IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED MARCH 1996 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) June 10, 1998 ) Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9507-CC-00188 ) ) Claiborne County v. ) Cecil Crowson, Jr. ) Honorable Lee Asbury, Judge Appellate C ourt Clerk ) TERRY FRANKLIN STOGDILL, ) (Rape of a child and incest) ) Appellant. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Martha J. Yoakum Charles W. Burson District Public Defender Attorney General of Tennessee P.O. Box 386 and Tazewell, TN 37879-0386 Michael J. Fahey (AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL) Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 450 James Robertson Parkway Charles Herman Nashville, TN 37243-0493 John Beaty John McAfee William Paul Phillips Assistant Public Defenders District Attorney General P.O. Box 386 P.O. Box 10 Tazewell, TN 37879-0386 Huntsville, TN 37756-0010 (AT TRIAL) and Shayne Sexton Assistant District Attorney General P.O. Box 455 Tazewell, TN 37879-0455
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton Judge OPINION
The defendant, Terry Franklin Stogdill, appeals as of right from his
convictions by a jury in the Claiborne County Criminal Court for rape of a child, a Class
A felony, and incest, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I,
standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty years and five years in the custody
of the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that:
(1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance to obtain a forensic evaluation;
(2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the defendant’s statement;
(3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to require the state to elect at the close of its proof the particular offense for which it sought a conviction for each count of the indictment; and
(4) the trial court erred by misapplying an enhancement factor.
We affirm the judgments of conviction.
Lieutenant Ben Evans of the Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department
testified that he along with Mike Cosby from the Department of Human Services went to
the defendant’s residence on February 4, 1994, at approximately 2:45 p.m. to interview
the defendant. He stated that when he introduced himself and Mr. Cosby to the
defendant and told him that they were investigating allegations that the defendant
sexually abused his seven-year-old stepdaughter, the defendant invited them inside
and told them that he had been expecting them. Lieutenant Evans testified that he
informed the defendant that the victim accused him of penetrating her by putting his
penis in her mouth and by inserting his fingers and penis inside her vagina during the
snowstorm that occurred in January 1994.
Lieutenant Evans stated the defendant then gave a statement. He said
that Dawn Stogdill, the victim’s mother and the defendant’s wife at the time, was also
2 present during the interview. Lieutenant Evans believed that the defendant acted
remorseful and appeared to have a hard time remembering things. He said that the
defendant had tears in his eyes and confessed that he needed help. He testified that
although the defendant told him that he had taken three types of medication, he
believed that the defendant understood everything and answered his questions
appropriately.
The defendant’s statement was introduced into evidence and read to the
jury. The statement reflects that the defendant recalled an incident occurring more than
one year earlier at his home located in the Cape Norris area. Although the defendant
could not recall the exact date or time and he stated that he did not remember what
happened, the defendant told Lieutenant Evans that he remembered masturbating in
front of the victim in the living room while the rest of the family was asleep.
In his statement, the defendant told Lieutenant Evans that the first time
that he physically touched the victim was in January 1993 just before moving to the
residence located next to Hickman’s Junkyard. The statement reflects that the
defendant stated that at approximately noon while the other children were sleeping and
his wife was at work, he rubbed the victim on the outside of her clothing on her legs and
between her legs for approximately ten or fifteen minutes. The defendant told
Lieutenant Evans that afterwards he went inside his bedroom and masturbated. The
defendant described his actions as a “want to touch thing,” and he said that he was not
“really attracted to [the victim].” The defendant conceded that something else may
have happened, but he claimed that he could not remember. He explained that he was
taking a lot of medication, including Anaprox, Talwin and Ativan, and that he might have
a mental block, making it hard to remember.
3 The statement also shows that the defendant recalled an incident
occurring toward the last part of the snowstorm in January 1994 at the residence
located next to Hickman’s Junkyard. The defendant told Lieutenant Evans that the
victim approached him while he was sitting in his bath wrap in a chair in the living room
and asked the defendant, “‘Can we do it?’” The defendant stated that he told the victim
that it was not right. He admitted that he should have told the victim’s mother and
asked her to talk to the victim. The defendant’s statement shows that the defendant
conceded that he had done wrong and needed help.
