OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
The City of Española appeals from the apportionment of a judgment on a cross-claim requiring it to pay one-half of the total amount of damages awarded plaintiffs in a suit by them against three defendants wherein all three defendants were found jointly and severally liable for the injuries of plaintiff, Peggy Sue Sanchez. We reverse the trial court on the apportionment of contribution between the three defendants.
Peggy Sue Sanchez and her mother sued the City of Española, Aalco Manufacturing Company and Tiano’s Sporting Goods Store for damages arising from an accident in which a volleyball standard fell and severely injured Peggy Sue’s foot, eventually resulting in the amputation of two of her toes. The standard, manufactured by Aalco, had been purchased by the City from Tiano’s and was being used in a recreation center under the City’s supervision when the accident occurred. A jury found the City liable for the injury under a negligence theory whereas Tiano’s and Aalco were found liable under strict products liability. The total award was for $96,000. A judgment holding the three defendants jointly and severally liable for that amount was accordingly entered.
As between the defendants, who had all cross-claimed against each other for contribution or indemnity, the court, sitting without a jury after the verdict had been rendered, found that the City and Aalco should each pay one-half of the judgment and that Aalco should indemnify Tiano’s for any costs. The basis of this apportionment was the court’s judgment that Tiano’s was not negligent but was only a party in the chain of supply, and was therefore not an active tortfeasor as were the City and Aalco. The court concluded that Tiano’s liability was derivative and purely technical. The City, claiming'it should be required to pay only one-third of the damages since there are three tortfeasors, appeals the court’s allocation of damages. Aalco has not appealed the decision that it should indemnify Tiano’s, and, therefore, that issue is not before us.
The sole question on appeal is whether, under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which New Mexico has adopted, damages awarded against three tortfeasors, two of whom are liable under strict products liability and one of whom is liable for negligence, should be split equally three ways, or whether the tortfeasors liable under strict products liability should be considered as one tortfeasor in assessing the amount of contribution between the parties. We hold that, in these circumstances, each defendant should be required to contribute one-third of the total damages. Since the trial court’s judgment that Aalco indemnify Tiano’s has not been challenged, or decision in this case will result in the City of Espanola paying one-third of the damages and Aalco paying two-thirds.
As both negligence and strict products liability sound in tort, the question of contribution between the defendants is properly decided under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as adopted in New Mexico, §§ 41-3-1 to 41-3-8, N.M. S.A.1978. The pertinent sections read: 41-3-1. Joint tortfeasors defined.
For the purposes of this act [41-3-1 to 41-3-8 NMSA 1978] the term “joint tortfeasors” means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.
41-3-2. Right of contribution; accrual; pro rata share.
A. The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors.
B. A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof.
******
This Act has been interpreted to require the obligation to contribute toward a payment of a judgment be predicated on joint or several liability. Rodgers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961). Thus, when multiple parties are responsible for the same injury, and all are found liable, each and every one of them is a joint tortfeasor, and is required by the Act to contribute his pro rata share of the judgment against them all. The right to contribution exists among joint tortfeasors regardless of the fact that they have been found liable under different tort theories, such as negligence and strict products liability. Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F.Supp. 1000 (M.D.Pa.1973).
It is not disputed here that contribution obtains between joint tortfeasors liable under different tort theories. Neither Aalco (liable under strict products liability) nor the City of Española (liable under negligence theory) contends that the other party does not have the right to cor i. Yet Aalco, claiming that in essence there are two, not three, joint tortfeasors, is asserting that the City has no right to contribution from Tiano’s. This is what the trial court found, categorizing Tiano’s liability as “purely technical”; but we disagree.
Tiano’s liability under strict products liability theory arises from its having sold a defective product which eventually' injured a user of the product. The seller’s liability under this theory is set out in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) and was adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). This section states in part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, .
******
Subsection (2)(a) clearly indicates that the seller’s liability is not predicated upon negligence. Neither, for that matter, is the manufacturer’s liability dependent upon negligence under strict products liability theory. See, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966).
Tiano’s liability runs directly to the injured plaintiff, just as Aalco’s does. Simply because Tiano’s received a defective product from Aalco does not make its liability merely technical.
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OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
The City of Española appeals from the apportionment of a judgment on a cross-claim requiring it to pay one-half of the total amount of damages awarded plaintiffs in a suit by them against three defendants wherein all three defendants were found jointly and severally liable for the injuries of plaintiff, Peggy Sue Sanchez. We reverse the trial court on the apportionment of contribution between the three defendants.
Peggy Sue Sanchez and her mother sued the City of Española, Aalco Manufacturing Company and Tiano’s Sporting Goods Store for damages arising from an accident in which a volleyball standard fell and severely injured Peggy Sue’s foot, eventually resulting in the amputation of two of her toes. The standard, manufactured by Aalco, had been purchased by the City from Tiano’s and was being used in a recreation center under the City’s supervision when the accident occurred. A jury found the City liable for the injury under a negligence theory whereas Tiano’s and Aalco were found liable under strict products liability. The total award was for $96,000. A judgment holding the three defendants jointly and severally liable for that amount was accordingly entered.
