10/29/2024
DA 24-0075 Case Number: DA 24-0075
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2024 MT 246
VERNON K. STENSVAD,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
NEWMAN AYERS RANCH, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Prairie, Cause No. DV-2023-08 Honorable Olivia Rieger, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Shandor S. Badaruddin, Shandor S. Badaruddin, PC, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Albert R. Batterman, Batterman Law Offices, P.C., Baker, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 25, 2024
Decided: October 29, 2024
Filed: Vor-64w—if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. (Ayers Ranch) appeals an order of the Seventh Judicial
District Court, Prairie County, granting Vernon K. Stensvad’s (Stensvad) application for
preliminary injunction. We remand for supplemental findings consistent with the
preliminary injunction standard.
¶2 We restate the following issues for review:
1. Whether a district court must consider and make written findings on all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard, § 27-19-201, MCA.
2. Whether a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien.
3. Whether the District Court erred by finding that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Stensvad owns a small cattle herd that he has selectively bred and developed since
2011. In July 2022, Stensvad entered a Grazing Lease Contract with Ayers Ranch. The
Lease provided that Stensvad would graze his herd of approximately 84 cattle for $45 per
animal unit with payment due at the beginning of each month. The Lease stated that
Stensvad would “be responsible for winter rates,” which are typically higher than the
summer pasture rates due to the cost of feed and care, but did not specify an amount. The
Lease could only be changed with discussion and written agreement by all parties.
¶4 Stensvad paid Lease fees for July and August. Sometime after the Lease was
created, Stensvad and Ayers Ranch came to an oral agreement that Stensvad would perform
labor for Ayers Ranch in exchange for a reduction of fees. The parties did not determine
2 an hourly rate that Stensvad would be credited. Stensvad worked approximately two
weekends per month on Ayers Ranch until September 2023, repairing fences, moving hay,
and repairing a trailer, though Ayers Ranch testified that the work was low quality and had
to be redone. Stensvad made a $5,000 payment in May 2023 but did not otherwise pay
monthly Lease fees.
¶5 In December 2022, a memo appearing to be written by Ayers Ranch was sent to
Stensvad’s Farm Services Agency Farm Loan Manager. That memo states:
1) Vern has 76 bred cows, 4 bulls, and 4 replacement heifers currently being feed [sic] on my ranch. The charge will be $2.50/day beginning November 15th. As of December 31st, he will owe $9,450 to New [sic] Ayers Ranch. 2) Vern pastured the cows on the ranch from early June on. I agree to allow Vern to work off the pasture for 2022 and 2023. I expect him to work every weekend at the ranch. He is in agreement to the terms of this arrangement.
Sincerely,
Newman Ayers Ranch Courtney Ayers, President.
The memo is signed and dated by Stensvad, but Ayers Ranch asserts that it never saw the
memo and was not aware of its existence until litigation began. Ayers Ranch testified that
$2.50 per day was “not even close” to a reasonable winter rate and “wouldn’t even pay for
the cost of the hay.”
¶6 On October 13, 2023, Stensvad informed Nancy Ayers, the ranch manager, that he
was moving his animals at the end of the month and that Ayers Ranch would be paid after
Stensvad sold his calves for the year. He also requested a bill. Instead of a bill, Stensvad
received an agister’s lien (Lien) claiming that he owed $78,662.50—an amount reflecting
a winter rate totaling $55,312.50, much higher than the $2.50 per animal per day
3 memorialized in the memo—and no credit for Stensvad’s labor. Pursuant to the agister’s
lien, Ayers Ranch seized Stensvad’s entire herd and would not let him enter the property.
The attached bill had significant discrepancies with the Lease and the Memo including
number of animals, credit for Stensvad’s labor, and winter rates. The parties dispute the
amount owed.