The defendant also said that he did not remember, as alleged by the
victim, putting his penis inside the victim’s mouth and ejaculating, touching the victim’s
vagina with his penis, and sticking his finger inside the victim’s vagina. However,
without specifying the time or the location of the incidents, he conceded that it was
possible that the actions occurred. The defendant recalled that the victim grabbed his
penis a couple of times, although he could not remember when it took place. The
defendant claimed that the victim never acted scared or acted as if she wanted the
defendant to quit.
Mary Palmer Campbell, a pediatrician, testified that she examined the
victim on February 17, 1994. She said that the victim was very cooperative, although
she testified that the victim was hesitant to tell her what happened. Dr. Campbell stated
that the victim stopped telling her what happened at one point and also told her to talk
to the counselor for the Department of Human Services that had interviewed her. Dr.
Campbell testified that the victim reported being constipated, and she said that
constipation can be associated with abuse, although it could be normal also. She also
stated that her examination revealed a thickening and rolling of a portion of the victim’s,
hymen, scar tissue at the bottom of the opening of the hymen, and an opening in the
hymen. In Dr. Campbell’s opinion, the thickened and rolled hymen was consistent with
4 penetration of the vagina, although the opening in the hymen was within the normal
limits. Dr. Campbell testified that the rectal examination showed that the skin had been
torn and had healed deeper. In her summary report, Dr. Campbell stated that in her
opinion, the victim had a history “dramatically consistent with sexual abuse.” Dr.
Campbell also expressed the opinion that the results of the examination were
consistent with penetrating trauma to the vagina and possibly to the rectum.
On cross-examination, Dr. Campbell testified that when the victim stopped
telling her what happened and told her that she could not remember, Dr. Campbell
asked the victim whether something happened and the victim responded yes or no to
her questions. She stated on redirect examination that the injury to the victim’s hymen
would have been painful.
Dawn Johnson, the defendant’s ex-wife, testified that she was married to
the defendant at the time of the offenses. She said that she and the defendant moved
to Tennessee in February 1992. She stated that she and the defendant rented a house
from her parents in Cape Norris for approximately one year beginning in March 1992.
Ms. Johnson testified that about March 1993, they moved next to Hickman’s Junkyard.
She stated that in October 1993 while at their home near Hickman’s Junkyard, she
asked the victim whether the defendant had been “messing with her” and the victim
responded affirmatively. Ms. Johnson said that when she confronted the defendant, he
admitted his guilt, telling her that he had touched the victim’s privates and had rubbed
himself on her. She testified that she had earlier experienced problems with ovarian
cysts. Ms. Johnson testified that she and the victim moved to the home of Ms.
Johnson’s parents, the victim’s grandparents, in October 1993, but she did not tell
anyone what happened.
5 Ms. Johnson stated that she later moved back in with the defendant in
December 1993, but the victim lived with her grandparents until January 17, 1994,
when the victim stayed with her and the defendant because her grandparent’s house
caught on fire. She said that the victim slept on the living room floor. Ms. Johnson
recalled that a snowstorm occurred while the victim was staying with them, causing
them to be unable to leave the house. She said that on February 3, 1994, she learned
that the victim had told Ms. Johnson’s sister that the defendant had abused the victim
and that Ms. Johnson’s mother had called the Department of Human Services. Ms.
Johnson testified that she told the defendant about the victim’s allegations and that the
police were coming to question him the next day.
She said that the defendant acted nervous and scared and that he did not
go to work. She stated that the defendant told her that during the morning before being
interviewed by the police, he spent most of his time in the woods with a gun in his hand.
Ms. Johnson believed that the defendant acted normally on February 4, 1994, when
Lieutenant Evans and Mr. Cosby came to talk to the defendant. She stated that she
also gave a statement to the police. She stated that the following night the defendant
went to Oakwood Medical Center for detoxification. Ms. Johnson testified that after
leaving the center, the defendant told her that he planned on returning for treatment in
the psychiatric ward of the center. She said that the defendant told her that he had to
be suicidal to be admitted, and she claimed that in order to get the defendant admitted,
she lied by stating that the defendant had heard voices and was suicidal.
