State v. Lewis

797 A.2d 1198, 2002 WL 1009816

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: May 20, 2002
• Docket: 548, 2000
• Status: Published

Opinions

WALSH, Justice,

for the Majority.

The State of Delaware (“State”) initiated this appeal from a decision of the Superior Court that denied the State’s motion to vacate an order granting the appellee, Roy Lewis’ (“Lewis”) motion for modification of sentence. The State contends that the Superior Court lacked authority under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) to modify a sentence after the terms of the sentence had expired. Even if such authority exists, the State further argues, the granting of such in this case constituted an abuse of discretion.

We conclude that the Superior Court has authority to modify a sentence under Rule 35(b) so long as collateral consequences attach to the sentence. We further conclude that the modification granted here was not an abuse of the discretion afforded by the Rule. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Lewis, a citizen of Jamaica who has resided in Delaware since 1977, pleaded guilty in 1991 to Assault Second Degree and was sentenced to eight years of Level V incarceration. The incarceration was suspended for one year of Level IV to be followed by six months of Level III probation. Lewis violated his probation in 1992 and was given a new sentence of thirty-one days at Level V and one additional year of probation. In 1999, Lewis pleaded guilty to Assault Third Degree and Menacing, and was sentenced to one year and thirty days at Level V, suspended for one year at Level III, suspended in turn after six months for the remainder at Level II.

On January 24, 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) initiated deportation proceedings against Lewis citing the offenses mentioned above and a misdemeanor drug offense that occurred in 1990. By that time, Lewis had completely served the sentences for those offenses. The United States Immigration Court ordered Lewis deported.

Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), Lewis filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence. Lewis requested that the sentence for his Assault Second conviction be reduced to eleven months at Level V, so that this conviction would no longer be in the class of criminal offenses that would make him deportable. The Superi- or Court granted the motion, reasoning that the hardship on Lewis’ family constituted “extraordinary circumstances” within the meaning of Rule 35(b). The court held that the “collateral consequences” exception for mootness as applied in Gural v. State, 251 A.2d 344 (Del.1969), provided a basis for relief under Rule 35 and thus the completion of Lewis’ sentence did not prevent the court from granting the motion.¹

II

The applicability or construction of a statute or court rule is a question of law and is subject to de novo review. Grand Ventures v. Whaley, 682 A.2d 63, 66 (Del.1993).

The State argues that the Superior Court could not reduce Lewis’ 1991 sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) because the sentence was legal in its terms, and had been fully served and discharged by the time of this petition in 2000. The rule’s purpose, it contends, is to examine the appropriateness of a sentence while it is still being served. The State further contends that since Gural was decided in 1969, the Superior Court Criminal Rules have been restructured and the exceptions to time limits more, narrowly defined. Specifically, the State maintains that Rule 61, with its equitable consideration, is the only operative rule for post-conviction relief, precluding the need for a time limit in Rule 35.

In Gural, this Court adopted the “federal rule” that “satisfaction of the sentence renders the case moot unless ... the defendant suffers collateral legal disabilities.” Gural v. State, 251 A.2d 344. In United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177 (3d. Cir.1988), the Third Circuit Court held that deportation was a collateral consequence for the purposes of the mootness exception, despite the fact that the sentencing court was not required to inform the defendant of this potential consequence of his guilty plea. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d at 179. This Court has also ruled that a defendant is not entitled to a warning of possible deportation at the time of sentencing. Christie v. State, 655 A.2d 306 (Del.1994).

The State’s argument that a sentence modification through postconviction relief is available only on the basis of a constitutional or legal defect does not acknowledge the differences in the language and funetion of Rule 35(b) and Rule 61. In Johnson v. State, 280 A.2d 712, 713 (Del.1971), this Court held that “[t]he purpose of Rule 35 is to afford a remedy in lieu of habeas corpus and coram nobis, to the defendant who claims that his conviction was obtained or his sentence imposed in violation of his constitutional guaranties.” The Superior Court Criminal rules were revised, however, in 1987, after the Johnson opinion. The former Rule 35 was replaced by Rule 61 and Rule 35 in its current form. Rule 61 addresses postconviction relief, which requires a legal challenge to the conviction, whereas Rule 35(b) allows a reduction of sentence, without regard to the legality of the conviction.

Rule 61(a)(1) provides relief only “on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or on any other ground that is a sufficient factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon a criminal sentence .... ” Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(a)(1). Moreover, the three year time limit for relief under Rule 61(i)(l) is inapplicable only when there is a claim that “there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the conviction.” Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(i)(5).²

Rule 35(b), on its face, makes a clear distinction based on the timing of the motion. The power to grant modification, in general, is limited to motions filed within 90 days of sentencing. In contrast, the rule sets no time limit for granting relief under “extraordinary circumstances.” In short, Rule 35(b) authorizes a sentencing court to modify or reduce a sentence that has expired where “extraordinary circumstances” are present. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b). Here, the Superior Court found that under the “unique set of facts presented” that “extraordinary circumstances were present.” State v. Lewis, 2000 WL 33113932, *3 (Del.Super.2000).

The plain meaning of words controls when a statute is unambiguous, and statutory interpretation is unnecessary. See Ingram v. Thorpe, 747 A.2d 545, 547 (Del.2000); Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del.1999). We find that analysis equally applicable to an interpretation of a court rule. We are aware of no policy reason that supports imposing a time requirement in the absence of clear language in the rule.

