State of Maine v. Santos

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: October 26, 2018
• Docket: CUMcr-17-2103
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OP MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL COUI{T CUMilERLAND, ss. POR'l'LAND Docket Nos. CR-17-2103 CR-17-3257

STATE OF MAINE ) ) V. ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION ) FOR JUDCMENT OF ACQUITTAT, TANYA SANTOS ) ) Defendant )

At the conclusion of a jury trial held on September 18 and 19, 2018, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all twelve counts charged, which included four countc.; of Aggravated Porgcry, four counts of Forgery, and four counts of Theft by Deception. The issue before the court is whether Defendant is entitled to a Judgment of Acquittal as to the Forgery and Aggravated Forgery convictions, Defendant having moved for a Judgment of AcquiLtal after the Stale rested and again at the close of the evidence. The court reserved decision on Defendant's motion, and, after the jury returned its verdict, requested that the parties brief the issue. I laving considered Defendant's Memorandum of Law, filed October 5, 2018, and the State's Reply Memorandum of Law and Argument, filed October 19, 2018, in light of the standard governing motions for Judgment of Acquittal, the court finds and concludes as follows: Under Maine law, "[a] person is guilty of forgery if, with the intent to defraud or deceive another person or government, he: A. Falsely makes, completes, endorses or alters a written instrument, or knowingly utters or possesses such an instrument; or B. Causes another, by deception, to sign or execute a written instrument, or utters such an instrument." 17-A M.R.S . § 703('1 ). In arguing that Defendant's forgery convictions should st,md, the State points to evidence adduced at trial establishing that Defendant, with intent to defraud or deceive, knowingly possessed and used fake $100 bills. The problem with the State's argument is that, while Lhe Slate b correct that to be convicted of forgery a person need not herself have falsely made, completed, endorsed, or altered a written instrumenl, the written instrument does need to have been falsely made, completed, endorsed, or altered by someone. The State contends that the evidence supports n finding that the fake bills Defendant possessed used were falsely made. The State's argument, however, docs not

1 take into account the .statutory definition of "falsely made." Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 701(3): "A person 'falsely makes' a written instrument when he makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety ... which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible author, maker or drawer .... " ln other words, a person who possesses and uses a written instrument which is admittedly fake and which does not purport to be authentic may not properly be convicted of forgery . Inspection of the bills at issue makes clear that they do not on their face "purport to be authentic." On the contrary, although resembling actual currency, the $100 bills plainly state on the front "For Motion Picture Use Only" along with a seal stating "Cinema Props" and the words "Prop Money." In addition, the words "For Cinematic Use Only" likewise appear five times on each bill -- twice on the front and three times on the back, and Benjamin Franklin's visage, with its smirk and raised eyebrow, evidences a lack of authenticity. Since the bills do not purport to be authentic, they were not "falsely made," and since there is no evidence that they were falsely made, completed, endorsed, or altered -- by Defendant or by anyone else -­ Defendant's possession and use of the bills cannot properly support Defendant's convictions for forgery. Defendant's convictions for aggravated forgery cannot stand for the same reason. Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 702, A person is guilty of aggravated forgery if, with intent to 11

defraud or deceive another person or government, he falsely makes, completes, endorses or alters a written instrument, or knowingly utters or possesses such an instrument" and the instrument forged falls within one of the categories set forth in § 702(1 )(A-E). Assuming without deciding that the bills at issue are "[pJart of an issue of money .. . issued by a government or governmental instrumentality," and thus wilhin the scope of § 702(1 )(A), because the bills do not "purport to be an authentic creation," and accordingly were not "falsely made," the evidence adduced at trial does not support Defendant's aggravated forgery convictions. Pursuant to M.R. U. Crim. P. 29(a), the court "shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more crimes charged ... if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such crime or crimes." Tfaving viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court finds that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support Defendant's forgery and aggravated forgery convictions, and accordingly GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Acquittal as to each of Defendant's forgery and aggravated forgery convictions. lt is therefore hereby ORDERED lhal Judgment of

2 Acquittal shall enter as to Counts 1-6 of the Superseding Indichnent in Docket No. 17­ 2103 as well as to Counts 1-2 and of the Indicbnent in Docket No. 17-3257. The clerk shall schedule this matter for sentencing on Defendant's convictions for Theft by Deception at the earliest possible date.

