Filed 8/31/26 Stringcandy v. Am. Federation of Musicians etc. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
STRINGCANDY LLC et al., B348324
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV02708)
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs, Rodney Diggs and Samuel E. Chilakos for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Bush Gottlieb, Dana S. Martinez, Jason Wojciechowski and Mathew J. Solett for Defendant and Respondent.
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Stringcandy LLC and its managing member Stephanie Matthews appeal from an order of dismissal entered in favor of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada (Federation) after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the Federation’s demurrer to the third amended complaint. Matthews and Stringcandy, a company that staffs musicians for live productions, asserted causes of action for defamation and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage based on public statements made by a local union affiliate of the Federation that Stringcandy wrongfully terminated three musicians. Matthews, who is a musician and Federation member, also sought a declaration that the Federation could not discipline her on charges related to the musicians’ termination (in addition to injunctive relief).
On appeal, Stringcandy and Matthews contend the trial court erred in finding that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq.; LMRA) (Section 301) preempted their defamation and intentional interference causes of action. The court based its ruling on the fact that adjudication of the causes of action would require the court to interpret the terms of collective bargaining agreements between Stringcandy and the local union.1 Stringcandy and Matthews also contend the court erred in ruling that Matthews must exhaust the Federation’s internal disciplinary appeal procedures before seeking declaratory relief. We affirm.
1 Stringcandy and Matthews also contend the trial court erred in finding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) preempted their tort claims. We do not reach this contention because we conclude Section 301 preempted the tort claims.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Allegations of the Third Amended Complaint Stringcandy and Matthews filed this action on February 1, 2024. After the trial court sustained demurrers to the first and second amended complaints, on February 3, 2025 they filed the operative third amended complaint (complaint). The complaint asserted four causes of action against the Federation: (1) defamation (libel); (2) defamation (slander); (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (4) declaratory relief.
As alleged in the complaint, Stringcandy is a Los Angelesbased company that hires musicians to perform in high-profile musical productions. Matthews is Stringcandy’s managing member, a working musician, and a member of the Federation.
In November 2022 Stringcandy entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Musicians Union of Las Vegas, Local 369 (Local 369) “governing the provision of musical services by string musicians within the jurisdiction of [Local 369]” for an artist residency show titled “Weekends with Adele” in a Las Vegas, Nevada hotel-casino. Local 369 is an unincorporated affiliate of the Federation that, as alleged on information and belief, “is controlled by” the Federation and “contractually required to comply with all orders and directions” from Federation leadership. The 2022 CBA commenced on November 12, 2022 and terminated on December 31, 2022, and it was “fully performed by all parties thereto.”
In January 2023 Matthews, on behalf of Stringcandy, engaged in collective bargaining with Local 369, which was represented by its president, Yunior Lopez. The negotiations concerned the employment of string musicians for additional
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dates of the Adele residency that had been recently announced and would play from January 20, 2023 through March 25, 2023. On January 17, while negotiations were ongoing, Matthews sent Lopez a list of the musicians that Stringcandy planned to hire in 2023; seven of the musicians who worked on the 2022 shows (including Lopez) were not on that list. The following day Lopez emailed Matthews to ask why he was not included on the list, but he did not request that Stringcandy hire him or the other omitted musicians, and he “did not object to their exclusion from the proposed roster” for the 2023 shows.
On January 21, 2023 Stringcandy and Local 369 entered a new CBA that, like the 2022 agreement, “govern[ed] the provision of musical services by string musicians” within Local 369’s jurisdiction for the Adele residency. Both the 2022 and 2023 CBA’s included mandatory dispute resolution procedures requiring “submission of written grievances to the employer.”
Concurrently with execution of the 2023 CBA, Stringcandy and Local 369 entered into a side agreement, the “LPH-LV contract,” which “specifically identified exactly 24 string musicians that would be hired by [Stringcandy] to provide musical services pursuant to the terms and provisions of the 2023 CBA.” Due to a “physical limitation” imposed by the stage design of the Adele residency, “it [was] not possible for more than 24 string musicians to perform simultaneously” at any of the shows. The 2022 and 2023 CBA’s and the LPH-LV contract were not attached to the complaint (that is, the third amended complaint), or filed with the demurrer.
