Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry-Goods Co.

105 F. 163, 62 L.R.A. 673, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 3816

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: November 14, 1900
• Docket: No 1,410
• Status: Published

Opinions

THAYER, Circuit Judge,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The complaint filed in the lower court, the substance of which has been stated, shows by necessary intendment that when the circular of the defendant company was issued it had in stock a limited quantity of the four brands of calico of the plaintiff’s manufacture which are therein described. The circular stated, in substance, that the defendant had such calicoes in stock, and the complaint did not deny that fact, but admitted it by averring that “the defendant corporatino had but a small quantity of such goods to sell, and for that fea- . son qualified its offer to sell by inserting in the circular after ,the name of the goods the words, ‘as long as they last.’ ” Moreover, the owner of property, real or personal, has an undoubted right to sell it and to offer it for sale at whatever price he deems proper, although the effect of such offer may be to depreciate the market value of the commodity which he thus offers, and incidentally to-occasion loss to third parties who have the same kind or species of property for sale. The right to offer property for sale, and to fix the price at which it may be bought, is incident to the ownership of property, and the loss which a third party sustains in consequence of the exercise of that right is damnum absque injuria. We are thus confronted with the inquiry whether the motive which influenced the defendant company to offer for sale such calicoes of, the plaintiff’s manufacture as they had in stock at the price named in its circular, conceding such motive to have been as alleged in the complaint, changed the complexion of the act, and rendered the same unlawful, when, but for the motive of the actor, it would have been clearly lawful. It is common learning that a bad motive — such as an intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, by virtue of St. 13 Eliz. c. 5, and possibly by the rules of the common law — will render a conveyance or transfer of property void which, but for the bad motive, would have been valid. So, also, one who sets the machinery of the law in motion without j)rob-able cause, and for the sole purpose of injuring ihe reputation of another, or subjecting him to loss and expense, is guilty of an unlawful act which would have been lawful but for, the improper motive. And one who, by virtue of his situation, has a qualified privilege to make defamatory statements concerning another, may be deprived of the benefit of that privilege by proof that it was not exercised in good faith, but in pursuance of a malicious intent to injure the person concerning whom the defamatory statement or statements were made. Poll. Torts (Webb’s Ed.) pp. 831-335-, and cases there cited. There is also some authority for saying that one who maliciously (that is, with intent to obtain some personal benefit at another’s loss or expense) induces another to break his contract with a third party thereby commits an actionable wrong if special damage is disclosed, although the act done would have been lawful if the wrongful motive had been absent. Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555. And see Poll. Torts (Webb’s Ed.) pp. 668-673. Aside from cases of the latter kind, it is a general rule that the bad motive which inspires an act will not change its complexion,' and render it unlawful, if otherwise the act was done in the exercise of an undoubted right. Or,, as has sometimes been said, “when an act done is, apart ‘from the feelings which prompted it, legal, the civil law ought to take no cognizance of its motive.” The question as to how far and under what circumstances a bad purpose will render an act actionable which, considered by itself, and without reference to the purpose which prompted it, is lawful, has been so much discussed since the decision, in Allen v. Flood [1898] 1 App. Cas. 1, that it would be profitless to indulge in further comment. It' has been well observed that'it would be dangerous to the peace of society to admit the doctrine that any lawful act can be transformed prima facie into an actionable wrong by a simple allegation that the act was inspired by malice or ill will, or by an improper motive. It is wiser, therefore, to exclude any inquiry into the motives of men when their actions are lawful, except in those cases where it is well established that malice is an essential ingredient of the cause of action, or in those cases where, the act done being wrongful, proof of a bad motive will serve to exaggerate the damages.

The case at bar falls within neither of the exceptions to the general rule above stated, — that, if an act is done in the exercise of an undoubted right, and is lawful, the motive of the actor is immaterial. No one can dispute the right of the defendant company to offer for sale goods tha t it owned and were in its possession, whether the quantity was great or small, for such a price as it deemed proper. This was the outward visible act of which complaint is made, and, being lawful, the law will not hold it to be otherwise because of a secret purpose entertained by the defendant company io inflict loss on the plaintiff by compelling- it to reduce the cost of a certain kind of its prints or calicoes.

Nor is the complaint aided in any respect by reference to the law of conspiracy, since the only object that the defendants had in view which the law will consider was the disposition or sale of certain goods which the defendant corporation had the right to sell; and tiie means employed to accomplish that end, namely, placing them on the market at a reduced cost, were also lawful.

In the brief filed in behalf of the plaintiff in error it is suggested finally that the complaint may be sustained on tlie ground that it states 'a good cause of action for maliciously causing certain persons to break or cancel their contracts with the plaintiff, but we think it quite obvious that the complaint was not framed with a view of stating a cause of action of that nature, and that it is insufficient for that purpose. It does not give the name of any person or corporation with whom the plaintiff had a contract for the sale of its prints which was subsequently broken in consequence of the wrongful acts of the defendant. Neither does it show that it had accepted any orders for goods which the jobber was not privileged to cancel at his* pleasure. Nor does it allege any special damage incident to the breach of any particular contract. In view of all the allegations which the complaint contains it is manifest, we think, that it was framed with a view of .recovering on the broad ground that the issuance of the circular was unlawful and actionable, provided the motive of the defendant company in issuing it was to occasion loss or inconvenience to the plaintiff.

We are of opinion that the complaint did not state a cause of action, as the trial court held, and the judgment below is therefore affirmed.