1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEPHANIE D. GUTIERREZ, Case No. 2:25-cv-08237-JC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. REMAND 14 [DOCKET NO. 16] GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 I. SUMMARY 19 On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff Stephanie D. Gutierrez (“Plaintiff”), filed a 20 Complaint for Violation of Statutory Obligations (“Original Complaint” or “OC”) 21 against Defendants General Motors LLC (“Defendant”), Inland Chevrolet, Inc. 22 (“Inland”), and Does 1-10 in Los Angeles County Superior Case No. 23 25STCV04117 (“State Action”). (Docket (“Dkt.”) No. 1-1). The Original 24 Complaint alleged that on or around April 26, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a used 25 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 (“Subject Vehicle”), which “manifested defects 26 covered by Defendant’s express written warranties” including “transmission, 27 engine and infotainment defects” that “substantially impair the use, value, and/or 28 safety of” the vehicle. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12-13; OC at 1-2). The Original Complaint 1 raised causes of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 2 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791 et seq. (Claims One through Four), and the Magnuson- 3 Moss Warranty Act (alternatively, “MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq. (Claim 4 Five). (Docket No. 1-1 at 13-17; OC at 2-6). On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff 5 served the Summons and the Original Complaint on Defendant. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6 2). 7 On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint 8 (alternatively, “FAC”) against Defendant and Does 1-10. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25). The 9 First Amended Complaint omitted Inland as a defendant in this action and added 10 new causes of action for violating the Uniform Commercial Code (Claim Six)1 and 11 the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (Claim Seven).2 12 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 26, 31-34; FAC at 1, 6-9). On June 27, 2025, Defendant filed an 13 Answer to the First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1-2). 14 On September 2, 2025, Defendant removed the case to federal court based on 15 diversity jurisdiction, alleging that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, Defendant is a 16 citizen of Michigan and Delaware, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 17 (Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4). The matter was thus removed to the United States District 18 Court for the Central District of California and was subsequently assigned to this 19 Court as to whom the parties have been deemed to consent. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 5-6, 20 12-13). 21 On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (“Motion”) with 22 a supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot. Mem.”), and a 23 Declaration of Michelle Yang, Esq. (“Yang Decl.”) with an exhibit (“Yang Ex.”). 24 (Dkt. No. 16). Plaintiff contends that remand is warranted because Defendant’s 25 26 1Plaintiff cites Cal. Comm. Code §§ 1203, 2602, 2607, and 2608. (FAC at 6-7). 27 2The Notice of Removal states that Plaintiff dismissed Claim Seven on May 27, 2025. 28 (See Docket No. 1 at 2 n.1). 2 1 || removal of the case to this Court (1) was untimely; and (2) Defendant has not 2 || established that removal is proper. (See Mot. Mem. at 5-11). On October 7, 2025, 3 || Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp.”) and a 4 || supporting Declaration of Karyn L. Ihara, Esq. (“Ihara Decl.) with exhibits (“Ihara 5 || Ex.”). (Docket No. 17). On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Dkt. No. 6 || 19). On October 24, 2025, the Court submitted the Motion for decision. (Dkt. No. 7 || 21). 8 For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied. In reaching this 9 || conclusion, the Court has considered every argument made by the parties and 10 || discusses the main contentions herein. 11) 0. PERTINENT LAW 12 “As a general matter, defendants may remove to the appropriate federal 13 | district court ‘any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 14 || of the United States have original jurisdiction.’” City of Chicago v. Int’] Coll. of 15 | Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a));° see also Home 16 || Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019) (“The general removal 17 || statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provides that ‘any civil action’ over which a federal 18 || court would have original jurisdiction may be removed to federal court by ‘the 19 || defendant or the defendants.’”). “The propriety of removal thus depends on 20 || whether the case originally could have been filed in federal court.” City of 21 || Chicago, 522 U.S. at 163; Yocupicio v. PAE Group, LLC, 795 F.3d 1057, 1059 22 | (9th Cir. 2015). 23 /// 24 2000 *Section 1441(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of 26 Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 27 || States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such 28 || action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
