Opinion of the Court by
LIM, J.
Defendant-Appellant Jonathan Riveira (Riveira) appeals the judgment of the District Court of the Third Circuit, entered May 14, 1998, convicting him of the offense of driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10C-104(a) (Supp.1997), and sentencing him, as a repeat offender, to a $1500 fine.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 8, 1997, Riveira was cited for driving without no-fault insurance in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104(a).2 On April 9, 1998, [548]*548he pled no contest to the charge. Previously, Riveira had been adjudicated for the same offense; on November 26, 1993, when he was seventeen years old.
The district court continued sentencing to May 14, 1998, to give the parties time to file sentencing memoranda.
Riveira filed a sentencing memorandum on May 11, 1998, contending that, because he was adjudicated as a juvenile for the previous offense, HRS § 571-1 prohibits consideration of the 1993 juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes.
The State filed a memorandum in support of sentencing as second conviction on May 12, 1998, arguing that, because State v. Nobriga, 56 Haw. 75, 527 P.2d 1269 (1974), allows the courts to consider juvenile records in sentencing adults, the 1993 juvenile adjudication should be treated as a prior conviction. The State also insisted that juveniles be treated the same as adults for traffic offenses.
When Riveira was cited, HRS § 431:100-117(a)(2)(B) provided:
If the person is convicted of not having had a [no-fault] policy in effect at the time the citation was issued, the fine shall be $500 for the first offense and a minimum of $1,500 for each subsequent offense that occurs within a five-year period from any prior conviction [.]
(Emphasis added).
HRS § 571-1 provides, in relevant part:
The chapter creates within this State a system of family courts and it shall be a policy and purpose of said courts to promote the reconciliation of distressed juveniles with their families, foster the rehabilitation of juveniles in difficulty, render appropriate punishment to offenders, and reduce juvenile delinquency. The court shall conduct all proceedings to the end that no adjudication by the court of the status of any child under this chapter shall be deemed a conviction; no such adjudication shall impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from conviction; no child shall be found guilty or be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication; no child shall be charged with [a] crime or be convicted in any court except as otherwise provided in this chapter; and all children found responsible for offenses shall [549]*549receive dispositions that provide incentive for reform or deterrence from further misconduct, or both. The disposition made of a child or any evidence given in the court, shall not operate to disqualify the child in any civil service or military application or appointment. Any evidence given in any case under section 571-11 shall not in any civil, criminal, or other cause in any court be lawful or proper evidence against the child for any purpose whatever except in subsequent cases involving the same child under section 571-11.
At the May 14, 1998 sentencing, the district court, after hearing the arguments of the parties, deemed Riveira a repeat offender and sentenced him to a $1500 fine. Written findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered on July 27, 1998. Notice of appeal was filed by Riveira’s counsel on August 27, 1998.
II. JURISDICTION
Before we reach the merits of the appeal, we must determine that we have jurisdiction. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. State v. Knight, 80 Hawai'i 318, 909 P.2d 1133 (1996). “It is well-settled that every court must ... determine as a threshold matter whether it has jurisdiction to decide the issue[s] presented. Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and can be challenged at any time.” Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Comm’n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If neither side raises the issue, “a court sua sponte will, for unless jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter exists, any judgment rendered is invalid.” Meyer v. Territory, 36 Haw. 75, 78 (1942).
A.
Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction even though Riveira’s appeal was not timely filed?
A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of judgment. HRS § 641-12; Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) 4(b). Judgment was entered on May 14, 1998, when the clerk noted the disposition on the court’s daily calender.3 The notice of appeal filed by Riveira on August 27, 1998 was, therefore, not timely.
However, if driving without no-fault insurance is a crime, as opposed to a mere violation, then Riveira’s right to appeal may not be denied merely because his counsel failed to comply with procedural rules. Knight, 80 Hawai'i at 323-24, 909 P.2d at 1138-39 (“a criminal defendant is entitled, on his first appeal, to effective counsel who may not deprive him of his appeal by failure to comply with procedural rules.”) See also State v. Erwin, 57 Haw. 268, 270, 554 P.2d 236, 238 (1976).