DATED: Jed J. ,·ench Jud g , Unified Criminal Court

Entered on the Docket: JI) -2 ~ - I c­

3 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-l7-2I03 CR-17-3257 STATE OF MAINE

V. ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS TANYA SANTOS,

Defendant

Defendant seeks to suppress statements she made to Yarmouth Police Department

Detective Paul Martin. Defendant argues that her waiver of her Miranda rights was not knowing

and voluntary.' For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

FACTS Defendant was arrested on March 21, 2017. She gathered her medicine, which she is

required to take daily. She was transported to the Cumberland County jail and later that evening,

she was transported to the Kennebec County jail. She told the jail personnel that she needed her

medicine but did not receive it.

According lo defendant, because of a prolapsed heart valve, she takes a medicine to

prevent fluid from gathering in her heart. If she does not take the medicine, she cannot breathe

well and is tired. These symptoms develop within a few hours. She is severely hypoglycemic. If

her blood sugar is too low, she becomes lethargic, dizzy, and can become comatose. She takes

glucose and if she does not receive that medicine, symptoms can be immediate. She takes

stomach medicine daily because she has too much acid in the stomach. If she docs not receive I this medicine, she cannot eat and she did not eat while incarcerated. She takes a medicine for I

nerve pain. If she does not receive this medicine, she cannot sleep and feels miserable with her f,

legs feeling as though they are on fire. l f

• The focus of defendant's motion is the waiver of her Miranda rights. (Mot. Suppress 2.) Defendant I n argued at the hearing, however, that the State was required lo prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable 1: doubt. The court addresses both issues. Detective Martin was contacted by Lieutenant Perry regarding defendant's having passed

counterfeit one hundred-dollar bills on March 20 and 21, 2017. Detective Martin reviewed the

reports and arrest warrant for defendant, who was then in custody at the Kennebec County jail.

He went to the jail on March 23, 2017 to speak with defendant. He interviewed defendant in a

room at the Kennebec County jail. Defendant was in hand cuffs and leg shackles. The door was

closed.

The interview was recorded. (Def.'s Ex. 1.) The video shows that Detective Martin

explained why he was there and she understood. He said he had to read the Miranda rights to

her because they would be talking about crimes. He asked if defendant would speak to him. He

told her that he could not make any promises about leniency through the court but he would do

what he can and what he says a lot of times goes a bit of a way with the District Attorney. He

asked for her date of birth and she responded. Detective Martin then read the Miranda warnings

from the form. He asked after each whether defendant understood and she replied that she did.

She agreed to speak to him, reviewed the form, and signed it.

Defendant agreed she passed a one hundred-dollar bill at the Circle K in Yarmouth on

March 20, 2017. She stated she did not know the bill was not U.S. currency and was not quite

sure how she got the bill. She realized the bills were not good the next day when the bills were

refused at Hannaford. She then stated with regard to dates that she was a little off because she

had not had her medicine for a couple of days, she was hypoglycemic, her sugars were probably

low, and she was a little lethargic. She told Detective Marlin that she took medicine for

hypoglycemia, for her heart, and a diuretic but no illegal drugs.

Defendant told Detective Martin her address, her ex-boyfriend's date of birth, and where

her son attended school. She stated she received lhe bills from her recent tax refund from H & R

Block in Topsham. Detective Martin staled that she was not being honest and asked why she

would pass another one hundred-dollar bill at Rite Aid on March 21, 2017, after she learned at

Hannaford that the bills were not good. She stated she passed the bill at Rite Aid before she went

to Hannaford.

2 When Detective Martin told defendant that she did not receive the bills from a bank,

defendant stated that apparently somebody gave her fake money and she had no idea how she

received the money. He told her twice that law enforcement had videos of her conduct at the

stores. lie stated she was being honest about passing the bills because she knew law

enforcement had those videos but he did not believe her story about not knowing where the bills

came from. Defendant said that was his prerogative. Defendant laughed several times during

the interview.

Defendant then stated she was a little bit off, did not feel good, and felt like she would

pass out. They needed to get her medicine figured out because she had not received it for two

days.

They discussed again where she had passed the bills. She agreed with Detective Martin's

dates because she did not have a calendar. She identified the cars she had used.

Finally, they discussed the charges, class B felonies. She said she knew it was not good.

She signed and dated the summonses. She then stated she needed sugar.

At the hearing on the motion, defendant did not recall hearing about her rights. She had I little recollection about the interview. She remembered being taken to the interview from another

building while shackled. She stated that without medicine, she may appear to be "with it" but she

is not.

Detective Martin did not ask defendant if she felt well but defendant did not appear to

him to be under the influence or experiencing medical issues. She appeared to understand and

was not uncomfortable or confused.

