Sylvester v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 RYAN SYLVESTER and ANGELA No. 2:20-cv-01797-TLN-CKD ELLIS, 12 Plaintiffs, v. 14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S 15 DEPARTMENT, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Scott Jones (“Jones”), in his official 19 capacity as Sacramento County Sheriff; Sacramento County Deputies Sheriff Timothy Mullin 20 (“Mullin”), Dick Mah (“Mah”), and Bobi Griggs (“Griggs”), in their individual capacities; the 21 County of Sacramento; and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department’s (collectively, 22 “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the 23 alternative, Motion to Strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (ECF No. 31.) 24 Plaintiffs Ryan Sylvester and Angela Ellis (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition (ECF 25 No. 32), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 34). 26 Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend their Third Amended Complaint 27 (“TAC”). (ECF No. 35.) Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to amend. (ECF No. 36.) 28 Plaintiffs did not file a reply. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and 2 DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 31.) The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to 3 Amend. (ECF No. 35.) 5 This case arises from the death of an unarmed pretrial detainee, Ryan Ellis (“Ellis”). 6 Plaintiffs are Ellis’ parents and allege they received a 141-page investigative report from the 7 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department (“Report”) that outlines Defendants’ version of the 8 circumstances that led to Ellis’ death. (ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 3–4, 16–28.) The Report details a series 9 of events that began after Griggs, Mah, and Mullin responded to a call from Ellis’ former partner 10 that Ellis was violating the terms of his restraining order. (Id. at ¶¶ 16–28.) 11 According to the Report, the officers searched and handcuffed Ellis upon arriving at the 12 scene and placed Ellis in the back of Griggs’ patrol car. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Ellis became increasingly 13 agitated during transportation to the county jail and reportedly kicked out one of the rear windows 14 of Griggs’ patrol car and propped his body out of the open window. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 21–22.) Griggs 15 began alternating between accelerating and decelerating to keep Ellis off balance to prevent him 16 from escaping through the window. (Id. ¶ 22.) Griggs’ erratic driving continued for some time 17 until Ellis allegedly jumped head-first out of the window during a point of deceleration, resulting 18 in his death. (Id.) 19 Plaintiffs contest the accuracy of the Report and present an alternate version of events. In 20 their view, Ellis could not have kicked out the back window of Griggs’ patrol car and jumped out 21 of a moving vehicle while handcuffed because he was “untrained in acrobatics, was a long- 22 standing meth addict, out of shape, and had little athletic ability[,]” among other things. (Id. at ¶ 23 42.) Instead, they believe Griggs, Mah, and Mullin murdered Ellis and covered it up pursuant to a 24 county policy of obscuring officer-involved fatalities when the deceased is African American. 25 (Id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs allege Griggs intentionally turned off her cameras and took a detour to a 26 discreet location where the officers beat Ellis to death before dragging his body to the side of the 27 road to make it look like an accident. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 47, 52, 58.) 28 In May 2019, Plaintiffs, proceeding in pro per, filed a Complaint in the Sacramento 1 County Superior Court against the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. (See ECF No. 29 at 2 2 n.3 (taking judicial notice of Plaintiffs’ Complaint); ECF No. 17-2, Ex. B (Plaintiffs’ 3 Complaint).) The following month, Plaintiffs — now represented by counsel — amended their 4 Complaint to add Jones and the County of Sacramento as Defendants and causes of action under 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civ. Code § 51. (ECF No. 1-1.) Jones, the Sacramento County 6 Sheriff’s Department, and the County of Sacramento removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 7 1.) 8 In August 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) after receiving 9 leave from the Court, adding Griggs, Mah, and Mullin as Defendants and realleging causes of 10 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civ. Code § 51. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) Defendants moved 11 to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See ECF Nos. 17, 24.) The 12 Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim with leave to amend and declined to exercise 13 supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claim. (ECF No. 29.) Specifically, the Court found 14 that: (1) Jones is a redundant Defendant because he is only sued in his official capacity and the 15 County of Sacramento and its Sheriff’s Department are already named as Defendants; (2) 16 Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a § 1983 claim for purported violations of Ellis’ Fourth and 17 Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for a purported violation of Ellis’ Fifth 18 Amendment right to due process is not cognizable because that amendment only constrains the 19 federal government — not counties; and (4) Plaintiffs’ claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 20 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (hereinafter Monell claim) failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs did not 21 sufficiently allege Defendants had a custom, policy, or practice that violated Ellis’ federal rights. 