The complaint alleged on information and belief that around January 18, 2023 Lopez notified the Federation that Stringcandy did not intend to hire three union musicians—Lopez, Rhea Hosanny, and Jason Bonham (collectively defined as the
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“Grievants”)—to perform in the 2023 shows. The Federation managers directed Lopez to file grievances on behalf of Local 369 against Stringcandy, but only after the parties executed the 2023 CBA, and further, they instructed Lopez and Local 369 to conceal this plan from Stringcandy. At the Federation’s direction, Lopez “intentionally failed to disclose” the planned grievances before signing the CBA and the LPH-LV contract. Lopez, Local 369, and the Federation did not assert “any objections whatsoever” to the agreements before signing them, nor did they assert any reservation of rights.
On January 23, 2023, two days after signing the agreements, Local 369 submitted written grievances to Stringcandy on behalf of the Grievants, in which the Grievants claimed their terminations were unjust and demanded they be reinstated immediately and made whole. As alleged on information and belief, Lopez and Local 369 knew reinstatement would be impossible “without wrongfully terminating at least 3 of the specified musicians” in the LPH-LV contract because of the 24-musician capacity limitation.
A mediation took place on March 16, 2023. Thereafter, Local 369 failed “to take any of the post-mediation actions, including arbitration of the dispute, required by the dispute resolution provisions of the [2022 and 2023 CBA’s] within the time allowed by said [CBA’s],” with the result that the grievances “became invalid.” At no time did any of the parties to the grievances or this litigation dispute the terms of their agreements, and, as alleged, “none of the terms [of the agreements] are currently disputed.”
The first cause of action for libel alleged that around April 2023, Local 369, with the “knowledge, approval and ratification” of the Federation, published in its January-March
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2023 newsletter the following statement: “‘Since January 2023, we [Local 369] have again stepped forward to defend members who were wrongfully terminated from the Adele Residency.’” (Boldface omitted.) Stringcandy was the only employer who hired Local 369 members for the Adele residency, so recipients of the newsletter reasonably understood the statement referred to Stringcandy. The statement was false “because no members of [Local 369] had been wrongfully terminated from the Adele Residency.” And, as alleged on information and belief, Local 369 and the Federation knew at the time the newsletter was published that the statement was false, “or acted with reckless disregard to whether it was true or not.”
The second cause of action for slander further alleged that around April 2023 representatives of Local 369 and the Federation told the production team responsible for the Adele residency that Stringcandy and Matthews had wrongfully terminated Local 369 members from the show. As alleged on information and belief, the Federation representatives knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard to its truth.
The third cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage alleged, in relevant part, that “by publishing the newspaper statement and the false statements [to the production team], the Federation either “intended to disrupt” the economic relationship between Stringcandy and Matthews and musical production companies or “knew that disruption of that relationship was certain or substantially certain to occur.”
The fourth cause of action for declaratory relief related to union disciplinary charges filed against Matthews for her role in
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omitting the Grievants from the 2023 shows.2 As alleged, Lopez, acting on directions from the Federation, emailed Matthews in October 2023 to state that if Stringcandy and Matthews did not pay $24,000 to the Grievants, the Grievants would file disciplinary charges against Matthews with the Federation and place Matthews and Stringcandy on the Federation’s “International Unfair List” and Local 369’s “Do Not Work For List.” Matthews and Stringcandy did not pay the demand, and on November 15, 2023 the Federation commenced a disciplinary proceeding against Matthews based on the Grievants’ March 2023 grievances filed against Stringcandy. In December the Federation and Local 369 added Matthews and Stringcandy to their blacklists, which meant that union musicians could not work for Stringcandy while the labor disputes were pending. Matthews prayed for a judicial declaration that the Federation could not adjudicate the charges because it was not impartial, and for a permanent injunction restraining the Federation from adjudicating the disciplinary charges and ordering the removal of Stringcandy and Matthews from the blacklists.
2 Both Matthews and Stringcandy asserted the cause of action for declaratory relief. In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court found they conceded that Stringcandy, which is not a Federation member, did not have standing to assert the claim for declaratory relief. Stringcandy and Matthews do not challenge this ruling on appeal, and the issue is forfeited. (See Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4 [issue not raised on appeal “deemed waived”]; Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [“‘“Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are [forfeited] or abandoned.”’”].)