¶7 On November 28, 2023, Stensvad filed a Verified Application for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order to prevent Ayers Ranch from selling
Stensvad’s animals pursuant to the Lien. A hearing was held on December 20, 2023. On
January 8, 2024, the District Court granted the preliminary injunction and ordered
Stensvad’s animals to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 We review a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for manifest
abuse of discretion. Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC v. State, 2024
MT 200, ¶ 8, 418 Mont. 78, 555 P.3d 759. A court abuses its discretion when it acts
arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of
reason resulting in substantial injustice. Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 2022 MT
157, ¶ 5, 409 Mont. 378, 515 P.3d 301. A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is
obvious, evident, or unmistakable. Shammel v. Canyon Res. Corp., 2003 MT 372, ¶ 12,
319 Mont. 132, 82 P.3d 912. We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions for correctness. Davis v. Westphal, 2017 MT 276, ¶ 10, 389 Mont.
251, 405 P.3d 73.
4 DISCUSSION
¶9 1. Whether a district court must consider and make written findings on all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard, § 27-19-201, MCA.
¶10 The 2023 Montana Legislature changed the standard for issuance of a preliminary
injunction under § 27-19-201, MCA. Under the previous version of the statute, we
employed a disjunctive test that required only one subsection to be met. See Sweet Grass
Farms v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2000 MT 147, ¶ 27, 300 Mont. 66, 2 P.3d 825. Now, a
party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy all four parts of the standard:
(a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits; (b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant’s favor; and (d) the order is in the public interest.
Section 27-19-201(1), MCA (emphasis added). “It is the intent of the legislature that [this
language] mirror the federal preliminary injunction standard, and that interpretation and
application . . . closely follow United States [S]upreme [C]ourt case law.”
Section 27-19-201(4), MCA. The parties to this appeal point out that “this Court has not
yet reconciled this revised statutory approach with established case law.” As a critical
mass of cases applying the new preliminary injunction standard now reaches this Court,
we take the opportunity to clarify the purpose, context, and application of this remedy.
¶11 The Supreme Court’s most recent definitive ruling on the federal preliminary
injunction standard was Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). In Winter, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s grant
of a preliminary injunction, clarifying that the factors were not just considerations but
5 rather separate showings that a plaintiff “must establish.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S. Ct.
at 374. The Court also held that plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable
injury—more than the Ninth Circuit’s previous “possibility” standard. Winter, 555 U.S. at
21-22, 129 S. Ct. at 375.
¶12 Unfortunately for this Court, the Legislature’s instruction to mirror Supreme Court
case law is not as simple as merely applying the Winter factors.1 Winter arose amid a
diverse landscape of approaches to equitable relief and did little to alleviate confusion in
its application. Both pre- and post-Winter, federal courts diverge on how to weigh the
factors while accounting for the judicial discretion necessary to effectuate an equitable
remedy. Now, like the federal circuits before us, this Court is tasked with determining what
“Supreme Court case law” really means. To do so, we look to the history of the remedy
and the approaches taken by various federal courts.
¶13 Equitable injunctive relief is grounded in old English law predating this state and
this country by centuries. The history of the English legal system is long and far more
nuanced than can or should be summarized in a judicial opinion. For purposes of
understanding the roots of the preliminary injunction, it is worth noting that courts of law
determined the rights of parties under highly specific causes of action (standardized writs)
and awarded money damages, while courts of equity fashioned more tailored equitable
relief with remedies, including injunctions, that were not available through courts of law.
1 We use the term “factor” for consistency with Ninth Circuit case law and prevailing scholarly sources. The Winter ruling, depending on its interpretation, could also be construed as creating “elements,” “steps,” “prongs,” or simply “parts.” 6 This separate law and equity system originated in part because writs available in the courts
of law were unworkably rigid in their requirements, leading parties to ask the king, via his
chancellor, for new writs. These requests became so frequent and burdensome that the
process was deputized to separate courts of equity. The courts of equity were often tasked
with deciding whether injunctive relief should issue while a case was pending in the court
of law. But because it was the court of law that determined the parties’ legal rights, the
court of equity had to decide its request based on its estimation of whether the plaintiff
would ultimately succeed in the court of law, as well as the public interest and the balance
of equities. The equity courts’ injunctive power transferred to America post-Revolution.
