[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-238.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J. Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- Case No. CT2023-0064 KEITH TAYLOR
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2023- 0218
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 23, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
RON WELCH, ESQ. CHRIS BRIGDON Prosecuting Attorney 8138 Somerset Road Muskingum County, Ohio Thornville, Ohio 43076 27 North Fifth Street P.O. Box 189 Zanesville, Ohio 43702 Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 2
Hoffman, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Keith Taylor appeals the judgment entered by the
Muskingum County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of guilty to
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity with a firearm specification (R.C. 2923.32(A)(1),
2941.141), four counts of theft (R.C. 2913.02(A)), four counts of identity fraud (R.C.
2913.49(B)(1)), one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification (R.C.
2903.11(A)(1)), and one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2913.02(A)(3)), and
sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of twenty one to twenty-six and one-
half years. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On January 25, 2023, Appellant and his co-defendant, Juliana Washington,
smashed the windows of five cars parked at FlowFit Studios in Zanesville, Ohio. Appellant
and Washington stole purses and wallets from the vehicles, including checks, credit
cards, and driver’s licenses belonging to the owners of the vehicles. Appellant and
Washington then went to Zanesville Gymnastics and smashed a car window, stealing a
victim’s purse which contained credit cards and the victim’s driver’s license.
{¶3} The next day Appellant and Washington smashed another car window at a
gymnastics studio, stealing a victim’s checks and identification. Two of the checks stolen
from this vehicle were forged and cashed by Appellant and Washington, using driver’s
licenses stolen from the Flowfit thefts.
{¶4} On February 7, 2023, Appellant and Washington were introduced to B.K.,
who was homeless at the time, through a mutual friend. Appellant and Washington
1 The State has not filed a brief in the instant appeal. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 3
offered B.K. an opportunity to make some money. Appellant and Washington put B.K. in
a car with another woman, and instructed them to go through a bank drive-through in
Zanesville to cash one of the stolen checks using a stolen driver’s license. After turning
the money over to Appellant, B.K. indicated she did not want to be a part of what Appellant
was doing, and she wanted out of the car. Appellant drove B.K. to an area behind a strip
mall in Zanesville, where Appellant assaulted B.K., striking her with his fists and a
handgun until B.K. was unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she made her
way to a store in the strip mall, where the police were called. B.K. was taken to the
emergency room for treatment.
{¶5} After participating in several “smash and grabs” in the Twinsburg area,
Appellant and Washington returned to the Newark/Heath area, where, with the aid of
another woman, they attempted to cash several checks stolen from the vehicles in
Muskingum County. When the woman attempted to cash one of the stolen checks at a
bank branch in Zanesville, she was caught by the drive-through teller because the victim
to whom the check belonged was a former employee of the bank branch. The bank called
911, and a police officer stopped the vehicle. When the deputy approached the vehicle,
the woman sped away at the urging of Appellant and Washington, who were instructing
her via cell phone. A chase ensued on Interstate 70, reaching speeds of 115 mph. The
woman crashed the vehicle into a truck in the median, while still on the phone with
Appellant and Washington.
{¶6} Appellant was charged by the Muskingum County Grand Jury in a 45-count
indictment. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Appellant pled guilty to engaging in a pattern
of corrupt activity with a firearm specification (R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), 2941.141), four counts Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 4
of theft (R.C. 2913.02(A)), four counts of identity fraud (R.C. 2913.49(B)(1)), one count of
felonious assault with a firearm specification (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)), and one count of grand
theft of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2913.02(A)(3)), and the remaining charges were dismissed.
Both parties reserved the right to argue for the sentence they felt was appropriate at the
sentencing hearing.
{¶7} The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of
21 to 26 ½ years. It is from the July 28, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant
prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
I. SHOULD THIS COURT SHOULD [SIC] REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON COUNT
1 AND COUNT 28; BECAUSE, THE SENTENCE WAS IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. 2929.11
AND R.C. 2929.12.