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B. The Federation’s Demurrer and the Trial Court’s Ruling On March 3, 2025 the Federation demurred to the complaint. It argued the tort claims for defamation and intentional interference were preempted by Section 301, which establishes exclusive federal court jurisdiction over “suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” (29 U.S.C. § 185(a).) To prevail on these claims, Stringcandy and Matthews would need to prove the Federation intentionally made false statements when it (through affiliates under its control) stated that Stringcandy wrongfully terminated union musicians; determination of whether the musicians were wrongfully terminated would require interpretation of the 2023 CBA. The Federation also argued the tort claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U.S.C. 151 et. seq.; NLRA) under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236 (Garmon), in which the United States Supreme Court held the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes based on unfair labor practices and employee rights covered by sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158).
As to the declaratory relief cause of action, Matthews’s request to enjoin the Federation’s disciplinary action failed because, among other things, she did not exhaust the procedures set forth in the Federation bylaws. Moreover, declaratory relief was not available to remove Matthews and Stringcandy from the blacklists because the blacklists did not prevent Matthews from working as a musician, and Stringcandy was not union member.
In their opposition, Matthews and Stringcandy argued Section 301 did not preempt their tort claims because the claims did not require the trial court to interpret a collective bargaining agreement; rather the court need only “consult” the parties’
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CBA’s and LPH-LV contract to see that Local 369 agreed in 2023 to a roster of musicians that did not include the Grievants. In addition, Garmon preemption did not apply because the Federation acted with actual malice. With respect to the declaratory relief cause of action, Matthews was excused from exhausting the Federation’s internal appeal procedures because doing so would be futile in light of the Federation’s hostility to her and the unreasonable delay in adjudicating the charges.
After a hearing, on May 12, 2025 the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action without prejudice. The court found the LMRA preempted the tort claims under Section 301, explaining that “for the court to determine whether the refusal to hire was a wrongful termination, the court would have to look at the 2023 [CBA] and interpret the Parties’ obligations and the scope of permissible conduct, including [the Federation’s] ability to publicize its labor disputes.” Moreover, “there are legal questions as to whether the LPH-LV contract is a collateral agreement or an agreement that supersedes or explains the terms of the 2023 [CBA],” which would require the court to examine both agreements. The court also found the NLRA preempted the tort claims under Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. 236. On the declaratory relief cause of action, Matthews failed to show she was excused from exhausting the Federation’s procedures; she did not show the procedures were inadequate to address her arguments or that a resolution in her favor would not provide her complete relief.
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On May 12, 2025, the trial court entered an order of dismissal of the entire action without prejudice.3 Stringcandy and Matthews timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.) “““We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.””” (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) Where
3 An order of dismissal is an appealable “judgment” if it is in writing, signed by the court, and filed in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.) Although the order of dismissal was “without prejudice,” the order was a final adjudication on the merits between these parties with respect to preemption and exhaustion, and it is therefore appealable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 577 [“[a] judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding”]; Topa Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1336 [involuntary dismissal without prejudice was appealable because order was final judicial determination of plaintiff’s rights against insurance company].)
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factual allegations are based on information and belief, the plaintiff must allege “information that ‘lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.’” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5; accord, Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158-1159.)
“A judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend will be affirmed if proper on any grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court acted on that ground.” (Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324; accord, Ko v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1150.)4
B. Section 301 of the LMRA Preempted the Defamation and Intentional Interference Causes of Action 1. Section 301 preemption Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides, “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States.” (29 U.S.C. § 185(a); see Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Melendez).)5 As the court in Melendez explained, under the
4 Stringcandy and Matthews do not seek leave to amend the complaint. 5 Section 301(a) of the LMRA is currently found in Chapter 29, section 185(a) of the United States Code, but courts “‘typically refer to the statutory provisions at issue as “section 301(a)” rather than by citation to the United States Code.’” (Melendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 7.)
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United States Supreme Court’s preemption rule, “‘[section] 301’s jurisdictional grant require[s] the “complete preemption” of state law claims brought to enforce collective bargaining agreements.’” (Id. at p. 7; accord, Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1102, 1107; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65.) “The main policies behind this preemption rule are to ‘ensure nationwide uniformity with respect to the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and preserve arbitration as the primary means of resolving disputes over the meaning of collective bargaining agreements.’” (Melendez, at pp. 7-8; accord, Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1163 (Sciborski).)
