Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Dissent by Judge CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL
OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
Steven Collins appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. During jury selection prior to his state court trial for possession of a controlled substance, Collins, an African-American male, alleged that race motivated the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes against two African-American women in the jury venire in violation of People v. Wheeler,1 but the state trial court rejected Collins’ Wheeler motion. The jury found him guilty of the possession charge and also found that Collins had been convicted of robbery and forcible rape in 1982. Accordingly, with three felony convictions, the court sentenced him to a three strikes term of twenty-five years to life in state prison.2 The California Court of Appeal affirmed [1085]*1085his conviction and sentence, and the California Supreme Court denied both Collins’ petition for review and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we conclude that the California Court of Appeal’s decision that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination during jury selection represents (1) an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial, and (2) an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established law. Accordingly, we reverse with instructions to grant the petition.
BACKGROUND
After Collins was discovered in possession of 0.10 grams of powder cocaine in March 1996, the State of California charged him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11350(a). When jury selection began, the trial court excused ten of the original thirty-three members of the venire. Of the remaining twenty-three, three appeared to be African-American.3
During voir dire, Juror 016, one of two African-American women in the venire, stated that she lived in Inglewood, California, was single, had no children, no prior jury experience, no prior employment experience in law enforcement, and worked as an automations clerk for the Federal Aviation Administration. She also stated that no one close to her had ever been accused of a drug-related offense, nor had anyone close to her had a problem with alcohol or drugs, and that she had no reason to believe that drug dealers operated in her neighborhood. When asked whether she thought that possession of rock cocaine ought to be against the law, she answered “yes.” Juror 016 also told the court that there was nothing about the nature of the charge of possession of rock cocaine that might make it difficult for her to sit on a case involving drug charges. The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 016.
Juror 019, the other African-American woman in the venire, told the court that she lived in Inglewood, California, was single with seven grown children,4 and was currently a retired nurse. She also stated that she had no relatives or close friends in law enforcement and had never had an experience with a police officer that was “particularly positive or particularly negative.” At one time, her youngest daughter had a problem with drugs. Juror 019 had no idea what kind of drugs but thought that it might have been cocaine. Juror 019 stated that she “was involved in” her daughter’s struggle with addiction and “had to help her,” but that she did not think that anything about her relationship with her daughter or the daughter’s cocaine problem would affect her ability to be fair and impartial in Collins’ case.
After the prosecutor exercised another peremptory challenge to excuse Juror 019, defense counsel made a motion pursuant to People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748,5 alleging that the [1086]*1086prosecutor had improperly dismissed Jurors 016 and 019 on the basis of race. The trial court determined that Collins had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination and thus asked the prosecutor to justify her peremptory challenges. The prosecutor responded:
Ms. 016 as well as Ms. 019 were both young and I was concerned with them being too tolerant of this type of case. Also, Ms. 016 made a remark when the judge made a response to her comment “uh-huh,” she turned away and rolled her eyes. I don’t think you asked her specifically to give a yes or no, but she went “yes,” and rolled her eyes and turned away from the court. She and Mr. 006 were both single, no ties.
[Defense Counsel]: Who is 006?
[Prosecutor]: He is the white juror. That was the reason, the justification, for excusing her, rather than her being an African-American. 019, she also had a daughter having a drug problem and she talked about not knowing much about what drug it was, things like that. She was not sufficiently educated in some areas to decide a case like this. But it is beyond any of her experience.
The judge, outside the presence of the prospective jurors, asked the prosecutor if she had any additional justifications to offer for striking the two African-American female jurors. The following colloquy took place:
[Prosecutor]: I was the one to bring to the court’s attention that the two African-American jurors that were excused were both female and the defendant is a male and there is a male African-American on the jury that has been on it since the beginning, I believe, of this case, of the jury panel that were seated. And there is a second female juror that is of African-American color, black color, on the jury, still seated. That is it, your honor, at this point. Does the court need cases for those types of reasons as being upheld in other courts, age and gender and inexperience with a certain subject area?
