Sweeney v. Smith

167 F. 385, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5351
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 5, 1909
DocketNo. 173
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 167 F. 385 (Sweeney v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sweeney v. Smith, 167 F. 385, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5351 (circtedpa 1909).

Opinion

J. B. McPHERSON, District Judge.

The defendants in this action may be arranged in two groups, one composed of the partners in the firm of Edward B. Smith & Co., and the other composed oí John W. Van Dyke and B'rank D. Zell. The bill does not pray for the same, or even similar, relief against each group, but asks for different, and, indeed, for only distantly related, decrees, as will be seen in a few moments. It is not altogether easy to summarize the charges of the bill, for the complainant has chosen the unusual and undesirable course of including much of his evidence and not a few argumentative statements, with the result of presenting for examination a document of more than a hundred printed pages. After attentive consideration, however, it is possible, I think, to condense his cause of action against Edward B. Smith & Co., at least into a comparatively small compass:

In the fall of 1905, the Bay Shore Terminal Company, a Virginia corporation operating a street railway in and near the city of Norfolk, passed into the hands of receivers. A majority of the bondholders, uuiting for their own protection, agreed to put their interests into the hands of a committee, to whom was given plenary power to act. On September 12th this committee entered into a contract with the complainant by which he was to acquire a large part of the company’s bonds and stock, and was to pay therefor 40 per cent, of the par value of the bonds. Other covenants were contained in the contract; among them, an agreement that a certain cloud on the title to the company’s right of way should be cleared off and adjusted. On November 11th this agreement concerning the tille to the right of way was modified, but the change is not material in the present dispute. It is only essential to notice that the complainant was to obtain a controlling interest in the company’s stock and bonds. No limit of time was fixed within which the respective engagements of the parties were to he fulfilled. For reasons not now important to consider, the contract of September 12th was not carried out. On [386]*386January 25, 1906, the same committee made a second contract with D. L,. Groner and Tazewell Taylor, who were acting as agents for E. B. Smith & Co. This agreement covered substantially the same ground as the contract of September 12th with the complainant, and practically transferred to Smith & Co. the option upon the bonds and stock that had previously been given to the complainant. There are differences between the two contracts, but none, I think, that calls for attention in the present aspect of the controversy. The agreement of January 25th was carried out in essential particulars. The bonds were delivered to Smith & Co., and were used by them at par and interest in paying the purchase price of the terminal company’s property, which they bought at foreclosure sale in the following May. The complainant now prays that Smith & Co. account to him for the profit made by this use of the bonds, proceeding upon the theory that Smith & Co. in effect have in their hands this profit, or-its equivalent, which they refuse to give up, although in equity it belongs to the complainant. The only ground set forth in the bill to support this theory is the following sentence from paragraph 12:

“The said Edward B. Smith. & Co. knew before they entered upon their negotiations of your orator's contract, as is shown by their answer to a certain petition filed by B. W. Leigh and M. C. Ferrebee, to be more particularly referred to hereafter, and tbeir negotiation with said committee was conducted through one IX L. Groner and one Tazewell Taylor, both of whom knew of your orator’s said contract before they entered upon the said negotiations.”

The answer referred to in this quotation is not included among the numerous exhibits, but I shall assume that its contents justify the complainant’s averment, and that Smith & Co., being chargeable either with their own knowledge or with the knowledge of their agents, Groner and Taylor, were aware of the complainant’s contract before they made their own agreement of January ,25th. There is no other relevant averment in the bill on this subject. No charge of deceit or false representation or fraud in any form or degree is made against Smith & Co. The bill does not even state that they used any means whatever, fair or unfair, to induce the committee, to break the contract of September 12th with the complainant, and there is no averment that they entered into the agreement of January 25th with the intention of injuring the complainant, whether such intention was deliberately malicious or fraudulent, or was only such intention as would be inferred by the law from the fact that injury actually followed. In other words, while it may be supposed that the complainant meant to charge that Smith & Co. interfered with the carrying out of his contract of September 12th, and persuaded or induced the committee to break that contract, no such charge appears in the bill. The only complaint is that Smith & Co. had prior knowledge of the complainant’s contract when they began the negotiations that resulted in the agreement of January 25th.

Under.all the authorities the bill is fatally defective on this point. The complainant’s cause of action does not rest upon contract, for he had no such relation with Smith & Co. It must be founded on a tort, on a wrong done by Smith & Co., and must be supported by [387]*387the proposition that it is an actionable wrong to make a second contract with a promisor if he is known to have had a prior contract upon the same subject with another promisee. In my opinion, this proposition is not sound. The promisor may have excellent reasons for declining to be bound by the earlier contract, and these he need not disclose. If he chooses to take the risk of breaking the first agreement, that is his own affair, which may make him liable on that agreement, but imposes no obligation on the second promisee. It is enough for the second promisee that the agreement is now offered to him without his own procurement or persuasion. If he has done nothing to bring the situation about, the mere fact that he knew of the first contract is no bar to his entering upon the second. Mere knowledge of the first does not make the second an actionable wrong; he is under no legal obligation to insist upon being told why the promisor declines to carry out the first contract, and is not bound to weigh these reasons and decide at his peril whether they are good or bad. Before he can he called to account, some legal ground of liability must appear; he must participate in the breach before he can be held to blame; and the mere knowledge that the promisor intends to break the contract with the first promisee is not wrongful in itself, and does not disable the second promisee from making the subsequent contract. To be blameworthy, he must take some active step to bring about the breach. At the least, he must induce or persuade the promisor to abandon the earlier agreement, and even this he may sometimes do with impunity, unless the decisions in several jurisdictions are to be regarded as erroneous. Take the case of two trade competitors: One makes a contract with a customer; the other, knowing that the contract has been made, persuades the customer by fair and legitimate arguments that his wares are belter than his rival’s, and thus induces the customer to cancel the contract. In such a situation, I am not aware of any decision that would support a suit against the second merchant, although he has unquestionably interfered actively to supplant his rival.

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Bluebook (online)
167 F. 385, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sweeney-v-smith-circtedpa-1909.