“‘[A]lthough the language of § 301 is limited to “[s]uits for violation of contracts,” [federal] courts have concluded that, in order to give the proper range to § 301’s policies of promoting arbitration and the uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreement provisions, § 301 “complete preemption” must be construed to cover “most state-law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements.”’” (Melendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 8; accord, Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., supra, 208 F.3d at p. 1108 [summarizing U.S. Supreme Court decisions].) This does not mean that “‘“every claim which requires a court to refer to the language of a labor-management agreement is necessarily preempted”’”; rather, the United States Supreme Court “‘has distinguished between claims that require interpretation or construction of a labor agreement and those that require a court simply to “look at” the agreement.’” (Melendez, at p. 8; accord, Balcorta, at p. 1108.)
“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not
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require the claim to be extinguished.” (Livadas v. Bradshaw (1994) 512 U.S. 107, 124.) However, “‘[p]reemption occurs when a claim cannot be resolved on the merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim.’” (Melendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 9.) Interpretation is necessary and preemption occurs if the court must answer “‘questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement’” or if “the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 211, 213; accord, Sciborski, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.)
When deciding a preemption issue on a demurrer, we apply a de novo standard of review “because federal preemption presents a pure question of law.” (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 9; accord, Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1, 16.)
2. Resolution of the defamation and intentional interference claims requires interpretation of the 2023 CBA
Stringcandy and Matthews contend Section 301 does not preempt their tort claims because the trial court could resolve the case without interpreting the 2023 CBA, instead simply “consulting” the LPH-LV contract to identify the roster of musicians hired to perform pursuant to the CBA. This, they argue, would establish that the Grievants were not wrongfully terminated (i.e., if they were not on the agreed-upon roster), and there is no dispute over the terms of the CBA. We agree with the
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trial court that interpretation of the 2023 CBA6 is necessary to determine the validity of the causes of action.
The elements of a cause of action for defamation are “‘[1] a publication that is [2] false, [3] defamatory, and [4] unprivileged, and that [5] has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720; accord, Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 980, 991.) The complaint alleged the Federation acted with actual malice, which requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defamatory statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” (Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 256-257; accord, Edward v. Ellis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 780, 793.)
The only publications alleged to constitute defamation are the April 2023 printed statement in the Local 369 newsletter that “‘[s]ince January 2023, we . . . have again stepped forward to defend members who were wrongfully terminated from the Adele Residency,’” and the union representatives’ April 2023 oral statement to the producers of the Adele residency that Stringcandy and Matthews wrongfully terminated Local 369 members from the show.
The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are “(1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to
6 We focus on the 2023 CBA, as do the parties and the trial court.
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disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512; accord, Jung v. Acosta (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 429, 447.) To state a claim, the plaintiff must allege the defendant “committed an independently wrongful act.” (Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130, 1142.) “‘[A]n act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.’” (Ibid.) Stringcandy and Matthews acknowledge in their opening brief that the “intentional interference claim is predicated on the same false and defamatory statements as the defamation claims: that [they] ‘wrongfully terminated’ the Grievants.”
The critical element of proof for each tort claim is whether the statement Stringcandy “wrongfully terminated” the Grievants was false (and, for malice and intentional interference, whether the Federation knew it was false). The trial court will therefore need to determine whether there was a wrongful termination, and within the factual universe of the complaint, it cannot do this without examining the CBA’s and resolving “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement.’” (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 211; accord, Sciborski, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.)
Despite two previous demurrers and three amendments, the relevant allegations are spare. Stringcandy and Local 369 entered a CBA in 2022 “governing the provision of musical services” by union musicians for the Adele residency, and they entered a substantially similar agreement in January 2023.
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These agreements were not filed with the complaint, and the complaint did not allege any of their terms other than an allegation that both agreements “contain mandatory dispute resolution procedures that include the submission of written grievances to the employer.” The only allegation about the LPH- LV contract is that it “identified exactly 24 string musicians that would be hired by [Stringcandy] to provide musical services pursuant to the terms and provisions of the 2023 CBA.” After the 2023 CBA and the LPH-LV contract were signed, the Grievants submitted written grievances contending “their terminations were unjust” and demanding immediate reinstatement and to be made whole. In February 2023 Local 369 filed a complaint with the NLRB based on the same allegations.
The complaint does not allege the basis of the Grievants’
contentions that their termination was wrongful but acknowledges their grievances were asserted pursuant to the CBA’s. The complaint also admits that as of April 2023, when the allegedly defamatory statements were published, there had been no adjudication of the Grievants’ claim that their omission from the 2023 roster was wrongful. Instead, the complaint alleged that following a mediation in March 2023, Local 369 failed to timely pursue the required post-mediation actions, including demanding arbitration, rendering their grievances “invalid.” But in order to determine whether the Grievants’ claims were invalid for failure to timely demand arbitration, the trial court would need to interpret the dispute resolution procedures of the CBA’s, and in any event, even if the grievances became invalid, this would not establish that the April 2023 publications were false.