The Court: I’ll let you know. [Defense counsel], would you like to be heard?
[Defense counsel]: Yes. [Prosecutor] has talked about looking for more male/female balance. I thought the court was asking each of these potential jurors if they could be fair. And I don’t think that should be decided upon their gender. [Prosecutor] has compared Ms. 016 to Mr. 006, who she excused by saying they are both young and she didn’t feel she was getting enough information. If she wanted more information, she could have asked the court to ask more questions of Ms. 019....
The Court: [Prosecutor], do you have any authority to cite to the court that gender is not a suspect classification in the usage of peremptory challenges?
[Prosecutor]: I don’t have exact citations here for the court, but People v. Ortega, which also talks about the jury being balanced between young and old and men and women.
The Court: I recall the United States Supreme Court saying the use of peremptory challenges based on gender is improper. I don’t see, [Prosecutor], that you are seeking to justify excusing [1087]*1087people of one ethnicity based on their gender. I don’t think that is going to cut it.
[Prosecutor]: I think I tied that into a lack of ties in the community with both of them; that that was one factor that I considered, that is, the manner in which I stated that they could — that their youth was important. It was not that I don’t want any young people on the jury. There are, I believe, other young people on the jury.
After considering these arguments, the court denied the Wheeler motion. With regard to Juror 019, the court stated that it was “satisfied that at least one race and gender neutral explanation was offered for the exercise of that peremptory challenge, that being Ms. 019’s experiences with a family member who had a drug problem.” As to Juror 016, the court stated that it, “frankly, did not observe the demeanor of Ms. 016 that was complained of by the district attorney. However, Ms. 016 was a youthful person, as was 006. And one or more other prospective jurors also. The court is prepared to give the district attorney the benefit of the doubt as to Ms. 016.”
After sentencing, Collins appealed his conviction and properly exhausted his remedies in both the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Collins challenged the trial court’s denial of his Wheeler motion only with respect to Juror 016. On November 19, 1998, Collins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Ultimately, the district court dismissed his petition. Noting that the trial court had not observed Juror 016’s demeanor, the district court concluded that it had to respect the trial court’s decision to give the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt because Collins had not rebutted this decision with “clear and convincing evidence.” The district court subsequently granted Collins’ request for a certificate of appealability as to “[wjhether the petitioner’s rights were violated under Batson v. Kentucky ... where the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge against an African-American juror ostensibly on the ground of the juror’s age and demeanor.”
I.
Because the California Supreme Court denied Collins’ petition for review without comment, our analysis begins with the decision of the California Court of Appeal, an unpublished disposition. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the state appellate court adopted the reasons cited by the trial court; thus, our analysis “will necessarily include discussion of the trial court’s decision as well.” Lewis, 321 F.3d at 829.
The California Court of Appeal determined that “because the trial court did not observe the prospective juror’s demeanor, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to exclude prospective [Jjuror [N]o. 016 based solely on her age.” Citing both Wheeler and Batson, the state appellate court further rejected Collins’ contention that age was an improper basis upon which to justify a peremptory challenge, noting that age groups are not a cognizable class and that peremptory challenges to “youthful and/or Immature prospective jurors repeatedly have been upheld as proper.” Even assuming that the prosecutor’s reliance on Juror 016’s young age was improper, the appellate court alternatively concluded that the trial court had engaged in a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s justification, as “[jjurors may be excused on ‘hunches’ and even ‘arbitrary’ exclusion is permissible, so long as the reasons are not based on impermissible group bias.” Noting that “nothing in [1088]*1088the present record, including the trial court’s decision to give the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt as to prospective [J]u-ror [N]o. 016’s demeanor, indicates that the trial court did not approach its task appropriately,” the appellate court determined that the trial court’s decision was entitled to deference.
