity was overruled in Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), the retroactive effect of the decision was limited to the parties before the Court. Even where statutory construction has been involved, this Court has limited the retroactivity of a decision when justice so required. See Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981); Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590; 274 NW2d 392 (1979).
The question before us is whether our interpretation of a statute should be applied retroactively to the statute’s effective date. In Putney, we found the clear import of the statute to be to require the plaintiff to name and retain the allegedly intoxicated person at risk. Were Putney a case of first impression in the Michigan courts, we would hold that the statutory language gave plaintiffs no reason to believe that the settlements entered into would comply with the "retain” portion of the statute. Putney, however, was not a case of first impression in the Michigan courts.
In Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507; 245 NW2d 111 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 827 (1977), the plaintiff was struck by an automobile and brought suit against the driver and the bar owners who allegedly served the driver while he was visibly impaired. Four days prior to trial, the plaintiff entered into an "Indemnification Agreement”, under which the driver’s liability was limited to $19,000. The driver was expressly "retained” in the action. In analyzing the effect of this agreement on the plaintiff’s action against the bar owners, the court looked to the purpose of the name and retain provision as stated by the Court of Appeals in Salas v Clements, 57 Mich App 367; 226 NW2d 101 (1975), rev’d 399 Mich 103; 247 [362]*362NW2d 889 (1976), to avoid collusion and perjury. Extrapolating from that purpose, the Court stated:
"Balanced against this purpose is the policy of the law to encourage settlement of litigation. The statute is not intended to prohibit settlement between a plaintiff and his intoxicated tortfeasor except where claims against tavern owners are first or simultaneously settled. On the contrary, the language of the statute indicates only an intention to require the intoxicated tortfeasor to be retained as a defendant. In enacting this 'special interest legislation’ the Legislature has manifested an intention to prohibit a plaintiff from going to a jury with only a claim versus a tavern. The plaintiff must not only name but must retain the tortfeasor in the lawsuit. But that is all the statute requires. To prohibit a plaintiff from a 'hold harmless’ type settlement, as was used here, would impede the prompt disposition of litigation and force trials of cases that would otherwise be settled.” Buxton, supra, p 511.
Of course, Buxton was implicitly overruled by Putney. Until Putney was decided by this Court, however, Buxton remained as the uncontradicted interpretation of the name and retain provision. Nonetheless, it is argued that any reliance by plaintiffs on Buxton was misplaced because it was a decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than one of this Court. This argument fails to take into account the structure of the Michigan appellate system.
A decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals is a decision of the Court. GCR 1963, 800.4. A decision by any panel of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, controlling statewide until contradicted by another panel of the Court of Appeals or reversed or overruled by this Court. See In the Matter of Hague, 412 Mich 532; 315 NW2d 524 (1982); Hackett v Ferndale City Clerk, 1 Mich App 6; 133 NW2d 221 (1965). While the possibility of reversal or contradiction may lessen a claim of [363]*363reliance, it does not preclude it.2 And, although the possibility of the contradiction of Buxton by another panel of the Court of Appeals existed, that did not happen. Subsequent expressions by panels of the Court of Appeals on the same issue did nothing to lessen the authority of Buxton. See Cussans v Harris, 118 Mich App 567; 325 NW2d 793 (1982); Putney v Gibson, 94 Mich App 466; 289 NW2d 837 (1979), rev’d sub nom Putney v Haskins, supra; Rowan v Southland Corp, 90 Mich App 61; 282 NW2d 243 (1979); Denham v Bedford, 82 Mich App 107; 266 NW2d 682 (1978), aff'd 407 Mich 517; 287 NW2d 168 (1980). In light of the unquestioned status of Buxton at the time Putney was decided by this Court,3 it would be unjust to apply Putney retroactively to persons other than those before the Court in that case.4
[364]*364In contrast to the harsh effect which the full retroactivity of Putney would have on injured plaintiffs, prospective application will have little effect on dramshop defendants in those pending cases where settlement agreements have been made, even though the defense of Putney will be unavailable. For them, the law will simply remain as it was from 1976 to 1982. We hold that Putney v Haskins is applicable to all cases where settlement agreements are entered into with the allegedly intoxicated person after the date of decision in Putney.
In granting leave to appeal to defendant Denter, we directed that the following question be briefed: "[Wjhether the no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., alters the common-law collateral-source rule”. We answer that narrow question in the negative.
Section 3135(2) of the no-fault act provides:
"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101(3) and (4) was in effect is abolished except as to:
"(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations con[365]*365tained in those sections. The party liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his or her liability by the amount of taxes "that would have been payable on account of income the injured person would have received if he or she had not been injured.” MCL 500.3135(2); MSA 24.13135(2).