See generally John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
525, 527-31 (1978); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure,
78 Wash. L. Rev. 429, 437-48 (2003).
¶14 As an equitable remedy, the hallmark of the preliminary injunction is its inherent
flexibility—a court uses its discretion to “do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S. Ct. 587, 592 (1944). This flexibility—and
the corresponding necessity of balancing various considerations against each other—is
deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402, 407
(1792) (granting injunction where issues were a “fair foundation for future judicial
investigation” and the possible harm might be “out of [the Court’s] power to repair”);
Newton v. Levis, 79 F. 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1897) (“When the questions to be ultimately
decided are serious and doubtful, the legal discretion of the judge in granting the writ
7 should be influenced largely by the [balance of harms].”); Blount v. Societe Anonyme du
Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur, 53 F. 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1892) (quoting the old English
case of Shrewsbury v. Ry. Co., 1 Sim. (N.S.) 410) (“[T]here are two points on which the
court must satisfy itself. First, it must satisfy itself, not that the plaintiff has certainly a
right, but that he has a fair question to raise as to the existence of such a right. The other
is whether ‘interim’ interference, on a balance of convenience or inconvenience to the one
party and to the other, is or is not expedient.”).
¶15 By the time Winter was decided in 2008, the vast majority of federal courts followed
a “sliding scale” test; that is, some version of variable weighting amongst factors. One
common iteration of the sliding scale was the “serious questions” test, articulated in 1953
in Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953):
To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain, wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i.e., the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.
¶16 While the circuits’ language varied somewhat, more general sliding scale tests and
the serious questions test (allowing for a lesser showing of success on the merits to be
counterbalanced by other factors as long as the questions going to the merits were serious
enough to make the matter fit for further litigation/investigation) were described as
“equivalent approaches,” Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th
Cir. 1984), or as the Ninth Circuit put it, the serious questions test was “the outer reaches
‘of a single continuum’” of sliding scale approaches. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Am.
8 Broad Co., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted). Overall, there was
a uniform acceptance that the remedy required an inherent allowance for judicial discretion.
¶17 But then Winter was decided. It neither addressed nor explicitly overruled the
various sliding scale approaches, leaving the circuits to decide whether their respective
tests survived. We examine several exemplary cases to broadly analyze the reasoning of
the circuits that continue to follow a sliding scale approach and those that do not.
¶18 The Fourth Circuit quickly tightened its previously flexible test post-Winter. In Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated, 599 U.S.
1089, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010), the court rejected that requirements could be “conditionally
redefined as other requirements are more fully satisfied so that ‘grant[ing] or deny[ing] a
preliminary injunction depends upon a ‘flexible interplay’ among all the factors
considered.’”2 (Internal citation omitted.) Rather, the Winter requirements “must be
satisfied as articulated.” Real Truth About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347.
¶19 The Tenth Circuit took a more circuitous route to tightening its standard, initially
seeming to uphold the serious questions test before holding more recently that although
Winter “dealt with a different prong of the preliminary injunction test” than likelihood of
success, its reasoning meant that “any modified test which relaxes one of the prongs for
preliminary relief and thus deviates from the standard test is impermissible.” Diné Citizens
Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016); cf. RoDa
2 Though this case was vacated, the Fourth Circuit has since upheld its post-Winter interpretation of the preliminary injunction standard. See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013).
9 Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming serious
questions test in a footnote). Essentially, these courts reason that anything less than an
absolute showing of any one factor, even if balanced by a stronger showing on another
factor, is a deviation from Winter’s requirements. A mere “serious question” going to the
merits, then, is insufficient.
¶20 On the other hand, the Second, Seventh, D.C., and Ninth Circuits have expressly
held that some version of the sliding scale test survives Winter.3 The Second Circuit found
that it was too broad a reading of Winter to require a showing that the movant “is more
likely than not to succeed on its underlying claims”; rather, a movant must show either
“likelihood of success on the merits or . . . sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly
toward the party requesting preliminary relief.” Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special
Opportunities Masters Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 30-34 (2d Cir. 2010). The value of this
approach is “its flexibility in the face of varying factual scenarios and the greater
uncertainties inherent at the outset of particularly complex litigation.” Citigroup, 598 F.3d
at 35. The court reasoned that a rote requirement of likelihood of success would confine
preliminary injunctions to “cases that are simple or easy,” which would be “‘unacceptable
as a general rule . . . .Limiting the preliminary injunction to cases that do not present
significant difficulties would deprive the remedy of much of its utility.’” Citigroup, 598
3 The Third Circuit has implicitly upheld its sliding scale standard in the context of a stay pending appeal, see Revel AC, Inc. v. IDEA Boardwalk LLC, 802 F.3d 558, 569-71 (3d Cir. 2015), and the First Circuit has avoided the issue despite recently being directly confronted with it in an environmental case, see Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 997 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 2021). 10 F.3d at 35-36 (quoting 11A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2948.3 (2d ed. 2009)). The court also discussed preliminary injunction cases around the
time of Winter, finding that “[i]f the Supreme Court had meant for Munaf [v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008)], Winter, or Nken [v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 129 S. Ct.