Because there has been no determination whether the Grievants were wrongfully terminated, the trial court would need
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to adjudicate the merits of that claim. A claim for wrongful termination, even when filed under state contract or tort law, is preempted by section 301 where “the substance of [the] complaint is a grievance against [the employer] within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.” (Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (9th Cir. 1984) 736 F.2d 1348, 1350; see Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. (9th Cir. 1984) 740 F.2d 1468, 1474 (Olguin) [“Even if the ‘wrongful discharge’ is based on state tort law it is preempted” if a collective bargaining agreement governs the parties’ employment conditions because an employees’ “right not to be dismissed without just cause is essentially equivalent to a right created by the collective bargaining agreement.”].) Because the defamation and interference claims would require a trial-within-a-trial on wrongful termination, they belong in federal court.
Stringcandy and Matthews argue that the trial court need not consider, let alone construe, the 2023 CBA to resolve their tort claims, because simply consulting the LPH-LV contract would show that Grievants were not included in the roster of 24 musicians hired in January 2023 to provide musical services pursuant to the terms of the 2023 CBA. But the fact Grievants were omitted from the 2023 roster is not in dispute—the question is whether the failure to include them was wrongful. The complaint alleges the 2023 CBA governed the provision of string musicians for the 2023 Adele residency; thus, the terms of that agreement would govern the musician’s claims they were wrongfully terminated, regardless of the LPH-LV contract’s roster of musicians. (See Olguin, supra, 740 F.2d at p. 1474 [even where wrongful discharge claim does not identify a collective bargaining agreement and is alleged based on some other agreement, “any independent agreement of employment
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could be effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement”].)
Stringcandy and Matthews argue that because Local 369 approved the 2023 musician roster by signing the LPH-LV contract during the collective bargaining process, the Grievants necessarily do not have valid claims for wrongful termination. We are not persuaded. That Local 369 signed off on the roster and the Federation allegedly concealed its plan to file grievances without reserving its rights under the LPH-LV contract could potentially support defenses to a wrongful termination claim (e.g., waiver, estoppel, unclean hands, and fraudulent inducement). But that does not mean the CBA did not give the Grievants a basis for asserting they were wrongfully terminated. Because the complaint does not allege the nature of the Grievants’ claims or what terms in the CBA were relevant to those claims, it is impossible to determine without interpreting the CBA whether the statements that the Grievants were wrongfully terminated were false or that the Federation knew they were false.
Stringcandy and Matthews also contend that section 301 does not preempt state law claims for defamation based on actual malice, citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114 (1966) 383 U.S. 53. In Linn, the United States Supreme Court held the NLRA did not preempt a company’s general manager from asserting a cause of action for malicious libel based on union organizers’ circulation of leaflets containing inflammatory false statements about the manager. (Linn, at p. 66.) The court reasoned that “a State’s concern with redressing malicious libel is ‘so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility’ that it fits within the exception specifically carved out by [Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. 236]” for cases of “compelling state interests” such as prevention of intimidation and threats of
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violence. (Linn, at p. 62; see id. at p. 64 [“The [NLRB]’s lack of concern with the ‘personal’ injury caused by malicious libel, together with its inability to provide redress to the maligned party, vitiates the ordinary arguments for pre-emption.’”].)
Linn addresses only NLRA preemption under Garmon, not preemption under Section 301 based on federal court jurisdiction over collective bargaining agreements.7 Stringcandy and Matthews do not cite, and we are not aware of, any California or federal case holding that Section 301 preemption rules do not apply to claims for malicious defamation. In any event, the defamation alleged here did not involve an injury inflicted during a labor dispute that the NLRB is ill-equipped to address. Instead, the central question is whether the public characterization of the labor dispute by the Federation and Local 369 was false, a question that should be decided under federal labor law. (Olguin, supra, 740 F.2d at p. 1474.)