On cross-examination, Ms. Johnson admitted that she knew in January
1992 that something had happened between the defendant and the victim because the
defendant had been accused of sexual abuse in another state. She said that the victim
told her that the defendant touched her private parts and rubbed his penis between her
legs. Ms. Johnson testified that she believed that the victim was telling the truth. Ms.
6 Johnson also conceded that her statement reflects that the victim revealed to her that
the defendant rubbed his penis on the victim’s leg, but she claimed that the officer
incorrectly wrote down her answer. She explained that she failed to correct the
inaccuracy because it was a hectic day. Ms. Johnson stated that she told the officer
that the victim had been acting weird for approximately three to four months before
revealing what had happened. She explained that the victim often asked for a night
light, and she eventually gave her one. Ms. Johnson testified that the victim’s weird
conduct prompted her to ask the victim whether the defendant had done anything to
her. She denied that the victim did not like the defendant, and she said that the victim
was scared of the defendant.
The victim testified that she knew the difference between a good touch
and a bad touch. She explained that a bad touch is when someone touches her private
parts. The victim testified that she remembered living in a house that belonged to her
grandparents in Cape Norris. She said that the defendant, whom she called “Daddy,”
touched her more than once while living in that house. She stated that the defendant
touched her during the daytime in her mother’s bedroom while her mother was at work
and her brothers and sisters were napping. The victim explained that she was in her
bedroom when the defendant, standing in the hallway, whistled at her and told her to
come to him. She said that both she and the defendant were wearing pants and a shirt.
The victim testified that the defendant touched her between her legs where she
urinates, sticking his finger inside her. She said that although it did not last long, it hurt.
The victim testified that the defendant did not say anything to her before
he stuck his finger inside her vagina. She stated that when he finished, the defendant
told her not to tell anyone. She said that she eventually told her mother that the
defendant had been touching her in inappropriate places. The victim testified that she
7 did not tell her mother what the defendant had done until they moved to the residence
next to Hickman’s Junkyard some time in 1993. She said that approximately three or
four days after telling her mother about the defendant’s conduct, her mother took the
victim to live with her grandparents. The victim stated that she also told her aunt about
the defendant’s conduct. On cross-examination, the victim testified that she could not
remember the date that the incident at the Cape Norris residence occurred.
The victim testified that around Christmas in 1993, she stayed with her
mother and the defendant for approximately two and a half weeks at the residence
located next to Hickman’s Junkyard. She stated that she remembered having a big
snowfall while staying there, causing them to be unable to leave the house. She
testified that one morning, the defendant came into the living room where she was
sleeping and turned on the television. She said that the defendant, who was wearing a
black robe, sat in a chair in the living room and told her to come to him. The victim
stated that the rest of her family was asleep. She said that she went to see what the
defendant wanted, believing that he was going to give her something. The victim, who
was wearing a nightgown, said that the defendant then pulled her panties down and
stuck his finger inside her vagina as she was standing beside the chair. She stated that
at one point, she tried to get away from the defendant. The victim testified that it hurt
when the defendant stuck his finger inside her. She said that after the snowstorm, she
moved back to live with her grandparents. The victim stated that she never told her
mother what the defendant did during the snowstorm, but she did tell her aunt.
On cross-examination, the victim acknowledged that she had earlier
testified at the preliminary hearing that the defendant did not stick his private part inside
her and that she did not see the defendant’s private part. She conceded that she
stated at the preliminary hearing that the defendant did not do anything to her on the
day of the snowstorm. The victim admitted that she had told someone that if she could
8 be granted three wishes, she wanted to be with her natural father and that her natural
father not remarry. She also admitted that she did not like the defendant. The victim
testified on redirect examination that she had never liked the defendant. She stated on
recross-examination that she also claimed that two of her uncles had touched her on
earlier occasions.
No witnesses were called to testify for the defense. Based upon the
above proof, the jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child and incest.
I. CONTINUANCE
The defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion
for a continuance to obtain a forensic evaluation. He argues that a medical report
received on December 1, 1994, eight days before the hearing on the motion for a
continuance and thirteen days before trial, tends to show that the defendant had a
defense based upon his mental condition. Specifically, the defendant asserts that a
statement made by Dr. Kenneth Carpenter in the report raised a question regarding the
defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense:
It is my speculation that the abuse, if it occurred, was associated with drug behavior and the patient had blackouts at the time. In just talking with him, it is obvious that he has blackouts for a lot of events during the times that he was taking excessive amounts of Talwin.
