Stewart v. Gates

450 F. Supp. 583, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17958
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMay 3, 1978
DocketCV 75-3075-WPG
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 450 F. Supp. 583 (Stewart v. Gates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stewart v. Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17958 (C.D. Cal. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WILLIAM P. GRAY, District Judge.

This class action, which raises constitutional challenges of practices and conditions of confinement of prisoners at the Orange County Central Jail in Santa Ana, California, has been tried, argued, briefed and submitted to this court for decision.

In my Memorandum to Counsel of January 26, 1978, I disposed of some of the issues of fact listed in the pretrial order, beginning at page 14. I shall undertake here to state my findings and conclusions with respect to the remaining issues. ■

*585 In reaching such findings and conclusions, and in rendering judgment thereon, I have tried to be mindful of two well established principles. On the one hand, this court has the obligation to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners to due process and equal protection of the laws, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. On the other hand, courts must be careful to refrain from imposing upon jail administrators their personal views as to how penal institutions should be operated and the conditions under which inmates should live.

It is not difficult to recognize and enter orders against extremely bad living conditions or harsh and cruel discipline as being in violation of constitutional rights. But the question of whether less onerous treatment that may be undesirable, or even deplorable, is bad enough to be termed a constitutional deprivation presents some very difficult problems. In undertaking to resolve these matters, this court has tried to limit its interference to situations in which a constitutional right is quite clearly involved. As to these matters, the court intends to make certain that the remedial actions that it directs are accomplished. However, there are a number of situations in which corrective measures appear desirable but the court refrains from issuing orders, in the belief that the problem involved does not reach constitutional proportions. Some of these instances are “borderline,” and in withholding its hand the court takes considerable comfort in the conviction that the defendant Sheriff and his staff are genuinely desirous of administering the County Jail in such manner as to give all reasonable consideration to the comfort and sensibilities of the inmates. In accordance with such belief, this memorandum contains certain recommendations that counsel for the defendants are requested to transmit to his clients for their consideration.

The following paragraphs are numbered according to the similarly numbered issues of fact in the pretrial order to which they pertain.

5. The defendants do read, on a selective basis, prisoners’ outgoing and incoming mail. This is done, not for the broad purpose of censorship, but in furtherance of “the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation”, as these terms are used in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). In light of that decision, this court cannot enjoin such process of examination. However, this court invites the attention of the defendants to the admonition in the opinion in Martinez that “. . . the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” (416 U.S. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 1811). The opinion also suggested that . . the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation . . . .” (416 U.S. at 412, 94 S.Ct. at 1811).

Under these circumstances, the court commends to the defendants that they give consideration to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that, except in unusual circumstances, outgoing mail need not be examined at all and that incoming mail should be checked only for contraband.

6. and 7. It is well established that public interest does require that some people accused of crime be held in custody pending trial. But pretrial prisoners have a right that no more restraints shall be placed upon their liberty than such custody reasonably entails. This clearly means that they must be allowed to communicate by telephone with members of their families, or with anyone else they choose, at all reasonable times. As the defendants suggest, there is always the possibility that plans concerning escape or importation of contraband may be hatched or developed through telephone conversations, and there is the ever present risk that fraudulently placed long distance calls may result in expense to Orange County. The existence of these dangers, which may be reduced by reasona *586 ble monitoring and supervision, cannot justify preventing or unduly limiting prisoners in their use of the telephone.

Telephone facilities available to inmates, as of January 26, 1978, are entirely inadequate and much too inaccessible. Not less than sixteen additional telephones should be installed in locations that the defendants shall determine to be most reasonably accessible. These telephones, and all other telephones installed for inmates’ use, should be made available to the inmates for outgoing calls at reasonable times upon request, subject to priorities of emergency and rotation.

8. Visits to prisoners take place daily over periods of at least six hours, each inmate being allowed one visit of thirty minutes, five days per week. Minor children must be accompanied by adults, and former inmates may not be visitors within sixty days following their release from the jail. The defendants relate the latter restriction to the requirements of institutional security, and in this they must be upheld. In Pell v. Proeunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), the Court was confronted with a challenge to a similar regulation. The opinion stated:

“In this case the restriction takes the form of limiting visitations to individuals who have either a personal or professional relationship to the inmate — family, friends of prior acquaintance, legal counsel, and clergy. In the judgment of the state corrections officials, this visitation policy will permit inmates to have personal contact with those persons who will aid in their rehabilitation, while keeping visitations at a manageable level that will not compromise institutional security. Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties. But when the issue involves a regulation limiting one of several means of communication by an inmate, the institutional objectives furthered by that regulation and the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials in their attempt to serve those interests are relevant in gauging the validity of the regulation.” (417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800 at 2806).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pierce v. County of Orange
905 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (C.D. California, 2012)
Pierce v. County of Orange
526 F.3d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Thomas v. Baca
514 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. California, 2007)
Alexander S. Ex Rel. Bowers v. Boyd
876 F. Supp. 773 (D. South Carolina, 1995)
Navin v. Iowa Department of Corrections
843 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Iowa, 1994)
Gates v. Municipal Court
9 Cal. App. 4th 45 (California Court of Appeal, 1992)
Benson v. County of Orange
788 F. Supp. 1123 (C.D. California, 1992)
Benjamin v. Sielaff
752 F. Supp. 140 (S.D. New York, 1990)
In Re Grimes
208 Cal. App. 3d 1175 (California Court of Appeal, 1989)
People v. Smith
702 P.2d 180 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Inmates of the Riverside County Jail v. Clark
144 Cal. App. 3d 850 (California Court of Appeal, 1983)
Nicholson v. Choctaw County, Ala.
498 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Alabama, 1980)
Stewart v. Gates
618 F.2d 117 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Burks v. Walsh
461 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Missouri, 1978)
Rutherford v. Pitchess
457 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. California, 1978)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
450 F. Supp. 583, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17958, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stewart-v-gates-cacd-1978.