7 Stringcandy and Matthews argue Linn applies to Section 301 preemption because its holding is based on language in Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. at page 243 that federal courts have declined to find preemption “‘where the activity regulated was merely a peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act.’” (See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 59.) However, it is clear from Garmon and the cases it cites (see Garmon, at pp. 241-244) that Garmon considered only whether the employers’ state law action for damages and injunctive relief against the union for picketing of the companies was preempted under the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). The reference by Garmon to the LRMA was in this context (preemption under the NLRA) because the NLRA is codified as a subchapter of the LMRA. (See 29 U.S.C. § 141(a) [“This chapter may be cited as the ‘Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.’”].)
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Moreover, determination of actual malice hinges on whether the Federation knew that the Grievants had valid wrongful termination claims under the CBA and whether the CBA had any restrictions on disclosure of disputes, which are preempted questions involving interpretation of the CBA. (See Miller v. AT&T Network Systems (1988) 850 F.2d 543, 550 [employee claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are frequently preempted under section 301 because the terms of the collective bargaining agreement may be relevant to determining whether the employer’s conduct was “outrageous,” “extremely unreasonable,” or otherwise inappropriate as may be required by the applicable state tort law].)8
C. The Declaratory Relief Cause of Action Fails Because Matthews Did Not Exhaust the Federation’s Internal Procedures Matthews contends the trial court erred in finding she must exhaust the Federation’s internal disciplinary procedures before seeking a judicial declaration that the Federation cannot
8 Stringcandy and Matthews also argue that Section 301 preemption does not apply because there is no dispute over the “meaning of contract terms,” citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, supra, 512 U.S. at page 124. They point to their allegations that “none of the terms [of the agreements] are currently disputed” or were previously disputed. However, we ignore contentions and conclusions of fact or law (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1010), such as a conclusory allegation that there is no dispute over the CBA’s. Stringcandy and Matthews could have pleaded the terms of the agreements and the allegations in the grievances to show there were no disputes over interpretation of the CBA’s, but they did not.
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discipline her and must remove her and Stringcandy from its blacklists. The complaint has not alleged facts that establish an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
“As a general rule, ‘“a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. [Citations.] Under this rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon ‘termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures.’”’” (Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 477.) “The exhaustion requirement applies to defenses as well as to claims for affirmative relief,” and courts have described “exhaustion of administrative remedies as ‘a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.’” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080 (Coachella); see Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co. LLC v. Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 453, 469 [“The exhaustion requirement is not a matter of judicial discretion; it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.”].) The exhaustion requirement is “‘excused if it is clear that the exhaustion would be futile,’” that is, “‘the party invoking the exception “can positively state that the [administrative body] has declared what its ruling will be on a particular case.”’” (Coachella, at pp. 1080-1081; accord, Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1025.)
“‘A demurrer may properly be [sustained] based on the failure to adequately plead an exhaustion of administrative remedies.’” (Ventura29 LLC v. City of San Buenaventura (2023) 87 CalApp.5th 1028, 1036; see Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 333 [trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint where plaintiff did not show “that
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she either attempted to exhaust her administrative remedies or that she should be excused from doing so”].)
Holderby v. Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 12 (1955) 45 Cal.2d 843 (Holderby), relied on by the trial court, is directly on point. In Holderby the Supreme Court recognized it is a “jurisdictional rule” that “a plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against an organization of which he is a member must first invoke and exhaust the remedies provided by that organization applicable to his grievance.” (Id. at p. 846.) The court reversed a trial court judgment in favor of an expelled union member who sued his union for reinstatement and damages for wrongful expulsion because the member had not challenged his suspension through an internal appeal process provided by the union’s constitution. (Id. at pp. 845-849.) The court rejected the member’s argument that exhaustion was excused because the union violated its rules and caused him harm by suspending him, explaining that such a broad conception of futility would “swallow the rule” in any case where a member has “a justified grievance involving personal and property rights” against his organization. (Id. at p. 847.) Instead, “[i]t is only when the organization violates its rules for appellate review or upon a showing that it would be futile to invoke them that the further pursuit of internal relief is excused. The violation of its own rules which inflicts the initial wrong furnishes no right for direct resort to the courts.” (Ibid.)
As discussed, Matthews sought a judicial determination that her union, the Federation, could not discipline her in connection with charges it filed in November 2023 and that it must remove her and Stringcandy from its blacklists pending any adjudication because the Federation was not an impartial tribunal and would not give her a fair hearing. The complaint
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alleged the Federation’s bylaws guaranteed a full and fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. Specifically, Article 10, Section 1 of the bylaws, as quoted in the complaint, provided in relevant part: “‘Every member in good standing shall have the following rights: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Due Process in all cases of discipline, which must include: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . a full and fair hearing by an impartial tribunal with the opportunity to tell his/her own side of the story.’” (Boldface omitted.)