1749 (2009)] to abrogate the more flexible sliding scale standard for a preliminary
injunction, one would expect some reference to the considerable history of the flexible
standards applied in this circuit, seven of our sister circuits, and in the Supreme Court
itself.” Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 38.
¶21 The Seventh Circuit likewise acknowledged Winter but maintained its sliding scale
approach. The court frames its test for success on the merits as “[h]ow strong a claim on
the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net harm an injunction can
prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still supporting some
preliminary relief.” Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins., 582
F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). Noting the uncertainties on the ultimate resolution of that
case and the potential harm that would be avoided by an injunction, the court took a broad
view to hold that “these uncertainties collectively support the . . . conclusion that [the
plaintiff] has some prospect of prevailing on the merits.” Hoosier Energy, 582 F.3d at 725,
729-30.
¶22 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that “the analysis in Winter could be read
to create a more demanding burden, although the decision does not squarely discuss
whether the four factors are to be balanced on a sliding scale.” Davis v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, it set forth its sliding
11 scale approach—“[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors,
then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor”—before
finding the potential effect of Winter immaterial in that specific case because the plaintiffs
could not prevail even under the sliding scale. Davis, 571 F.3d at 1292.
¶23 Perhaps most pertinent to our Court, the Ninth Circuit unequivocally has held that
the serious questions version of the sliding scale test survived Winter in Alliance for the
Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). The court joined “the reasons
identified by our sister circuits,” namely the Second and the Seventh, as discussed above,
“in concluding that the ‘serious questions’ version of the sliding scale test for preliminary
injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.” All. for the Wild
Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134. The serious questions test is articulated as:
A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised4 and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.
All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134-35 (citing Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d
981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiffs must still satisfy the other Winter factors. Summarily,
the Ninth Circuit held that
[t]o the extent prior cases applying the “serious questions” test have held that a preliminary injunction may issue where the plaintiff shows only that serious
4 If it is clear that there is not even a serious question going to the merits, then injunctive relief is not an appropriate remedy. In this sense, the likelihood of success is foundational—if there is not at least a serious question, a court need not continue its analysis, because a preliminary injunction would not be in the interest of equity. This is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent instruction that likelihood of success “is a threshold inquiry and is the most important factor.” See Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023). But this should not be construed to somehow overvalue or heighten the showing of likelihood of success under the serious questions test.
12 questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, without satisfying the other two prongs, they are superseded by Winter, which requires the plaintiff to make a showing on all four prongs. But the “serious questions” approach survives Winter when applied as part of the four-element Winter test.
All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. Thus, the Ninth Circuit explained that “‘serious
questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the
plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows
that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public
interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.
¶24 As the concurrence in that case recognized, Winter cabined a court’s flexibility with
regard to the irreparable harm finding to more than a possibility of harm, but “there are
good reasons to treat the likelihood of success differently.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632
F.3d at 1139 (Mosman, J., concurring). Predicting the likelihood of irreparable harm is
generally more possible at the preliminary injunction stage, whereas predicting the
likelihood of success is much more difficult; “[t]he parties are often mostly guessing about
important factual points that go, for example, to whether a statute has been violated,
whether a noncompetition agreement is even valid, or whether a patent is enforceable.”
All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1139-40 (Mosman, J., concurring). If the likelihood
of success threshold is recognized as independent and therefore not cabined by Winter, the
serious questions test easily survives.