1 “In 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a), Congress granted federal courts 2 || jurisdiction over two general types of cases: cases that ‘aris[e] under’ federal law, 3 | § 1331, and cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is 4 || diversity of citizenship among the parties, § 1332(a). These jurisdictional grants 5 || are known as ‘federal-question jurisdiction’ and ‘diversity jurisdiction,’ 6 || respectively.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 587 U.S. at 437-38; see also Caterpillar, 7 || Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that 8 || originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court 9 || by the defendant. Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is 10 || required.” (footnotes omitted)); Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068 11 | (9th Cir. 2005) (“In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred 12 || upon federal district courts either through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 13 || or federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”). “Each serves a distinct 14 | purpose: Federal-question jurisdiction affords parties a federal forum in which ‘to 15 || vindicate federal rights,’ whereas diversity jurisdiction provides ‘a neutral forum’ 16 || for parties from different States.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 587 U.S. at 438." 17 18 19 “Although the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act — which Plaintiff claims Defendant violated in both the Original and First Amended Complaints (OC at 5-6; FAC at 5-6) — is a federal statute, 20 || it is unique in that it does not confer a basis for federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy is at least $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B); Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F.4th 21 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the MMWA is a federal statute, federal courts do not 22 || have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000.”); Schultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The MMWA is a somewhat 23 || unique federal statute in that merely alleging a violation of the act is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction; a separate $50,000 amount in controversy requirement must also be satisfied.”); Lopez v. Kia Am., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“Actions 25 || removed based on the [MMWA] do not trigger federal question Jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy is equal to or greater than ‘the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and 26 costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in [the] suit.’”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 27 || § 2310(d)(3)(B)); Guerrero v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2023 WL 4085975, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (“In order [to] file a claim in district court under the [MMWA], the amount in controversy 28 || must be at least $50,000.”).
1 “Removal statutes are ‘strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of 2 || removal requires resolution in favor of remand.’” Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 3 || 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 4 | 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 5 || 28, 32 (2002) (“[S]tatutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed.”). 6 | “This rule of narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of federal 7 || courts and “‘protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.’” Casola, 98 F.4th at 954 8 | (quoting Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)). 9 || “The presumption against removal means that ‘the defendant always has the burden 10 || of establishing that removal is proper.’” Casola, 98 F.4th at 954 (quoting 11 || Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 12 | 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside 13 | the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the 14 || contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and 15 || brackets omitted)). Remand to state court may be ordered for lack of subject matter 16 | jurisdiction or any defect in the removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 17 “128 U.S.C. §] 1446(b) provides the rules governing the timeliness of 18 || removal. The default rule is that the party seeking removal must remove ‘within 30 19 || days after the receipt .. . of a copy of the initial pleading.’” Blumberger v. Tilley, 20 | 115 F.4th 1113, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)), cert. 21 || denied, 145 S. Ct. 2818 (2025); see also Mayes v. Am. Hallmark Ins. Co. of Texas, 22 | 114 F.4th 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 2024) (Section “1446(b)(1) establishes a time limit 23 || for removal that generally starts to run when the defendant receives a copy of the 24 || initial pleading, which is typically a complaint.”). But for this default rule to apply, 25 | “the ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading[.]” 26 || Harris, 425 F.3d at 695; Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 27 | 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). If ‘‘the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,’ 28 || a party may remove a case within 30 days ‘of a copy of an amended pleading,
1 motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is 2 one which is or has become removable.’” Blumberger, 115 F.4th at 1122 (quoting 3 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)); Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 4 2021). But “an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper must make a 5 ground for removal unequivocally clear and certain before the removal clock 6 begins under . . . § 1446(b)(3).” Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. Finally, when read 7 together, 28 U.S.C. “§§ 1441 and 1446 . . . permit a defendant to remove outside 8 the two thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it has 9 not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines” set forth in Section 1446(b)(1) or 10 (b)(3), so long as any such “notice of removal [is] filed . . . within one year of the 11 commencement of the action.” Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 12 1121, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1)). “If a defendant files 13 a notice of removal after the time limit has run out, then removal is improper.” 