Taub v. BIG M, INC.

719 F. Supp. 2d 325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64314, 2010 WL 2532476
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 23, 2010
Docket09 Civ. 10592(LTS)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 719 F. Supp. 2d 325 (Taub v. BIG M, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taub v. BIG M, INC., 719 F. Supp. 2d 325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64314, 2010 WL 2532476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

Opinion

Memorandum Order

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Hindy Taub (“Plaintiff’) brings a claim against Defendant' Big M, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging that Defendant failed to make certain disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (“TILA”), and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (“Regulation Z”). This court has jurisdiction of Plaintiffs claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Defendant moves to dismiss this action pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

Discussion

In adjudicating a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court accepts the *326 factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. 1 See Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 501 (2d Cir.2007). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. --•, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard applies to all civil actions. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953.

Plaintiff was issued a credit account by Defendant in March 2009. (Compl. ¶ 10.) In connection with the creation of that account, Defendant provided Plaintiff a document entitled “Annie Sez Retail Installment Credit Agreement” containing a “Billing Rights Summary” relating to disputes of credit card charges. {Id. ¶ 11; id., Ex. A.) Plaintiff alleges that the disclosures in the “Billing Rights Summary” were insufficient to satisfy the TILA and Regulation Z disclosure requirements pertaining to billing errors. (Id. ¶¶ 30-38.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s disclosures were not sufficiently similar to the Federal Reserve Board’s (“FRB”) Model Form G-3(A), 2 as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(7) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(5)(iii), 3 because they lack a number of the items contained in the model form. (Compl. ¶¶ 34-36.) The Complaint and the document appended thereto indicate that Defendant’s disclosures did not cover the following TILA and Regulation Z issues: (1) Defendant’s obligation to acknowledge receipt of a billing inquiry within 30 days, (2) Defendant’s obligation to respond to the inquiry within 90 days, and (3) the two limitations on the consumer’s right not to pay an amount due on property or services as to which the consumer is dissatisfied, namely that such purchase must have (1) been in the consumer’s home state or within 100 miles of her mailing address, and (2) had a price of more than $50.

Defendant argues that the Complaint nonetheless fails to state a claim because Defendant extended credit to Plaintiff (and other class members) on “terms that are more expansive than those required by TILA” and that its “customers therefore enjoy more rights than [Defendant] is required to afford under TILA.” (Def.’s Br. at 6.) This, Defendant contends, renders lawful its omission of disclosures otherwise required by TILA and Regulation Z because “[t]he agreement is more beneficial to the customer because it omits exclusions permitted by TILA, and therefore places greater burdens on [Defendant].” (Def.’s Br. at 9.) Aside from Defendant’s factual assertions, contained in its motion papers, that it offered Plaintiff terms more generous than those required by TILA, there is *327 no indication in the pleadings or documents attached thereto that the parties’ credit agreement contains such terms. Indeed, the installment credit agreement attached to the complaint is silent on the subject of billing errors and disputes, other than the challenged disclosures contained at the bottom, and no other agreement is attached to or reference in the Complaint. The allegations regarding the terms of the parties’ agreement contained in Defendant’s brief do not form a proper basis for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir.2000) (“a district court errs when it ... relies on factual allegations contained in legal briefs or memoranda in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted)).

Nor are Defendant’s proffers availing as a matter of law. The disclosures mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(7) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b)(5)(iii) pertain to a consumer’s rights and obligations under TILA, and are thus necessary regardless of the consumer’s rights and obligations under her agreement with the creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) sets for the procedure by which an obligor may challenge a charge and imposes on the creditor obligations to investigate and respond to such a challenge. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(c)-(e) and 1666a limit a creditor’s ability to take certain actions after receiving a notice conforming with the procedures provided in Section 1666(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 1666i subjects a creditor to most claims and all defenses, with two important limitations, that an obligor has against a merchant with whom she has a dispute relating to a transaction involving the credit card. 15 U.S.C. § 1637

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Bluebook (online)
719 F. Supp. 2d 325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64314, 2010 WL 2532476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taub-v-big-m-inc-nysd-2010.