¶25 We agree and hold that the serious questions test is the most appropriate means of
applying the federal preliminary injunction standard. There are a number of reasons we
choose to adopt the serious questions test. First, it is in accordance with Ninth Circuit case
13 law. While we are not beholden to that court’s precedent, we may review its opinions for
guidance when federal cases or rules are implicated. See, e.g., Mark Ibsen, Inc. v. Caring
for Montanans, Inc., 2016 MT 111, ¶ 44, 383 Mont. 346, 371 P.3d 446 (analyzing U.S.
District Court and Ninth Circuit cases for interpretation of the Montana Unfair Trade
Practices Act); Motta v. Granite Cnty. Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20, 370 Mont. 469, 304
P.3d 720 (adopting Ninth Circuit test for pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants); State
v. Case, 2024 MT 165, ¶ 33, 417 Mont. 354, 553 P.3d 985 (explaining how the first two
prongs of our community caretaker test mirror the Ninth Circuit’s exigent circumstances
standard for warrantless entry). By paralleling the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
preliminary injunction standard, we hope to allow attorneys to draw from its case law,
easing the transition to Montana’s new standard. Whether in state or federal court, Montana
litigants will be served by the clarity of a consistent standard across venues.
¶26 Second, the serious questions test is the best fit with Montana precedent. We have
always emphasized the need for flexibility in the preliminary injunction context, as
reflected by the disjunctive nature of the prior test. See Sweet Grass Farms, ¶ 27. We have
held that “[i]n deciding whether an applicant has established a prima facie case, a court
should determine whether a sufficient case has been made to warrant the preservation of
the property or rights in status quo until trial, without expressing a final opinion as to such
rights.” Sweet Grass Farms, ¶ 28 (citing Fox Farm Estates Landowners Ass’n v. Kreisch,
285 Mont. 264, 268, 947 P.2d 79, 82 (1997)). The serious questions test continues to allow
Montana courts to preserve the status quo until a full trial can be held without having to
tread too far into the merits of the case.
14 ¶27 Last, the serious questions test is the best fit with the overall equitable purpose of
the remedy. Preliminary injunctions are, and remain, “an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 9, 129 S. Ct. at 367. If flexibility is a hallmark
of equity jurisdiction, then some version of a sliding scale among the required factors is
the means of allowing that flexibility. It also alleviates concerns of judicial economy; if
likelihood of success on the merits is an absolute standard, then district court judges and
parties are effectively forced to conduct a trial on the merits without the benefit of full
discovery. This is harmful for numerous reasons and ultimately is not in the interest of
justice.
¶28 In contrast to the uncertainty regarding application of the Winter factors, the United
States Supreme Court, other federal courts, and this Court have remained resolute that the
purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until
a trial on the merits can be held.” See Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, __ U.S. __, 144 S. Ct.
1570, 1576 (2024); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 773,
789 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094
(9th Cir. 2010)); Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State, 2024 MT 228, ¶ 16, 418 Mont. 253,
__P.3d __.
¶29 In summary, in accordance with Winter, the legislature’s directive, and the plain
language of the statute, the preliminary injunction standard sets forth a conjunctive test that
requires an applicant to make a sufficient showing as to each of the four factors. The
sufficiency of that showing is determined using the Ninth Circuit’s serious questions
framework. Unless it is clear that an applicant fails to raise serious questions going to the
15 merits, a district court should likewise consider and address each of the remaining factors.
The ultimate equitable purpose of injunctive relief remains preservation of the status quo.
¶30 Turning to the case at hand, we hold that the District Court manifestly abused its
discretion by granting a preliminary injunction without addressing all four factors. Though
the District Court repeatedly acknowledged the necessity of addressing all four factors
orally during the hearing and set out the correct test in its written order, it erred by only
addressing irreparable injury. We make no finding as to whether a preliminary injunction
should be granted or denied; we hold only that the District Court must make supplemental
findings and conclusions upon remand to satisfy the applicable preliminary injunction
standard.
¶31 2. Whether a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien.