We review Collins’ petition according to the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), as Collins filed his petition after April 24,1996. We may only reverse a judgment of the state that was adjudicated on the merits if the state’s decision was based on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 5.Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003), or if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as determined by “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision,” Andrade, 123 S.Ct. at 1172 (citations omitted). We further note that the ultimate determination of whether the prosecutor evidenced an intent to discriminate in dismissing Juror 016 is a question of fact, see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 367, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), and that under section 2254, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Collins therefore must prove that the state court’s decision was “ ‘objectively unreasonable’ in light of the record before the court.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1045, 154 L.Ed.2d 931.
II.
The Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Where a defendant asserts that a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges were racially-motivated, a court must apply a three-step process for evaluating a Batson claim. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60, 111 S.Ct. 1859. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Id.6 Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the state to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. If the first two steps are satisfied, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
A.
Because the trial court determined that Collins had established a prima facie case, the prosecutor was required to articulate a race-neutral explanation — an explanation “based on something other than the race of the juror.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). In assessing the race-neutrality of the prosecutor’s explanation, we “must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the [1089]*1089Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859. At this step, “the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the prosecutor must give a “ ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate’ reasons” and “the reason must be ‘related to the particular case to be tried,’ ” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712), “it is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justifications becomes relevant.” Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. For purposes of step 2, the prosecutor’s explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Id.
The prosecutor offered five reasons for excluding Juror 016:(1) her youth and the possibility that she might be “too tolerant for this type of case,” (2) her demeanor, (3) her marital status — “single” with “no ties,” (4) her lack of ties to the community, and (5) her gender.7 The trial court rejected the prosecutor’s attempt to justify her strike on the basis of Juror 016’s gender, but appeared to credit the prosecutor’s discussion of Juror 016’s youthful age and her alleged demeanor as race-neutral justifications. The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly accepted the prosecutor’s youthful age and demeanor justifications as race-neutral.
Although Collins concedes that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking Juror 016 “may appear to be race-neutral on their face,” citing United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.1992), he contends that rolling of the eyes, lack of ties in the community, and youthful age are not characteristics that would affect a juror’s approach to a specific trial and therefore the prosecutor’s explanations were “transparent proxies for racism.” However, as Collins acknowledges, “[a]t this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (emphasis added), and, unlike the justifications offered in Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825, youthful age and the demeanor in question are not characteristics peculiar to a given race or “group-based presuppositions applicable in all criminal trials” to African-American jurors. Id.
Further, neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit has held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from striking potential jurors on account of age. United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 762 (7th Cir.1993). Thus, the California Court of Appeal’s determination that age was a race-neutral justification for excusing Juror 016 is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. Alternatively, if the prosecutor had excluded Juror 016 because of her demeanor, this justification would not constitute a denial of equal protection, as discriminatory intent is not inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Because we find no error in the California Court of Appeal’s analysis at step 2, we proceed to step 3.
B.
In the third step of a Batson challenge, the trial court has “the duty to determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination,” Bat[1090]*1090son, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and therefore must evaluate the “persuasiveness” of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons, see Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. In determining whether the defendant has carried this burden, the Supreme Court provides that “a court must undertake ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’ ” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859. “[I]mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769; see also Lewis, 321 F.3d at 830 (“[I]f a review of the record undermines the prosecutor’s stated reasons, or many of the proffered reasons, the reasons may be deemed a pretext for racial discrimination.”)
In the end, a finding of discriminatory intent turns largely on the trial court’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712, because “[t]he credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Indeed, “[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Id. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859. “Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931. Although we afford great deference to the trial court’s observations of the prosecutor’s demeanor and intent, “[deference does not by definition preclude relief.” Id. at 1041; see also Lewis, 321 F.3d 824 (“The proffer of various faulty reasons and only one or two otherwise adequate reasons, may undermine the prosecutor’s credibility to such an extent that a court should sustain a Batson challenge.”); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that although reasons given by a prosecutor “would normally be adequately ‘neutral’ explanations taken at face value, the fact that two of the four proffered reasons do not hold up under judicial scrutiny militates against their sufficiency”); Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that courts are not required to accept neutral reasons that are either unsupported by the record or are refuted by it).