22 (ECF No. 29 at 7–11.) The Court admonished Plaintiffs that they have one “final opportunity to 23 amend” and that “any amended filing must comply with [the Court’s] Order.” (Id. at 12.) 24 On March 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative TAC, realleging causes of action under 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civ. Code § 51 and including Jones as a Defendant. (See ECF No. 26 30.) Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss, or alternatively strike, the TAC on March 27 29, 2023. (ECF No. 31.) 28 / / / 1 On June 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to amend their TAC to include 2 additional exhibits and allegations regarding standing. (See ECF No. 35.) 4 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 6 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 7 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 9 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 10 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 11 citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 12 discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 13 of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 14 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 15 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 16 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 17 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 18 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 19 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 20 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 21 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 22 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 23 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 24 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 25 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 26 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 27 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 28 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 1 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 2 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 3 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 4 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 5 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 6 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 7 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 8 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 9 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 10 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 11 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 12 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 13 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 14 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 15 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits 16 thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 17 See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. 18 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Daniels- 19 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court need not accept as true 20 allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice). 21 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 22 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 23 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 24 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 25 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 26 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 27 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 28 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” 1 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 2 Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 4 Defendants raise seven main arguments in their motion to dismiss: (1) Plaintiffs lack 5 standing to bring a wrongful death or survival action; (2) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim should be 6 dismissed; (3) Griggs, Mah, and Mullin are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) Jones is a 7 redundant Defendant who should be dismissed; (5) Plaintiffs’ second cause of action under Cal. 8 Civ. Code § 51 should be dismissed; (6) Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief should be stricken 9 or dismissed for lack of standing and failure to allege an irreparable injury; and (7) Plaintiffs’ 10 claims should be dismissed because they are based on conclusory and groundless allegations that 11 are contradicted by Plaintiffs’ statements and exhibits.1 (ECF No. 31-1 at 10–22.) 12 A. Standing to Bring a Wrongful Death or Survival Action 13 As a threshold matter, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ TAC should be dismissed in its 14 entirety because Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a wrongful death or survival action under 15 California law. (ECF No. 31-1 at 10–13.) Defendants maintain Plaintiffs have not made the 16 requisite showing that they are the personal representatives or heirs of Ellis or otherwise 17 demonstrate they are entitled to bring a wrongful death or survival action. (Id.) In opposition, 18 Plaintiffs contend they have standing to pursue a wrongful death action under § 1983 as Ellis’s 19 parents.2 (ECF No. 32 at 7–10.) 20 1 Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim as to all Defendants, the Court refers 21 to Defendants collectively (unless otherwise noted) and declines to address Griggs, Mah, and 22 Mullin’s argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of 23 qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”). Likewise, Defendants’ argument that Jones is a redundant 24 Defendant is moot, and therefore, the Court declines to address it.

