OTIS, Justice.
Appellant Striebel challenges, on equal protection grounds, the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 126.21, subd. 5 (1980), authorizing separate seasons of play for high school athletic teams separated or substantially separated according to sex. The trial court determined that the lack of adequate tennis and swimming facilities made it necessary to schedule these sports in two seasons, and that separating the teams by sex was a reasonable means of achieving maximum participation by both sexes in the high school athletic program. It concluded that the policy of the Minnesota State High School League (MSHSL) establishing separate seasons for boys and girls in tennis and swimming is constitutional and in compliance both with Minn.Stat. § 126.21 (1978), and as amended by Act of March 18,1980, c. 355, 1980 Minn.Laws 40. We hold that under the narrow factual circumstances presented, the scheduling policies of the MSHSL do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. We therefore need not decide the issue of the constitutionality of the statute.
A short history of previous litigation on this matter may be helpful. In Striebel, et al. v. St. Paul Board of Education, et al., (Ramsey County Dist.Ct., No. 397836, July 9, 1976), the plaintiffs alleged sex discrimination in the St. Paul school athletic programs. Interpreting the language of Minn. Stat. § 126.21 (1978) the court found that separate seasons were impermissible unless shown to be necessary to provide equal opportunity for both sexes to participate in athletics. Pursuant to that decision the St. Paul school board established a program for combined seasons for boys and girls participating in swimming and tennis, the effect of which was to exclude male swimmers and female tennis players from participation in state tournaments. After parents of several male swimmers and female tennis players sued to restrain the proposed season change, the St. Paul Board of Education was enjoined from combining seasons and ordered to set the swimming and tennis seasons to conform with the dates set by the MSHSL. Stumpf v. St. Paul Board of Education (Ramsey County Dist.Ct. No. 421814, August 25, 1977). Appellant Strie-bel intervened in that action and filed a third party complaint against respondent. The original action was dismissed prior to trial.
Minn.Stat. § 126.21 (1978) was amended after the close of the trial and permits the scheduling practices at issue.
The Minnesota State High School League was established in 1916 as a voluntary collection of Minnesota schools for the promotion of amateur sports. The majority of Minnesota public and private schools are members. The League establishes playing seasons for various sports and arranges tournaments at the state level when enough schools have demonstrated an interest. Girls’ athletics came within the scope of the League’s activities around 1969, and since then the program has grown enormously.
The first state girls’ tennis tournament was held in the fall of 1974, and girls’ state swimming meets were initiated in the fall of 1975. State tennis tournaments for boys began in 1929, and have traditionally been held in the spring. Boys’ swimming meets have been held since 1930, traditionally scheduled in the winter. The MSHSL sponsors state tennis and swimming touma-[402]*402ments for the girls’ teams in the fall, a state swimming tournament for boys in the winter, and a state tennis tournament for boys in the spring. The League presently sponsors four tournaments in a coed format: skiing, track, cross-country and golf. A coed tournament means that the state meet is scheduled in the same season for both sexes and the boys’ and girls’ events are alternated. In the actual competition girls compete against girls and boys compete against boys.
Minn.Stat. § 126.21 (1980) does not prohibit co-educational teams. Where two teams in one sport are provided, one of the teams may be restricted to “members of a sex whose overall athletic opportunities have previously been limited.” Id., subd. 3(4). This will generally mean that there will be one team restricted to girls only;1 the other team is open to members of both sexes.
1. It is a basic principle of constitutional law that courts will avoid any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied. See e.g., Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945). With this principle in mind, it should be made clear what this court does not decide. We do not hold that it would be constitutionally permissible to have separate seasons were adequate facilities available.2 The evidence was uncontroverted that access to pool and tennis courts was limited in many high schools and no feasible way to accommodate boys’ and girls’ teams in the same season existed. The solution to this problem is an administrative decision uniquely within the competence of educators. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978); Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass.1979).