The defendant argues that it can logically be inferred from Dr. Carpenter’s conclusions
that the defendant did not know what he was doing at the time of the offenses, and he
contends that a continuance was necessary to provide him the opportunity to gather
and present evidence in support of an insanity defense. The state responds that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance.
9 On December 9, 1994, a pretrial hearing was conducted on a motion for a
continuance filed by the defendant on December 8.1 In support of his motion, the
defendant introduced medical discharge summaries reflecting that the defendant
obtained treatment at Oakwood Medical Center from February 5 to February 9, 1994,
was readmitted on February 10 because of depression and threats to kill himself with a
handgun, and he received treatment through February 21, 1994.
The medical records state that the defendant reported taking daily
quantities of several prescription drugs. They reflect that the defendant was under the
influence and in a “blackout of multiple drugs” at the time of the offenses. They show
that while at the medical center, the defendant received treatment for his alcohol and
opiate dependence. The medical records also show that the defendant had a history of
depression and suicidal tendencies and he heard voices telling him to kill himself, had
difficulty sleeping, and experienced continuous crying spells and feelings of being
watched by someone. The defendant reported that he had no recollection of
committing the offenses or giving a statement to the police. The medical records state
that the fact that the defendant’s “mental status was clouded related to the multiple
drug ingestion such that he was having auditory hallucinosis and some of the voices . . .
were telling him to kill himself.” Regarding the auditory hallucinosis, the records state
that the defendant had heard voices for four years and that it may be secondary to
drugs.
The medical records state that the defendant was initially diagnosed as
having dysthymia, but upon re-evaluation, the diagnosis was changed to major
depression with psychotic features. The defendant was later diagnosed as having
recurrent, major depression with non-psychotic features. The records reflect that the
1 The record on appeal does not contain the defendant’s motion for a continuance. The transcript of the continuance hearing reflects that the motion alleged that a psychiatric, forensic evaluation was nece ssa ry bec aus e the defe nda nt su ffere d ser ious me ntal, p hysic al, em otion al and psyc hiatric problems.
10 treating physician requested that the defendant have a consultation for evaluation for
group therapy and a possible transfer to the psychiatric services for primary psychiatric
treatment, but the defendant was released before a consultation was conducted. On
February 21, the defendant was discharged but was ordered to follow up treatment with
a program at Child and Family Services and, if that failed, to attend Cherokee Mental
Health Center. The record does not reflect whether follow-up treatment was obtained.
At the hearing, the state argued that the motion for a continuance was
untimely and that the medical records did not support a showing that a continuance was
necessary to determine the issues of the defendant’s competency to stand trial or his
sanity at the time of the offense. The state asserted that the defendant had access to
the February 5 through 9 medical records on June 21, 1994, approximately two months
before the defendant was indicted, and those records set forth a similar medical history.
The defendant explained that the delay in filing the motion was a result of not receiving
the February 10 through 21 medical records until December 1. He stated that although
he requested the defendant’s medical records in June, the only medical records
furnished to him at that time were the February 5 through 9 records. The defendant
argued that although the defendant’s competency to stand trial was not of great
concern, a continuance was necessary to evaluate the defendant’s sanity at the time of
the offenses.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a continuance. It noted
that the issue was not one of timeliness because the defendant’s sanity was at issue.
The court ruled that the medical records did not indicate the type of condition that would
require a forensic evaluation. In its decision, the trial court stated that the defendant’s
problem apparently stems from depression and drugs.
11 Pursuant to T.C.A. § 33-7-301(a), the trial court, in its discretion, may
order the defendant to be evaluated if the defendant is believed to be incompetent to
stand trial or there is a question as to the defendant’s mental capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. State v. Rhoden, 739 S.W.2d 6, 16 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1987). The trial court’s decision to deny a psychiatric evaluation will not be reversed on
appeal absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Lane, 689
S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
The granting of a continuance also rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Moorehead v. State, 219 Tenn. 271, 274-75, 409 S.W.2d 357, 358 (1966).