II. SHOULD THIS COURT SHOULD [SIC] REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE AN AGGREGATE SENTENCE OF 21
YEARS; BECAUSE, THE SENTENCE WAS IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. 2929.11 AND 4.C. 2929.12
I., II.
{¶8} We address both assignments of error together, as Appellant does in his
brief. Appellant argues the proportionality of the sentence was inconsistent with the Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 5
principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors to be considered set forth in R.C.
2929.12.
{¶9} Appellant first argues the trial court impermissibly relied on advocacy from
the prosecution. Appellant argues ten days after Appellant’s arrest, the State made an
offer of a recommendation of a twelve-year sentence upon a plea to the same counts to
which Appellant pled in the instant case. However, after the co-defendant went to trial,
counsel for Appellant represented the State told Appellant if the co-defendant was
convicted, the offer was “going up.” Sent. Tr. 12. At the sentencing hearing, the State
argued for a sentence of 25 to 30 years.
{¶10} The plea agreement signed by the parties set forth, “[T]he parties agree that
the State will make no recommendation as to sentencing at the time of the Defendant’s
plea herein. However, both the State and counsel for Defendant reserve the right to argue
for the sentence they feel is appropriate at the time of sentencing.” Nothing in the plea
agreement precluded the State from arguing for a sentence of more than the twelve years
previously offered. Further, the trial court did not accept either of the parties’ arguments
concerning sentencing, instead sentencing Appellant to more years than argued by
defense counsel, but less years than argued by the State. We find the State was not
bound by its previous offer to recommend a sentence of twelve years, and the trial court
did not impermissibly rely on the State’s advocacy in sentencing Appellant.
{¶11} Appellant next argues in sentencing, the trial court considered dismissed
counts which would have merged in sentencing had Appellant been convicted of these
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[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2024-Ohio-238.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J. Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- Case No. CT2023-0064 KEITH TAYLOR
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2023- 0218
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 23, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
RON WELCH, ESQ. CHRIS BRIGDON Prosecuting Attorney 8138 Somerset Road Muskingum County, Ohio Thornville, Ohio 43076 27 North Fifth Street P.O. Box 189 Zanesville, Ohio 43702 Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 2
Hoffman, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Keith Taylor appeals the judgment entered by the
Muskingum County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of guilty to
engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity with a firearm specification (R.C. 2923.32(A)(1),
2941.141), four counts of theft (R.C. 2913.02(A)), four counts of identity fraud (R.C.
2913.49(B)(1)), one count of felonious assault with a firearm specification (R.C.
2903.11(A)(1)), and one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2913.02(A)(3)), and
sentencing him to an aggregate term of incarceration of twenty one to twenty-six and one-
half years. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On January 25, 2023, Appellant and his co-defendant, Juliana Washington,
smashed the windows of five cars parked at FlowFit Studios in Zanesville, Ohio. Appellant
and Washington stole purses and wallets from the vehicles, including checks, credit
cards, and driver’s licenses belonging to the owners of the vehicles. Appellant and
Washington then went to Zanesville Gymnastics and smashed a car window, stealing a
victim’s purse which contained credit cards and the victim’s driver’s license.
{¶3} The next day Appellant and Washington smashed another car window at a
gymnastics studio, stealing a victim’s checks and identification. Two of the checks stolen
from this vehicle were forged and cashed by Appellant and Washington, using driver’s
licenses stolen from the Flowfit thefts.
{¶4} On February 7, 2023, Appellant and Washington were introduced to B.K.,
who was homeless at the time, through a mutual friend. Appellant and Washington
1 The State has not filed a brief in the instant appeal. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 3
offered B.K. an opportunity to make some money. Appellant and Washington put B.K. in
a car with another woman, and instructed them to go through a bank drive-through in
Zanesville to cash one of the stolen checks using a stolen driver’s license. After turning
the money over to Appellant, B.K. indicated she did not want to be a part of what Appellant
was doing, and she wanted out of the car. Appellant drove B.K. to an area behind a strip
mall in Zanesville, where Appellant assaulted B.K., striking her with his fists and a
handgun until B.K. was unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she made her
way to a store in the strip mall, where the police were called. B.K. was taken to the
emergency room for treatment.
