SMITH, Justice.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of the indictable misdemeanor of failure to stop his motor vehicle at the scene of an accident and to render aid and furnish information, after striking and injuring two persons, in violation of the provisions of I.C. §§ 49-516.1 and 49-516.3.
Appellant on his appeal from the judgment of conviction and from the prder denying his motion in arrest of judgment, has saved for review the question of the sufficiency of .the information to charge a public offense.
The charging part of the information reads:
“That the said defendant, at and in Twin Falls County, State of I.daho, and on or about the 10th day of July, í'955, then and there being, did, then .and [78]*78there drive a certain Plymouth automobile in a westerly direction on U. S. Highway No. 30 and at point on U. S. Highway No. 30 approximately 31/2 miles east of Murtaugh, Idaho, did strike and injure, with said Plymouth automobile, one R. L. Brown and one E. R. Noble. That the said Archie Parish thereafter failed to stop at or near the scene of the accident and failed to give aid to the injured or inform anyone at the scene of the accident of his name, address or registration number of said Plymouth automobile.”
I.C. § 49-516.1, under which the information was intended to be drawn, in part, reads:
“(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible and shall then forthwith return to, and in every event remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirement of section 49.516.3 * * *,
“(b) .Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall upon conviction be punished * *
I.C. § 49-516.3 requires the driver of a motor vehicle involved in such an accident to give his' name, address and motor vehicle registration number and to render aid to the injured.
I.C., sec. 49-516.1 does not expressly set forth the requisite of knowledge on the part of the driver, of the accident resulting in injury to another person; nor does the information allege such knowledge on the part of appellant driver.
Appellant contends that the information is fatally defective because it fails to allege, as an essential element of the offense, knowledge on the part of appellant, accused driver, of an accident resulting in injury to Brown and Noble, and his subsequent failure to stop and render aid. Appellant raised that question at the time of commencement of the trial before respondent had introduced any evidence, and thereafter by his motions, for a directed verdict, in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial.
I.C. § 18-114 reads:
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.”
In State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, 460, the “intent” as used in the aforesaid section of the statute is construed to mean, “not an intent to commit a crime but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to perform the required act.” People v. Maggio, 90 Cal.App. [79]*79683, 266 P. 813, 815, holds that the intent “which need be proved is that involved in the knowledge of the facts requiring that the vehicle stop and that aid be rendered.”
The courts of the State of California from time to time have construed its motor vehicle “hit and run” laws, similar in import to Idaho’s statute. The present California law reads in part as follows:
“The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to * * * or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle * * * and shall fulfill the requirements of Section 482(a)." West’s Ann.Cal. Vehicle Code, § 480.
The holdings of California courts, which we deem decisive of the questions raised in this case, are to the effect that knowledge is an essential element of the offense, though the statute does not expressly require knowledge on the part of an accused driver, of the accident resulting in injury to another person. People v. Fodera, 33 Cal.App. 8, 164 P. 22; People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914; People v. Leutholtz, 102 Cal.App. 493, 283 P. 292; People v. Pahner, 10 Cal.App.2d 294, 51 P.2d 1143; People v. Odom, 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 66 P.2d 206; People v. Henry, 23 Cal.App.2d 155, 72 P.2d 915; People v. Dallas, 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 109 P.2d 409; People v. Kuhn, 139 Cal.App.2d 109, 292 P.2d 964. In People v. Fodera, supra, it is stated [33 Cal.App. 8, 164 P. 25]:
"* * * our reading of the section in question convinces us that the element of knowledge of the fact of the collision is necessarily to be implied from the requirements of the act, to the effect that drivers of such vehicles must stop- and render aid to those who may possibly have been injured in the collision. Moreover section 20 of the Penal Code, which is to be read together with and into the section under review, provides that ‘in every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.’ ”
In People v. Graves, 74 Cal.App. 415, 240 P. 1019, 1020, appears the following:
“ * * * it is inconceivable to us that the Legislature ever intended to make the provisions of this section applicable to a person who was ignorant of the fact that the automobile which he was driving had struck another person. And it is with equal difficulty that we can bring our minds to believe that any jury would convict an accused of the violation of the provisions of said section, without being assured to a certainty that he had actual knowledge that his machine had struck a person * *
In People v. Rallo, 119 Cal.App. 393, 6 P.2d 516, 520, it is said:
[80]*80“ * * * One may not be deemed to be criminally guilty of failing to render aid to an injured person when he is ignorant of the fact that injury has been inflicted. The gist of this offense is the willful omission to render reasonable assistance to one who has been injured,” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914; People v. Leutholtz, supra.
