Chaput v. Sawyer

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 6, 2024
DocketKENre-22-45
StatusUnpublished

This text of Chaput v. Sawyer (Chaput v. Sawyer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chaput v. Sawyer, (Me. Super. Ct. 2024).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE-22-45

SHANE CHAPUT, etal,

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS

CHRISTOPHER S. SAWYER, et al.,

Defendants.

Nee Nee ee eee ee” ee” eee”

Plaintiffs (Shane and Rosemarie Chaput, Woodland Camp Condo Association, and Tall Pines Trust, hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) seek reconsideration of the court’s decision dated February 17, 2023, ordering the joinder of additional parties. For the following reasons, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

BACKGROUND

The initial complaint in this case, docketed on August 29, 2022, named as defendants Christopher Sawyer and Alanna York (“York Defendants”). Plaintiffs and the York Defendants own property on a peninsula that protrudes out into Great Pond in Belgrade, Maine. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, in part, sought a declaratory judgment as to the parties’ rights in two private roadways that access Plaintiffs’ and the York Defendants’ properties: Chester Thwing Road and New Woodland

Camp Road. On September 14, 2022, the York Defendants filed a motion seeking either dismissal of the complaint for failure to join necessary parties or, in the alternative, joinder of the necessary parties pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). On February 23, 2023, the court (Cashman, J.) denied the motion to dismiss, but granted the joinder motion in part, ordering Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint joining as necessary parties the owners of properties situated to the north of the York Defendants’ property on the peninsula (“Other Peninsula Owners”) and the owners of properties over which Chester Thwing Road runs (“Chester Thwing Owners’) (collectively, “Other Property Owners’).

On April 25, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint naming the Other Property Owners as parties-in-interest. On May 12, 2023, the York Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint because Plaintiffs had not named the necessary parties as plaintiffs or defendants. On August 1, 2023, the court denied the motion to dismiss, but ordered Plaintiffs to amend their complaint again to name the newly joined parties as defendants rather than parties-in-interest.

Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on August 16, 2023, this time naming the Other Property Owners as defendants in the action.! On August 30, the court issued an order giving Plaintiffs 90 days from the filing of the Second

Amended Complaint to serve the additional parties.

1 The Second Amended Complaint joins a total of 39 Other Property Owners as defendants. On November 2, 2023, Plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider its previous order joining the Other Property Owners. The York Defendants have opposed the motion. On November 16, 2023, with the agreement of Plaintiffs and the York Defendants, the court stayed the deadlines in this case pending further order of the court.

It appears from the court’s records that service on the Other Property Owners is now complete, although the court seeks confirmation from Plaintiffs that this is the case. The court has received three motions to dismiss from Other Property Owner Defendants.” Plaintiffs do not oppose the motions; the York Defendants take no position. The court has not received answers from most of the Other Property Owner Defendants.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s previous order of joinder pursuant to MR. Civ. P. 7(b)(5). See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass’n as Tr. for RASC 2005KS9 v. Manning, 2020 ME 42, § 31, 228 A.3d 726 (explaining that Rule

7(b)(5) governs a motion to reconsider an order that is not a final judgment).3 A

2 The court has received motions to dismiss from Holly Smith and James Smith; Steve Tagtmeier and Katherine Tagtmeier; and Steven Arnold.

3 Plaintiffs also cite M.R. Civ. 60(b) as a basis for their motion. See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (permitting the court to relieve a party from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding for...any ... reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”) That rule, however, applies by its terms to final judgments. See Merrill uv. Merrill, 449 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1982) (explaining that Rule 60(b) “permits the court ... to relieve a party from final judgment for any of the six reasons articulated motion for reconsideration of an order “shall not be filed unless required to bring to the court’s attention an error, omission or new material that could not previously have been presented.” M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5). “Rule 7(b)(5) is intended to deter disappointed litigants from seeking ‘to reargue points that were or could have been presented to the court on the underlying motion.” Shaw v. Shaw, 2003 ME 153, § 8, 839 A.2d 714 (quoting M.R. Civ. P. 7, Advisory Committee’s Notes (May 1, 2000)); see Roalsuik v. Comack, 2019 ME 71, § 3, 208 A.3d 367 (affirming the denial of a motion for reconsideration when the motion presented “allegations of events that occurred only after the hearing was held and the record was closed”).

Here, Plaintiffs, relying on several Law Court cases‘, argue that while the Other Property Owners may be proper parties to the litigation, they are neither necessary nor indispensable parties. Pl. Mot. 9. Plaintiffs acknowledge “the lack of a Law Court case” addressing a key question here: “whether all persons who hold an easement over servient property must be joined as necessary parties in a suit by one of them to enforce that easement.” Id.

The court has reviewed the cases Plaintiffs cite and has concluded that

Plaintiffs’ motion ultimately is an attempt to reargue points that were made in its

in the rule”); see also Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, § 18, 955 A.2d 202 (“Relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary remedy that may be granted only

when the more particularized circumstances set out in the other subsections of Rule 60(b) do not apply.”).

4 Plaintiffs’ motion explores, among other cases, Avaunt v. Town of Gray, 634 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Me. 1993), Sleeper v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, 83 A.3d 769, Sanseverino v. Gregor, 2011 ME 8, 10 A.3d 735, and Muher v. Broad Cove Shore Ass'n, 2009 ME 87, 968 A.2d 539. opposition to the York Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs have not identified “an error, omission or new material that could not previously have been presented.” M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5). Thus, the court finds that reconsideration is improper, and likely would lead to more confusion where dozens of Other Property Owners have now been served and joined as parties to this litigation.

Motions to Dismiss

The court must still decide whether to allow those Other Property Owners who wish to dismiss themselves from the litigation to do so. Plaintiffs do not oppose those motions to dismiss. While the York Defendants take no position, they have argued to the court that:

Joinder does not mean that the necessary parties are required to be active

participants in the litigation. If they believe that their rights are not, in fact,

imperiled by the litigation, they are absolutely free to reach their own resolution, whether by not appearing at all, settling with [Plaintiffs], or voluntarily dismissing themselves from the case.

Def. Opp. Mot. 5-6 (Nov. 22, 2023) (emphasis added).

The court agrees with this analysis. In its February 17, 2023, Order requiring joinder of the Other Property Owners, the court noted the importance of joining parties whose property and/or easement interests might be affected by the litigation.

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Related

Shaw v. Shaw
2003 ME 153 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
State v. McKeen
2009 ME 87 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2009)
Merrill v. Merrill
449 A.2d 1120 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1982)
Avaunt v. Town of Gray
634 A.2d 1258 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1993)
Sanseverino v. Gregor
2011 ME 8 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2011)
Gary Sleeper v. Donald R. Loring
2013 ME 112 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2013)
Lisa Roalsvik v. Brett Comack
2019 ME 71 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2019)
Ezell v. Lawless
2008 ME 139 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2008)
Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass'n
2009 ME 37 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Chaput v. Sawyer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chaput-v-sawyer-mesuperct-2024.