Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, and LEVY, JJ.
Dissent: SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.
CLIFFORD J.
[¶ 1] The State of Maine appeals from the order of the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) granting Brent L. McKeen’s motion to suppress all of the evidence in the operating under the influence case brought against him. Because we agree with the State that the Superior Court erred when it determined that 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(G) (2008)1 violates the Fourth Amendment by authorizing game wardens to stop any all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and granted McKeen’s motion to suppress, we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Game Warden Joshua Smith testified as follows at the hearing on McKeen’s motion to suppress. At approximately midnight on August 12, 2007, Warden Smith and a Maine State Trooper [384]*384were having a conversation outside of a convenience store located on the corner of Routes 1 and 1A in Mars Hill. Two ATVs approached the intersection of Routes 1 and 1A, and then each proceeded on a different path. Smith proceeded after McKeen and stopped him in order to check his registration and safety equipment.2 Smith had no specific suspicion of any criminal activity on the part of McKeen prior to the stop.
[¶ 3] Smith approached the ATV and asked McKeen to furnish his certificate of registration. As McKeen searched for his registration, Smith observed that McKeen’s movements were slow, his speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Smith also noticed a beer can in one of the compartments that McKeen had opened. After McKeen performed field sobriety tests, Smith arrested McKeen and ultimately charged him with operating an ATV while under the influence (Class D), 12 M.R.S. § 10701(1-A)(D)(2) (2008).
[¶ 4] McKeen moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure. The Superior Court held a hearing, and ultimately granted McKeen’s motion to suppress on the grounds that the warden’s stop was constitutionally unreasonable and violated McKeen’s Fourth Amendment rights. Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1), (5) (2008), the State obtained permission from the Attorney General and filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 5] The parties agree that 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(G) gives the warden authority to stop McKeen’s ATV. They disagree, however, about the constitutionality of the statute. “We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, beginning with the presumption of the statute’s constitutionality.” State v. Malpher, 2008 ME 32, ¶ 18, 947 A.2d 484, 488. As the person challenging the statute, the burden is on McKeen to establish the statute’s infirmity. See Kenny v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 1999 ME 158, ¶ 7, 740 A.2d 560, 563.
[¶ 6] Pursuant to 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(G), wardens are authorized to:
Stop and examine any all-terrain vehicle to ascertain whether it is being operated in compliance with chapter 939 or any other provision of this Part regulating ATVs, demand and inspect the operator’s certificate of registration and, when appropriate, demand and inspect evidence that the operator has satisfactorily completed a training course as required by section 13152.3
[¶ 7] The Legislature authorized ATV stops, such as the one that occurred here, based on its finding expressed in the statute that “activities associated with ATVs constitute a more intrusive use of private property open to recreational use by the public than do other recreational activities, and that abusive uses of ATVs puts access to private property for recre[385]*385ational use at risk.” 12 M.R.S. § 13156-A (2008). In enacting section 10353(2)(G), the Legislature recognized the importance of assuring that private property in Maine continues to be available for recreational use. Maine’s recreation industry, which plays a vital role in the State’s economy, depends on the continued willingness of the owners of private property to allow their land to be used for activities such as hunting, fishing, cross-country skiing, and snowmobiling.
[¶ 8] As the Legislature has found, ATV use — or misuse — puts such access to private land at risk. If private landowners lack confidence in the State’s efforts to protect their land, they will prohibit the public’s access to it. Section 10353(2)(G) is vital to the State’s efforts, and thus to the sustainability of our recreation industry, because it allows wardens to stop ATVs with or without reasonable articulable suspicion in order to assure that they are being operated in accordance with the laws of the State.
[¶ 9] McKeen argues that section 10353(2)(G) is unnecessary to ensure compliance with the laws regulating the operation of ATVs. McKeen contends that a warden does not have to actually stop an ATV to confirm that it is properly registered because the “highly-visable, large registration stickers” are sufficient for a warden to ascertain whether the ATV is properly registered.
[¶ 10] Consistent with the legislative finding that ATV use intrudes on private property and puts the recreational use of private property at risk, ATVs are subject to a myriad of regulations, which are currently codified at 12 M.R.S. §§ 13151-13161 (2008). Although in most cases a warden could ascertain, without stopping an ATV, whether the ATV is properly registered, and whether the operator is in compliance with some of the safety regulations, not all of the requirements set forth in sections 13151 to 13161 can be checked without an actual stop.
[¶ 11] For example, children as young as nine years old can operate ATVs, but only if they complete a proper training program. 12 M.R.S. § 13152(2). Operation of ATVs by untrained children poses a serious risk to the safety of children as well as a risk of damage to private land, and there is no way to check a child’s age and to determine whether the child has completed the requisite training without stopping the ATV. Additionally, an ATV operator must obtain permission from a private landowner before traveling on that person’s land. 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(1-A). In fact, ATV operators are required to stop and identify themselves at the request of the landowner. 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(2). An ATV operator also needs permission before operating on snowmobile trails. 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(4); see also 12 M.R.S. § 13107 (2008). It is difficult for a warden to verify such permission without stopping the ATV.