Knowledge on the part of the accused of the accident resulting in injury to another person does not require a showing by. the state, by direct testimony, that the accused actually knew that the motor vehicle he was driving had struck some one. All of the facts and circumstances indicative of-knowledge of such an accident may be considered by the jury in its determination of the fact of knowledge. In People v. Pahner, supra, it is stated [10 Cal.App.2d 294, 51 P.2d 1144]:
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SMITH, Justice.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of the indictable misdemeanor of failure to stop his motor vehicle at the scene of an accident and to render aid and furnish information, after striking and injuring two persons, in violation of the provisions of I.C. §§ 49-516.1 and 49-516.3.
Appellant on his appeal from the judgment of conviction and from the prder denying his motion in arrest of judgment, has saved for review the question of the sufficiency of .the information to charge a public offense.
The charging part of the information reads:
“That the said defendant, at and in Twin Falls County, State of I.daho, and on or about the 10th day of July, í'955, then and there being, did, then .and [78]*78there drive a certain Plymouth automobile in a westerly direction on U. S. Highway No. 30 and at point on U. S. Highway No. 30 approximately 31/2 miles east of Murtaugh, Idaho, did strike and injure, with said Plymouth automobile, one R. L. Brown and one E. R. Noble. That the said Archie Parish thereafter failed to stop at or near the scene of the accident and failed to give aid to the injured or inform anyone at the scene of the accident of his name, address or registration number of said Plymouth automobile.”
I.C. § 49-516.1, under which the information was intended to be drawn, in part, reads:
“(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible and shall then forthwith return to, and in every event remain at, the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirement of section 49.516.3 * * *,
“(b) .Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances shall upon conviction be punished * *
I.C. § 49-516.3 requires the driver of a motor vehicle involved in such an accident to give his' name, address and motor vehicle registration number and to render aid to the injured.
I.C., sec. 49-516.1 does not expressly set forth the requisite of knowledge on the part of the driver, of the accident resulting in injury to another person; nor does the information allege such knowledge on the part of appellant driver.
Appellant contends that the information is fatally defective because it fails to allege, as an essential element of the offense, knowledge on the part of appellant, accused driver, of an accident resulting in injury to Brown and Noble, and his subsequent failure to stop and render aid. Appellant raised that question at the time of commencement of the trial before respondent had introduced any evidence, and thereafter by his motions, for a directed verdict, in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial.
I.C. § 18-114 reads:
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.”
In State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, 460, the “intent” as used in the aforesaid section of the statute is construed to mean, “not an intent to commit a crime but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to perform the required act.” People v. Maggio, 90 Cal.App. [79]*79683, 266 P. 813, 815, holds that the intent “which need be proved is that involved in the knowledge of the facts requiring that the vehicle stop and that aid be rendered.”
The courts of the State of California from time to time have construed its motor vehicle “hit and run” laws, similar in import to Idaho’s statute. The present California law reads in part as follows:
“The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to * * * or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle * * * and shall fulfill the requirements of Section 482(a)." West’s Ann.Cal. Vehicle Code, § 480.
The holdings of California courts, which we deem decisive of the questions raised in this case, are to the effect that knowledge is an essential element of the offense, though the statute does not expressly require knowledge on the part of an accused driver, of the accident resulting in injury to another person. People v. Fodera, 33 Cal.App. 8, 164 P. 22; People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914; People v. Leutholtz, 102 Cal.App. 493, 283 P. 292; People v. Pahner, 10 Cal.App.2d 294, 51 P.2d 1143; People v. Odom, 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 66 P.2d 206; People v. Henry, 23 Cal.App.2d 155, 72 P.2d 915; People v. Dallas, 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 109 P.2d 409; People v. Kuhn, 139 Cal.App.2d 109, 292 P.2d 964. In People v. Fodera, supra, it is stated [33 Cal.App. 8, 164 P. 25]:
"* * * our reading of the section in question convinces us that the element of knowledge of the fact of the collision is necessarily to be implied from the requirements of the act, to the effect that drivers of such vehicles must stop- and render aid to those who may possibly have been injured in the collision. Moreover section 20 of the Penal Code, which is to be read together with and into the section under review, provides that ‘in every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.’ ”
In People v. Graves, 74 Cal.App. 415, 240 P. 1019, 1020, appears the following:
“ * * * it is inconceivable to us that the Legislature ever intended to make the provisions of this section applicable to a person who was ignorant of the fact that the automobile which he was driving had struck another person. And it is with equal difficulty that we can bring our minds to believe that any jury would convict an accused of the violation of the provisions of said section, without being assured to a certainty that he had actual knowledge that his machine had struck a person * *
In People v. Rallo, 119 Cal.App. 393, 6 P.2d 516, 520, it is said:
[80]*80“ * * * One may not be deemed to be criminally guilty of failing to render aid to an injured person when he is ignorant of the fact that injury has been inflicted. The gist of this offense is the willful omission to render reasonable assistance to one who has been injured,” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also People v. Scofield, 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914; People v. Leutholtz, supra.