14 Mayes, 114 F.4th at 1078. 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Original Complaint was filed on February 13, 17 2025 and was served on Defendant on February 21, 2025, but Defendant did not 18 remove this action to federal court until September 2, 2025 – more than thirty (30) 19 days after the Original Complaint was served on Defendant. Plaintiff argues that 20 this action should be remanded because Defendant’s Notice of Removal (1) was 21 untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) and had to have been filed within thirty (30) 22 days after service because (a) federal question jurisdiction was ascertainable from 23 the Original Complaint since it contained an MMWA claim; and (b) the requisite 24 amount in controversy was ascertainable from the Original Complaint; and (2) fails 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 6 1 to establish the requisite amount in controversy.5 (Mot. Mem. at 5-9). Defendant 2 disagrees. (Opp. at 10-18). 3 A. The Notice of Removal Was Not Untimely 4 First, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that the Notice of Removal was 5 untimely and should have been filed within thirty (30) days of service because 6 federal question jurisdiction was ascertainable from the Original Complaint based 7 merely on the inclusion of the MMWA claim (Mot. Mem. at 5-6). As noted above, 8 the MMWA does not confer federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in 9 controversy is at least $50,000. See supra note 4 and authorities cited therein. 10 Second, the Court likewise rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that the Notice of 11 Removal was untimely and should have been filed within thirty (30) days of service 12 because the requisite amount in controversy – whether $50,000 for federal question 13 juridiction under the MMWA or $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction – was 14 ascertainable from the Original Complaint. (Mot. Mem. at 6-9). Neither Plaintiff’s 15 Original Complaint nor the operative First Amended Complaint, provides an 16 approximate value of the Subject Vehicle. Rather, they simply identify the vehicle 17 as a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 and provide the vehicle identification number. 18 (See OC at 1; FAC at 1). 19 Plaintiff concedes that her “state court complaint does not allege a specific 20 dollar amount in controversy,” but argues that “it is impossible to believe that 21 Defendant could not ascertain the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000 based 22 on the face of the complaint alone.” (Mot. Mem. at 6-9). Plaintiff reasons that “the 23 24 5This argument appears to contradict Plaintiff’s contention that the amount in controversy is clearly ascertainable from the Original Complaint. See Fortune v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2025 25 WL 2866659, *2 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (Plaintiff’s argument that “Defendant has failed to meet its 26 burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction (or $50,000 for jurisdiction pursuant to the 27 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act) . . . appears to run directly contrary to her argument that it was clear from the face of her Original Complaint that the amount in controversy exceeded the 28 jurisdictional threshold.”). 7 1 || complaint explicitly states that Plaintiff's claims arise out of his [sic] purchase of a 2 || new 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicle and seeks: ‘restitution for the 3 || purchase of the vehicle’; ‘incidental and consequential damages’; ‘civil penalties of 4 || two times the actual damages’; and ‘attorneys’ fees[.]””® (Mot. Mem. at 6). But, 5 || even setting aside the fact that the Original Complaint identifies the Subject 6 || Vehicle as used (see OC at 1-2),’ “absent any specific allegations of the dollar 7 || value of the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the vehicle and 8 || claims for broad categories of damages are insufficient to trigger the removal 9 || deadline.” Torres v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2848989, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2025); 10 || Stewart v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2848991, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2025); see also 11 || Pastrana v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2024 WL 2817533, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“The 12 || Complaint seeks damages, including with regard to the [rescission] of the vehicle 13 || sales contract and restitution of all monies expended, diminution in value, a civil 14 || penalty in the amount of twice actual damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 15 || However, the Complaint does not list a dollar amount corresponding to the 16 || damages. For example, the Complaint does not allege the sale price of the Vehicle 17 || or any other specific measure of damages, nor does it allege the amount of 18 || attorneys’ fees and costs incurred. Without information sufficiently providing an 19 || amount in controversy, the presence of diversity jurisdiction 1s not ‘revealed 20 | /// 21 4 /// 22 23 °Plaintiff cites the Original Complaint’s prayer for relief as her source for the quoted 24 || language. But some of the quoted language does not appear in the Original Complaint’s prayer — or anywhere else in the Original Complaint or the First Amended Complaint. For instance, 25 Plaintiff refers to “restitution for the purchase of the vehicle” while the Original Complaint and 26 || First Amended Complaint both more simply request “restitution.” (Compare Mot. Mem. at 6 with OC at 6-7 and FAC at 9-10). 28 ’The First Amended Complaint does not specify whether the Subject Vehicle is new or used.
