Stern v. Kramarsky

84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3148, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,538
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedOctober 22, 1975
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 84 Misc. 2d 447 (Stern v. Kramarsky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3148, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,538 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

Samuel A. Spiegel, J.

Plaintiffs, Annette Stern, as a taxpayer of Harrison, Westchester County, New York, and as president of Operation Wake Up — an organization of women’s groups united to defeat what is commonly referred to as the Equal Rights Amendment — and others, seek a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants, Werner Kramarsky, as Commissioner of the Division of Human Rights of the State of New York, and the Division of Human Rights itself from engaging in any activities to achieve approval of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the State of New York. The proposed amendment to the State Constitution, which is to be submitted to the voters of the State of New York on November 4, 1975, would add a "Section 13” to *449 article I of the State Constitution, stating: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State of New York or any subdivision thereof on account of sex”.

Plaintiffs contend that the defendants are engaging in a campaign in support of the specified amendment, and as evidence of that campaign submit a copy of an August 25, 1975 inter-office memorandum of the Division of Human Rights addressed to certain of its staff members, which states, inter alia: "The Division of Human Rights is a member of the New York coalition for Equal Rights, a coalition of more than 70 organizations united in a statewide effort to achieve approval of the Equal Rights Amendment by the voters in November. The Division is asking you, our Advisory Council members, to help us educate the public about the Equal Rights Amendment.”

Plaintiffs have also submitted copies of various flyers and pamphlets prepared by supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment, such as the New York Coalition for Equal Rights and the League of Women Voters, which are made available to the public at the defendants’ offices. Such a flyer prepared by the New York Coalition for Equal Rights in support of the Equal Rights Amendment states in part: "Its really quite simple. Either you believe that all people are created equal or you don’t. If you do * * * Vote Yes on Nov. 4th”. [Emphasis in the original.] It is further alleged by the plaintiff that the defendants are promoting the Equal Rights Amendment through a series of radio and televised broadcasts.

Defendants cross-move to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that: (1) the plaintiffs’ application seeks to abridge their rights of freedom of speech and association; (2) the defendants, pursuant to article 15 of the Executive Law, have the requisite statutory authority to engage in activities in support of the Equal Rights Amendment; and (3) the plaintiffs’ lack of standing to maintain this action.

Regarding defendants’ initial argument, it does not appear that the plaintiffs are attempting to improperly abridge defendants’ rights of freedom of speech and association. Plaintiffs essentially argue that the defendants have no authority to support the Equal Rights Amendment in their official capacity. They do not suggest that either the commissioner or the personnel of the Division of Human Rights may be precluded from personally supporting the Equal Rights Amendment. Thus the issue raised by the instant application is not *450 one concerning freedom of speech or association, but whether it is a proper function of a State agency to actively support a proposed amendment to the State Constitution which is about to be presented to the electorate in a State-wide referendum. It should be noted that by lending their support to the campaign underway for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, defendants not only provide certain promotional and advertising assistance, but they endow that campaign with all of the prestige and influence naturally arising from any endorsement of a governmental authority.

The defendants argue that they "have the statutory authority to engage in activities in support of the Equal Rights Amendment”, specifically sections 290, 294, 295 and 300 of the Executive Law. These sections admittedly vest the Division of Human Rights with broad authority to promote and protect human rights; however, that authority must be construed in the context of the State and Federal Constitutions. Neither the language of the statutory authority relied on by the defendants nor the statutory scheme of our jurisprudence contemplates administrative agencies engaging in promotional activities in order to secure the passage of proposed constitutional amendments.

The court has found no reported cases directly in point, and notwithstanding the comprehensive and considered briefs submitted by the plaintiff and the Attorney-General, they have apparently been similarly unsuccessful in finding reported authority directly in point. The defendants cite, inter alia, Abrams v Rockefeller (NY County Clerk’s Index No. 18881), in support of their cross motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action. In Abrams v Rockefeller (supra), plaintiffs sought to enjoin certain public officials from spending public funds in connection with the promotion of Proposition No. 1 (The 1973 Transportation Bond Issue) on the November 6, 1973 ballot. The court granted defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds, inter alia, that the application was untimely, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action. Since Abrams v Rockefeller (supra) was dismissed on essentially procedural grounds, inapplicable to the action presently before the court, it does not constitute authority warranting dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action.

In Matter of Olivieri (Ronan) (NY County Clerk’s Index No. 23334), petitioner — relying on section 8 of article VII and section 1 of article VIII of the New York State Constitution— *451 sought a preliminary injunction restraining the respondents William J. Ronan, Metropolitan Transportation Authority and New York Transit Authority from promoting "Proposition #1” (The 1971 Transportation Bond Issue) on the November 2, 1971 ballot. Specifically the petitioner sought to restrain the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the New York Transit Authority from permitting their employees to put up placards and posters for the private organization known as "Yes For Transportation In N. Y. State, Inc.” during the hours when these employees are employed in their regular duties, and permitting the use of the public transit conveyances and facilities space for the display of the placards and posters of "Yes For Transportation In N. Y. State, Inc.” promoting an affirmative vote on Proposition No. 1. Réspondents Ronan et al. cross-moved to dismiss the petition upon the grounds the petitioner lacked standing and the respondents had acted lawfully in authorizing the use of space on transit facilities under their jurisdiction, for the placement of posters and signs informing the public of the importance of a favorable vote on Proposition No. 1. By order dated November 1, 1971 the court granted petitioner Olivieri’s application for a preliminary injunction and denied respondents’ cross motion to dismiss the petition.

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84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3148, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stern-v-kramarsky-nyappdiv-1975.