Further, Matthew based her allegation that she could not get a fair hearing from the Federation on the very violations that she alleged had “inflict[ed] the initial wrong.” (Holderby, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 847.) Specifically, she alleged the Federation was “hostile” to her and would not be impartial because of (1) the April 2023 false statement in the Local 369 newsletter; (2) the April 2023 false representation to the Adele residency production team; and (3) the placement of Stringcandy and Matthews on the blacklists prior to adjudicating the disciplinary charges, causing her financial harm. Matthew did not allege “the organization violates its rules for appellate review or . . . it would be futile to invoke [those rules].” (Ibid.) Nor did she “positively state” the Federation had declared what its ruling will be in her case. (Coachella, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1080-1081.)
Matthews relies on Clayton v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agr. Implement Workers of America (1981) 451 U.S. 679, 689, which held that “courts have discretion to decide whether to require exhaustion of internal union procedures,” listing three factors for courts to consider. Clayton is inapposite. That case addressed whether a union member asserting a Section 301 claim against his union for breach of its duty of fair representation under the collective bargaining agreement in representing the member in his suit against his
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employer (by not timely demanding arbitration) had to first exhaust the union’s internal administrative appeal procedures. (Id. at pp. 681-682.) The case did not address whether a union member like Matthews may sue her union in state court to prevent the union from conducting an internal proceeding on its disciplinary charges against the member. Moreover, the question in Clayton was whether the employee could file his section 301 claim in federal court without first exhausting his remedies; by contrast, Matthew sought to bring her claims in a state trial court, for which exhaustion is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” and “not a matter of judicial discretion.” (Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co. LLC v. Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Bd., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 469.)
Matthews also contends she should be excused from exhaustion of her administrative remedies because requiring exhaustion would lead to unreasonable delay and financial harm. Courts of Appeal have recognized exceptions to exhaustion for “situations where the agency indulges in unreasonable delay” or “when pursuit of an administrative remedy would result in irreparable harm.” (Green v. City of Oceanside (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 212, 222 [citing cases]; accord, SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 339, 346.) Matthews has not met her burden to show she falls within this exception.
Matthews argues there was unreasonable delay because the Federation’s disciplinary action has been “indefinitely suspended” pending action on complaints Local 369 and the Federation filed with the NLRB, which could take “years.” Specifically, the complaint alleged that Local 369 and the Federation, in February 2023 and February 2024, respectively, filed complaints with the NLRB against Stringcandy based on the allegations in the 2023 grievances (which also formed the basis of
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the disciplinary charges against Matthews). In April 2024 the Federation notified Matthews that the disciplinary charges against her were being held in abeyance pending resolution of the NLRB cases; as of the date the third amended complaint was filed, the NLRB had not taken any action on the complaints. Further, because Matthews will remain on the Federation blacklists, she will suffer “severe financial distress” and unreasonable interference “with her ability to earn a living in her occupation as a musician.”
These allegations are inadequate to excuse exhaustion.
The complaint does not allege the Federation was being dilatory or that its decision to stay the disciplinary proceedings pending adjudication of the NLRB charges was improper. On the contrary, the NLRB adjudications will afford Matthews the independent hearing she seeks given that the NLRB complaints are based on the same alleged misconduct: the failure to include the Grievants on the list of hired musicians for the Adele residency. Matthews has also failed to show irreparable harm. The blacklists prevent union musicians from working for a blacklisted entity. The fourth cause of action, if successful, would prevent the Federation and its affiliates from blacklisting Matthews, but the blacklist would only impact Stringcandy (which has no standing to bring the cause of action), not Matthews. Moreover, the complaint does not allege any other harm to Matthews or that the blacklist has impaired her ability to pursue work as a musician.9
9 Stringcandy and Matthews argue for the first time on appeal that the blacklists violate section 411(a)(5) of the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq.) because they constitute punishment without the
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DISPOSITION
The May 12, 2025 order of dismissal is affirmed. The Federation is to recover its costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
due process guaranteed by that statute. However, any such claim would not create an exception to the exhaustion requirement for the declaratory relief claim. Further, Stringcandy and Matthews have not requested leave to amend the complaint to assert a claim under section 411(a)(5), nor have they addressed whether any such claim is preempted.