According to HRS § 701-107(1), “[a]n offense defined by this Code [Hawaii Penal Code] or by any other statute of this State for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime.” (Emphasis added) For example, in State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 59, 890 P.2d 291, 296 (1995), the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a crime because a sentence of imprisonment is authorized by the statute. HRS § 291-4. A violation, on the other hand, does not carry a potential prison sentence, and is not considered a crime. See HRS § 701-107(5).
We question whether HRS § 701-107(1) applies in this case. Although HRS § 431:10C-117(a) authorizes imprisonment as punishment, it does so only for repeat offenders with multiple offenses.4 Unlike the de[550]*550fendants in Lau, who faced possible prison time even upon their first offenses, Riveira was not subject to incarceration.
However, offenses which do not carry the possibility of imprisonment can also be considered criminal. For example, improper mooring of vessel is a criminal offense, even though no prison sentence can be imposed. State v. Simeona, 10 Haw.App. 220, 229, 864 P.2d 1109, 1114 (1993), overruled on other grounds, State v. Ford, 84 Hawaii 65, 929 P.2d 78 (1996). The controlling factor is whether the legislature intended to classify the penalties as criminal or civil. Simeona, 10 Haw.App. at 229-32, 864 P.2d at 1114-15.
Accordingly, a prosecution for driving without no-fault insurance is criminal in nature because the legislature intended the penalties to be criminal. The purpose of the no-fault insurance penalties is “[t]o deter persons from driving without motor vehicle insurance coverage not only through criminal penalties, but through a limitation on the ability of the uninsured motorist to recover for injuries in tort....” (Emphasis added) 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 245, § 1 at 510-21, cited in Del Rio v. Crake, 87 Hawai'i 297, 303, 955 P.2d 90, 96 (1998). The Del Rio Court also noted that the legislature’s several approaches to enforcing universal no-fault coverage extend to “[c\riminal penalties including fines, possible license suspension, jail, and impoundment of the vehicle[.]” (Emphasis added) Id. at 302, 955 P.2d at 95. Finally, the legislature has provided a specific criminal procedure statute for HRS § 431:10C violations. HRS § 805-13 (HRS Chapter 805 is entitled “Criminal Procedure: District Courts.”). See also State v. Shamp, 86 Hawai'i 331, 334-39, 949 P.2d 171, 174-79 (describing a driving without no-fault insurance case as “a criminal case,” and applying a criminal state-of-mind requirement to the material elements of the offense).
Therefore, although Riveira did not face a sentence of imprisonment, the proceeding was nevertheless criminal. As a criminal defendant, Riveira is entitled to the present appeal.
B.
Whether Riveira’s right to appeal an alleged illegal sentence was waived by his plea of no contest?
The next jurisdictional issue is whether Riveira’s right to appeal an alleged illegal sentence was waived by his plea of no contest.
Generally, a valid and unconditional plea of guilty or no contest constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdic-tional claims. State v. Morin, 71 Haw. 159, 162, 785 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1990). The Hawaii Supreme Court has identified the policy behind this general rule:
“Once the defendant chooses to bypass the orderly procedure for litigating his constitutional claims in order to take the benefits, if any, of a plea of guilty, the State acquires a legitimate expectation of finality in the conviction thereby obtained.”
Id. at 163, 785 P.2d at 1319 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 289, 95 S.Ct. 886, 43 L.Ed.2d 196 (1975)).
Allowing a defendant to appeal an illegal sentence after a plea of guilty or no contest does not conflict, however, with the policy behind Morin. An appeal pertaining to the legality of a sentence does not disturb finality in the conviction, no matter how the appeal is ultimately decided.
