Stavola v. Macro Digital Technology Corp.

District Court, E.D. New York·Decided August 27, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-00026·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8/27/2 025 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK U.S. DISTRICT COURT ------------------------------------------------------------X EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PAUL STAVOLA, LONG ISLAND OFFICE Plaintiff, ORDER 24-CV-00026 (GRB) (JMW) -against- MACRO DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CORP. and PETER KACZENSKI, Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------X WICKS, Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff Paul Stavola (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against Defendants Macro Digital Technology Corp. and Peter Kaczenski (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) to recover unpaid minimum wage and overtime pay and seek redress for Defendants’ purported failure to provide wage notices and wage statements to Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 1.) On August 6, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel the production of complete, verified responses to certain interrogatories, and to produce undisclosed documents referenced in Defendants’ Third Amended Response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories. (See ECF No. 44.) In that same Order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney costs and fees incurred in bringing that motion and directed Plaintiff to make the appropriate application for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at pp. 11-13.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, requesting a total of $10,443.00 in connection with the motion to compel. (ECF No. 46.) Though afforded the opportunity to oppose this motion, Defendants chose not to do so. (See Electronic Order dated 8/16/2025). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and attorneys’ fees are awarded in the total amount of $10,038.00, with the application for costs being denied.1 DISCUSSION

a. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees Under Rule 37 “A party that fails to cooperate in discovery or comply with court orders is subject to sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Allied 100, LLC v. Chadha, No. 20-CV-03493 (AMD) (PK), 2021 WL 7184241, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021). “Rule 37 provides a district court with a wide range of sanctions which it may apply to a wide range of circumstances -- potential sanctions extend from payment of expenses and similar monetary sanctions at one end of the spectrum to default judgment on the other.” Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. v. Shore Funding Sols., Inc., No. CV176499 (ADS)(AKT), 2019 WL 2436239, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1986606 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2019). Namely, after a motion to compel is granted, Rule 37 provides:

If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). An award of fees and costs is not appropriate, however, where a defendant establishes that “(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection

1 Although Plaintiff’s motion seeks “attorneys’ fees and costs” (ECF No. 46 at p. 1), no detail or support whatsoever was submitted as to “costs,” but only as to attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, although attorneys’ fees are awarded, there is no award for costs. was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)—(iii); see Wager v. G4S Secure Integration, LLC, No. 19-cv-03547- MKV-KNF, 2021 WL 293076, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021) (finding that a defendant must show “that Plaintiff failed to attempt in good faith to obtain the discovery without judicial

intervention, Defendant's nondisclosure was substantially justified, or an award of expenses would be unjust”). The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel. (See ECF No. 44.) Moreover, Defendants have not opposed the current application, and the Court is unable to ascertain any “substantial justification” or “other circumstances” why an award of fees is unjust. See Sadowski v. Yeshiva World News, LLC, No. 21-cv-7207 (AMD) (MMH), 2023 WL 6812273, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2023) (determining plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for bringing a motion to compel where there was “nothing to suggest” substantial justification or “that any other circumstances exist that would make an award of fees unjust”) (quoting Republic of Guatemala v. IC Power Asia Dev. Ltd., No. 22-cv-394 (CM) (JW), 2023 WL 3294277, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May

5, 2023)). Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to fees incurred in bringing the prior motion to compel. b. Reasonableness of Plaintiff’s Requested Fees “Where Rule 37 expenses are awarded they must be reasonable. A reasonable award reflects the result of the ‘lodestar’ analysis, i.e., the product of a reasonable hourly rate (which rate reflects the hourly rate in the District for similar cases) and the reasonable number of hours spent on the tasks for which expenses are sought.” Jackson v. Nassau County, 602 F. Supp. 3d 352, 355–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). This presumptively reasonable fee is essentially “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay, given that such a party wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The method for determining reasonable attorneys’ fees in this Circuit is based on a number of factors, such as the labor and skill required, the difficulty of the issues, the attorney’s

customary hourly rate, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, and awards in similar cases.” Scelsi v. Habberstad Motorsport Inc., No. 19-CV-4315 (FB), 2021 WL 6065768, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2021) (referencing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany & Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 184, 186 n.3, 190 (2d Cir. 2008)). Once a reasonable hourly rate is determined, the Court must then “multiply that rate by the number of hours reasonably expended, in order to determine the presumptively reasonable fee.” Id. (referencing Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190). When analyzing an application for attorneys’ fees, “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours” will be excluded. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-35, 440 (1983)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Stavola v. Macro Digital Technology Corp., (E.D.N.Y. 2025).

Stavola v. Macro Digital Technology Corp. (Stavola v. Macro Digital Technology Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

United States v. Rodriguez
602 F.3d 346 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority
575 F.3d 170 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Bliven v. Hunt
579 F.3d 204 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Grant v. Martinez
973 F.2d 96 (Second Circuit, 1992)