Appellant contends that alternative methods existed for dividing athletes between two seasons. We recognize that neither the solution chosen by the MSHSL nor the alternatives espoused by appellant are without disadvantages. Experts testified to the harmful effects of sex segregation on women and men in their work and social relationships, and on women’s economic status and later career development. Respondent’s assertion that girls are not disadvantaged, because they have the opportunity to compete on the boys’ teams in the spring and fall tournaments, is not dispositive of the issue. Appellant does not seek coeducational teams, acknowledging that physiological differences among men and women make separate teams necessary for the time being to provide girls with equal athletic opportunity. That being the case, it should be noted that treatment of the separate teams must be as nearly equal as possible, and separation allowed only to the extent absolutely necessary to provide equal athletic opportunity for all participants.
Appellant has not suggested that the teams are treated unequally in any way regarding length of seasons, game rules, coaching, or money spent on the programs. The only allegation is that girls’ teams are placed in a separate season. While we could not condone a solution which benefited boys at the expense of the more recent girls’ programs, neither season is so substantially better than the other as to deny equal protection of the laws.
We hold that under the limited factual situation presented, the practice of scheduling two teams substantially separated according to sex is a permissible scheduling decision for the MSHSL to make. While we concur in the argument that coeducational athletic programs are preferable [403]*403to sex-segregated programs, respondent is not constitutionally compelled to offer a gender-neutral two season format.
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OTIS, Justice.
Appellant Striebel challenges, on equal protection grounds, the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 126.21, subd. 5 (1980), authorizing separate seasons of play for high school athletic teams separated or substantially separated according to sex. The trial court determined that the lack of adequate tennis and swimming facilities made it necessary to schedule these sports in two seasons, and that separating the teams by sex was a reasonable means of achieving maximum participation by both sexes in the high school athletic program. It concluded that the policy of the Minnesota State High School League (MSHSL) establishing separate seasons for boys and girls in tennis and swimming is constitutional and in compliance both with Minn.Stat. § 126.21 (1978), and as amended by Act of March 18,1980, c. 355, 1980 Minn.Laws 40. We hold that under the narrow factual circumstances presented, the scheduling policies of the MSHSL do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. We therefore need not decide the issue of the constitutionality of the statute.
A short history of previous litigation on this matter may be helpful. In Striebel, et al. v. St. Paul Board of Education, et al., (Ramsey County Dist.Ct., No. 397836, July 9, 1976), the plaintiffs alleged sex discrimination in the St. Paul school athletic programs. Interpreting the language of Minn. Stat. § 126.21 (1978) the court found that separate seasons were impermissible unless shown to be necessary to provide equal opportunity for both sexes to participate in athletics. Pursuant to that decision the St. Paul school board established a program for combined seasons for boys and girls participating in swimming and tennis, the effect of which was to exclude male swimmers and female tennis players from participation in state tournaments. After parents of several male swimmers and female tennis players sued to restrain the proposed season change, the St. Paul Board of Education was enjoined from combining seasons and ordered to set the swimming and tennis seasons to conform with the dates set by the MSHSL. Stumpf v. St. Paul Board of Education (Ramsey County Dist.Ct. No. 421814, August 25, 1977). Appellant Strie-bel intervened in that action and filed a third party complaint against respondent. The original action was dismissed prior to trial.
Minn.Stat. § 126.21 (1978) was amended after the close of the trial and permits the scheduling practices at issue.
The Minnesota State High School League was established in 1916 as a voluntary collection of Minnesota schools for the promotion of amateur sports. The majority of Minnesota public and private schools are members. The League establishes playing seasons for various sports and arranges tournaments at the state level when enough schools have demonstrated an interest. Girls’ athletics came within the scope of the League’s activities around 1969, and since then the program has grown enormously.
The first state girls’ tennis tournament was held in the fall of 1974, and girls’ state swimming meets were initiated in the fall of 1975. State tennis tournaments for boys began in 1929, and have traditionally been held in the spring. Boys’ swimming meets have been held since 1930, traditionally scheduled in the winter. The MSHSL sponsors state tennis and swimming touma-[402]*402ments for the girls’ teams in the fall, a state swimming tournament for boys in the winter, and a state tennis tournament for boys in the spring. The League presently sponsors four tournaments in a coed format: skiing, track, cross-country and golf. A coed tournament means that the state meet is scheduled in the same season for both sexes and the boys’ and girls’ events are alternated. In the actual competition girls compete against girls and boys compete against boys.