In assessing the prosecutor’s proffered justifications for excluding Juror 016, the state trial and appellate courts made unreasonable factual determinations in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding and unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. With a careful eye towards “such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as [was] available” to the appellate court, Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted), we address each of the justifications relied upon by the California courts.
1. Age
The state court of appeal determined that the prosecutor had dismissed Juror 016 solely on the basis of her age. The court explained that because youth was not a cognizable class for purposes of the cross-section rule and because youth had been recognized as a permissible justification for dismissal in the past, Collins had failed to demonstrate purposeful diserimi-[1091]*1091nation. However, the appellate court’s conclusion is troubling in several respects.
First, although age has been upheld as a proper basis for excusing a potential juror, see Pichay, 986 F.2d at 1259, here, the prosecution explained that Juror 016’s youthful age might make her “too tolerant for this type of case.” Thus, the prosecutor attempted to equate her youthful age with a possible bias favoring criminal defendants facing drug charges. The prosecutor also later explained that Juror 016’s youthful age was “important” because of her “lack of ties in the community,” stating, “I think I tied that into a lack of ties in the community with both [Juror 016 and 019]; that was one factor that I considered, that is, the manner in which I stated that they could — that their youth was important.”
According to the Supreme Court, Juror 016’s age must be “related to the particular case to be tried,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and must have some relevance to Juror 016’s “possible approach to a specific trial,” Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825. Indeed, although the prosecutor claimed that Juror 016’s youthful age was of concern, she later explained that it was not the general presence of young jurors on the jury that concerned her. Rather, in referring to Jurors 016 and 019, the prosecutor stated “[i]t was not that I don’t want any young people on the jury. There are, I believe, other young people on the jury.” Thus, in explaining that she was not trying to exclude all young jurors from the jury, the prosecutor clarified that her reason for excluding Juror 016 was not her youthful age at all. Instead, her reason for excluding Juror 016 related to particular characteristics that the prosecutor associated with her youth — namely, the prosecutor’s beliefs that Juror 016 might be sympathetic to an individual charged with drug possession and that she lacked ties to the community.8
The state court of appeal, however, glossed over the prosecutor’s clarification and found that the sole basis upon which the trial court had permitted the prosecutor to exclude Juror 016 was her age. It concluded that because the exclusion of jurors on the basis of their age did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Collins had failed to meet his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. However, the state appellate court’s characterization of the prosecutor’s reason for striking Juror 016 was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Indeed, the evidence in the trial record is clear and convincing that the prosecutor’s proffered justifications for striking Juror 016 on the basis of her youthful age — possible tolerance of drug use and lack of ties to the community— were pretexts for purposeful discrimination.
[1092]*1092With regard to Juror 016’s possible tolerance,9 during voir dire, Juror 016 answered “yes” to the court’s question regarding whether she believed that possession of cocaine should be against the law, and she also told the court that there was nothing about the nature of the charge of possession of rock cocaine that might make it difficult for her to sit on Collins’ ease. There is no other evidence in the record that remotely suggests that Juror 016 was otherwise sympathetic to or tolerant of individuals involved with drug use or possession. Juror 016 told the court that neither she nor her family members or any of her close friends had ever had a problem with drugs or alcohol; nor had they ever been accused of committing a crime involving illegal drugs. No other information regarding drug use, drug laws, or criminal enforcement of drug laws was solicited by the court or counsel, and Juror 016 never gave the court any information regarding her age. The prosecutor’s clarification that Juror 016 might be “too tolerant for this type of case” as a basis for striking Juror 016 is therefore contrary to the evidence in the record. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (“[I]mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”); McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1221 (9th Cir.2000) (rejecting prosecutor’s attempt to attribute to challenged juror “beliefs that she did not hold” about “mistrust[ing] the system,” where juror never made such a statement and indicated to the court that she did believe her son had been treated fairly by “the system”).