[¶ 12] Other safety regulations that would be difficult or impossible to check without actually stopping the ATV include the requirement that operators younger than eighteen years old wear protective headgear, 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(13), the requirement that ATVs be equipped with certain noise devices and spark arresters, 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(15), and the prohibition on carrying a snorkel kit or other equipment designed to allow the ATV to be used in deep water without the permission of the landowner, 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(26). These regulations are directly related to the intrusiveness of ATVs on private property and the safety risks they pose if operated improperly. Section 10353(2)(G) makes it possible for wardens to effectively enforce these regulations. If wardens are stripped of the authority to [386]*386stop ATVs without articulable suspicion, the regulations become much less effective.
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Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, and LEVY, JJ.
Dissent: SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.
CLIFFORD J.
[¶ 1] The State of Maine appeals from the order of the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Hunter, J.) granting Brent L. McKeen’s motion to suppress all of the evidence in the operating under the influence case brought against him. Because we agree with the State that the Superior Court erred when it determined that 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(G) (2008)1 violates the Fourth Amendment by authorizing game wardens to stop any all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and granted McKeen’s motion to suppress, we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Game Warden Joshua Smith testified as follows at the hearing on McKeen’s motion to suppress. At approximately midnight on August 12, 2007, Warden Smith and a Maine State Trooper [384]*384were having a conversation outside of a convenience store located on the corner of Routes 1 and 1A in Mars Hill. Two ATVs approached the intersection of Routes 1 and 1A, and then each proceeded on a different path. Smith proceeded after McKeen and stopped him in order to check his registration and safety equipment.2 Smith had no specific suspicion of any criminal activity on the part of McKeen prior to the stop.
[¶ 3] Smith approached the ATV and asked McKeen to furnish his certificate of registration. As McKeen searched for his registration, Smith observed that McKeen’s movements were slow, his speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Smith also noticed a beer can in one of the compartments that McKeen had opened. After McKeen performed field sobriety tests, Smith arrested McKeen and ultimately charged him with operating an ATV while under the influence (Class D), 12 M.R.S. § 10701(1-A)(D)(2) (2008).
[¶ 4] McKeen moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure. The Superior Court held a hearing, and ultimately granted McKeen’s motion to suppress on the grounds that the warden’s stop was constitutionally unreasonable and violated McKeen’s Fourth Amendment rights. Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1), (5) (2008), the State obtained permission from the Attorney General and filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 5] The parties agree that 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(G) gives the warden authority to stop McKeen’s ATV. They disagree, however, about the constitutionality of the statute. “We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, beginning with the presumption of the statute’s constitutionality.” State v. Malpher, 2008 ME 32, ¶ 18, 947 A.2d 484, 488. As the person challenging the statute, the burden is on McKeen to establish the statute’s infirmity. See Kenny v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 1999 ME 158, ¶ 7, 740 A.2d 560, 563.
[¶ 6] Pursuant to 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(G), wardens are authorized to:
Stop and examine any all-terrain vehicle to ascertain whether it is being operated in compliance with chapter 939 or any other provision of this Part regulating ATVs, demand and inspect the operator’s certificate of registration and, when appropriate, demand and inspect evidence that the operator has satisfactorily completed a training course as required by section 13152.3
[¶ 7] The Legislature authorized ATV stops, such as the one that occurred here, based on its finding expressed in the statute that “activities associated with ATVs constitute a more intrusive use of private property open to recreational use by the public than do other recreational activities, and that abusive uses of ATVs puts access to private property for recre[385]*385ational use at risk.” 12 M.R.S. § 13156-A (2008). In enacting section 10353(2)(G), the Legislature recognized the importance of assuring that private property in Maine continues to be available for recreational use. Maine’s recreation industry, which plays a vital role in the State’s economy, depends on the continued willingness of the owners of private property to allow their land to be used for activities such as hunting, fishing, cross-country skiing, and snowmobiling.
[¶ 8] As the Legislature has found, ATV use — or misuse — puts such access to private land at risk. If private landowners lack confidence in the State’s efforts to protect their land, they will prohibit the public’s access to it. Section 10353(2)(G) is vital to the State’s efforts, and thus to the sustainability of our recreation industry, because it allows wardens to stop ATVs with or without reasonable articulable suspicion in order to assure that they are being operated in accordance with the laws of the State.
[¶ 9] McKeen argues that section 10353(2)(G) is unnecessary to ensure compliance with the laws regulating the operation of ATVs. McKeen contends that a warden does not have to actually stop an ATV to confirm that it is properly registered because the “highly-visable, large registration stickers” are sufficient for a warden to ascertain whether the ATV is properly registered.
