State v. Young

64 P.3d 296, 138 Idaho 370, 2002 Ida. LEXIS 179

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: November 26, 2002
• Docket: 27705
• Status: Published

Opinions

ON REVIEW

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This is an appeal by Steven Paul Young (Young) from his conviction for felony injury to a child based upon his failure to seek professional medical care for burns sustained by his son. Young argues that the district court erred by improperly instructing the jury and by admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his sentence was excessive. The Court of Appeals reversed Young’s conviction, finding that the district court’s instructions erroneously indicated that the jury only needed to find that Young willfully failed to obtain professional medical treatment for his child, when the statute under which Young was charged requires a finding that he did so with a purpose or willingness to cause his child to suffer. The State petitioned for review.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Young’s son, Michael Young (Michael), was born blind, cannot speak, and is developmentally delayed; however, he does have the ability to communicate needs, emotions, and pain. Young and Michael’s mother eventually separated, and Michael came to live with Young. Subsequently, Young remarried.

On July 2, 1998, Young placed Michael in bathwater, when, according to Young, he was momentarily distracted by friends who were leaving the house. Although Young testified that Michael did not indicate any discomfort, apparently the water was too hot, and the next morning Michael’s feet and buttocks were swollen and blistered. Young treated Michael’s burns at home with antibiotic burn packs and aloe vera. Young continued to treat the burns until the early morning of July 6, when, at Young’s request, Young’s sister took Michael to her house in order to care for him. Later in the day of July 6, Young’s sister determined that Michael’s burns required professional medical attention and, although Young had not instructed her to do so, she transported Michael to St. Luke’s Hospital in Boise. Later that day, Michael was transferred to a bum center in Salt Lake City. The treating physician diagnosed Michael’s injuries as “typical immersion burn[s],” and Michael eventually received skin grafts to repair the damage. The physician testified that Michael also developed a urinary tract infection, most likely due to the delay in treating the burns.

Young was charged with felony injury to a child, based upon his act of placing Michael in the bathtub or, alternatively, his “failure to take the child for medical treatment after the child was burned.” A jury found Young guilty of felony injury to a child based solely upon his failure to “provide reasonably necessary medical treatment after the child was burned.” The district court imposed a sentence of six years, with eighteen months fixed. Young appealed, posing several arguments: 1) the district court erred by improperly instructing the jury regarding the offense of felony injury to a child, 2) the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offense of misdemeanor injury to a child, 3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, 4) the district court erred in admitting photographs of Michael’s injuries into evidence, 5) the district court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial, and 6) the district court abused its discretion in imposing Young’s sentence.

The Court of Appeals reversed Young’s conviction, remanding the case for a new trial, because it found that the district court’s instructions erroneously instructed the jury that in order to find Young guilty, the jury only had to find that he purposefully or willingly caused delay in obtaining medical treatment for Michael, regardless of whether he intended for Michael to suffer or be injured. The Court held that, under the statutes dealing with felony injury to a child, the prosecution was required to show that Young kept Michael at home after he was burned with at least the knowledge that his actions would bring about further injuries or suffering. The State of Idaho petitioned for review.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court does not merely review the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 627, 991 P.2d 349, 352 (1999). Rather, this Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the decision of the trial court; however, this Court does give serious consideration to the decision of the Court of Appeals. Id.

The standard of review for factual issues relating to a jury conviction is whether there is substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 1114, 1116 (2000). When the issue is one of law, this Court has free review. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999).

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS MISSTATED THE LAW AND WERE APT TO CONFUSE OR MISLEAD THE JURY

The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). This Court has upheld jury instructions that do not strictly comply with those contained in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions (ICJI), but this Court has cautioned: “[w]e emphasize, however, that any court which varies from jury instructions previously approved by this Court does so at considerable risk that the verdict rendered will be overturned on appeal.” State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). When reviewing jury instructions, this Court must first ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P.2d at 1089. To be reversible error, instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. Id.

Young argues that the district court’s jury instructions misstated the law and were apt to confuse and mislead the jury in two ways. First, he argues, the instructions misstated the law regarding a parent’s legal duty to secure medical treatment for his or her children. Second, he argues, the instructions misstated the mental state the prosecution was required to show in order to secure a conviction.

Idaho Code section 18-1501(1) provides the following:

Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years.

A plain reading of section 18-1501(1) indicates that its purpose is to punish conduct or inaction that intentionally causes a child to suffer. In this case application of the statute would require that the State prove that Young failed to take the child for medical treatment after the child was burned and that this failure was done with the knowledge that it would cause the child to suffer or would inflict unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. The purpose of the statute is not to punish mistakes in judgment that are reviewed in hindsight. If Young knew that failure to take the child for medical care would cause, unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain, then he would be guilty. The question is not limited to the issue of whether he failed to obtain reasonable medical attention. Once established that the child should have received reasonable medical attention, there must be a further showing that the failure to obtain that medical attention was done with knowledge that this would cause unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain. Otherwise custodians of children may be subjected to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out poorly — innocent mistakes in judgment.

Read by itself section 18-1501(1) leads a jury to the proper analysis. In this case, however, the jury was given Instruction 13 based upon Idaho Code section 18-101(1). Instruction 13 provides the following:

The word “willfully,” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a puipose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred- to. It does not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.