The prosecutor later attempted to explain that Juror 016 was “single, no ties,” presumably indicating that she was not married and possibly had no children. However, as we have already explained, Batson is clear that the prosecutor’s proffered justifications must be reasonably “related to the particular case to be tried.” 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825 (stating that a prosecutor’s reason for dismissing a potential juror must have some nexus to her “possible approach to a specific trial”). The trial court record fails to establish how Juror 016’s marital or parental status would have had any bearing on her ability to serve as a juror in a case involving prosecution for crack cocaine possession, and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court’s questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification.10 See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (“Peremptory challenges cannot be lawful[1093]*1093ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.”); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (“[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.”); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding that where a non-black juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled, the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1043, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (noting the fact that “three of the State’s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged” showed that the strikes “might have been selective and based on racial considerations”).
The prosecutor also claimed that Juror 016’s youth was “important” because of her “lack of ties in the community,” stating, “I think I tied that into a lack of ties in the community with both [Juror 016 and Juror 019]; that was one factor that I considered, that is, the manner in which I stated that they could — that their youth was important.” Not only is the prosecutor’s statement that Juror 016 had a “lack of ties in the community” not sufficiently “clear and reasonably specific,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712, but it is also not supported by the record and does not appear to have any relation to Juror 016’s ability to serve as a juror in a criminal trial involving possession of crack cocaine. See id. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (holding that the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges must be “related to his view concerning the outcome”) (internal quotation marks omitted); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1223 (stating that where the prosecutor did not explain the significance of a juror’s body language, the prosecutor’s claim that he struck that juror “on the sole basis that she had her elbow on the chair is patently frivolous,” especially where no other evidence in the record indicated any possible bias).
In sum, there was clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor’s stated concern over Juror 016’s youthful age was a pretext for discrimination, evidence that the state appellate court did not address in unreasonably concluding that the prosecutor had dismissed Juror 016 on the basis of her age. This evidence supports Collins’ claim that the prosecutor struck Juror 016 because of her race, and also demonstrates that the state appellate court was unreasonable when it determined that the trial court did not err by determining that Collins had failed to prove purposeful discrimination. However, because the appellate court offered Juror 016’s demeanor as an alternative explanation, we must assess whether the court unreasonably deter[1094]*1094mined that the trial court had properly accepted that justification as nondiscriminatory before determining the ultimate significance of the appellate court’s conclusion regarding Juror 016’s age.
2. Demeanor
The state court of appeal also concluded that even if the prosecutor’s reliance on Juror 016’s youthful age had been improper, the “prosecutor reasonably could have interpreted prospective [Juror 016’s] body language as indicative of hostility or disrespect” and properly dismissed her on that basis. Although the trial court did not witness Juror 016’s alleged offensive conduct, the appellate court determined there was “nothing in the present record” indicating that the trial court should not have given the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt or that it had failed to evaluate whether the prosecutors’ justifications should have been accepted.
As the record reflects, the state appellate court reasonably determined that the trial court had not observed Juror 016’s demeanor but nonetheless accepted this alternate reason for striking Juror 016 on the basis of the prosecutor’s credibility. Because the trial court did not observe Juror 016’s demeanor, the critical question here is whether the appellate court’s determination that the trial court properly credited the prosecutor’s representation was unreasonable.11 Notably, the basis for the state appellate court’s determination was its conclusion that there was “nothing in the present record” to indicate that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry in giving the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt or should have questioned the prosecutor’s credibility. We conclude that this determination was an unreasonable determination of the facts because the prosecutor failed to offer any credible justification for striking Jurors 016 and 019.
First, we note that the prosecutor consistently identified Jurors 016 and 019 as “both young.”12 However, the record re[1095]*1095veals that Juror 019 was at least a middle-aged grandmother. Indeed, Juror 019 informed the court that she was a retired nurse with seven grown children, the youngest of which had five children of her own. A prosecutor supplied with this information could not credibly identify Juror 019 as young. This incorrect factual statement supports Collins’ argument that the prosecutor was not credible. See McClain, 217 F.3d at 1222 (holding that reasons for excusing black jurors that were objectively contradicted by the record provided evidence of purposeful discrimination); Caldwell v. Maloney, 159 F.3d 639, 651 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that serious questions of pretext arise when the facts in the record are “objectively contrary to” the prosecutor’s proffered justifications).