¶32 Ayers Ranch argues that a preliminary injunction is not an appropriate remedy
because statutory provisions govern agister’s liens. Indeed, Ayers Ranch is an agister, and
the lien arises as a matter of law. See § 71-3-1211(2)(a), MCA (“If there is an express or
implied contract for keeping, feeding, herding, pasturing, or ranching stock, a rancher,
farmer, [or] agister . . . to whom any horses, . . . cattle, . . . or other stock are entrusted has
an agister’s lien upon the stock for the amount due for keeping, feeding, herding, pasturing,
or ranching the stock.”). The relevant statute also provides that “agisters’ liens require
expeditious action to protect the welfare of the stock and to ensure that the cost to feed and
care for the stock covered by the lien does not exceed the market value of the stock.”
16 Section 71-3-1211(1), MCA. Section 71-3-1213, MCA, provides a process for public
auction of the stock if payment is not provided within 30 days to the lienholder.
¶33 Ayers Ranch seemingly confuses the existence of a statutory remedy with an
exclusive remedy. It is correct that public policy, market forces, and animal welfare
encourage the “expeditious” resolution of such issues. But the statute does not suggest
anywhere that § 71-3-1213, MCA, is an exclusive remedy. The language that the
lienholder “may” enforce the lien by sale reflects its non-exclusive nature. Injunctive relief
necessarily co-exists with statutory remedies “as an alternative or supplemental remedy to
those ordinarily available by statute or common law.” Davis, ¶ 23 (upholding a grant of
injunctive relief where common law ejectment remedy also existed). Here, the public sale
process for an agister’s lien is not an exclusive remedy, nor is this one of the enumerated
situations where injunctive relief is proscribed under § 27-19-103, MCA. Injunctive relief
is therefore available.
¶34 3. Whether the District Court erred by finding that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law.
¶35 Ayers Ranch argues that because “the nature of the dispute . . . is a breach of
contract claim,” Stensvad could be adequately compensated with monetary damages,
rendering injunctive relief inapposite. But given Stensvad’s alleged potential injury, we
agree with the District Court that injunctive relief is an appropriate consideration.
¶36 Generally, Montana courts do not provide injunctive relief where monetary damages
would adequately compensate harm. Shammel, ¶ 17. This is usually the case in contractual
disputes. See Reier Broad Co. v. Kramer, 2003 MT 165, ¶ 15, 316 Mont. 301, 72 P.3d 944
17 (“Injunctions are rarely used to enforce contract rights or prevent breaches, and applicable
court decisions concerning the propriety of this tactic are scarce.”).
¶37 Ayers Ranch asserts that this is a simple breach of contract claim ineligible for
injunctive relief. But this is a rare factual circumstance where there is no underlying claim
to date—there is only an application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.5 There may well be a breach of contract, but as Stensvad points out, there may also
be negligence, fraud, and reputational harm. What matters is not the potential claim, but
whether the alleged harm meets the preliminary injunction standard.6 Again being mindful
that we should not step into the fact-finding role of the District Court at this juncture,
Stensvad has asserted injuries for which an adequate remedy does not exist at law.
CONCLUSION
¶38 The District Court’s decision is remanded for supplemental findings in accordance
with this Opinion.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
5 We have previously declined to address whether a party may seek injunctive relief under Title 27 without filing a complaint. Protect the Clearwater v. Mont. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 2024 MT 181, ¶ 15, 417 Mont. 527, 554 P.3d 197. Because the parties do not raise this argument directly, we also decline to address it here. 6 Of course, this does not extend to alleged harm where statute otherwise dictates that injunctive relief is not the appropriate remedy. See § 27-19-103, MCA (enumerating when an injunction may not be granted); Protect the Clearwater, ¶¶ 20-22 (holding that a separate preliminary injunction under Title 27 was not an appropriate remedy when other administrative remedies were available and pending in a separate suit). 18 Justice Jim Rice, specially concurring.