As between the defendants, who had all cross-claimed against each other for contribution or indemnity, the court, sitting without a jury after the verdict had been rendered, found that the City and Aalco should each pay one-half of the judgment and that Aalco should indemnify Tiano’s for any costs. The basis of this apportionment was the court’s judgment that Tiano’s was not negligent but was only a party in the chain of supply, and was therefore not an active tortfeasor as were the City and Aalco. The court concluded that Tiano’s liability was derivative and purely technical. The City, claiming'it should be required to pay only one-third of the damages since there are three tortfeasors, appeals the court’s allocation of damages. Aalco has not appealed the decision that it should indemnify Tiano’s, and, therefore, that issue is not before us.
The sole question on appeal is whether, under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which New Mexico has adopted, damages awarded against three tortfeasors, two of whom are liable under strict products liability and one of whom is liable for negligence, should be split equally three ways, or whether the tortfeasors liable under strict products liability should be considered as one tortfeasor in assessing the amount of contribution between the parties. We hold that, in these circumstances, each defendant should be required to contribute one-third of the total damages. Since the trial court’s judgment that Aalco indemnify Tiano’s has not been challenged, or decision in this case will result in the City of Espanola paying one-third of the damages and Aalco paying two-thirds.
As both negligence and strict products liability sound in tort, the question of contribution between the defendants is properly decided under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as adopted in New Mexico, §§ 41-3-1 to 41-3-8, N.M. S.A.1978. The pertinent sections read: 41-3-1. Joint tortfeasors defined.
For the purposes of this act [41-3-1 to 41-3-8 NMSA 1978] the term “joint tortfeasors” means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.
41-3-2. Right of contribution; accrual; pro rata share.
A. The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors.
B. A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof.
******
This Act has been interpreted to require the obligation to contribute toward a payment of a judgment be predicated on joint or several liability. Rodgers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961). Thus, when multiple parties are responsible for the same injury, and all are found liable, each and every one of them is a joint tortfeasor, and is required by the Act to contribute his pro rata share of the judgment against them all. The right to contribution exists among joint tortfeasors regardless of the fact that they have been found liable under different tort theories, such as negligence and strict products liability. Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F.Supp. 1000 (M.D.Pa.1973).
It is not disputed here that contribution obtains between joint tortfeasors liable under different tort theories. Neither Aalco (liable under strict products liability) nor the City of Española (liable under negligence theory) contends that the other party does not have the right to cor i. Yet Aalco, claiming that in essence there are two, not three, joint tortfeasors, is asserting that the City has no right to contribution from Tiano’s. This is what the trial court found, categorizing Tiano’s liability as “purely technical”; but we disagree.
Tiano’s liability under strict products liability theory arises from its having sold a defective product which eventually' injured a user of the product. The seller’s liability under this theory is set out in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) and was adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). This section states in part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, .
******
Subsection (2)(a) clearly indicates that the seller’s liability is not predicated upon negligence. Neither, for that matter, is the manufacturer’s liability dependent upon negligence under strict products liability theory. See, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966).
Tiano’s liability runs directly to the injured plaintiff, just as Aalco’s does. Simply because Tiano’s received a defective product from Aalco does not make its liability merely technical.
[T]he justification for the strict liability [against the seller] has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; * * *
Restatement, supra, Comment c. Tiano’s liability results from its having sold a defective product. The plaintiff is as much injured by Tiano’s having sold the volleyball standard to the City as by Aalco’s having manufactured it in the first place. But for the sale, the injury would not have occurred.
Aalco argues that the relationship between manufacturer and retailer of a product is analogous to the relationship between master and servant. We disagree.
The liability of a master for his servant’s torts is vicarious. Vicarious has been defined as, “1: having the function of a substitute: serving instead of someone or something else: acting for a principal: . . ” “Webster’s New International Dictionary 2549 (3rd ed. 1961). Tiano’s does not perform the same functions as Aalco; it is not a substitute. Tiano’s is neither employed by, nor owned by, nor is it the agent of Aalco. They are two independent entities. Since we do not find the relationship between Aalco and Tiano’s to be analogous to that between master and servant, we do not reach the question of how contribution would be implemented between three tortfeasors where one tortfeasor’s liability was vicarious.
It having been established that there are three tortfeasors each directly liable to the plaintiff for her injuries, each tortfeasor has a right to contribution when he has paid more than his pro rata share of the judgment, § 41-3-2(B), supra, which is here one-third.
Normally the apportionment of liability effected by contribution is on the basis that “equality is equity,” which means that each tortfeasor is required ultimately to pay his pro rata share, arrived at by dividing the damages by the number of tortfeasors. * * *
Prosser, Law of Torts § 50, at 310 (4th ed. 1971). Although some jurisdictions, notably California and New York, have insisted that equitable considerations will determine pro rata shares, see Ramirez v. Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco, 4 Cal.App.3d 397, 84 Cal.Rptr. 356 (1970); Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938), New Mexico has adopted the view that pro rata share means equal share. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Western Farm Bureau Insurance Cos., 18 N.M.St.B.Bull. 830, 93 N.M. 507, 601 P.2d 1203 (1979).
Española is required to pay only one-third of the judgment. The propriety of the indemnity awarded Tiano’s as against Aalco not having been appealed, Aalco will pay the remaining two-thirds. The order of the trial court is reversed with respect to the apportionment of contribution among the three defendants and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED:
WALTERS, J., concurs.
SUTIN, J., dissents.