In the trial court, Denter moved to exclude all testimony regarding plaintiffs economic losses on the grounds that the above provision barred tort damages to the extent plaintiff had received compensation under the no-fault insurance act. The trial court granted the motion, and on interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536; 309 NW2d 174 (1981), rev’g 96 Mich App 763; 294 NW2d 224 (1980).
In Tuttle, the motorist plaintiff brought suit for damages sustained when he collided with the defendant’s negligently kept cow. This Court held that because the cause of action against the defendant arose out of negligent cow-keeping, the plaintiffs action was not barred by § 3135(2) of the act. We stated:
"Only persons who own, maintain or use motor vehicles can be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a .motor vehicle [under the no-fault act]. The non-motorist tortfeasor cannot be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The abolition of tort liability for injuries or damage caused by (arising from) the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, therefore, does not abolish the tort liability of the non-motorist tortfeasor.” 411 Mich 545-546.
In the present case, Denter did not own, maintain, or use the motor vehicle that caused plain[366]*366tiffs injuries. His liability, instead, arises out of his alleged sale of intoxicating liquors to a visibly intoxicated person. Just as the tort liability bar of § 3135 is inapplicable, so too is the remainder of the act inapplicable.
Notwithstanding that the language of the no-fault insurance act does not apply to the present case, Denter contends that the act manifests a legislative intent to prohibit recovery of damages in all tort actions where the plaintiff has been compensated by insurance. In short, Denter requests abolition of the collateral-source rule. We find no reason in the no-fault insurance act to comply with that request.
The common-law collateral-source rule provides that the recovery of damages from a tortfeasor is not reduced by the plaintiffs receipt of money in compensation for his injuries from other sources. Motts v Michigan Cab Co, 274 Mich 437; 264 NW 855 (1936); Perrott v Shearer, 17 Mich 48 (1868). In the context of insurance, the rationale for the rule is that the plaintiff has given up consideration and is entitled to the contractual benefits. The plaintiffs foresight and financial sacrifice should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor, who has contributed nothing to the plaintiffs insurance coverage. Similarly, gratuitous compensation should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiffs injuries.
The no-fault insurance act was a radical restructuring of the rights and liabilities of motorists. Through comprehensive action, the Legislature sought to accomplish the goal of providing an equitable and prompt method of redressing injuries in a way which made the mandatory insurance coverage affordable to all motorists. See Shav[367]*367ers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), cert den 442 US 934 (1979). It is in light of that goal that the setoff provisions of the no-fault insurance act must be viewed.
The obvious purpose of the setoff provisions of the act is to eliminate duplicate benefits. The act "reduces the amount that the insurance companies must pay out, making it possible for them to reduce the amount that they must charge, and it does so only in those situations where benefits are redundant”. O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 546; 273 NW2d 829 (1979). In effect, the Legislature made a trade-off. Those who were required to participate in the no-fault scheme gave up the possibility of redundant recoveries, but they were intended to receive the benefit of lower insurance rates.
Analysis of the setoff provisions in the no-fault act reveals a careful legislative effort to limit duplicative recovery only where the limitation would benefit a no-fault insurer, thus providing an incentive for lower insurance rates. Section 3116 of the act requires that personal injury protection no-fault benefits be reduced to the extent the insured has received equivalent compensation from tort judgments arising from accidents outside of the state, from accidents with uninsured motorists, and from intentionally caused harm. This reduction of benefits payable inures to the benefit of the injured party’s no-fault insurer in situations where the tortfeasor would normally not be within the coverage of the no-fault act. Similarly, § 3109 of the act provides that personal injury protection no-fault benefits are to be reduced by the amount of governmental benefits provided or required by law to be provided to the injured insured. Again, when the additional compensation to the insured [368]*368has come from a source outside the scope of the no-fault act, the no-fault insurer benefits by having to pay less compensation to the insured.
Finally, § 3135 of the act provides that tort judgments against persons arising from their ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle within the scope of the no-fault act are allowable only to the extent they exceed personal injury protection no-fault benefits received by the injured party under §§ 3107 to 3110 of the act. Although under §3135 it is the liability insurer of the tortfeasor who benefits, it is still, normally, a no-fault insurer.
As relevant to the present action, the dramshop defendant Denter has not participated in the no-fault scheme. Denter asks us to turn around the policy of the no-fault act to benefit a tortfeasor rather than a no-fault insurer. This would not only be an unwarranted extension of the no-fault act, but it would be contrary to its intent. Abolition of the collateral-source rule as to him would do nothing to fulfill the legislative goal of lower no-fault insurance rates. The careful structure of the no-fault act’s setoff provisions evinces no legislative intent to benefit dramshop defendants and their insurers.
In Burns, the summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
In Tebo, pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7), the motion for summary judgment is denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for trial.
Cavanagh (participating as to Burns only) and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.