Opinion of the Court by
LEVINSON, J.
We granted the application of the petitioner-appellant Jonathan Riveira for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), 92 Hawai'i 521, 993 P.2d 580, filed on December 29,1999 [hereinafter, the ICA’s majority opinion], affirming the judgment of the district court of the third circuit, filed on May 14,1998. Riviera argues that the ICA erred in holding that his juvenile adjudication constituted a conviction, pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:100-117 (1993 & Supp.1997),
for the purposes of applying the repeat offender sentencing provision therein to the offense of driving without no-fault insurance.
We agree with Riveira that the ICA’s majority opinion reached an erroneous result. In contrast to the ICA’s majority opinion, we hold that HRS § 571-1 (1993)
mandates against treating juvenile adjudications as convictions. The reasoning underlying our holding is addressed succinctly by Judge Acoba’s dissent [hereinafter, the dissent]. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s majority opinion with respect to whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication may be treated as a conviction, summarily adopt the dissent, va
cate the district court’s judgment, and remand the case for resentencing.
Inasmuch as Riveira does not contest the ICA majority’s analysis of the jurisdictional issues presented by this matter, and we agree that the ICA had jurisdiction to examine Riveira’s appeal, we leave that section of the ICA’s majority opinion undisturbed.
I.
BACKGROUND
On October 8, 1997, Riveira was cited for driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
On April 9, 1998, he pled no contest to the charge. Riveira had been adjudicated for the same offense on November 26, 1993, when he was seventeen years old.
The district court deemed Riviera a repeat offender and sentenced him to a fine of $1,500.00, pursuant to HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B),
see supra
note 1. On May 14, 1998, the district court entered its judgement. On August 27, 1998, Riveira filed a notice of appeal.
The ICA filed its opinion on December 29, 1999. As a preliminary matter, the ICA majority opinion noted,
sua sponte,
that Ri-veira had not filed a timely notice of appeal.
Id.
at 549, 993 P.2d at 583. The ICA’s majority opinion determined that, as a “criminal defendant,” Riveira was entitled to the present appeal.
Id.
at 549, 993 P.2d at 583. The ICA’s majority opinion also ruled that Ri-veira’s right to appeal was not waived by his plea of no contest.
Id.
at 551, 993 P.2d at 585.
The ICA’s majority opinion recognized that “[t]he only issue on appeal [was] whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication for driving without no-fault insurance can be used to enhance the fine when he is convicted of the same offense as an adult.”
Id.
at 551, 993 P.2d at 585. Relying on the absence of language excluding juveniles from the penalty provisions of § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B),
see supra
note 1, the ICA majority determined that “there is no indication [that] the legislature intended to treat juvenile drivers differently from adult drivers for purposes of the no-fault insurance law[.]”
Id.
at 553, 993 P.2d at 587. In light of this reasoning, the ICA majority held that juveniles may be sentenced as repeat offenders under the no-fault insurance law.
Id.
at 554, 993 P.2d at 588. Accordingly, the ICA majority affirmed the sentence of the district court.
Id.
at 555, 993 P.2d at 589.
In his dissent, Judge Acoba noted that this court’s decision in
State v. Sylva,
61 Haw. 385, 605 P.2d 496 (1980), “left no doubt that any adjudicated violation of a criminal law by a minor does not constitute a conviction for adult sentencing purposes.” Dissent at 555, 993 P.2d 589. Judge Acoba observed that
“Sylva ...
affirmed the plain language of HRS § 571-1[,
see supra
note 2,] which prohibits treating juvenile adjudications as convictions.”
Id.
at 557, 993 P.2d at 591. He voiced the concern that, “[u]nder the reasoning adopted by the majority, a juvenile adjudication must be treated as a criminal conviction. In my opinion, this is not only violative of the provisions in HRS chapter 571 (1993)[,] but a rejection of the juvenile family court system altogether.”
Id.
at 559, 993 P.2d at 593. Judge Acoba concluded that “[a]ssuredly no minor could be subjected to HRS § 431:100-117 because[,] by virtue of HRS § 571-1, a minor’s violation does not result in convietion[.]”
Id.
at 561, 993 P.2d at 595. He noted that he “would vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for resentencing.”
Id.
at 561, 993 P.2d at 595.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he interpretation of a statute ... is a question of law reviewable
de novo.” State v. Arceo,
84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (quoting
State v. Camara,
81 Hawai'i 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)).
See also State v. Toyomura,
80 Hawai'i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995);
State v. Higa,
79 Hawai'i 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930,
reconsider
ation denied,
79 Hawai'i 341, 902 P.2d 976 (1995);
State v. Nakata,
76 Hawai'i 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704,
reconsideration denied,
76 Hawai'i 453, 879 P.2d 558 (1994),
cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 1095, 130 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1995).
Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court,
84 Hawai'i 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original).
See also State v. Soto,
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Opinion of the Court by
LEVINSON, J.
We granted the application of the petitioner-appellant Jonathan Riveira for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), 92 Hawai'i 521, 993 P.2d 580, filed on December 29,1999 [hereinafter, the ICA’s majority opinion], affirming the judgment of the district court of the third circuit, filed on May 14,1998. Riviera argues that the ICA erred in holding that his juvenile adjudication constituted a conviction, pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:100-117 (1993 & Supp.1997),
for the purposes of applying the repeat offender sentencing provision therein to the offense of driving without no-fault insurance.