Furthermore, Hawaii cases suggest that the right to appeal an illegal sentence is not waived by a plea of guilty or no contest. The Hawaii Supreme Court has routinely reviewed appeals in which the defendant had pled guilty but was appealing an alleged illegal sentence. See, e.g., Territory of Hawaii v. Maunakea, 39 Haw. 249 (1952); State v. Ferreira, 59 Haw. 255, 580 P.2d 63 (1978); State v. Jumila 87 Hawai'i 1, 950 P.2d 1201 (1998). In none of these cases did the supreme court abjure jurisdiction because the [551]*551defendant had entered a plea of guilty or no contest.
The procedural history of this ease parallels that in Jumila. In Jumila, the defendant entered pleas of no contest to second degree murder and armed robbery charges. He then appealed his sentence. The supreme court confirmed Jumila’s right to appeal, stating:
[although Jumila entered pleas of no contest to the second degree murder ..., because he raised the HRS § 701-109 argument at his sentencing hearing, before judgment was entered, and because the prosecution has never contended that Ju-mila should be precluded from raising the argument, we conclude that Jumila did not waive his HRS § 701-109 rights when he entered his no contest pleas.
Id. at 3 n. 5, 950 P.2d at 1203 n. 5 (1998).
Similarly, Riveira raised the arguments presented in this appeal at the sentencing hearing, before judgment was entered, and the prosecution has never contended that Riveira should be precluded from raising the argument because of his no contest plea.
Some courts hold that a plea of guilty or no contest waives the right to appeal only those nonjurisdictional matters arising before the plea. United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 204 (9th Cir.1997) (“[A]n unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all antecedent constitutional defects.”) (citations omitted) (emphases added); United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1996)(“[A] defendant who pleads guilty unconditionally while represented by counsel may not assert independent claims relating to events occurring prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”) (emphasis added); Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1390 (5th Cir.1995) (“[A] knowing and voluntary plea of guilty waives all preceding nonjurisdictional defects, ....”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Other courts explicitly hold that a plea of guilty or no contest does not waive the right to appeal matters that occur at the sentencing stage. United States v. Cordero, 42 F.3d 697, 699 (1st Cir.1994) (stating that “a defendant’s unconditional guilty plea does not automatically waive the right to appeal matters incident to sentencing as opposed to guilt.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that a guilty plea does not waive the right to object to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the sentencing stage); United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that a guilty plea does not automatically waive rights that occur at the sentencing stage.)
Still other courts focus the issue on the nature of the plea. “It is a constitutional requirement that a trial judge ensure that a guilty plea be voluntarily and knowingly entered.” State v. Dicks, 57 Haw. 46, 49, 549 P.2d 727, 730- (1976) (citations omitted); see also State v. Merino, 81 Hawai'i 198, 915 P.2d 672 (1996). This being so, it is unreasonable to foreclose the right to appeal a sentence, for a defendant pleading guilty or no contest cannot possibly know then what will occur later, at the sentencing stage. See United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 571 (5th Cir.1992) (Parker, Jr., concurring) (a defendant can never “knowingly and intelligently waive, as part of a plea agreement, the right to appeal a sentence that has yet to be imposed at the time he or she enters into the plea agreement; such a ‘waiver’ is inherently uninformed and unintelligent.”); United States v. Raynor, 989 F.Supp. 43, 49 (D.C.1997) (“A defendant cannot knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily give up the right to appeal a sentence that has not yet been imposed and about which the defendant has no knowledge as to what will occur at the time of sentencing.”)
For the reasons stated, we conclude this court does have jurisdiction to examine Ri-veira’s appeal.
III. QUESTION PRESENTED
The only issue on appeal is whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication for driving without no-fault insurance can be used to enhance the fíne when he is convicted of the same offense as an adult.
Riveira notes that the enhanced fine for repeat offenders depends upon a previous [552]*552“conviction” for the same offense, and contends that, because no juvenile adjudication can be deemed a “conviction,” he has no prior conviction and therefore cannot be sentenced as a repeat offender.
HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B) (Supp.1997) governed Riveira’s sentencing:
If the person is convicted of not having had a [no-fault] policy in effect at the time the citation was issued, the fine shall be $500 for the first offense and a minimum of $1,500 for each subsequent offense that occurs within a five-year period from any prior conviction [.]