At the hearing, Detective Martin could not recall whether she said she was on medicine

or she did not have her medicine but she did mention medicine. He also testified that she did not

say she thought she would pass out, as the video shows. If she had, he would have stopped the

interview. He also would have stopped the interview if she appeared unwell. Ile did not stop

3 ANALYSIS

Waiver of Miranda

In order for defendant's statements made to Detective Martin to be admissible, "the State

bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence , that (1) law enforcement

officers properly delivered Miranda warnings to the suspect before commencing the

interrogation , and (2) the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the privilege

protected by the warnings." State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133,, 14, 146 A.3d 427; State v.

Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, t 21,830 A.2d 433; Slate v. Coombs, 1998 ME l, ,- 15,704 A.2d 387.

Voluntary Statements

In order to find a statement voluntary, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement resulted from the "defendant's exercise of his own free will and rational

intellect." State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1123-1124 (Me. 1982). "A confession is voluntary

if it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not the product of coerced police

conduct, and if under all the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair." State v.

Mikul ewicz, 462 A2d 497,501 (Me. 1983). "A statement may be voluntarily made even if the

defendant was injured, medicated, or in dislress." State v. Lowe , 2013 ME 92, ,J 22, 81 A.3d

360. The requirement that a statement must be voluntary in order to be admissible "gives effect

to three overlapping but conceptually distinct values: (1) it discourages objectionable police

practices; (2) it protects the mental freedom of the individual; and (3) it preserves a quality of

fundamental fairness in the criminal justice system." Mik ulewicz, 462 A .2d at 500.

In determining voluntariness, the court considers the totality of the circumstances,

including

The details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogati on; whether the interrogation wns custodi al; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of office rs involved; the persistence of the officers; police tri ck.cry ; threat , promi se. or inducements made tu the defendant; and the defendant '· age, physical and mental health; emotional stal>ility , and conduct.

State v. McNaughJQ!!, 2017 ME 173,, 34, 168 A.3d 807; §Ce also :Withrow v. Williams, 507

U.S. 680, 693-94 (1993) . "A confession, otherwise freely and voluntarily made, is not vitiated

4 by a promise of leniency unless such promise was the motivating cause of the confession." State

v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598, 601 (Me. 1977). False promises of leniency jeopardize the

voluntariness of a defendant's statements. See McNaughton, 2017 ME 173, '.II 36, 168 A.3d 807;

State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172,' 5, 151 A.3d 911; State v. Wiley, 2013 ME 30, '.IJ'.11 19-25, 61 A.3d

750.

CONCLUSIONS

In this case, the custodial interview between Detective Martin and defendant took place

in a room al U1e Kennebec County jail and lasted 27.56 minutes. Detective Martin read the

Miranda warnings from a form and defendant responded after each warning that she understood.

Defendant was 50 years old at the time of the interview.

The video shows that defendant was not shaking and did not appear to be in distress or

confused. She responded to Detective Martin's questions appropriately and clearly. She gave

detailed information and corrected him when his time line for her conduct was incorrect, a

correction that supports her argument that she did not know the bills were counte,feit when she

passed them. The video does not support defendant's claim that she was not "with it" during the

interview or that she could not breathe, was dizzy, or was suffering nerve pain, the symptoms

she alleges result from not taking her medicine.

Detective Martin was not particularly persistent, although he raised seyeral times the

implausibility that defendant received the counterfeit bills from a bank. He did not try to trick

defendant. He did say that he could not make promises about leniency through the court but he

would do what he can and what he says a lot of times goes a bit of a way with the District

Attorney. Sec State v. McNaughton, 2017 ME 173,534, 168 A.3d 807

The State has proved that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her

Miranda rights . Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ~ 14, 146 A.3d 427. Further, based on the totality of

the circumstances, the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's

statements were voluntary. Sec State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88,, 9, 772 A.2d 1173, l 176.

Detective Martin made no specific suggestion or promise about how the prosecution or

5 sentencing would be better for defendant if she confessed. See McNaughton, 2017 ME 173, ,,

36-37, 168 A.3d 807 (concluding that although police investigators had made problematic

statements that they could "minimize it" if the defendant confessed, the trial court did not err in

determining that incriminating statements were voluntarily made). Further, his statement was

not the "motivating cause of the confession." Tardiff, 374 A.2d at 600. Defendant admitted her

conduct recorded at the stores. She maintained her position, however, that she did not know the

bills were counterfeit. Defendant's statements were not made under circumstances that offend

"fundamental values of social policy and constitutional law." Hunt, 2016 ME 172, ! 20, 151

A.3d 91.

The entry is

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENTE

Date: April 5, 2018 Nan Mills r, Justice, Superior Court