{¶5} After participating in several “smash and grabs” in the Twinsburg area,
Appellant and Washington returned to the Newark/Heath area, where, with the aid of
another woman, they attempted to cash several checks stolen from the vehicles in
Muskingum County. When the woman attempted to cash one of the stolen checks at a
bank branch in Zanesville, she was caught by the drive-through teller because the victim
to whom the check belonged was a former employee of the bank branch. The bank called
911, and a police officer stopped the vehicle. When the deputy approached the vehicle,
the woman sped away at the urging of Appellant and Washington, who were instructing
her via cell phone. A chase ensued on Interstate 70, reaching speeds of 115 mph. The
woman crashed the vehicle into a truck in the median, while still on the phone with
Appellant and Washington.
{¶6} Appellant was charged by the Muskingum County Grand Jury in a 45-count
indictment. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Appellant pled guilty to engaging in a pattern
of corrupt activity with a firearm specification (R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), 2941.141), four counts Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 4
of theft (R.C. 2913.02(A)), four counts of identity fraud (R.C. 2913.49(B)(1)), one count of
felonious assault with a firearm specification (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)), and one count of grand
theft of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2913.02(A)(3)), and the remaining charges were dismissed.
Both parties reserved the right to argue for the sentence they felt was appropriate at the
sentencing hearing.
{¶7} The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of
21 to 26 ½ years. It is from the July 28, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant
prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
I. SHOULD THIS COURT SHOULD [SIC] REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE ON COUNT
1 AND COUNT 28; BECAUSE, THE SENTENCE WAS IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. 2929.11
AND R.C. 2929.12.
II. SHOULD THIS COURT SHOULD [SIC] REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE AN AGGREGATE SENTENCE OF 21
YEARS; BECAUSE, THE SENTENCE WAS IN CONTRAVENTION OF
THE SENTENCING STATUTES R.C. 2929.11 AND 4.C. 2929.12
I., II.
{¶8} We address both assignments of error together, as Appellant does in his
brief. Appellant argues the proportionality of the sentence was inconsistent with the Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 5
principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors to be considered set forth in R.C.
2929.12.
{¶9} Appellant first argues the trial court impermissibly relied on advocacy from
the prosecution. Appellant argues ten days after Appellant’s arrest, the State made an
offer of a recommendation of a twelve-year sentence upon a plea to the same counts to
which Appellant pled in the instant case. However, after the co-defendant went to trial,
counsel for Appellant represented the State told Appellant if the co-defendant was
convicted, the offer was “going up.” Sent. Tr. 12. At the sentencing hearing, the State
argued for a sentence of 25 to 30 years.
{¶10} The plea agreement signed by the parties set forth, “[T]he parties agree that
the State will make no recommendation as to sentencing at the time of the Defendant’s
plea herein. However, both the State and counsel for Defendant reserve the right to argue
for the sentence they feel is appropriate at the time of sentencing.” Nothing in the plea
agreement precluded the State from arguing for a sentence of more than the twelve years
previously offered. Further, the trial court did not accept either of the parties’ arguments
concerning sentencing, instead sentencing Appellant to more years than argued by
defense counsel, but less years than argued by the State. We find the State was not
bound by its previous offer to recommend a sentence of twelve years, and the trial court
did not impermissibly rely on the State’s advocacy in sentencing Appellant.