(Emphasis added.) For the proposition that no juvenile adjudication can be deemed a “conviction” for purposes of HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B), Riveira cites HRS § 571-1, in pertinent part:
The [family] court shall conduct all proceedings to the end that no adjudication by the court of the status of any child under this chapter shall be deemed a conviction; ... no child shall be found guilty or be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication; no child shall be charged with [a] crime or be convicted in any court except as otherwise provided in this chapterf.]
(Emphasis added.)5
The question on appeal is thus whether or not the term“conviction” in HRS § 431:100-117(a)(2)(B) includes a juvenile adjudication for violating the same statute.
IV STANDARD OF REVIEW
“ ‘The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo.’ ” State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Hawai'i 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)). See also State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai'i 317, 320, 893 P.2d 168, 171 (1995).
V. DISCUSSION
The first step in statutory interpretation is “to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.” State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 129, 706 P.2d 1293, 1297 (1985). “[W]hen the language is plain and unmistakable, the court is bound by the plain, clear, and unambiguous language of the statute.” State v. Sylva, 61 Haw. 385, 387-88, 605 P.2d 496, 498 (1980).
In this case, however, a simple and literal reading of the statute is impossible, because we are dealing with the often employed but rarely precisely defined term “conviction.” See State v. Akana, 68 Haw. 164, 166, 706 P.2d 1300, 1303 (1985) (“[t]he meaning of the term ‘convicted’ or ‘conviction’ varies according to the context in which it appears and the purpose to which it relates.”) For example, for the purpose of sentencing repeat offenders, HRS § 706-606.5, the term “conviction” consists of a finding of guilt by a jury or a court and a pronounced judgment. See Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 706 P.2d 1293. For the purpose of revocation of probation, HRS § 706-628, however, the term “conviction” does not extend beyond the ascertainment of guilt or a guilty plea. See Akana, 68 Haw. at 167, 706 P.2d at 1303 (1985).
“When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or ... uncertainty of an expression used in a statute an ambiguity exists.” Sylva, 61 Haw. at 388, 605 P.2d at 498. And when the statutory language is ambiguous, “the purpose and objective which moved the legislature to enact it may be determinative of its interpretation.” State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 518, 572 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1977).
For legislative intent, we may turn to legislative history for guidance and clarification. State v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 81, 837 P.2d 776, 779 (1992) (“In construing a statute, legislative history may be considered [553]*553when a statute is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning.”)
The stated purpose of the no-fault insurance law is to:
(1) Create a system of reparations for accidental harm and loss arising from motor vehicle accidents;
(2) Compensate these damages without regard to fault; and
(3) Limit tort liability for these accidents.
Del Rio, 87 Hawai‘i at 305, 955 P.2d at 98.
The legislature was convinced that “[t]he system of no-fault insurance ... can only be effective if all drivers participate to the extent required by law[,]” and was especially concerned about a chronic systemic problem, “the minority which consistently refuses to obtain the motor vehicle insurance coverage required under the law.” Id. at 301-02, 955 P.2d at 95-96. To encourage universal coverage, the legislature demanded that:
[tjhose uninsured drivers who try to obtain the privilege of driving a motor vehicle without the concomitant responsibility of an ability to compensate adequately those who are injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident are to be dealt with more severely in the criminal or civil areas than those who obtain the legally required no-fault insurance coverage!)]
Id. at 306, 955 P.2d at 99 (citing HRS § 431:10C-102(b)) (emphasis in the original).
One of the mechanisms the legislature designed to deter driving without the required coverage is stiffer penalties for repeat offenders. No-fault insurance law “provides mandatory imposition of additional penalties in the case of multiple offenders] ... the fine must be levied upon all offenders.” Statement on Hse. Bill No.1986-80 to the 10th State Leg., 2d Sess., Feb. 11, 1980 at 3 (emphasis added).