[¶ 10] Consistent with the legislative finding that ATV use intrudes on private property and puts the recreational use of private property at risk, ATVs are subject to a myriad of regulations, which are currently codified at 12 M.R.S. §§ 13151-13161 (2008). Although in most cases a warden could ascertain, without stopping an ATV, whether the ATV is properly registered, and whether the operator is in compliance with some of the safety regulations, not all of the requirements set forth in sections 13151 to 13161 can be checked without an actual stop.
[¶ 11] For example, children as young as nine years old can operate ATVs, but only if they complete a proper training program. 12 M.R.S. § 13152(2). Operation of ATVs by untrained children poses a serious risk to the safety of children as well as a risk of damage to private land, and there is no way to check a child’s age and to determine whether the child has completed the requisite training without stopping the ATV. Additionally, an ATV operator must obtain permission from a private landowner before traveling on that person’s land. 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(1-A). In fact, ATV operators are required to stop and identify themselves at the request of the landowner. 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(2). An ATV operator also needs permission before operating on snowmobile trails. 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(4); see also 12 M.R.S. § 13107 (2008). It is difficult for a warden to verify such permission without stopping the ATV.
[¶ 12] Other safety regulations that would be difficult or impossible to check without actually stopping the ATV include the requirement that operators younger than eighteen years old wear protective headgear, 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(13), the requirement that ATVs be equipped with certain noise devices and spark arresters, 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(15), and the prohibition on carrying a snorkel kit or other equipment designed to allow the ATV to be used in deep water without the permission of the landowner, 12 M.R.S. § 13157-A(26). These regulations are directly related to the intrusiveness of ATVs on private property and the safety risks they pose if operated improperly. Section 10353(2)(G) makes it possible for wardens to effectively enforce these regulations. If wardens are stripped of the authority to [386]*386stop ATVs without articulable suspicion, the regulations become much less effective.
[¶ 13] Moreover, the difficulty in preventing ATV operators from damaging private property is compounded by the great utility of ATVs. Standard motor vehicles and trucks, whose use is limited — both legally and practically — to roads and highways, are subject to supervision by local, county, and State law enforcement officers. In contrast, ATVs are operated — legally and practically — off road, on land throughout the State, and the regulation of ATVs across a wider expanse of area is primarily left to a limited number of wardens. Provisions allowing wardens to stop watercraft, 12 M.R.S. § 1Q353(2)(F) (2008), and snowmobiles, 12 M.R.S. § 10353(2)(H) (2008), without articulable suspicion are necessary for this same reason.
[¶ 14] The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that there are circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment protections may be limited. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). Often, these circumstances involve stops by wardens and others who are charged with promoting safety and protecting natural resources. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (clarifying that restrictions on motor vehicle stops as set out in Prouse do not cast any “constitutional shadow upon the necessarily somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens in the performance of their duties”).
[¶ 15] We, along with courts in other states, have also recognized the limitations of the Fourth Amendment’s reach regarding wardens and other officers whose duties include patrolling and protecting vast territories, such as waterways and wooded areas. See, e.g., State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 193 (Me.1996) (noting the “special exigencies of sea travel” in upholding the routine stop of a boat without articula-ble suspicion); State v. Sherburne, 571 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Me.1990) (upholding the use of road blocks by game wardens to enforce fishing laws due to the State’s substantial interest in protecting natural resources); see also State v. Layton, 196 Ill.App.3d 78, 142 Ill.Dec. 539, 552 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (1990) (stating that “[t]he roving conservation officer patrol stopping hunters, encountered in the field ... does not violate the fourth amendment” because hunters are deemed to have consented to some intrusions when they get a hunting license or hunt without one); State v. Boyer, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771, 775 (2002) (holding that “a game warden may request production of a valid hunting or fishing license when the circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual has been engaged in those activities”).
[¶ 16] In the cases cited above, courts have articulated the need to preserve natural resources so that generations to come can enjoy these resources. Section 10353(2)(G) aims to preserve one type of these valuable resources — the thousands of acres of land in Maine owned by private individuals but available for recreational use by the public. Because ATVs are designed, regulated, and primarily used for off-road recreation, and given the State’s legitimate and substantial interest in its natural resources and the safety of all involved, operators like McKeen have a limited expectation of privacy, even though some operators may use ATVs as a mode of transportation. The intrusiveness of the stops authorized by section 10353(2)(G) is minimal when compared with the State’s legitimate and substantial interests in regulating ATVs. McKeen has not met his burden to demonstrate the statute’s uncon[387]*387stitutionality, and his motion to suppress must be denied.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of an order denying McKeen’s motion to suppress, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.