Karyn Ridgeway v. Montana High School Association

858 F.2d 579, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 13612, 1988 WL 100795
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 4, 1988
Docket86-3901
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 858 F.2d 579 (Karyn Ridgeway v. Montana High School Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Karyn Ridgeway v. Montana High School Association, 858 F.2d 579, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 13612, 1988 WL 100795 (9th Cir. 1988).

Opinions

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs in this class action are girls attending public high schools in the State of Montana and the girls’ parents. Plaintiffs brought this action against the Montana High School Association and various school districts for the purpose of challenging a wide range of practices in Montana high school athletic programs that plaintiffs maintain have unlawfully discriminated against female students in favor of males. They sought equitable relief for conditions which they alleged violated both federal law and provisions of the Montana State Constitution. The case in its early stages was before District Judge Ray McNichols, and after his death, before District Judge Charles Lovell.

With the encouragement of both judges, the parties pursued a creative settlement course in which they utilized the services of a professional “facilitator.” The facilitator was chosen for his expertise in the area of [581]*581improving equality of opportunities for males and females in school athletic programs.

As a result of the settlement course, the parties were able to effectuate many changes in the programs of the high schools without the active intervention of the district court. In accordance with the Settlement Agreement and the recommendation of the facilitator, the matter eventually came back before Judge Lovell to determine a key issue: whether or not the high schools should be required to change the seasons in which the girls played varsity volleyball and basketball so that those seasons would coincide with the conventional seasons in the rest of the country.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that although the schools had made significant strides toward improving the opportunities for girls’ participation in athletics, equality was not yet achieved. It declined to require an immediate season shift because it found that such a switch would not bring about significant improvements in opportunities for the girls, and was not directly related to the remaining serious problems of inequality. The court did, however, maintain jurisdiction of the case, and appointed a special master to oversee the implementation of the parties’ Settlement Agreement attempting to achieve equality. Ridgeway v. Montana High Sch. Ass’n, 633 F.Supp. 1564, 1582-83 (D.Mont.1986).

The plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s order, and contend that the district court should have ordered an immediate change for the two girls’ sports. The order they appeal is in the nature of an order denying injunctive relief. We therefore have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which authorizes appeals from the granting or denial of injunctive relief.

We affirm the district court because we believe the district court appropriately resolved the issues which it was asked to resolve in the unique context of the parties’ Settlement Agreement. That agreement authorized the district court to examine the season question in the light of all of the conditions existing in the Montana high schools with respect to athletics, and to make an essentially factual determination as to whether immediate implementation of that change would materially further the agreement’s objective to bring the girls’ athletics program up to the level of the boys’.

BACKGROUND

The complaint in this case is a reflection of concerns voiced in many quarters over the last several decades that young women are being unfairly discriminated against in athletic programs at educational institutions. In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 with the intent of eliminating sex discrimination in education. Its scope included athletic programs. 45 C.F.R. § 8641(a).

By 1980, a survey by the United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded that while progress had been made, old ideas die hard. It traced attitudes toward athletics from the Victorian Era, when women were considered too weak and frail to participate, through more modern notions that sports are masculine activities. It concluded that the low participation rate by women was more a reflection of lack of opportunity rather than lack of interest. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, More Hurdles to Clear 1-6 (1980). Reprinted as an appendix to Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.1981) (separate opinion of Judge Jones).

That study and others have documented continuing inequities in the variety and number of athletic opportunities at educational institutions. For example, boys’ high school athletic programs received five times more money than girls’ in 1974; men’s college athletic programs received 30 times more money than women’s. More Hurdles to Clear at 6. Although by 1980 the disparity was not as great, male athletic programs continued to receive more funding. Id. In 1982, 71% of colleges continued to offer fewer sports for women than for men, and gave women only one-sixth of all athletic funding, although women numbered one-third of all intercollegiate [582]*582athletes. Tokarz, Separate but Unequal Educational Sports Programs, 1 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 201, 230 (1985). Disparity between female and male athletic programs has prompted much scholarly attention. See, e.g., H. Appenzeller & T. Appenzeller, Sports and the Courts (1980); DeCrow, Hardlining Title IX, 12 Civ.Rights Q. 16 (1980); Martin, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 8 Ohio N.L.Rev. 481 (1981); Fabri & Fox, The Female High School Athlete and Interscholastic Sports, 4 J.L. & Educ. 285 (1975).

Specific issues which have reached the courts include whether females can be excluded from a school’s only team in a given sport, see, e.g., Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 415 F.Supp. 569, 572 (E.D.Tenn.1976); whether males may be kept off female athletic teams when no male team is available, see, e.g., Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n., 695 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 104 S.Ct. 79, 78 L.Ed.2d 90 (1983) and Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 75 Ill.App.3d 980, 31 Ill.Dec. 653, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862 (1979); whether half-court basketball rules for girls are constitutional, see, e.g., Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Ass’n, 468 F.Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.Ark.1979); whether rules placing girls’ teams in out-of-norm seasons meet a separate but equal standard, see, e.g., Michigan Dept. of Civil Rights v. Waterford Township Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 124 Mich.App. 314, 335 N.W.2d 204, 208 (1983), reversed, 425 Mich. 173, 387 N.W.2d 821, 833-34 (1986) and Striebel v. Minnesota State High Sch. League,

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Karyn Ridgeway v. Montana High School Association
858 F.2d 579 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)

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858 F.2d 579, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 13612, 1988 WL 100795, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/karyn-ridgeway-v-montana-high-school-association-ca9-1988.