No express exceptions were made regarding juvenile drivers. Indeed, the legislature repeatedly stated that all drivers must comply with the no-fault insurance law:
The system of no-fault insurance ... can only be effective if all drivers participate to the extent required by law. This bill treats uninsured drivers more severely than those who obtain the legally required coverage within the specific legislative intent of encouraging participation by all drivers in the no-fault insurance system. Since the legislature has provided for persons economically unable to afford insurance under the public assistance provisions of the no-fault law, there is no valid reason for persons not to have no-fault insurance.
Id. at 301, 955 P.2d at 94 (quoting Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 830, in 1983 Senate Journal, at 1417) (emphasis added).
This being so, there is no indication the legislature intended to treat juvenile drivers differently from adult drivers for purposes of the no-fault insurance law; likewise, there is no indication the legislature intended to treat an adult defendant with a juvenile adjudication differently from any other offender. To do so would subvert the effectiveness of the legislative no-fault indemnity scheme.
“Statutes should be interpreted according to the intent, meaning, and purpose of the overall statutory scheme and not in a manner that would lead to absurd and unjust results.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hirose, 77 Hawai’i 362, 371, 884 P.2d 1138, 1147 (1994).
To adopt Riveira’s reasoning is to concede a series of absurdities. It would mean that a juvenile could be cited for driving without no-fault insurance any number of times, and that each and every time the juvenile must be considered a mere first-time offender. Under this scenario, the deterrent effect of stepladder sanctions is completely lost.
It would also mean that every person’s first violation of the statute as an adult must be deemed a first offense, regardless of the person’s history of violating the statute as a juvenile. This derogates the well-established rule that an adult defendant’s juvenile record may be considered for purposes of sentencing. Nobriga, 56 Haw. at 75, 527 P.2d at 1269.
In Nobriga, the Hawai'i Supreme Court considered a young adult defendants’ argument that the trial court erred in considering his juvenile record in sentencing him to a prison term. Id. at 76, 527 P.2d at 1270. [554]*554The defendant based his argument upon HRS § 571-84 (Supp.1973), the provision governing confidentiality of juvenile proceedings, and, most significantly upon HRS § 571-49, the former incarnation of the statute Riveira relies upon in this case, HRS § 571-1. Id.
In rejecting this argument, the supreme court noted that the purpose of HRS § 571-49 was to prohibit “the use of evidence against the child or minor involved in an adversary proceeding in any court other than family court, and not one of a blanket prohibition banning the use of juvenile records in a nonadversary proceeding, that is, at the sentencing stage.” Id. at 79, 527 P.2d at 1272.
In doing so, the supreme court recognized that, “[t]o adopt appellant’s reasoning on barring the use of juvenile records in the pre-sentence report would in effect deny the sentencing judge access to relevant information necessary for the rendition of an informed sentencing decision, Id. at 81, 527 P.2d at 1273, and expressly grounded its holding on “the fundamental importance of informed judicial sentencing.” Id. at 83, 527 P.2d at 1274.
Riveira’s reasoning would fly directly in the face of the principle announced in Nobriga, that “[t]he judge is not required to operate in a vacuum.” Id. at 84, 527 P.2d at 1275 (quoting Berfield v. State, at 458 P.2d 1008, 1011-12 (Alaska 1969)).
Finally, following Riveira’s logic would lead to the ultimate absurdity. No juvenile could ever be subject to any fine for driving without no-fault insurance, because the $500 fine for a first offense is itself conditioned upon the person first being “convicted.” HRS § 431:10C—117(2)(B) provides: “If the person is convicted of not having had a motor vehicle insurance policy in effect at the time the citation was issued, the fine shall be $500 for the first offense .... ” (emphasis added). Ri-veira’s strictly literal approach virtually immunizes juveniles against any significant penalties under Hawaii’s no-fault insurance law. It is unlikely that this was the legislature’s intent, given what has already been said about the no-fault indemnity scheme. Even the protective provision of HRS § 571-41(f), relied upon by Riveira, supra, n. 5, allows the imposition of fines upon juvenile traffic law violators. State v. Lapitan, 69 Haw. 455, 457 n. 3, 746 P.2d 82, 83 n. 3 (1987).