Idaho Code section 18-101(1) provides the following:

The following words have in this code the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent from the context:

1. The word “wilfully,” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.

Generally giving an instruction in statutory language is not error. However, section 101 has its own built in warning that it is not appropriate in all instances in which the word willfully is used in the charging statute. Section 101 expressly provides that the term willfully is to be applied as defined “unless otherwise apparent from the context.” It is apparent from the context of section 18-1501(1) that the generalized definition of willfully should not be used. Section 18-1501(1) tells the jury that the State must prove that Young willfully caused or permitted the child to suffer or inflicted unjustifiable physical pain. Instruction 13 told the jury that Young would be guilty even if he did not intend to injure the child by his conduct or omission. At best this is confusing. At worst it misstates the law — it allowed Young to be convicted even if he made a good faith mistake believing that the treatment he provided was adequate for the injuries. Idaho Code section 18-1501(1) is a criminal statute not a barometer for stupidity. It should have been instructed as written without the embellishment of section 18-101(1), which from the context was not applicable. This was not harmless error. The ease must be remanded for new trial with proper instructions.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING YOUNG’S REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MISDEMEANOR INJURY TO A CHILD

The State does not dispute that misdemeanor injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(2), is a lesser included offense of felony injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(1). This Court exercises free review over a trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction regarding a lesser included offense. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 895, 980 P.2d 552, 559 (1999).

An instruction on a lesser included offense is mandatory if a reasonable view of the evidence would support the instruction. I.C. § 19-2132; Trevino, 132 Idaho at 895, 980 P.2d at 559. Misdemeanor injury to a child is 'distinguishable from the felony charge solely by the fact that the misdemeanor charge does not require the actions to be undertaken in circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death. I.C. § 18 — 1501(1)—(2). Consequently, the district court was required to give an instruction on the lesser included offense if a reasonable view of the facts would support a finding that Young’s omission or failure to secure medical treatment after Michael was burned occurred in circumstances that were not likely to produce great bodily harm or death to Michael.

There is no reasonable view of the facts that would support a finding that Young ever intended to take Michael to get professional medical treatment. Therefore, the issue before the jury was not, as Young argues, whether the jurors thought they would have chosen to treat Michael at home “for a few days,” but whether the decision to forego professional medical treatment altogether involved circumstances likely to cause great bodily harm or death.

The State’s witness, Dr. Bond, testified that Michael suffered burns to approximately nine percent of his body, the majority of which were third-degree burns. He also testified that, while second-degree burns can heal by themselves, third-degree burns cannot. Dr. Bond testified that, while third-degree bums are initially treated with cleansing agents and antibiotic ointments, any third-degree bum greater than the size of a quarter eventually requires a skin graft. He also testified that, in his expert opinion, Michael’s elevated white blood cell count, his elevated temperature, and his urinary tract infection were caused by the delay in professional medical treatment. He further testified that, had Michael been taken to a hospital sooner, he could have received medication to relieve some of his pain. Finally, he testified that before medical professionals began using skin grafts to treat bums patients with third-degree burns covering five percent of their bodies would typically live with open wounds for years, and patients with third-degree bums covering ten to twenty percent of their bodies would typically die from infections.

In sum, there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support a holding that Young’s decision to completely forego professional medical care for Michael did not involve circumstances or conditions likely to cause severe bodily harm or death. Consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor injury to a child.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY ADMITTING PHOTOGRAPHS OF MICHAEL’S BURNS INTO EVIDENCE

Young appeals from the district court’s decision to admit photographs of Michael’s burns, which were taken at St. Luke’s Hospital on the day Michael was taken to the emergency room. Young points out that the photographs were taken more than fifteen hours after Michael left Young’s care and, as the treating physician testified, there is often an evolution of the appearance of burns over the first few days. Consequently, Young argues, the photographs did not reflect the appearance of Michael’s burns while he was in Young’s care and are therefore irrelevant.

The initial question of relevancy of evidence is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 502, 988 P.2d 1170, 1176 (1999). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. Young’s wife and sister both testified that the photographs accurately reflected Michael’s condition during part of the time he was under Young’s home care. The photographs were relevant to show the severity of Michael’s bums as they appeared when Michael was in Young’s care, and they had some tendency to show whether or not Young willfully and unjustifiably failed to obtain professional care for Michael. Consequently, the photographs were relevant.

Alternatively, Young argues that even if the photographs were relevant, their relevance was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice____” I.R.E. 403. “Balancing of probative value against prejudice and the ultimate decision to admit or exclude the evidence is within the trial court’s sound discretion.” Hairston, 133 Idaho at 502, 988 P.2d at 1176.

The photographs depict the burns on Michael’s feet, his buttocks, and his perineum, the portion of the body between the anus and the scrotum. The district court stated that the pictures were “heartrending,” likely to “create a lot of sympathy on the jury,” and “graphic.” The photographs show severe blistering and discoloration of Michael’s skin. As depicted in the photographs, the burns look extremely painful. As noted by the district court, these photographs were not merely cumulative evidence. They were directly relevant to the jury’s task of determining whether Young’s omission was justified, and whether it occurred under circumstances likely to cause severe bodily harm or death— elements of the offense that might otherwise be difficult to demonstrate.

Although the photographs are graphic, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that their relevance was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the conviction is vacated and the case is remanded for trial with proper instructions.

Chief Justice TROUT and Justice EISMIANN concur.