¶39 I agree with the Court’s holding that the plain language of the agister’s lien statutes
does not preclude requests for injunctive relief pending completion of the lien foreclosure
process. Opinion, ¶ 33. I would note, however, that the agister lien statutes contain a
process that is intended to resolve these disputes expeditiously, including a process
culminating in a hearing, § 71-3-1203(4), MCA, and thus, injunctive relief should be
ordered only to supplement that process, not displace it. The Legislature has found that
“agisters’ liens require expeditious action to protect the welfare of the stock and to ensure
that the cost to feed and care for the stock covered by the lien does not exceed the market
value of the stock.” Section 71-3-1211(1), MCA. Pursuant thereto, the Legislature has
provided that a party who keeps, feeds, or pastures livestock pursuant to a contract for the
provision of that care “has an agister’s lien upon the stock for the amount due,” and is
granted the right to “retain possession of the stock until the amount due is paid.” Section
71-3-1211(2), MCA. It is true, as Ayers Ranch argues, that the District Court ordered the
livestock be removed from the possession of Ayers Ranch to a feed lot. Noting the factual
conflicts regarding the parties’ agreement and their purported actions pursuant thereto, the
District Court ordered the livestock be placed in the care of a third party “pending further
Orders from the court,” but also ruled that Ayers Ranch’s agister lien would remain in force
until the issues surrounding the correct “amount due” could be sorted out factually, and
authorized the sale of Stensvad’s calves “to pay debts in order of first priority.”
Consequently, while Ayers Ranch lost possession of the livestock, which would usually be
a part of the mechanism of enforcing the lien, the District Court’s preliminary injunction
19 ensured the Ranch’s lien would not be lost during the pendency of the proceeding, and
ensured the livestock would be properly cared for. Given its protection of Ayers Ranch’s
claimed interest, I do not believe the District Court’s coordination of supplemental
injunctive relief with the agister’s lien statutes was an error of law by itself. However, the
District Court must nonetheless consider whether Stensvad qualifies for injunctive relief
under the correct injunction statute.
¶40 I thus concur with the Court’s holding, and as argued by Ayers Ranch, that the
District Court erred by failing to analyze and apply the new preliminary injunction statute,
§ 27-19-201, MCA (2023), to this dispute, and that the case must be remanded for further
consideration thereunder. The statements in the parties’ briefing, that this Court “has not
issued any opinions regarding the conjunctive or disjunctive nature” of the new statute or
“has not yet reconciled” the new statute with prior case law, were made prior to the issuance
of several recent decisions that now have done so. See Montanans Against Irresponsible
Densification, LLC v. State, 2024 MT 200, 418 Mont. 78, 555 P.3d 759 (MAID); Planned
Parenthood of Montana v. State, 2024 MT 227, 418 Mont. 226, ___ P.3d ___ (Planned
Parenthood I); Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, 2024 MT 228, 418 Mont. 253,
___ P.3d ___ (Planned Parenthood II). We held in these cases that, in contrast to the prior
statute and as required by the new statutory language itself, the four statutory factors of the
new injunction statute are conjunctive and a party seeking an injunction must satisfy all of
them. MAID, ¶ 12 (“The prior version of the statute contained a disjunctive test. In other
words, an applicant could obtain a preliminary injunction by showing proof of just one of
the statutory subsections. . . . The current test is conjunctive. That is, the applicant for an
20 injunction bears the burden of establishing the likelihood of each element . . .”); see also
Planned Parenthood I, ¶ 12; Planned Parenthood II, ¶ 12. This Court also held that
preservation of the status quo remains an appropriate consideration. Planned
Parenthood I, ¶ 16; Planned Parenthood II, ¶ 16 (“[I]t remains the case that ‘the purpose
of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and the rights of the parties until a
final judgment issues in the cause.’”) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
¶41 The Legislature uniquely provided in plain language the source of any further
clarification of the new statute that may be necessary. Section 27-19-201, MCA (2023),
provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A preliminary injunction order or temporary restraining order may be granted when the applicant establishes that:
(a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits;
(b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
(c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant’s favor; and
(d) the order is in the public interest.
(4) It is the intent of the legislature that the language in subsection (1) mirror the federal preliminary injunction standard, and that interpretation and application of subsection (1) closely follow United States supreme court case law.
Section 27-19-201(1), (4), MCA (2023) (emphasis added). Consequently, courts are to
look to and “closely follow” U.S. Supreme Court case law to guide the “interpretation and
application” of the new four-part, conjunctive standard, and I would do so in adherence to
21 this express statutory directive. The Court instead holds that the new statute should be
interpreted under the case law of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Opinion, ¶ 25.