A reversal may only occur if the denial was an abuse of discretion and the defendant
was improperly prejudiced in that a different result might reasonably have been reached
if the continuance had been granted. See State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 257 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1990). Thus, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show that he was
prejudiced. In Morehead, our supreme court stated that the trial court’s exercise of
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal “unless something is developed in the after
trial to show that the defendant might have been prejudiced in some way by the refusal
to grant a continuance.” 219 Tenn. at 275, 409 S.W.2d at 358-59.
The evidence submitted regarding the defendant’s mental status was not
substantial. Moreover, the medical records, taken as a whole, show that the defendant
experienced blackouts at the time of the offense as a result of his drug usage, not
because of a mental disease or defect. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for a continuance.
Furthermore, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that he was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance. He has not
demonstrated that had a continuance been granted and an evaluation conducted, the
12 findings of the evaluation would have been that the defendant was mentally
incapacitated at the time of the offenses. The defendant did not introduce any
additional evidence at the motion for new trial to support a showing of prejudice. It is
the burden of the defendant to clearly show that prejudice resulted from the denial of a
continuance, rather than leaving this court to speculate how the defendant was
prejudiced. See State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). He has
failed to meet his burden in this case. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court
properly denied a continuance.
II. SUPPRESSION OF STATEMENT
The defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress the statement given to Lieutenant Evans. He argues that the statement was
not given voluntarily because the defendant was under the influence of drugs. The
defendant, citing Dukes v. State, 578 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), contends
that the proof shows that the defendant was unable to make a definitive narrative of all
past events or to state his own participation in the crimes. The state responds that the
trial court properly allowed the statement into evidence because the proof did not
demonstrate that the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of
statement. We hold that the trial court did not err.
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he
gave to police. The defendant alleged that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive
his rights and give a statement because he was under the influence of prescribed
medications that interfered with his ability to understand his rights or to give a
statement.
A hearing was conducted on the motion to suppress on December 13,
1994. Lieutenant Evans testified that as part of his investigation, he along with Mike
13 Cosby of the Department of Human Services went to the defendant’s residence at
approximately 2:48 p.m. on February 4, 1994, to interview the defendant. Lieutenant
Evans testified that when he arrived, he introduced himself to the defendant, told the
defendant that he was there to investigate allegations that the defendant sexually
abused the victim, and asked to speak to him. He stated that the defendant invited
them inside and told them that he had been expecting them.
Lieutenant Evans testified that he advised the defendant of his Miranda
rights before questioning the defendant and the defendant signed the waiver of rights
form. He explained that because the defendant told him that he could not read well, he
read each line and asked the defendant whether he understood each particular right.
Lieutenant Evans stated that the defendant said that he understood his rights. He said
that he then took the defendant’s statement in the living room in the presence of Dawn
Stogdill and Mr. Cosby. According to Lieutenant Evans, the interview lasted
approximately thirty minutes. He stated that the defendant’s answers were responsive
to his questions. Lieutenant Evans explained that he transcribed the defendant’s
answers to his questions, but he asked the defendant to read the statement when it
was completed and to point out any mistakes to be corrected. Lieutenant Evans
testified that the defendant reviewed the statement, stated that it was accurate, and
signed the statement. He recalled the defendant having tears in his eyes after signing
the statement and stating that he knew that he needed help.
Lieutenant Evans stated that the defendant did not mention any limitations
mentally. He also said that the defendant did not tell him that he was under the
influence of any drugs, although the defendant did mention that he was taking three
different types of medication that the defendant believed might hamper his ability to
remember. Lieutenant Evans testified that he had no doubt that the defendant
understood what he was doing when he waived his rights and gave the statement.
14 On cross-examination, Lieutenant Evans conceded that he could not
recall what medication the defendant told him he had taken. He said that he did not
remember the defendant asking him to repeat anything. He stated that he questioned
the defendant again on March 7, 1994, at Hickman’s Junkyard, where the defendant
worked. Lieutenant Evans testified that the defendant told him that he could barely
remember talking to him on February 4. He stated that the defendant also told him that
he went to Oakwood Medical Center for drug detoxification after giving the statement on
February 4. Lieutenant Evans said that the defendant told him that he could not
remember anything before going for treatment.