We agree with Riveira that the ICA’s majority opinion reached an erroneous result. In contrast to the ICA’s majority opinion, we hold that HRS § 571-1 (1993)
mandates against treating juvenile adjudications as convictions. The reasoning underlying our holding is addressed succinctly by Judge Acoba’s dissent [hereinafter, the dissent]. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s majority opinion with respect to whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication may be treated as a conviction, summarily adopt the dissent, va
cate the district court’s judgment, and remand the case for resentencing.
Inasmuch as Riveira does not contest the ICA majority’s analysis of the jurisdictional issues presented by this matter, and we agree that the ICA had jurisdiction to examine Riveira’s appeal, we leave that section of the ICA’s majority opinion undisturbed.
I.
BACKGROUND
On October 8, 1997, Riveira was cited for driving without no-fault insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
On April 9, 1998, he pled no contest to the charge. Riveira had been adjudicated for the same offense on November 26, 1993, when he was seventeen years old.
The district court deemed Riviera a repeat offender and sentenced him to a fine of $1,500.00, pursuant to HRS § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B),
see supra
note 1. On May 14, 1998, the district court entered its judgement. On August 27, 1998, Riveira filed a notice of appeal.
The ICA filed its opinion on December 29, 1999. As a preliminary matter, the ICA majority opinion noted,
sua sponte,
that Ri-veira had not filed a timely notice of appeal.
Id.
at 549, 993 P.2d at 583. The ICA’s majority opinion determined that, as a “criminal defendant,” Riveira was entitled to the present appeal.
Id.
at 549, 993 P.2d at 583. The ICA’s majority opinion also ruled that Ri-veira’s right to appeal was not waived by his plea of no contest.
Id.
at 551, 993 P.2d at 585.
The ICA’s majority opinion recognized that “[t]he only issue on appeal [was] whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication for driving without no-fault insurance can be used to enhance the fine when he is convicted of the same offense as an adult.”
Id.
at 551, 993 P.2d at 585. Relying on the absence of language excluding juveniles from the penalty provisions of § 431:10C-117(a)(2)(B),
see supra
note 1, the ICA majority determined that “there is no indication [that] the legislature intended to treat juvenile drivers differently from adult drivers for purposes of the no-fault insurance law[.]”
Id.
at 553, 993 P.2d at 587. In light of this reasoning, the ICA majority held that juveniles may be sentenced as repeat offenders under the no-fault insurance law.
Id.
at 554, 993 P.2d at 588. Accordingly, the ICA majority affirmed the sentence of the district court.
Id.
at 555, 993 P.2d at 589.
In his dissent, Judge Acoba noted that this court’s decision in
State v. Sylva,
61 Haw. 385, 605 P.2d 496 (1980), “left no doubt that any adjudicated violation of a criminal law by a minor does not constitute a conviction for adult sentencing purposes.” Dissent at 555, 993 P.2d 589. Judge Acoba observed that
“Sylva ...
affirmed the plain language of HRS § 571-1[,
see supra
note 2,] which prohibits treating juvenile adjudications as convictions.”
Id.
at 557, 993 P.2d at 591. He voiced the concern that, “[u]nder the reasoning adopted by the majority, a juvenile adjudication must be treated as a criminal conviction. In my opinion, this is not only violative of the provisions in HRS chapter 571 (1993)[,] but a rejection of the juvenile family court system altogether.”
Id.
at 559, 993 P.2d at 593. Judge Acoba concluded that “[a]ssuredly no minor could be subjected to HRS § 431:100-117 because[,] by virtue of HRS § 571-1, a minor’s violation does not result in convietion[.]”
Id.
at 561, 993 P.2d at 595. He noted that he “would vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for resentencing.”
Id.
at 561, 993 P.2d at 595.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[T]he interpretation of a statute ... is a question of law reviewable
de novo.” State v. Arceo,
84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (quoting
State v. Camara,
81 Hawai'i 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)).
See also State v. Toyomura,
80 Hawai'i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995);
State v. Higa,
79 Hawai'i 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930,
reconsider
ation denied,
79 Hawai'i 341, 902 P.2d 976 (1995);
State v. Nakata,
76 Hawai'i 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704,
reconsideration denied,
76 Hawai'i 453, 879 P.2d 558 (1994),
cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 1095, 130 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1995).
Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court,
84 Hawai'i 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original).
See also State v. Soto,
84 Hawai'i 229, 236, 933 P.2d 66, 73 (1997).
Brown v. Thompson,
91 Hawai'i 1, 9, 979 P.2d 586, 594 (1999) (quoting
State v. Dudoit,
90 Hawai'i 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting
State v. Stocker,
90 Hawai'i 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05 (1999) (quoting
Ho v. Leftwich,
88 Hawai'i 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d 793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting
Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan,
87 Hawai'i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28 (1998))))) (ellipsis points and brackets in original).
III.
DISCUSSION
Riveira contends that the ICA “gravely erred in concluding that Mr. Ri-veira’s juvenile adjudication constituted a conviction for purposes of applying the repeat offender sentencing provision for the offense of driving without no-fault insurance.” Riveira’s contention has merit. We agree that the following items are troubling: (1) the ICA majority’s express disregard of the plain language of HRS § 571-1,
see supra
note 2, which provides that a juvenile adjudication is
not
a conviction; (2) the ICA majority’s narrow reading of
Sylva;
and (3) the fact that the ICA’s majority opinion opens the way for adult penalties to be applied as a matter of regular course to any offense committed by a juvenile. The dissent addresses these concerns succinctly and clearly.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we (1) reverse the ICA majority’s discussion and conclusion regarding the treatment of juvenile adjudications as convictions, (2) adopt the dissent, (3) leave undisturbed the ICA majority’s discussion of jurisdiction, (4) vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction, and (5) remand the case for resentenc-ing.