| || affirmatively in the initial pleading’ as necessary to trigger the first thirty-day 2 || removal period.” (citations omitted)).* 3 Plaintiff also argues that given Defendant’s “sophisticated knowledge of the 4 || motor vehicle industry,” it had, “at a minimum, a rudimentary understanding or 5 || ability to ascertain an approximation of the Subject Vehicle’s market value as the 6 | manufacturer and distributor of the Subject Vehicle; especially given that the make, 7 || model, year, and VIN, were included within the factual bases alleged within the 8 | [Original] Complaint.” (Mot. Mem. at 7). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that 9 || Defendant, as “the manufacturer and/or distributor of the Subject Vehicle had 10 || access to the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price .. . of the Subject Vehicle, 11 || which [Defendant] identifie[d] as $39,800.00 in Defendant’s internal March 14, 12 || 2022 invoice of the Subject Vehicle to Gosch Chevrolet, the selling dealership.” 13 || (Mot. Mem. at 7-8; see also Yang Decl. 4 11; Yang Ex. 2). But these contentions 14 || are meritless since, among other things, a defendant is required to examine only 15 || “the four corners of the applicable pleadings” and need not rely on “subjective 16 || knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694; see also 17 18 with suits in diversity, [the Court] [in an MMWA action] look[s] no farther than the 19 || pleadings to determine the amount in controversy unless ‘from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.’” Kelly v. 20 I Fleetwood, 377 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir, 2004); see also Lopez, 693 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 21 || CCourts analyze the amount in controversy under the [|MMWA| using the same principles as diversity jurisdiction.”); Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 22 (“There is nothing in the text of the [MMWA] that would indicate that the amount in controversy 73 for that statute is assessed any differently than the diversity jurisdiction requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). 24 35 "In her Reply, Plaintiff contends:
26 before Plaintiff ever filed this action, Defendant and its counsel already possessed the Subject Vehicle’s Retail Installment Sales Contract and all repair orders. As 27 Plaintiffs Motion established, these materials were provided to Defendant and 28 Defendant’s counsel on January 4, 2025 during the parties’ pre-litigation (continued...)
1 || Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 (‘BMW was not obligated to supply information 2 || which Kuxhausen had omitted.”’). 3 Plaintiff further argues that the “Civil Case Cover Sheet[] expressly 4 || indicated that the claim was being brought under the state court’s unlimited 5 || jurisdiction (seeking damages above $35,000.00).” (Mot. Mem. at 8). But the fact 6 || that Plaintiff filed an unlimited civil case in state court, without more, does not 7 || demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000 — for MMWA 8 || purposes — let alone $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction purposes. See, e.g., 9 || Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 10 || checked ‘Unlimited’ box on the cover sheet merely indicates that the ‘[a]mount 11 || demanded exceeds $25,000.’”); Martinez v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2926885, 12 | *5 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“[T]he caption page and Civil Case Cover Sheet were 13 | insufficient to trigger Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal” when these 14 | documents “merely indicate that the ‘Amount demanded exceeds $35,000[]’” and 15 || did not indicate “whether the amount demanded is the total amount in controversy, 16 || in which case the amount would be too low, or whether this is the amount 17 || demanded for actual damages.”); Medina v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 2963020, 18 |} ——M————_ 19 °(...continued) settlement discussions. Those documents, identifying the vehicle’s purchase 20 price, VIN, repair history, mileage, and alleged nonconformities, supplied every data point necessary to calculate the amount in controversy and determine removability. 22 3 (Reply at 1; see also Yang Decl. J 7 (“As part of . . . pre-litigation settlement efforts, my office produced to Defendant and Defendant’s counsel a copy of the Subject Vehicle[’|s Sales 24 || Agreement and all repair orders in January 2025.” (emphasis omitted)). But this argument fails for the reasons set forth herein. Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141; Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 25 Moreover, documents provided to Defendant prior to the initiation of a lawsuit cannot trigger the 26 30-day period under Section 1446(b)(3). See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141-42 (“Because Kuxhausen’s demand letter was provided to BMW before she initiated her suit, it cannot trigger 27 || [Section 1446(b)(3)’s] thirty-day period.”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 28 886 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]ny document received prior to receipt of the initial pleading cannot trigger [Section 1446(b)(3)’s] thirty-day removal period.”). 10