¶42 The Legislature’s intent to incorporate the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in this area
is further evidenced by the fact that the new four-part statutory standard restates exactly
the substance of the four-part, conjunctive test stated in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). While the 2008 Winter opinion is
generally regarded as the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal or modern statement of the test,
the Supreme Court has explained that Winter’s statement is actually a summary of the
“commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the
federal courts” and which “reflect a ‘practice with a background of several hundred years
of history.’” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, ___ U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024)
(citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803 (1982)
(quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S. Ct. 587, 591-92 (1944))); see also
Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402, 406 (1792) (opinion of Iredell, J.) and Georgia, 2 U.S.
at 407 (opinion of Blair, J.). Further reflecting the test’s long use and stability, the Supreme
Court has described the Winter articulation as the “familiar standard” and the “default
rule.” Starbucks Corp., 144 S. Ct. at 1575-76. In the 16 years since Winter was decided,
the Supreme Court has not revisited the case for purposes of revising or supplementing the
22 test. Rather, the Supreme Court’s citations to Winter have been for the purpose of stating
the preliminary injunction test and its source.
¶43 The U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the Winter test has instructed that “[a]
preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary’ equitable remedy that is ‘never awarded as of
right.’” Starbucks Corp., 144 S. Ct. at 1576 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S. Ct. at
376). The purpose of a preliminary injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Starbucks Corp., 144 S. Ct. at 1576
(citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 1834 (1981)). Our
holding that the status quo remains an appropriate consideration under the new statute,
Planned Parenthood I, ¶ 16, is consistent with this statement of purpose provided by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
¶44 The U.S. Supreme Court commonly first analyzes the first factor, likelihood of
success on the merits, which often includes the bulk of the Court’s analysis in the case.
See Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 425-33, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1277-82 (2022) (“Our
conclusion that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of his RLUIPA claims does not
end the matter. As noted earlier, he must also show ‘that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.’” (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129
S. Ct. at 375)). “‘A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might
otherwise result.’” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760 (2009)
(quoting Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672, 47 S. Ct. 222, 228 (1926)).
“The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at
23 434, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (noting the similarity between injunctive relief under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
et seq., and the Winter test). Under the first factor, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of
success on the merits be ‘better than negligible’. . . . [m]ore than a mere possibility of
relief is required.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (internal citations omitted).
“By the same token, simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ . . . fails to
satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (noting that Winter
had rejected “the ‘possibility standard’ as too lenient”).
¶45 The Legislature adopted an exact re-statement of the Winter factors for the new
statute. Section 27-19-201, MCA (2023). In applying those factors, the Legislature
expressly required that courts are to “closely follow” U.S. Supreme Court case law.
Section 27-19-201(4), MCA. The four-part Winter test provided by the U.S. Supreme
Court is a straightforward test that has been applied consistently by the Supreme Court for
many years, as set forth above. In its cases, the Supreme Court does not apply sliding
scales or impose additional tests upon factors or require additional inquiries or employ
approaches that may be used by the federal circuits or other courts. I thus respectfully
disagree with the Court that “the Legislature’s instruction to mirror Supreme Court case
law is not as simple as merely applying the Winter factors.” Opinion, ¶ 12. The Legislature
presumably intended for the new statute to change the status quo of injunction law, and the
Legislature’s choice of language is consistent therewith. See Sammons v. Sims (In re
Guardianship of L.R.T.S.), 2023 MT 83, ¶ 37, 412 Mont. 157, 529 P.3d 854 (referencing
“this Court’s long-held presumption that the Legislature intended to make some changes
24 in existing law by enacting an amendment or new law”). The clarity of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Winter jurisprudence is likely the reason the Legislature endorsed that particular
body of precedent and expressly required that it be “closely follow[ed].” I believe this
plain and specific directive does not leave room for application of alternate interpretive
factors or tests formulated by other courts.
¶46 The Winter test and the U.S. Supreme Court cases decided thereunder provide a
clear and settled framework of legal standards for district courts to apply and to
discretionarily grant or deny injunctive relief in accordance with the evidentiary record
made before them. I would so hold.
¶47 I specially concur.
/S/ JIM RICE