DANA, J.
[¶ 1] The State appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Augusta, Vafiades, J.) suppressing, as involuntary, a statement made by William Sawyer, Jr. We vacate the judgment.
BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The officer testified to the following facts at the suppression hearing. In December of 1999, at approximately 1 a.m., an officer on routine patrol observed a truck heading toward him passing another vehicle. To avoid a collision, the officer was forced to pull over into the breakdown lane. The officer clocked the truck at 73 mph in a 50 mph zone, proceeded to turn on his blue lights, and turned his cruiser around to follow the vehicles. While following the vehicles, the officer passed a driveway and saw two sets of taillights. He turned around a second time and pulled into a residential driveway. The court found that “[t]he red truck was parked up the driveway, the white vehicle was behind the truck and partially to the left,” and “the officer parked behind the white car.” The officer stated that he was conducting an investigatory stop based on a civil violation, and the court determined that the officer “thought it was important to talk to the driver of the vehicle regarding his dangerous pass and his speed.”1
[¶ 3] The officer observed four males in the driveway, including Sawyer who was standing by the front fender of the truck. The court found that the officer requested that Sawyer come talk to him, asked Sawyer if he was the driver of the truck, and Sawyer answered affirmatively. Next, the officer requested Sawyer’s license and conducted a field sobriety test, during which Sawyer told the officer he had been drinking too much. The officer agreed, placed him in handcuffs, and placed him in the cruiser. The officer did not administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning Sawyer.
[¶ 4] Sawyer was charged with criminal OUI pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411 (1996),2 and pleaded not guilty. Sawyer filed a motion to suppress the statements and arrest,3 and a hearing was held at [1175]*1175which only the officer testified. The court made the following determinations: the officer was justified in making an investigatory stop, the officer subjected Sawyer to an interrogation, Sawyer was not in custody, Miranda warnings were not required, Sawyer’s statement that he was the driver of the truck was not made voluntarily, and Sawyer’s statement that he had been drinking too much was a spontaneous statement made voluntarily. As a result, the court suppressed Sawyer’s involuntary admission to operating the truck and suppressed the arrest because probable cause for the arrest was partially based on Sawyer’s involuntary statement. The State’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the State filed this timely appeal pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A (1980) and M.R.Crim. P. 37B.
SAWYER’S ADMISSION
[¶ 5] The State contends the court reached two legally inconsistent conclusions by using similar facts to determine that Sawyer was not in custody but his admission that he was the driver was involuntary. The State further contends the court erred in its factual findings and its application of the law. Sawyer contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his admission to operating the truck was voluntary.
[¶ 6] In concluding that Sawyer’s admission to operating the truck was involuntary, the court made the following findings:
The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. The court finds that the defendant’s vehicle was blocked by the officer’s, the officer had arrived with his blue lights on, the officer was directing the defendant’s movements and asking questions. Based on the State’s questioning of its own witness, the officer clearly stated that when he approached the defendant to ask him for information, the defendant was not free to walk away. Based on these facts, the court concludes that a reasonable person would believe that he had no choice but to answer the officer’s questions. The court finds that the defendant’s statement that he was the driver of the vehicle was not voluntarily made.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 7] The “suppression judge must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary .... ” State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 387, 389. “Although findings of fact are reviewed deferentially, the application of legal principles to those findings is reviewed independently.” Id. ¶ 8, 704 A.2d at 390. “[T]he dispositive issue of the voluntariness of a confession, although based on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession, is a legal issue warranting independent appellate review.” Id. ¶ 9, 704 A.2d at 390. Thus, we determine whether the court’s factual findings warrant the legal conclusion that Sawyer’s admission to operating the truck was involuntary.
[¶ 8] “A confession is admissible in evidence only if voluntary, and the State bears the burden of establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 10, 704 A.2d at 390. “In order to find a statement voluntary, it must first be established that it is the result of defendant’s exercise of his own free will and rational intellect.” State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 3, 748 A.2d 976, 977 (citing State v. Caouette, [1176]*1176446 A.2d 1120, 1128-24 (Me.1982)). “[T]he voluntariness requirement gives effect to three overlapping but conceptually distinct values: (1) it discourages objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system.” State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 500 (Me.1983).
[¶ 9] In applying a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine voluntariness, we have considered both external and internal factors, such as: the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant’s age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct. We have applied these factors to determine the situations in which the totality of the circumstances indicate that a defendant’s admission is no longer the result “of his own free will and rational intellect.” See Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 3, 748 A.2d at 977. For example, in Rees, the defendant’s statements were involuntary because the record clearly indicated he suffered from dementia. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 748 A.2d at 977. In Mikulewiez, the defendant’s statements were involuntary because of his age, his nakedness throughout the interrogation, his illness, the length of the continuous interrogation, the number of officers involved, and the officers’ use of alcohol to encourage him to talk. Mikulewiez, 462 A.2d at 498-99, 501. Similarly, in Caouette,
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DANA, J.
[¶ 1] The State appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Augusta, Vafiades, J.) suppressing, as involuntary, a statement made by William Sawyer, Jr. We vacate the judgment.
BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The officer testified to the following facts at the suppression hearing. In December of 1999, at approximately 1 a.m., an officer on routine patrol observed a truck heading toward him passing another vehicle. To avoid a collision, the officer was forced to pull over into the breakdown lane. The officer clocked the truck at 73 mph in a 50 mph zone, proceeded to turn on his blue lights, and turned his cruiser around to follow the vehicles. While following the vehicles, the officer passed a driveway and saw two sets of taillights. He turned around a second time and pulled into a residential driveway. The court found that “[t]he red truck was parked up the driveway, the white vehicle was behind the truck and partially to the left,” and “the officer parked behind the white car.” The officer stated that he was conducting an investigatory stop based on a civil violation, and the court determined that the officer “thought it was important to talk to the driver of the vehicle regarding his dangerous pass and his speed.”1
[¶ 3] The officer observed four males in the driveway, including Sawyer who was standing by the front fender of the truck. The court found that the officer requested that Sawyer come talk to him, asked Sawyer if he was the driver of the truck, and Sawyer answered affirmatively. Next, the officer requested Sawyer’s license and conducted a field sobriety test, during which Sawyer told the officer he had been drinking too much. The officer agreed, placed him in handcuffs, and placed him in the cruiser. The officer did not administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning Sawyer.
[¶ 4] Sawyer was charged with criminal OUI pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411 (1996),2 and pleaded not guilty. Sawyer filed a motion to suppress the statements and arrest,3 and a hearing was held at [1175]*1175which only the officer testified. The court made the following determinations: the officer was justified in making an investigatory stop, the officer subjected Sawyer to an interrogation, Sawyer was not in custody, Miranda warnings were not required, Sawyer’s statement that he was the driver of the truck was not made voluntarily, and Sawyer’s statement that he had been drinking too much was a spontaneous statement made voluntarily. As a result, the court suppressed Sawyer’s involuntary admission to operating the truck and suppressed the arrest because probable cause for the arrest was partially based on Sawyer’s involuntary statement. The State’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the State filed this timely appeal pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A (1980) and M.R.Crim. P. 37B.
SAWYER’S ADMISSION
[¶ 5] The State contends the court reached two legally inconsistent conclusions by using similar facts to determine that Sawyer was not in custody but his admission that he was the driver was involuntary. The State further contends the court erred in its factual findings and its application of the law. Sawyer contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his admission to operating the truck was voluntary.
[¶ 6] In concluding that Sawyer’s admission to operating the truck was involuntary, the court made the following findings:
The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. The court finds that the defendant’s vehicle was blocked by the officer’s, the officer had arrived with his blue lights on, the officer was directing the defendant’s movements and asking questions. Based on the State’s questioning of its own witness, the officer clearly stated that when he approached the defendant to ask him for information, the defendant was not free to walk away. Based on these facts, the court concludes that a reasonable person would believe that he had no choice but to answer the officer’s questions. The court finds that the defendant’s statement that he was the driver of the vehicle was not voluntarily made.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 7] The “suppression judge must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary .... ” State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 387, 389. “Although findings of fact are reviewed deferentially, the application of legal principles to those findings is reviewed independently.” Id. ¶ 8, 704 A.2d at 390. “[T]he dispositive issue of the voluntariness of a confession, although based on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession, is a legal issue warranting independent appellate review.” Id. ¶ 9, 704 A.2d at 390. Thus, we determine whether the court’s factual findings warrant the legal conclusion that Sawyer’s admission to operating the truck was involuntary.
[¶ 8] “A confession is admissible in evidence only if voluntary, and the State bears the burden of establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 10, 704 A.2d at 390. “In order to find a statement voluntary, it must first be established that it is the result of defendant’s exercise of his own free will and rational intellect.” State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 3, 748 A.2d 976, 977 (citing State v. Caouette, [1176]*1176446 A.2d 1120, 1128-24 (Me.1982)). “[T]he voluntariness requirement gives effect to three overlapping but conceptually distinct values: (1) it discourages objectionable police practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system.” State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 500 (Me.1983).
[¶ 9] In applying a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine voluntariness, we have considered both external and internal factors, such as: the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant’s age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct. We have applied these factors to determine the situations in which the totality of the circumstances indicate that a defendant’s admission is no longer the result “of his own free will and rational intellect.” See Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 3, 748 A.2d at 977. For example, in Rees, the defendant’s statements were involuntary because the record clearly indicated he suffered from dementia. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 748 A.2d at 977. In Mikulewiez, the defendant’s statements were involuntary because of his age, his nakedness throughout the interrogation, his illness, the length of the continuous interrogation, the number of officers involved, and the officers’ use of alcohol to encourage him to talk. Mikulewiez, 462 A.2d at 498-99, 501. Similarly, in Caouette, although the deputy told the defendant he did not want to discuss the case and that anything he said could be used against him, the defendant’s statements were involuntary because he was incarcerated, vomiting, crying, frightened, emotionally upset, and had no conscious intent to discuss the case. Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1121, 1124.
[¶ 10] In contrast, in Coombs, the defendant’s statements, made while she was crying and intermittently handcuffed to a pole in the interrogation room during a two to three hour interrogation, were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt when the officer testified that she was not threatened nor promised anything in exchange for her confession (other than his willingness to dispose of some marijuana found in her vehicle). Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶¶ 5-6, 11-12, 704 A.2d at 389, 391. Likewise, in State v. Theriault, 425 A.2d 986 (Me.1981), the defendant’s statements, made after the officers stated that “it would be better to tell us (the truth)” and “people would think more of [you] if [you] got it off [your] chest,” were voluntary and not elicited by a promise of leniency. Id. at 990.
[¶ 11] The findings made at the suppression hearing are as follows: Sawyer’s vehicle was blocked by the officer’s, the officer arrived with his blue lights on, the officer directed Sawyer’s movements and asked questions, and the officer was of the opinion that Sawyer was not free to walk away. The court determined that Sawyer was not in custody,4 and the officer testified that in communicating with Sawyer, he did not [1177]*1177have his gun drawn and did not speak in a threatening manner. Because the court placed great importance on the irrelevant subjective belief of the police officer, as to whether Sawyer was free to walk away, we must vacate the suppression and remand for a reevaluation of the circumstances.5
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.