Mike Cosby of the Department of Human Services testified that he
accompanied Lieutenant Evans to the defendant’s residence on February 4, 1994, and
was present during the interview. He said that the defendant did not appear to be
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, although the defendant told them that he had
taken some medication. He stated that the defendant answered appropriately to the
questions that were asked. Mr. Cosby testified that he believed that the defendant
understood Lieutenant Evans’ questions and understood what was happening.
The defendant testified that he had been depressed for several years
after injuring his back. He said that at the time of the statement, he had been taking
prescription drugs on a daily basis, including Talwin, Anaprox, Ativan, Elavil, and
Zantac. The defendant stated that he took more medication than prescribed before the
interview because he experienced bad pain in his back. He said that the day after the
interview, he went to Oakwood Medical Center to obtain treatment for his drug abuse.
The defendant testified that he stopped taking the drugs after the treatment. He stated
that he could not fully remember Lieutenant Evans and Mr. Cosby being at his house in
February 1994. The defendant said that he had been under the influence of drugs
every day for a long time, and he stated that it caused him to forget things. The
15 defendant claimed that he would not have given a statement had he known what he
was doing. He stated that when he spoke to Lieutenant Evans in March, he told
Lieutenant Evans that he did not recall giving the statement in February. The
defendant conceded that the signature at the bottom of the statement was “close” to
being his signature, but he asserted that he did not have any recollection of giving the
statement. He blamed his loss of memory on the medication he was taking.
On cross-examination, the defendant conceded that he had worked and
driven a car during the six months before giving the statement, a period of time when he
was also taking the medications. He also admitted that he was not surprised that the
Oakwood Medical Center’s records reflect that the only medication detected in the
defendant’s system was Talwin. The defendant testified that he recalled giving a
second statement to Lieutenant Evans on March 7, 1994, stating that he did not recall
giving the earlier statement. He admitted that he also gave a statement on April 12,
1994, that reflects that he could not remember what happened between him and the
victim.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled the defendant’s
motion to suppress the statement. The trial court determined that the defendant was
capable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving his rights and giving a statement to police.
On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact at the conclusion of a
suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.
State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s factual findings.
Id. However, the application of the law to the facts as determined by the trial court is a
question of law which is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d
626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).
16 In this case, the defendant has failed to establish that the evidence
preponderated against the trial court’s factual determinations. The evidence shows that
Lieutenant Evans testified that the defendant stated that he understood his rights
before signing the waiver of rights form. He also said that although the defendant had
taken prescription medication, Lieutenant Evans had no doubt that the defendant
understood what he was doing when he waived his rights and gave a statement. Mr.
Cosby believed that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or
alcohol and also expressed the opinion that the defendant understood what was
happening. We agree that this evidence demonstrates that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his rights and gave a statement. Therefore, we conclude that
the defendant’s motion to suppress the statement was appropriately denied.
III. ELECTION OF OFFENSES
The defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
require the state to elect at the close of its proof the particular incident for which a
conviction in each count was being sought. He argues that the failure to require
election cannot be considered harmless error because it is impossible to determine
whether the jury returned unanimous verdicts. The state asserts that the failure of the
trial court to require the state to elect is not reversible error. We agree.
In Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1973), our supreme court
held that the submission of evidence of multiple rapes by the defendant upon the victim
when each of the several rapes so proven would meet the allegations of the charge in
the indictment made it “the duty of the trial judge to require the State, at the close of its
proof-in-chief, to elect the particular offense of carnal knowledge upon which it would
rely for conviction, and to properly instruct the jury so that the verdict of every juror
would be united on the one offense.” Id. at 804; see State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d
824, 829 (Tenn. 1994). The court gave three reasons for these requirements:
17 First, to enable the defendant to prepare for and make his defense to the specific charge; second, to protect him from double jeopardy by individualization of the issue; and third, so that the jury’s verdict may not be a matter of choice between offenses, some jurors convicting on one offense and others, another.
Burlison, 501 S.W.2d at 803.
The requirement that the state elect the particular offense upon which it
relies for a conviction is “fundamental, immediately touching the constitutional rights of
the accused.” Id. at 804. As the court stated in Shelton, “the purpose of election is to
insure that each juror is considering the same occurrence. If the prosecution cannot
identify an event for which to ask a conviction, then the court cannot be assured of a
unanimous decision.” 851 S.W.2d at 138.
