Benjamin v. Sielaff

752 F. Supp. 140, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16112, 1990 WL 194087
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 30, 1990
Docket75 Civ. 3073(MEL), 76 Civ. 2854(MEL), 79 Civ. 4913(MEL), 79 Civ. 4914(MEL), 76 Civ. 101(MEL) and 76 Civ. 190(MEL)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 752 F. Supp. 140 (Benjamin v. Sielaff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 140, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16112, 1990 WL 194087 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

Opinion

LASKER, District Judge.

Approximately 120,000 inmates were admitted to New York City jails last year. The Department of Correction is faced with the difficult task of finding beds for approximately 250 new inmates each day. 1 After these inmates are initially processed in court, they are transported to one of the jails on Rikers Island or to one of the Borough facilities. At each of these facilities, Department personnel classify the inmates, medically screen them, and assign them to beds. While awaiting the completion of these processes, inmates are confined in “receiving rooms.” In receiving rooms, inmates do not have beds and have only limited access to toilets, showers, medical care and other essential services.

In March 1981, the plaintiffs moved for relief as to the conditions in the receiving rooms alleging that, “Detainees are being required to sleep in dayrooms and receiving rooms, as well as in dormitories filled far beyond their capacity,” with resulting chaotic conditions. 2 An order was entered (the “1981 Order”) enjoining the Department from housing inmates in non-housing areas, such as dayrooms, receiving rooms, gymnasiums and program space. 3

*142 In April 1989, inmates were again required to spend days of confinement in gymnasiums and unsanitary receiving rooms and court pens. As a result, plaintiffs moved to hold defendants in contempt for violating the 1981 Order. On May 3, 1989, having concluded that members of the plaintiff class had been subjected in receiving rooms to “degrading, dangerous, unhealthy and unconstitutional conditions” for as long as several days at a time, this court issued an order (the “1989 Order” or the “Order”) prohibiting the Department of Correction from confining inmates in non-housing areas for more than twenty-four hours. The Order also required defendants to house “overload inmates” (inmates being transferred from a housing area in one facility to a housing area in another facility) without delay, setting a guideline of twelve hours. To ensure compliance with the Order, the Department was required to report weekly to the court on a detailed basis as to the extent of compliance as well as to carry out the actions promised by then-Commissioner Koehler in his affidavit of April 17, 1989. These included the establishment of an inmate tracking system and an admission control center, the acquisition of additional buses and the expansion of medical and correctional staff assigned to receiving rooms and court pens. The court declined at that time to hold defendants in contempt.

Some of the measures promised in the Koehler Affidavit were adopted and remain in place today. Others were adopted and subsequently abandoned. Some were never adopted. 4 In April of 1989, the department established a new admission control center which continues to operate today. An inmate tracking system was put in place, but intradepartmental memoranda indicate that it has not always produced accurate results. Although the Department agreed to add eleven rally wagons to its transportation fleet, the Department now maintains that the seven it has added are sufficient to perform the required tasks. Only some of the new staff positions allocated for admissions processing were in fact filled. 5

The Department remained in substantial compliance with the 1989 Order for approximately one year. 6 However, compliance began to unravel in May of 1990 and deteriorated dramatically during the summer and fall of 1990. Required weekly reports were submitted to the court regularly from May 1989 until June 18, 1990, but after June 18, 1990, the Department failed to send reports to the court.

No request was made for modification or temporary waiver of the terms of the Order. On November 5, 1990, the plaintiffs filed the present motion to hold the defendants in contempt for violation of the Order.

The defendants do not dispute the facts: that over the past six months, hundreds of inmates have been sleeping on the floors of receiving rooms and on cots in gymnasiums. As counsel for the plaintiffs declared in his affidavit, based on personal knowledge:

*143 The conditions to which plaintiffs are being subjected for days on end are reminiscent of the nightmarish conditions we observed in 1989.... Detainees have been forced to sleep on crowded, filthy floors in close proximity to seriously ill people, many of whom have not been medically screened; they must rely on inadequate numbers of grossly unsanitary toilets and sinks; access to telephones is de minimis or nonexistent, with the result that many inmates have been lost to their families and attorneys; access to showers is rare or nonexistent; access to medical care and critical medication is sporadic at best. 7

Inmates crowded together on the floor of a small holding pen have had to resort to a shared plastic container to urinate and inmates in need of essential prescription medications such as methadone, dilantin and psychotropic drugs have not received them.

It is clear that high-level Department officials knew of these conditions and knew that they violated the 1989 Order. The defendants argue, nevertheless, that they should not be held in contempt because they have made good faith efforts to comply with the Order, but were prevented from doing so by events beyond their ability to predict or control.

A hearing on the motion was held on November 15, 1990. Commissioner Allyn Sielaff testified as to the Department’s efforts to comply with the Order, the obstacles to compliance, and the reasons that he believes that the Department will be able to comply in the future.

The conclusion to be drawn from the record is that the violation of the Order constituted a contempt of court. There can be no doubt that by housing inmates in gymnasiums and receiving rooms without seeking a dispensation from the court, the Department willfully disregarded the Order. The Commissioner commendably acknowledged this fact when, during the hearing, he apologized for his failure to consult with the court prior to violating the terms of the Order.

I.

“Civil as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damage sustained by reason of noncompliance.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 499, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949). A court may hold a party in civil contempt if (1) the order the party allegedly has failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncomplianee is clear and convincing, and (3) the party has not diligently attempted in a reasonable manner to comply. N. Y. State Nat. Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.1989).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
752 F. Supp. 140, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16112, 1990 WL 194087, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/benjamin-v-sielaff-nysd-1990.