1 | *3 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“The fact that Plaintiff filed an unlimited civil case in state 2 || court, standing alone, did not demonstrate the amount in controversy exceeded 3 | $75,000.”); Lopez v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2025 WL 2629545, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2025) 4 || (‘Courts have rejected identical arguments that bringing a similar claim under the 5 || state court’s unlimited jurisdiction 1s sufficient to show that the amount in 6 || controversy requirement is met.”); Martinez v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 7 || 2025 WL 1862810, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“General notations regarding the amount 8 || in controversy on attachments, such as on an administrative civil case cover sheet, 9 || are insufficient to trigger removal.”). 10 Accordingly, because Plaintiff's Original Complaint did not clearly establish 11 || the amount in controversy for MMWA federal question jurisdiction or diversity 12 || jurisdiction purposes, it did not trigger the first thirty-day deadline under Section 13 1446(b)(1).'° Harris, 425 F.3d at 695; Torres, 2025 WL 2848989 at *3; Stewart, 14 | 2025 WL 2848991 at *3; see also Medina, 2025 WL 2963020 at *3 (“[B]ecause the 15 || Complaint was ambiguous on its face as to removability based on either diversity 16 || jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction, the 30-day removal clock did not start 17 || when the Complaint was served on April 2, 2025.”). And since Plaintiff does not 18 | suggest Section 1446(b)(3) is applicable,'! Defendant timely filed the Notice of 19 20 ‘Plaintiff alternate argument — discussed below — arguably concedes this point. (See 21 || Mot. Mem. at 9-11 (stating that “[w]here the amount is unclear from the face of the complaint, the removing defendant bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 22 || the jurisdictional threshold is met” and arguing that Defendant has not met its burden); see also 73 Reply at 3 (“Because it is unclear from the face of the Complaint that the Federal threshold is exceeded, Defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 24 || controversy exceeds $50,000.”). Plaintiff does not suggest her First Amended Complaint made a ground for remova 25 "Plaintiff d ggest her First Amended Complaint made a ground f l 6 “unequivocally clear and certain” so as to start the removal clock under § 1446(b)(3). Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. If she had, any such argument would be rejected as the First Amended 27 || Complaint is equally as indeterminate as the Original Complaint in relation to the amount in 28 controversy in this action. And as stated above, any papers provided to Defendant prior to the (continued...) 11
1 || Removal within one year of the commencement of this action. Roth, 720 F.3d at 2 || 1125; Medina, 2025 WL 2963020 at *3; see also Villegas v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 3 || 2025 WL 2964012, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (‘[T]he Court concludes that Defendant’s 4 || Notice of Removal was not untimely because it is not clear from the face of the 5 || Complaint that this action was removable.”). 6 B. Defendant Has Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence 7 That the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000 8 As previously noted, Section 1332 “gives federal district courts original 9 || jurisdiction of all civil actions ‘between . . . citizens of different States’ where the 10 | amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 11 | 81, 89 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). This statutory formulation 12 || requires “complete diversity of citizenship.” Caterpillar, Inc, 519 U.S. at 68 13 | (1996); Lincoln Prop. Co., 546 U.S. at 89. “That is, diversity jurisdiction does not 14 || exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.” 15 | Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphasis in 16 | original). Here, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s assertion that complete 17 || diversity exists between the parties. (See Docket No. 1 at 3-4; Mot. Mem. at 1-11); 18 || see also Loudermilk v. FCA US, LLC, 2025 WL 2753951, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2025) 19 | (“Plaintiffs do not dispute that complete diversity between the parties exists, and 20 || thus the Court considers that requirement satisfied.”). However, Plaintiff does 21 || challenge whether Defendant has established the amount in controversy necessary 22 || to provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction.’ (Mot. Mem. at 9-11). 23 | ———_____ 24 '(,. continued) initiation of a lawsuit cannot trigger the alternate 30-day period under Section 1446(b)(3). 25 || Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141-42: Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 886. 26 "While Plaintiff makes this argument in terms of the MMWA’s $50,000 jurisdictional 27 || limit (Mot. Mem. at 9-11), “Defendant did not remove on the basis of the MMWA claim. 28 Instead, Defendant removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). AS a (continued...) 12
1 “Where, as here, it is unclear from the face of the complaint whether the 2 || amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, ‘the removing defendant bears the burden 3 || of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 4 || exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’” Chavez v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 888 5 || F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); Guglielmo v. McKee Foods Corp., 6 || 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate 7 || of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n a case that 8 || has been removed from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the 9 || basis of diversity jurisdiction, the proponent of federal jurisdiction — typically the 10 || defendant in the substantive dispute — has the burden to prove, by a preponderance 11 || of the evidence, that removal is proper.”). 