In addition, the trial court judge rejected the prosecutor’s justification for striking Jurors 016 and 019 on the basis of gender. This too supports the argument that the prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 on the basis of her race.13 See Lewis, 321 F.3d at 834 (stating that the fact that the trial court had found some of the prosecutor’s arguments unconvincing “does not support the prosecutor’s credibility; it undermines it”). Further, the fact that the prosecutor attempted to offer a facially discriminatory justification for dismissing the only black female jurors in the venire, and then quickly abandoned this justification when informed by the trial judge that it was improper, is another indication that the prosecutor’s stated justifications were a pretext for discrimination. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor, by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are.”).
Finally, although the trial court credited the prosecutor as excusing Juror 019 for a race-neutral reason because she had a daughter who had completed rehabilitation for cocaine addiction, the record demonstrates that another white juror, Juror 030, whose son recovered from a cocaine addiction — -a highly comparable situation-— was not dismissed by the prosecutor. Because “[peremptory challenges cannot be lawfully exercised against potential jurors of one race unless potential jurors of another race with comparable characteristics are also challenged,” McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221, the prosecutor’s dismissal of Juror 019 provides further evidence of the prosecutor’s discriminatory intent. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (stating that a prosecutor’s motive may be inferred from the totality of relevant facts); Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 283 (3d Cir .2001) (“The relative plausibility or implausibility of each explanation for a particular challenge may strengthen or weaken the assessment of the prosecution’s explanation as to other challenges.”) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted).
The prosecutor’s objectively unreasonable statements regarding Juror 019’s age, her pretextual justifications for dismissing Juror 019, and her attempt to use gender as a race-neutral basis for excluding Jurors 016 and 019, combined with her pre-textual justifications for dismissing Juror 016 on the basis of her alleged lack of community ties, her marital status, and her purported tolerance, and the fact that nothing in the record corroborated her [1096]*1096allegations regarding Juror 016’s demean- or, provide “clear and convincing evidence” that the prosecutor did not dismiss Juror 016 on the basis of her demeanor. In light of the evidence in the record, the appellate court’s determination that the prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 because of her demeanor was an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because this determination provided the basis for the appellate court’s conclusion that the trial court had not clearly erred in accepting the prosecutor’s justification as race-neutral, this determination also was objectively unreasonable. See Johnson, 3 F.3d at 1331 (“When there is reason to believe that there is a racial motivation for the challenge,” we are not “bound to accept at face value a list of neutral reasons that are either unsupported in the record or refuted by it.”); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 833-34 (holding that where justification for strike was not corroborated by the record and the prosecutor was not credible, the proffered justification could not support state court’s conclusion that petitioner had failed to prove purposeful discrimination).
C.
The state court of appeal held that Collins had failed to establish purposeful discrimination on the basis of its objectively unreasonable determination that the prosecutor properly dismissed Juror 016 because of her age. The appellate court’s alternative ruling — that the trial court properly credited the prosecutor’s assertion that Juror 016 had rolled her eyes and turned away from the court when asked a question during voir dire, and that her dismissal based on Juror 016’s demeanor did not provide any evidence of purposeful discrimination — is also unsupported by the record. Thus, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that there was no credible basis for dismissing Juror 016 on the basis of her age or demeanor.
There is, however, substantial evidence supporting Collins’ contention that the prosecutor dismissed Juror 016 because of her race — evidence that the appellate court failed to address. The trial record demonstrates that the prosecutor’s justifications for dismissing Juror 016 on the basis of her age were contrary to the record (likely tolerance of drug offenders), were unrelated to her ability to serve as a juror in Collins’ case (lack of community ties), and were not applied equally to white jurors (single with no children). The record also shows that one of her justifications was patently discriminatory (gender), while her justifications for dismissing Juror 019 were contrary to the record (age) and patently pretextual (daughter’s former drug problem). In sum, the record demonstrates that the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for dismissing Juror 016 were wholly implausible, unpersuasive, and a pretext for discrimination on the basis of her race.14
In order to secure habeas relief, however, Collins “must demonstrate that [the] state court’s finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and that the corresponding factual determination was ‘objectively unreasonable’ in light of the record before the court.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1045, 154 L.Ed.2d 931. We con-[1097]*1097elude that Collins has met this heavy burden.
