Sullivan v. President & Trustees of the Village of Sing Sing

25 N.E. 366, 122 N.Y. 389, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 722, 77 Sickels 389, 1890 N.Y. LEXIS 1614
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 28, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 25 N.E. 366 (Sullivan v. President & Trustees of the Village of Sing Sing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sullivan v. President & Trustees of the Village of Sing Sing, 25 N.E. 366, 122 N.Y. 389, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 722, 77 Sickels 389, 1890 N.Y. LEXIS 1614 (N.Y. 1890).

Opinion

Parker, J.

Prior to June 8, 1882, the defendants determined to construct a bridge over Sing Sing kill, on Central avenue, in the village of Sing Sing. In pursuance thereof civil engineers, employed for that purpose, prepared plans and specifications for the required work. Bids were solicited, which resulted in the acceptance of plaintiffs’ proposal, which was followed by the formal execution of the contract for the construction of a bridge between these parties on the date above mentioned. The specifications, furnished the contractors as a basis for their proposals to do the work, being made a part thereof. The specifications, under the head of “ quantities,” contained the following:

“ The following is an approximate estimate of the quantities of material required in the foregoing work: 500 cubic yards earth excavation; 150 cubic yards rock excavation; 4,600 *393 cubic yards embankment; 200 cubic yards brick masonry; 190 cubic yards masonry protection wall.”

“Vote.—The above quantities are approximate only, but are considered sufficiently accurate for the purpose of basing a proposal. Contractors, however, will take such steps as they may deem necessary to verify the above quantities, as the Board of Trustees do not hold themselves absolutely bound by them.”

According to the plans shown, the average excavation to earth rock for the east abutment was a little over two and one-half feet, and, for the west abutment, four6 and one-half feet. While the actual average excavation made was ten feet under each abutment. So that instead of 500 cubic yards of earth excavation, there was 2,936-3.- yards ; instead of 150 cubic yards of rock excavation, there was 1,245|- yards; instead of 4,600 cubic yards of embankment, there was 6,563 yards; and in lieu of 190 yards of masonry protection wall, there was 537 yards.

The contention of the plaintiffs in this action is, that the plans, which were made a part of the contract, having shown the base lines for both abutments, and all the wing walls, that the additional depth of excavation, which necessarily was made at greater expense to them as the depth increased was extra work within the intent and meaning of the following clause of the contract:

It is also mutually agreed that all necessary extra work or additional material not specified in the bill of quantities, which may be found necessary to be done or furnished in the further prosecution of the work, in the opinion of the said superintendent, shall .be agreed upon and the price therefor established by said superintendent and contractor, with the consent of the parties of the second part.”

While on the part of the defendants it is insisted that the estimates made were not intended to be accurate, and that.the contract considered in its entirety does not admit of a different construction.

*394 The case was first tried before a referee, who construed the contract agreeably to plaintiffs’ contention, and directed judgment to be entered in their favor for $7,867.32.

On appeal to the General Term, the judgment was reversed re-trial resulted in a judgment for $5,350.61, that being the-amount to which plaintiffs were entitled' for all the work done at the prices named in the contract, with interest.

Stating appellants’ position still more briefly it is, that all work in excess of the quantities named in the specifications, must be held to be extra work, although it be of the same general kind and character as that designated under the heading “ quantities.” This claim is founded upon that clause-in the contract already alluded to, which provides : “ That all necessary extra work or additional material not specified in the bill of quantities * * * shall be agreed upon and the price therefor established by said superintendent and contractor with the consent of the parties.” The construction contended for by the appellants, therefore, assumes that, notwithstanding the specifications provide that the quantities of material estimated are only approximate, nevertheless the clause quoted referring to necessary extra work not specified in the bill of quantities, limits the work to be done at the prices named in the contract to the actual quantities specified. The mere-statement of the proposition demonstrates that the construction contended for by the appellants is altogether too narrow and not in accord with the spirit and intent of the instrument. It would seem that the provisions in the contract relating to-necessary extra work or additional material not specified in the bill of quantities was intended, to be more comprehensive than contended for by the appellants, because it necessarily embraces not merely the number of cubic yards specified under that heading, but also all that is stated under the word “ quantities.” That it comprehends of necessity as asserted, that the quantities named are merely estimated, for it is not only provided that the quantities constitute simply an estimate intended as a basis for proposal, but the further precaution is taken of stipulating in that connection that the board of trus *395 tees do not hold themselves absolutely bound by the quantities, and that contractors will take such steps, as they may deem necessary to verify them. Without, therefore, considering the other portions of the contract, it seems that a reasonable eonstruetio'n requires the holding that all work of a general character provided for in the specifications, even though the amount of it may have been considerably in. excess of the estimated quantities, comes within the work to be done at the contract prices.

There are, however, other portions of the contract which, considered in connection with that already referred to, makes it clear that the construction given by the General Term must prevail.

■ The contract provides that the parties of the first part (these plaintifís) “ agree to build and construct a culvert, arch, bridge, retaining walls and all necessary work thereon over Sing Sing kill on Central avenue in the village of Sing Sing, " * .* and to furnish, at their own cost, all the labor and all the materials therefor, * * * and to furnish all the materials and to construct the said bridge in all respects in accordance with the plans and specifications for the same made by Benjamin F. Church, civil engineer, hereto annexed, and which forms a part of this contract.”

And, further, that “ in consideration of the foregoing covenants the said parties of the second part agree to pay the said parties of the first part, "x" * * upon the certificate of the superintendent or engineer that the contract, specifications ■ and conditions have all been fully complied with at the rate of the following sums, viz.: Earth excavation at the rate of 35 cents per cubic yard; rock excavation at the rate of $1.50 ; embankment at the rate of 40 cents; brick masonry and arch at the rate of $8'; stone masonry and arch at the rate of $7.50; protection wall at the rate of $5.50; masonry and protection wall at the rate of $6.50.”

The specifications which are made a part of the contract also provide that “the work to be done is to construct a, culvert, 25 feet span, with retaining walls; to make the neces *396

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Bluebook (online)
25 N.E. 366, 122 N.Y. 389, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 722, 77 Sickels 389, 1890 N.Y. LEXIS 1614, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sullivan-v-president-trustees-of-the-village-of-sing-sing-ny-1890.