Minn.Stat. § 126.21 (1980) does not prohibit co-educational teams. Where two teams in one sport are provided, one of the teams may be restricted to “members of a sex whose overall athletic opportunities have previously been limited.” Id., subd. 3(4). This will generally mean that there will be one team restricted to girls only;1 the other team is open to members of both sexes.
1. It is a basic principle of constitutional law that courts will avoid any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied. See e.g., Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945). With this principle in mind, it should be made clear what this court does not decide. We do not hold that it would be constitutionally permissible to have separate seasons were adequate facilities available.2 The evidence was uncontroverted that access to pool and tennis courts was limited in many high schools and no feasible way to accommodate boys’ and girls’ teams in the same season existed. The solution to this problem is an administrative decision uniquely within the competence of educators. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978); Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass.1979).
Appellant contends that alternative methods existed for dividing athletes between two seasons. We recognize that neither the solution chosen by the MSHSL nor the alternatives espoused by appellant are without disadvantages. Experts testified to the harmful effects of sex segregation on women and men in their work and social relationships, and on women’s economic status and later career development. Respondent’s assertion that girls are not disadvantaged, because they have the opportunity to compete on the boys’ teams in the spring and fall tournaments, is not dispositive of the issue. Appellant does not seek coeducational teams, acknowledging that physiological differences among men and women make separate teams necessary for the time being to provide girls with equal athletic opportunity. That being the case, it should be noted that treatment of the separate teams must be as nearly equal as possible, and separation allowed only to the extent absolutely necessary to provide equal athletic opportunity for all participants.
Appellant has not suggested that the teams are treated unequally in any way regarding length of seasons, game rules, coaching, or money spent on the programs. The only allegation is that girls’ teams are placed in a separate season. While we could not condone a solution which benefited boys at the expense of the more recent girls’ programs, neither season is so substantially better than the other as to deny equal protection of the laws.
We hold that under the limited factual situation presented, the practice of scheduling two teams substantially separated according to sex is a permissible scheduling decision for the MSHSL to make. While we concur in the argument that coeducational athletic programs are preferable [403]*403to sex-segregated programs, respondent is not constitutionally compelled to offer a gender-neutral two season format.
The State appeals separately from that part of the order below requiring it to pay the cost of a trial transcript, ordered by respondent to use in preparation of the post-trial brief, and the cost of copies of four discovery depositions not used at trial.
2. Although no case in this jurisdiction has discussed the award of costs of the transcript used to prepare post-trial briefs, the law is well-settled that amounts paid for the transcript for the purpose of making a motion for a new trial are not taxable to the other party. See Wadleigh v. Duluth Street Railway Co., 92 Minn. 415, 100 N.W. 362 (1904). In Salo v. Duluth and Iron Range Railroad Co., 124 Minn. 361, 145 N.W. 114 (1914), this court held that the cost of a trial transcript obtained daily for the convenience of the attorney during trial is not a taxable disbursement. “If we rule as plaintiff desires on this point, we may look for a transcript to tax in almost every case tried.” Id. at 364, 145 N.W. at 115. The policy reasons stated in Salo were cited with approval in Miller v. Commissioner of Taxation, 242 Minn. 29, 64 N.W.2d 1 (1954), where we held that the costs incurred in obtaining a transcript for use before the board of tax appeals were not taxable against the losing party. We therefore reverse that portion of the trial court’s order which awards the costs of the transcript to respondent.
As no Minnesota case dealing with deposition costs appears to be on point, the trial court was free to determine whether the deposition costs were “necessary” items under Minn.Stat. § 549.04 (1980). The award of costs of the copies of the discovery depositions being within the discretion of the trial court, it will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 123-24 (Minn.1981). We affirm the award of discovery costs.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part.