Knowledge on the part of the accused of the accident resulting in injury to another person does not require a showing by. the state, by direct testimony, that the accused actually knew that the motor vehicle he was driving had struck some one. All of the facts and circumstances indicative of-knowledge of such an accident may be considered by the jury in its determination of the fact of knowledge. In People v. Pahner, supra, it is stated [10 Cal.App.2d 294, 51 P.2d 1144]:
“It is hardly to be expected that direct testimony could be obtained in such a case as this to the effect that a defendant knew that he had injured another person. From the nature of the case, such knowledge on the part of a driver, although a necessary element of the offense, must usually be proved by showing the surrounding facts and circumstances' which indicate such a knowledge.”
See also People v. Fodera, supra; People v. Graves, supra; People v. Leutholtz, supra; People v. Henry, supra; People v. Dallas, supra; People v. Kuhn, supra; State v. Kuchan, 47 N.M. 209, 139 P.2d 592.
An information sufficiently charges knowledge on the part of the accused driver of an automobile involved in an accident causing injury to another person, if it charges the wilful commission of the acts constituting the offense. In People v. Odom, supra, the information while not alleging actual knowledge on the part of the accused driver, in effect did charge that the accused wilfully and unlawfully drove a motor vehicle so as to be involved in an accident causing injury and death to another person. The California Court held [19 Cal.App.2d 641, 66 P.2d 209]:
“To charge that the defendant willfully drove the machine in such a manner as to cause the injury or death of a person, in effect alleges that he knowingly drove it so as to cause the injury or death of the individual. To allege that one knowingly operated a machine in such a manner as to kill or injure another person is equivalent to saying he knew that he had injured or killed the person by the manner in which he drove the machine.
“An information which charges that a person ‘willfully and unlawfully’ performed an' act is equivalent to alleging that he knowingly' did so, and [81]*81thus supplies the element of knowledge of the unlawful act * * *.
“ ‘* * * “To do a thing willfully is to do it by design with set purpose.” People v. Sheldon, 68 Cal. 434, 437, 9 P. 457, 459. To do a thing willfully is to do it knowingly. People v. Swiggy, 69 Cal.App. 574, 581, 232 P. 174; 4 Words and Phrases, Second Series, p. 1304; * * *.’”
See also People v. Dallas, supra; 94 C.J.S. Willful, Willfully p. 620; 45 Words and Phrases, Willful, Willfully, p. 186.
In State v. Love, 76 Idaho 378, 381, 283 P.2d 925, 926, this Court quoted with approval from People v. Williams, 27 Cal.2d 220, 163 P.2d 692, 695, as follows:
“ ‘Of course, it is elementary that every fact or circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged must be alleged and proved, and the proof must correspond with the allegations in the pleading. But technical or trifling matters of discrepancy will not furnish ground for reversal. Under the generally accepted rule in criminal law a variance is not regarded as material unless it is of such a substantive character as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense, or is likely to place him in second jeopardy for the same offense.’ ”
-The matter of knowledge on the part of the accused, under consideration here, cannot be classified as technical .or trifling, or one of variance, since knowledge appears to be a necessary element of the crime attempted to be charged, and knowledge was not alleged.
Further, I.C. § 19-2132 charges the trial judge with the duty of instructing the jurors on what he believes to be “matters of law necessary for their information.” His stock instructions, given on his own motion, are intended to state the fundamental principles of law applicable in all criminal cases, and additionally, “to advise the jury as to the nature and elements of the crime charged.” State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 78, 88 P.2d 493, 497. Here, the trial court did not and could not advise the jury as to the element of knowledge as an essential element of the crime in the information alleged to have been committed, because knowledge was not so alleged as ail element of the crime.
The information, since it fails to charge knowledge on the part of appellant as an essential element of the offense, defined by I.C. § 49-516.1, is fatally defective, inasmuch as it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense.
We deem it unnecessary to dispose of appellant’s remaining specifications of error.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to set said judgment aside, and to grant leave to respondent to file an amend[82]*82ed information, and to proceed further in the premises.
KEETON, C. J., and PORTER and McQUADE, JJ., concur.