25 2 Plaintiffs appear to conflate a wrongful death action under California law (see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 et seq.) with a § 1983 claim premised on a killing in violation of the 26 Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court nevertheless construes Plaintiffs’ 27 pleadings to argue the latter. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of L.A., 648 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the 28 plaintiff’s favor). 1 A claim of wrongful death is a statutory cause of action under California law. See Cal. 2 Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 et seq.; Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 1113, 1118 (2013) 3 (wrongful death actions are statutory in origin and exist only insofar as the Legislature declares). 4 Although Plaintiffs reference a wrongful death action in their TAC, their first cause of action is a 5 § 1983 claim premised on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, not a state wrongful death 6 claim. (ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 29–84; ECF No. 32 at 5 (“(T)he current claim is based on the 7 substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).) A survival action, on the other 8 hand, is one where a plaintiff asserts the rights of a deceased person. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 9 377.20 et seq.; Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998), as 10 amended (Nov. 24, 1998). As discussed below, however, Plaintiffs purport to assert their own 11 rights, not Ellis’. 12 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC for lack of standing to assert a 13 wrongful death or survival action is DENIED. 14 B. Section 1983 Claim3 15 Plaintiffs’ first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges “Defendants’ conduct in 16 wrongfully killing [Ellis] on May 4, 2017[,] in the fields behind the car wash on Watt [Avenue], 17 constitute[s] a violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process right[,] including the right of 18 familial relationship with the deceased.” (ECF No. 30 at ¶ 58.) Plaintiffs further allege 19 Defendants’ conduct in refusing to ask Ellis’s family “questions about what they knew about the 20 killing” and their “failure to provide a copy of the Sheriff’s investigative reports was a substantial 21 factor in bringing about a violation” of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. (Id. at ¶ 61.) 22 / / / 23

24 3 Plaintiffs appear to allege separate constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 29–84.) 25 Defendants move to dismiss all these claims. (See ECF No. 31-1 at 13–16.) In their opposition, 26 however, Plaintiffs clarify their § 1983 claim is brought only under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 32 at 5–6.) Accordingly, the 27 Court only addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. 28 1 Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim fails because it is 2 derived from a violation of Ellis’s rights, and Plaintiffs do not allege any unconstitutional conduct 3 was directed toward them. (ECF No. 31-1 at 14–15.) Defendants further contend Plaintiffs’ 4 claim fails because their allegations are conclusory and are contradicted by other allegations in 5 the TAC and the exhibits submitted therewith. (Id. at 21–22.) 6 In opposition, Plaintiffs contend they are asserting their own rights, not Ellis’, and have 7 sufficiently stated a claim that the killing of Ellis was unlawful. (ECF No. 32 at 6–7, 15–17.) To 8 support their position, Plaintiffs incorporate excerpts from the TAC — that restate the allegations 9 that Defendants unlawfully killed Ellis (see id. at 10–17) — but do not otherwise provide any 10 relevant legal authority to rebut Defendants’ contentions that they have failed to state a claim. 11 The Court agrees with Defendants and finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a due process 12 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs purport to assert their own rights under the 13 Due Process Clause, but they do not specify which right was allegedly violated or the conduct by 14 Defendants that led to the violation of their rights.4 Instead, Plaintiffs focus on Defendants’ 15 conduct toward Ellis. (See ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 29–84.) To the extent Plaintiffs purport to assert 16 their right to familial association, Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory, and they offer no legal 17 authority or facts to support an inference they are entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 18 (complaint must plead sufficient factual content to permit the court to draw the reasonable 19 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged). In any event, Plaintiffs 20 abandoned this argument by not raising it in their opposition brief. Jenkins v. Cnty. of Riverside, 21 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff abandoned claim by not raising it in opposition 22 to motion). 23 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim for failing to 24 allege unconstitutional conduct directed toward them. (See ECF No. 29 at 9.) The deficiency

25 4 The only conduct Plaintiffs allege that is directed toward them is Defendants’ purported failure to ask Ellis’ family questions about Ellis’ death and their failure to furnish Plaintiffs copies 26 of the investigative reports. (See ECF No. 30 at ¶ 61.) These allegations are conclusory, and 27 Plaintiffs offer no legal authority to support their contention that these inactions by Defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate they are 28 entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 1 remains. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 2 Amendment claim without leave to amend. 3 C. Monell Claim5 4 Plaintiffs allege Defendants have a policy, practice, or custom of covering up white-on- 5 black police killings by refusing to provide investigative reports to the parents of the deceased. 6 (ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 5–6, 37, 50–51, 54.) They maintain Defendants’ policy obstructs their ability 7 to obtain any investigative reports, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1510 and Plaintiffs’ rights to procedural 8 and substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and equal protection 9 under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 50–55, 59–61.) 10 Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is insufficiently pled and should be dismissed 11 on that basis. (ECF No. 31-1 at 16.) Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiffs fail to identify a 12 custom or policy, explain how the custom or policy was deficient and how it caused Plaintiffs 13 harm, and how the custom or policy amounted to deliberate indifference. (Id.) Plaintiffs disagree 14 and incorporate by reference portions of their TAC, which they argue sufficiently states a Monell 15 claim. (ECF No. 32 at 17–19.) 16 “A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, 17 practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of 18 constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 19 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “[A] policy is ‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action … made 20 from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final 21 policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 22 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 23 (1986)). “A ‘custom’ for purposes of municipal liability is a ‘widespread practice that, although 24 not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to 25