12 In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff requests remedies for her state law 13 || Song-Beverly Act claims that include: (1) actual damages; (2) civil penalties; and 14 |] (3) attorneys’ fees. (FAC at 9-10). In the Notice of Removal, Defendant estimated 15 || actual damages of $47,570.51, based on an estimate of the value of the Subject 16 || Vehicle and an estimate of statutorily required deductions for mileage offset, 17 || third-party service contracts, manufacturer’s rebates, and negative equity. (Docket 18 | No. 1 at 5). In its Opposition, Defendant revised its estimated actual damages to 19 || $31,849.65, by relying on Plaintiff's Lease Agreement, the Subject Vehicle’s repair 20 || history, and documents produced by Plaintiff demonstrating her payment history to 21 || calculate the cash value of the Subject Vehicle, an estimated mileage offset, and 22 || other offsets for optional third-party contracts. (See Opp. at 17; Ihara Decl. {J 2-3; 23 || Ihara Exs. A-B); see also Sosa v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2025 WL 2938075, *2 (C.D. 24 || Cal. 2025) (“Under the Song-Beverly Act, actual damages are equal to the actual 25 || price paid or payable by the buyer, less the reduction in value ‘directly attributable 26 | ——__ 27 "C.continued) 28 result, Defendant must demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, not $50,000.” Villegas, 2025 WL 2964012 at *3. 13
1 || to use by the buyer,’ such as mileage offsets.” (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 2 || 1793.2(d)(2)(B-C)). Based on the evidence provided with Defendant’s Opposition, 3 || the Court concludes that Defendant reasonably calculated actual damages of 4 | $31,849.65. Villegas, 2025 WL 2964012, at *3. 5 “The Ninth Circuit routinely considers civil penalties when deciding whether 6 || the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied, including in 7 || Song-Beverly cases.” Wang v. FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 1218745, *2 (C.D. Cal. 8 || 2025) (citing Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007) and 9 || Morey v. Louis Vuitton N. Am., Inc., 461 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011)); 10 || Villegas, 2025 WL 2964012, at *4; see also Azzinari v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 11 || Inc., 2025 WL 2835456, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“The maximum amount of civil 12 || penalties generally factor into the amount in controversy.”). In this case, Plaintiff 13 || clearly and repeatedly alleges Defendant’s conduct was willful, and she seeks civil 14 || penalties of up to two times the amount of actual damages. (See FAC at 2-4, 9). 15 || As a result, the Court concludes that Defendant reasonably calculated civil 16 | penalties of $63,699.30 ($31,849.65 x 2). Villegas, 2025 WL 2964012, at *4; see 17 || also Canseco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 872, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2021) 18 || (‘[C]ivil penalties [are] appropriate for inclusion in the calculation of the amount in 19 || controversy without the defendant needing to ‘prove a case against itself with 20 || respect to liability for civil penalties.”); Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. 21 || Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he Song—Beverly Act in effect 22 || authorizes treble damages (compensatory damages plus up to twice of said 23 || damages) in the form of a civil penalty. The Complaint alleges MBUSA willfully 24 || failed to comply with its obligation under the Song—Beverly Act and violated Cal. 25 || Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2), thus if Brady prevails, entitling him to treble damages 26 || under §§ 1794(c) and (e). Thus, the civil penalty ... is properly included in the 27 || amount in controversy.”); Sosa, 2025 WL 2938075 at *3 (“[A]s the amount in 28 || controversy reflects the maximum that the plaintiff could recover, Nissan correctly 14
1 || adds the full civil penalty to the amount in controversy calculation’). As a result, 2 || the amount in controversy, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, based on actual damages 3 || and civil penalties is $95,548.95.'° (Opp. at 18). 4 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant has adequately 5 || demonstrated the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and Plaintiff's Motion to 6 || Remand should be denied. See Carillo v. FCA USA, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d 995, 7 || 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2021) (‘The sum of the restitution and civil penalty amounts in 8 || controversy is $75,056.10. Accordingly, the Court finds that the $75,000 9 || jurisdictional requirement has been satisfied, and DENIES motion to remand for 10 || lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)); Akulyan v. Mercedes-Benz 11 | USA, LLC, 2025 WL 2553443, *5 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (“[T]he Court finds that 12 || Defendant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a civil penalty of up 13 || to two-times the vehicle price can be considered in determining whether the 14 | amount-in-controversy requirement has been met. Combined with actual damages 15 || of $44,226.60, the addition of $88,453.20 readily meets the amount in controversy 16 || for purposes of this Motion.”). 17] 1V. ORDER 18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 19 | 16) is DENIED. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 | DATED: October 27, 2025 22 /s/ 23 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 | “Because the Court concludes that the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied, it need not consider the parties’ dispute as to whether [Defendant] has met its burden to demonstrate the 27 || amount of attorneys’ fees that are potentially recoverable.” Carillo v. FCA USA, LLC, 546 F. 28 Supp. 3d 995, 1004 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2021); Sosa, 2025 WL 2938075 at *3; Zepeda v. Ford Motor Co., 2025 WL 2650358, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2025). 15