In this case, the indictment was neither time nor place specific. The
indictment charged the defendant in separate counts with committing the crimes of rape
and incest “on or about 1993 - February 1994.” Moreover, the state’s pretrial response
to the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars did not limit each charge to a particular
incident. Rather, the state responded that the events constituting the charges in counts
one and two of the indictment occurred “between the dates of January 1993 - February
1993 at the defendant’s then residence, located in the Cape Norris area of Claiborne
County, Tennessee, in a home rented from the parents of Dawn Stogdill.” It also stated
that the events constituting the charges in counts one and two of the indictment took
place “between the dates of February 1993 and January 29, 1994, at the defendant’s
then residence located [in] . . . Claiborne County, Tennessee near Hickman’s junkyard.”
Though the defendant was indicted for only one count of rape of a child
and one count of incest, the state introduced evidence that the defendant digitally
penetrated the victim on two separate occasions, once at the Cape Norris residence
and another time at the residence next to Hickman’s Junkyard. Moreover, during its
18 closing argument, the state summarized the evidence that showed the defendant’s guilt
for rape of a child, stating that the victim:
talked about two incidents, where the defendant put his fingers inside of her. One at Cape Norris, one next to Hickman’s Junkyard. Both times, very clear about what happened. He put his fingers inside of me. That is what she said. That is without question.
Also, in rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that:
[defense counsel] talks about other times and things, other accusations. She was crystal clear about what happened on the two times there. Crystal clear. There is no vague accusation. There is no inconsistency.
The state did not specify during its closing argument which incident it was relying upon
for a conviction for incest. The trial court instructed the jury that it must “give separate
consideration to each count of the indictment and return a separate verdict as to each
count of the indictment.”
The lack of indictment specificity and the evidence of multiple offenses
warranted state election and an appropriate jury instruction under Shelton and Brown.
Thus, the trial court’s failure to require an election constituted error. However, the
failure to elect may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in an appropriate case.
See Shelton, 851 S.W.2d at 138.
In Shelton, the defendant was charged with one count of aggravated rape
of one of his three step-granddaughters and two counts of aggravated sexual battery of
the other two step-granddaughters. The victim of the aggravated rape testified in very
general terms that the defendant digitally penetrated her and her two sisters on more
than one occasion, but described in detail one incident that occurred on her birthday
when the defendant was partially successful at his attempt to penetrate the victim with
his penis. Id. The medical expert testimony was that there were clear signs of sexual
abuse. Id. The court determined that it was error for the trial court to fail to require the
state to elect offenses but concluded that the error with regard to the aggravated rape
19 count was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “the jurors must have
considered the evidence of this particular incident in convicting the defendant of
aggravated rape.” Id.
With regard to the remaining two counts of aggravated sexual battery, the
court held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 139.
Important in this determination was the nature of the evidence presented with regard to
each charge. Id. One victim testified that the defendant fondled her and digitally
penetrated her on more than one occasion, but she did not differentiate one event from
the others. Id. With respect to that victim, the medical expert only found evidence of
irritation in the victim’s genital area. Id. The court reversed the defendant’s conviction
because in “view of the nature of the evidence and the error resulting from the state’s
failure to elect,” the convictions could not be sustained. Id. The other victim did not
testify, and medical proof found no evidence of irritation or any other physical proof. Id.
The only proof establishing the offense “was the brief and thoroughly non-specific
testimony of the other two victims . . . .” Id. The court not only determined that there
was a Burlison error but also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction. Id.
The state asserts that any error by the state in failing to elect a specific
instance for each count is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The state argues that
similar to the victim’s testimony in State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993), the
victim’s most specific testimony in this case concerned the defendant’s digital
penetration of the victim’s vagina in the living room of the defendant’s residence near
Hickman’s Junkyard during the snowstorm in January 1994. However, given the
victim’s admission during cross-examination that she had stated during the preliminary
hearing that the defendant did not do anything to her when she lived near the
20 Hickman’s Junkyard, we are not confident that all of the jurors would have agreed
beyond a reasonable doubt as to the commission of this offense.