{¶11} Appellant next argues in sentencing, the trial court considered dismissed
counts which would have merged in sentencing had Appellant been convicted of these
counts. Based on the record before this Court, it is not clear which, if any, of the dismissed
counts would have merged had Appellant been convicted of all counts. Appellant cites Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 6
this Court to State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), for the
proposition “where two or more aggravating circumstances arise from the same act or
indivisible course of conduct and are thus duplicative, the duplicative aggravating
circumstances will be merged for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at paragraph 5 of the
syllabus. However, Jenkins was a capital case, and the cited portion of the syllabus is
qualified by the phrase [i]n the penalty phase of a capital prosecution.” Id. We find
Jenkins inapplicable because the instant case is not a capital case. A sentencing court
may consider charges which have been dismissed or reduced pursuant to a plea
agreement. State v. Rush, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT12-0038, 2013-Ohio-2728, 996
N.E.2d 503, ¶ 13. We find the trial court did not err in considering counts dismissed
pursuant to the plea agreement in the instant case.
{¶12} Appellant argues the record does not support the sentence when
considering the principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.
{¶13} We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.
2953.08. State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 0030, 2020-Ohio-6722, ¶13,
citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence
and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find either the record does
not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),
2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Id.,
citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659.
{¶14} When sentencing a defendant, the trial court must consider the purposes
and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 7
recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hodges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99511, 2013-
Ohio-5025, ¶ 7.
{¶15} “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the
effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court
determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state
or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve these purposes, the
sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the
offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution
to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. Id. Further, the sentence imposed shall be
“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and
its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by
similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
{¶16} R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors which must be considered by the trial
court in determining the sentence to be imposed for a felony, and gives detailed criteria
which do not control the court's discretion, but which must be considered for or against
severity or leniency in a particular case. The trial court retains discretion to determine the
most effective way to comply with the purpose and principles of sentencing as set forth in
R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12.
{¶17} Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this Court to independently weigh
the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to
determine a sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 8
2929.12. State v. Jones, 1163 Ohio St.3d 242, 69 N.E.3d 649, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42.
Instead, we may only determine if the sentence is contrary to law.
{¶18} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial
court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed
in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant
within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Pettorini, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA
00057, 2021-Ohio-1512, 2021 WL 1714216, ¶¶ 14-16 quoting State v. Dinka, 12th Dist.
Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 & CA2019-03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶ 36.
{¶19} The judgment entry states the trial court considered the principles and
purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and balanced the seriousness and recidivism
factors under R.C. 2929.12. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted Appellant’s
record included seven separate felony cases in Florida and North Carolina, each of which
included numerous counts, dating back to 2006. The trial court further noted Appellant
was a fugitive in the State of Florida for six years. At the time of sentencing, Appellant
had two pending felony cases in Ohio, one in Medina County and one in Summit County.
We find the sentence in the instant case is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶20} Appellant argues generally the sentence in the instant case is
disproportionate to the offenses committed, based in part on the State’s original plea offer
of twelve years incarceration. Cases violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment “are limited to those involving sanctions which under the
circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person,” and “the penalty
must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the
community.” State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 9
14, quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 30 O.O.2d 38, 203 N.E.2d 334
(1964). Proportionality review should focus on individual sentences, rather than on the
cumulative impact of multiple sentences imposed consecutively. Id. at ¶20. “Where none
of the individual sentences imposed on an offender are grossly disproportionate to their
respective offenses, an aggregate prison term resulting from consecutive imposition of
those sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. As a general
rule, a sentence falling within the terms of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at ¶21.
{¶21} Appellant does not argue any of his individual sentences are
disproportionate to the offenses committed. Each of the individual sentences was within
the statutory range, and the maximum sentence was imposed only as to two counts: the
felony which covered all of the enterprises Appellant was involved in, and the felonious
assault, which in the trial court’s opinion was a separate victim and was not “necessary
in this case to perform [the] criminal enterprise.” Sent. Tr. 23. We find the penalties
imposed in the instant case are not so greatly disproportionate to the offenses Appellant
committed as to shock the sense of justice of the community. Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0064 10
{¶22} The first and second assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of
the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J. Wise, J. and Baldwin, J. concur