5 As the Court previously noted, Plaintiffs contend their first cause of action is only a direct 26 claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See ECF No. 32 at 5–6.) In 27 their opposition, however, Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss their Monell claim. (Id. at 17–19.) Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ first cause of action to also assert a 28 claim under Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. 1 constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.’” Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 2 1141, 1147 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). 3 “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 4 founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has 5 become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 6 1996), holding modified by Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001). After establishing 7 one of the methods of liability, “a plaintiff must also show that the circumstance was (1) the cause 8 in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Id. 9 The Court agrees with Defendants and finds Plaintiffs have failed to establish Monell 10 liability. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is premised on Defendants’ purported failure to ask them 11 questions about Ellis’s death and furnish them with documents related thereto. But Plaintiffs do 12 cite any legal authority to support an inference that they have a constitutional right to receive 13 those documents or to be consulted during the investigation into Ellis’ death. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 14 at 678; Saved Magazine v. Spokane Police Dep’t, 19 F.4th 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (rejecting a 15 theory of Monell liability when no case law was cited). Nor do Plaintiffs identify, beyond their 16 threadbare allegations, the policy or custom of which they complain. Plaintiffs’ allegations 17 amount to no more than an isolated incident, which is insufficient to form the basis of Monell 18 liability for an improper custom or practice. Saved Magazine, 19 F.4th at 1201. 19 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Monell claim for failing to sufficiently allege a 20 custom or policy. (See ECF No. 29 at 10–11.) The deficiency remains. Accordingly, the Court 21 GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claim without leave to amend.6 22

23 6 Plaintiffs move to amend their TAC to file their Fourth Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 35.) The proposed amendments purport to cure the standing deficiencies in the TAC by 24 adding allegations that Ellis separated from his former wife and had no children, presumably to satisfy the requirements for bringing a survival action. (Id. at 4–7.) These standing deficiencies 25 are only relevant insofar as Plaintiffs attempt to assert Ellis’s rights. (See ECF No. 29 at 8–9.) However, Plaintiffs repeatedly argue they are asserting their own rights, not Ellis’. (ECF No. 32 26 at 6, 15–16.) Thus, granting leave to amend would be futile here. Accordingly, the Court 27 DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[L]eave to amend will not be granted where an amendment would be 28 futile.”). 1 D. State-Law Claim 2 Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is a claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Unruh Act). (ECF 3 No. 30 at ¶¶ 85–112.) Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to 4 allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act and a violation of the Americans with Disabilities 5 Act. (ECF No. 31-1 at 18–20.) However, because this matter is before the Court based on 6 federal question jurisdiction and all federal claims have been dismissed, the Court declines to 7 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 8 1367(c)(3); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming the 9 district court’s declination to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 10 claims after all federal claims were dismissed). 11 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claim under the Unruh Act without 12 prejudice to bringing this claim in one of the Superior Courts of California.7 14 The Court was clear in its previous Order that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims were deficient. 15 (See ECF No. 29.) Nevertheless, the Court granted Plaintiffs one final opportunity to cure those 16 deficiencies in an amended complaint. (See ECF No. 29.) The deficiencies remain. For the 17 foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES 18 Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim (including their Monell claim) without leave to amend. (ECF No. 31.) 19 The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claim and 20 DENIES all other motions. (ECF Nos. 31 (Motion to Strike), 35 (Motion to Amend).) The Clerk 21 of Court is directed to close this case. 23 7 Related to their Monell claim, Plaintiffs allege Defendants’ policy, practice, or custom of 24 covering up white-on-black police killings violates 18 U.S.C. § 1510 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 50–55, 59–61.) Plaintiffs contend this purportedly unlawful 25 policy is ongoing and they seek to enjoin Jones from enforcing it under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). (Id. at ¶¶ 55–57.) Because the Court has dismissed both of Plaintiffs’ claims, 26 however, their request for injunctive relief is moot. See, e.g., Boland, Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen 27 (USA) Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent cause of action). 28 1 | Date: December 12, 2023 /) 1 “ □ | i fb 5 Troy L. Nuhlep ‘ United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12