On the other hand, we believe that the record supports a conclusion that
the jury unanimously agreed, at least, to the offense described at the Cape Norris
residence. That is, similar to Shelton, the risk of a composite jury simply did not exist in
this case. The victim provided specific testimony with respect to the offense. The
quality and certainty of her testimony as to this incident was strong. Moreover, the
defendant’s evidence, through his statement, did not have the potential of diminishing
the quality of the proof. His statement expressed, at best for him, a lack of recall
regarding the offenses and, at worst, the possibility that the offenses occurred.
Also, the primary defense was that the victim was fabricating the
episodes. However, given the fact that the jury accredited the victim, there is no basis
in the evidence upon which we can doubt the jury being unanimous as to the
defendant’s guilt of the offense at the Cape Norris residence. Under these
circumstances, the Burlison error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. SENTENCING
The defendant complains that the trial court improperly applied
enhancement factor (7), the offense involved a victim and was committed to gratify the
defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7). He argues
that there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the application of the factor.
The defendant also contends that he should have received a sentence of less than
twenty years for his rape of a child conviction.
Appellate review of sentencing is de novo on the record with a
presumption that the trial court's determinations are correct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d). As
21 the Sentencing Commission Comments to this section notes, the burden is now on the
defendant to show that the sentence is improper. This means that if the trial court
followed the statutory sentencing procedure, made findings of fact that are adequately
supported in the record, and gave due consideration and proper weight to the factors
and principles that are relevant to sentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act, we may
not disturb the sentence even if a different result were preferred. State v. Fletcher, 805
S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
However, "the presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial
court's action is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial
court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances."
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In this respect, for the purpose of
meaningful appellate review,
the trial court must place on the record its reasons for arriving at the final sentencing decision, identify the mitigating and enhancement factors found, state the specific facts supporting each enhancement factor found, and articulate how the mitigating and enhancement factors have been evaluated and balanced in determining the sentence. T.C.A. § 40-35-210(f) (1990).
State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994).
Also, in conducting a de novo review, we must consider (1) the evidence,
if any, received at the trial and sentencing hearing, (2) the presentence report, (3) the
principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives, (4) the nature
and characteristics of the criminal conduct, (5) any mitigating or statutory enhancement
factors, (6) any statement that the defendant made on his own behalf and (7) the
potential for rehabilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103 and -210; see
Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168; State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 236-37 (Tenn. 1986).
22 No witnesses testified at the sentencing hearing. A presentence report
was introduced into evidence. The report reflects that the then thirty-six-year-old
defendant had no prior felony convictions, although he had convictions for
misdemeanor assault and driving under the influence of an intoxicant. It shows that the
defendant dropped out of high school in the ninth grade. The report states that the
defendant began using alcohol and marijuana when he was twenty years old, using
them daily in large amounts until he turned thirty-five. The defendant also reported his
addiction to pain pills. The presentence report reflects that the defendant worked as a
machine operator for approximately five months and worked off and on for eleven years
as a mechanic.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the
defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of twenty years and
five years for his rape of a child and incest convictions, respectively. In sentencing the
defendant, the trial court applied the following enhancement factors pursuant to T.C.A.
§ 40-35-114:
(7) The offense involved a victim and was committed to gratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement; and
(15) The defendant abused a position of private trust.
In applying factor (7), the trial court did not detail the facts upon which its application
was based. The trial court determined that no mitigating factors applied.
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court appropriately
considered factor (7). In the defendant’s statement, he prefaced his account with the
statement that his wife “had been turning [him] away because she had some cysts.”
Although he denied that he was sexually attracted to the victim, the defendant
described his actions at the Cape Norris residence as being “a want to touch thing.”
The defendant told Lieutenant Evans that after rubbing the victim’s legs and between
her legs for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes, the defendant went into his
23 bedroom and masturbated. The fact that the defendant continued to stimulate himself
sexually after committing the crime suggests that the defendant was motivated to
commit the offenses to gratify his desire for pleasure or excitement. We conclude that
the evidence supports the application of factor (7) by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the circumstances of this case, a sentence of twenty years for the rape of a child
conviction is warranted.
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the
judgments of conviction.
____________________________ Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
_________________________ Paul G. Summers, Judge
_________________________ Charles Lee, Special Judge