1.
The facts underlying the appellate court’s conclusion, namely that the trial court properly accepted the prosecutor’s justifications that Juror 016 was young and had exhibited an improper demeanor, are unsupported by the record. Collins’ claim of pretext, however, is supported by the record — the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Jurors 016 and 019 were pretextual. Thus, not only were the state appellate court’s factual determinations not supported by the record, but the record also demonstrates that the appellate court’s ultimate conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding that Collins failed to establish purposeful discrimination was objectively unreasonable. The fact that the appellate court failed to address all the evidence relating to the prosecutor’s justification for striking Juror 016 and indeed disregarded this evidence by stating that “nothing in the present record ... indicates the trial court did not approach its task appropriately” highlights the objective unreasonableness of its assessment of the record. Collins has thus shown by “clear and convincing evidence” that the state appellate court’s determination, that the prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate on the basis of race in striking Juror 016, “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).15
2.
Further, although the appellate court identified the three-step inquiry for identifying purposeful discrimination under Batson, it unreasonably applied Bat-son’s third prong in determining that the trial court had fulfilled its duty to determine whether Collins had established purposeful discrimination. See Andrade, 123 S.Ct. at 1174 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). It is well-established that “once the prosecutor offers a race-neutral basis for his exercise of peremptory challenges, the trial court then has the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (holding that the “trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination”) (emphasis added); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (“The trial court will then have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”) [1098]*1098(emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[i]n deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available,’ ” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. 555), and must evaluate the “genuineness of the [prosecutor’s] motive,” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769. Thus, a state appellate court’s decision that overlooked a trial court’s failure to evaluate the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justifications in conducting this inquiry would rest on an unreasonable application of well-established Supreme Court precedent. See Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832 (“Unlike the trial court, a court of appeal is not in an ideal position to conduct a step three evaluation. It can, however, use the trial court’s findings and the evidence on the record to evaluate the support on the record for the prosecutor’s reasons and credibility, and to compare the struck and empaneled jurors.”)
Here, the appellate court’s determination that “nothing in the present record” indicated that the trial court failed to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility must have been based either (1) upon a conclusion that there was no evidence that undermined her credibility or (2) upon a belief that the record demonstrated that the trial court had assessed any such evidence in evaluating the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justification. The record belies either conclusion.
As we have discussed, the prosecutor’s attempt to justify her challenge of Juror 016 on the basis of her age, specifically on account of her marital status, her alleged lack of community ties, and her purported tolerance, was unsupported by the record. In addition, the prosecutor’s attempt to justify her strike of Juror 019 on the basis of her youthful age was contradicted by the record, while her justification based on Juror 019’s daughter’s past cocaine addiction was pretextual given that a white juror (Juror 030) with comparably similar characteristics was permitted to serve on the jury. The trial court acknowledged that it had not observed Juror 016’s alleged demeanor, and nothing in the record corroborates the prosecutor’s allegations. It also rejected the prosecutor’s justifications relating to gender as clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s assessment of the record, the trial court did not fulfill its duty by determining that Collins had faded to prove purposeful discrimination when the prosecutor failed to offer any credible justification for striking Jurors 016 and 019. The appellate court’s contrary determination demonstrates that, although it recognized the trial court’s duty under Batson to determine whether Collins had shown purposeful discrimination, it unreasonably applied that principle in concluding that the trial court had done so.
IV.
Because the basis for the appellate court’s decision was its unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the trial, and because it also unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, we conclude that the state trial appellate court committed constitutional error that warrants the grant of a writ of habeas corpus under section 2254. We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to grant the petition on conditions it deems appropriate.16
REVERSED and REMANDED.