C.
This court is not unmindful of the fact that HRS § 571-1 protects an adult defendant from certain permanent consequences of his juvenile transgressions.
For example, pursuant to HRS §§ 853-4(6) and 853-4(8), a defendant with a prior felony conviction is statutorily disqualified from deferred acceptance of his guilty (DAG) plea. Pursuant to HRS § 571-1, however, an adult defendant’s juvenile felony adjudication does not constitute such a disqualifying conviction. See Sylva, 61 Haw. 385, 605 P.2d 496.
Sylva is particularly germane to this case, because there the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted a literal approach very similar to Riveira’s, citing HRS § 571-1 in a footnote while peremptorily declaring that “subsections (6) and (8) do not apply because appellant has had no prior conviction.” Id. at 387, 605 P.2d at 498 (footnote omitted).
Whether such a defendant’s motion for a DAG plea is granted is, however, still within the discretion of the sentencing court. Id. at 389-90, 605 P.2d at 499. The court could still deny the motion, accept the plea and impose a more condign sentence. Indeed, in Sylva the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Sylva’s motion for a DAG based on Sylva’s background, including over forty juvenile felony adjudications. Id. at 386, 390, 605 P.2d at 496, 499.
The supreme court explained,
If, as argued by the State, we were to follow the language of [HRS § 853-4(7) ] literally, it would mean that every defendant with a juvenile record for offenses which would have been felonies if committed by an adult would be automatically disqualified from the benefits of DAG plea; it would simply make no difference if the defendant happens to have a juvenile record of a single offense incurred at age [555]*555twelve, and he is before the court with an unblemished adult record as a “one-time, accidental or situational offender.” We do not believe that the legislature intended such palpably absurd consequences.
Id. at 389, 605 P.2d at 498-99.
Thus, in our view, Sylva stands for the limited proposition that the more lenient disposition not be categorically foreclosed. Seen in this light, Sylva joins Nobriga in fostering maximum informed flexibility in sentencing, as we do in this opinion. Ri-veira’s position, which would categorically foreclose a more condign sanction, is simply the obverse of the position rejected in Sylva and, in the spirit of Sylva and Nobriga, should also be rejected.
The legislature designed the no-fault insurance law intending that its penalties be based upon the actual transgression, rather than the mere label given to its adjudication. The general bowdlerizing provisions of HRS § 571-1, relied upon by Riveira, should therefore be inapplicable to the specific penalty scheme here at issue.
It is doubtful that the legislature intended any special significance for the words it used to denote the prior adjudication. The legislature recently amended the statute by making “technical, nonsubstantive amendments for purposes of clarity and style,” Sen. Comm. Rep. No. 2548, in 1998 Senate Journal, at 1035. One of these amendments changed the dispositive word from “conviction” to “offense.” See HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B) (Supp.1998). Although the amendment became effective after Riveira was cited for his offense, the absence of any legislative comment on the change in terminology strongly suggests that the legislature never invested the word “conviction” with any significance more or less than the word “offense.” 6
Furthermore, in the provision for sentencing “of multiple offenders,” the word “violations” was amended to “convictions” in 1996. See HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(4) (Supp.1996). The term was changed again in 1998, from “conviction” to “offense.” See HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(5) (Supp.1998). These changes, too, were made without any legislative commentary or evident substantive effect. Such willy-nilly denotation negates any conception that the legislature had in mind anything like the convoluted interpretation Riveira espouses.
D.
It follows from our holding in this case that juveniles can be sentenced as “multiple offenders” as well as repeat offenders under the no-fault insurance law. See HRS § 471:10C-117(A)(5). We do not mean to say that juveniles are now subject to imprisonment as “multiple offenders.” That is explicitly prohibited by State v. Buckman, 70 Haw. 328, 770 P.2d 418 (1989). However, an appropriate disposition for repeat or multiple offenders does not necessarily entail imprisonment. The sentencing judge has a number of alternatives available in the statute to deter further noncompliance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the May 14, 1998 judgment should be affirmed.