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Taylor v. Sawyer Spindle Co.

75 F. 301, 22 C.C.A. 203, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2032
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJune 30, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 75 F. 301 (Taylor v. Sawyer Spindle Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Sawyer Spindle Co., 75 F. 301, 22 C.C.A. 203, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2032 (3d Cir. 1896).

Opinion

WALES, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the decree of the United States circuit court for the district of Xew Jersey, made [302]*302October 19, 1895, sustaining the validity of letters patent hTo. 253,-572, issued to John E.-Atwood, dated February 14, 1882, for “improvements in the supports for spindles for spinning 'machines,” declaring that the defendant corporation had infringed the third, fourth, and fifth claims of the patent, and ordering an accounting of profits from March 23, 1891, the date of the organization of the. defendant company. The patented improvements pertain to what are known as “self-adjusting spindles,” and relate “to that class of such spindles having step and bolster bearings within a supporting-tube.” The specifications give the following description of the invention:

“The characteristic feature of my present invention is a supporting tube which is flexibly mounted with relation to the spindle rail, and contains the step and bolster bearings for the spindle, so that the latter and said tube may move together laterally in all directions during the self-adjustment of the spindle, while carrying an unequally balanced bobbin and its yam, instead of relying upon the movement of the spindle and its bearings within, and independently of, the supporting tube, as heretofore in this class of spindles. By reason of my improvement, the means whereby fhe movable capacity or flexibility of the spindle is afforded are rendered openly accessible, and more easily renewed, if need be, than heretofore; and, further, elastic materials may be successfully employed, which would be liable to injury, and rendered inelastic, by oil, if located within the supporting tube, as heretofore. I am also enabled to readily graduate the degree of flexibility of the spindle with relation to'the spindle rail, so as to accommodate the self-adjusting capacity of the spindle to the various conditions incident to its use in working with bobbins materially differing in size and weight. All of these advantages are due to the novel, characteristic feature before referred to.”

The claims in issue are tliese:

“(3) The combination, substantially as hereinbefore described, of a spindle rail of a spinning machine, a spindle, and a supporting tube flexibly mounted with relation to the spindle rail, aud containing step and bolster bearings.
“(41 The combination, substantially as hereinbefore described, of a spindle rail, a spindle, a supporting tube containing step and bolster bearings, flexible connections between said tube and the spindle rail, and adjusting devices for varying the degree of flexibility of the supijorting tube and spindle' therein.
“(51 The combination of the spindle rail, the spindle, the supporting tube, loosely mounted with relation to the rail, and containing the step and bolster bearings for the spindle, the spring, and the nut for compressing it, substan- • tially as described.”

Tke validity of. tke complainants’ title is admitted. The first defense to the suit is that of laches, which was urged with much earnestness, and is made on the ground that the complainants had deprived themselves of relief in a court of equity by neglecting to prosecute any one for infringement until more than seven years after the date of the patent, and that the defendant had no notice of their claims until more than ten years after that date. It is alleged that the complainants permitted the manufacture and sale of the spindles complained of to be carried on for many years by men who were ignorant of their claim, and allowed the persons composing the defendant corporation to purchase the business without giving them notice; that spindles mounted flexibly, like those now complained of, were made and sold by the Cooke Locomotive & Machine Company, continuously and to a large extent, from August, 1881, until they sold the business to Mr. Taylor, Mr. Shaw, and Mr. [303]*303Cocker, and 1hat the hitter continued to make and sell the same spindles until the defendant, corporation was formed, March. 23, 1891, — (he date from which infringement is charged in the hill. The first suit brought against any infringer of (he Atwood patent was that of these complainants against W. O. & A. R. Morrison Company, September 2,1889, in the district of Connecticut (52 Fed. 590), in which the validity of the patent was sustained, and there was a decree for the infringement of the second, third, and fifth claims, and for’ an accounting. Subsequently another suit was brought by complainants against the Morrison Company for infringement of the same patent by types of modified spindles manufactured by them, in which, on motion for a preliminary injunction, the patent was upheld. 51 Fed. (593. The theory of this defense is that there is no absolute right t:o an injunction on proof of infringement of a patent; (hat the complainant must present a case for equitable relief, and if it. appears by the bill, or by the evidence, that by reason of his delay he is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity, it will be refused on final hearing, as well as on motion for a preliminary injunction. It is insisted that, if the Atwood patent has been infringed by the defendant, the only remedy for the complainants would be by an action at law for damages, and that the only possible relief obtainable in the present suit would be an injunction against future infringement.

It 1ms never been held that mere laches, unaccompanied by circumstances which amount to an equitable estoppel, shut out a party from all relief in a, court of equity. Knowledge of and long-continued acquiescence by a complainant in an infringement may, in special cases, be fatal on a motion for a preliminary injunction, but will not, on a final hearing, prevent the court from granting such relief as may be just and equitable. This is the general rule which is recognized in the authorities which are cited in the briefs of counsel. There is a, want of satisfactory proof that the defendant acted in ignorance of the rights of the complainants, or that the latter had always had full knowledge1 of the alleged infringement. 'Notice was given to the public at large that the spindles were patented, and the defendant could not have been blind to the fact that the new spindles had gout; into extensive use. The testimony of Mr. Taylor, of (he defendant corporation, liad reference to a time prior to the issue of the patent, when, as he says, Mr. Atwood saw the infringing spindles, or ones just like them, in operation in Paterson, and made no claim that the invention was his; but it is not pretended that Taylor, Shaw, and Cocker, or either of them, at the date of their incorporation, in March, 1891, did not know of the complainants’ claims, for the suit against the Morrison Company had then been pending for more than a year. In Kittle v. Hall, 29 Fed. 508, it was held that, while long- acquiescence might defeat a bill for infringement, no precedent had been discovered for the dismissal of a bill for so short a period as seven years, and that the defendants had not been misled, but knew of the plaintiff’s rights. In McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, the court said:

[304]*304“Equity courts will not, in general, refuse an injunction on account of delay in seeking relief, where the proof of infringement is clear, even though this délas' may be such as to preclude the parts' from any right to an account for past profits.”

To the same effect are the cases of Menendez v.

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Bluebook (online)
75 F. 301, 22 C.C.A. 203, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2032, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-sawyer-spindle-co-ca3-1896.