Ill

The comparison between the parameters of Rule 61 and the scope of relief under Rule 35(b) is enlightening. Rule 35(b) allows for a reduction of sentence without regard to the existence of a legal defect. Rule 35(b) states simply “[t]he court may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the sentence is imposed.” After 90 days, the court will consider an application only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Super. Ct.Crim. R. 35(b). While Rule 61 may provide relief comparable to a writ of ha-beas corpus or coram nobis, Rule 35(b), as it exists subsequent to the promulgation of Rule 61, appears on its face to permit a reduction of sentence at the discretion of the sentencing court.

The equitable considerations presently allowable under Gural are not limited to the “fairness” and “interest of justice” exceptions to Rule 61(i). Contrary to the assertion of the State in this case, Gural did not hold that a defendant can seek relief after the completion of a sentence only when there is a constitutional or legal defect alleged. In fact, Gural asserted no such defect. Rather, the Court held that collateral consequences, such as inability to engage in certain business activities or restricted civil rights, could be grounds to permit relief after the completion of a sentence. Gural, 251 A.2d 344. Such circumstantial factors are not considered under Rule 61(i) for the purposes of waiving a time limitation. The open language of Rule 35(b), however, can be plainly read as permitting such considerations.

Furthermore, Rule 61(a) allows for post-conviction relief only when the defendant is “in custody or subject to further custody” for the particular sentence being challenged. Guinn v. State, 625 A.2d 279 (Del.1993). The Guinn holding suggests, therefore, that relief after the completion of a sentence cannot be secured under Rule 61, because the language of 61(a) appears to create a standing bar. If the collateral consequences rule for mootness is to have any applicability at all, it must be available under Rule 35 as opposed to Rule 61.

Rule 35(b), as it is currently written, confers upon a sentencing trial judge considerable discretion over the appropriate grounds for a reduction of sentence. This discretion is comparable to the discretion to reduce a lawful sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247 (9th Cir.1973), the Ninth Circuit Court explained that “[i]f a lawful sentence was lawfully imposed in the first instance, then the function of Rule 35 is simply to allow the district court to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh. The motion is directed to the court’s discretion and is essentially a ‘plea for leniency.’ ” Maynard, 485 F.2d at 248 (citations omitted).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) was amended by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and is currently very different from Delaware’s Rule 35(b). While the former federal rule provided a 120 day time limit for motions to reduce a sentence, motions for a reduction of sentence may now be brought only by the government, upon a showing that the defendant rendered substantial assistance.³ See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. ,35(b). Thus, in the federal system, the discretion of judges to reduce a lawful sentence is no longer limited temporally, but is restricted to motions brought by the government. The Delaware rule, which clearly allows defendants to move for a reduction of their sentence, obviously grants trial judges broader discretion than its federal counterpart.

If we conclude, as we must, that Rule 35(b) confers authority to modify a sentence, the exercise of that authority is viewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this highly deferential standard, a reviewing court should resist a tendency to substitute its views for those of the judge exercising the initial power. The test is not whether the reviewing court would have ruled otherwise but whether the trial court acted within a zone of reasonableness or stayed within “a range of choice.” Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968 (8th Cir.1984); see also Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del.1983) (stating this Court “will not substitute its own opinions” for that of the trial judge); Chavin v. Cope, 243 A.2d 694, 695 (Del.1968) (holding that in reviewing an act of judicial discretion, “the reviewing court may not substitute its notions of what is right for those of the trial judge, if his judgment was based upon conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness”).

Here, the Superior Court identified certain factors that it viewed as constituting “extraordinary circumstances” which prompted the exercise of its discretion: “1) the nature of the original sentence; 2) the time Defendant spent actually incarcerated; 3) possible deportation of Defendant; and 4) the hardship on innocent persons that would result from Defendant’s deportation, viewed collectively.” State v. Lewis, 2000 WL 33113932, *3 (Del.Super.2000). The State contends that the risk of deportation is a federal concern within the purview of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and not a matter that should prompt a State court to exercise its authority under Rule 35(b). This argument overlooks the significance of the administrative proceeding at the federal immigration level that prompted Lewis’ Rule 35(b) motion.

On October 12, 2000, the Board of Immigration Appeals remanded Lewis’ deportation order to the Immigration Judge to permit Lewis “to apply for any relief for which he might be eligible” as a result of Lewis’ newly filed “motion for reduction of sentence.” In re Roy Henry Lewis, File No. A35 541 061 (Bd. Immigration Appeals Oct. 12, 2000). Thus, Lewis’ resort to a modification of sentence is not only permitted under the federal immigration scheme but, in this case, provided the basis for a stay in the proceeding. Presumably, when the Superior Court entered its order under Rule 35(b) it was aware that its grant of relief could affect the pending deportation proceedings and thus was a factor in determining “extraordinary circumstances.”

We conclude that the Superior Court had authority under Rule 35(b) to modify Lewis’ sentence notwithstanding its expiration, and did not abuse its discretion in granting relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

1 . Lewis also sought a modification of his June 14, 1999 sentence of one year imprisonment suspended for one year of probation. On July 17, 2000, another Superior Court judge modified that sentence to provide for a suspended period of imprisonment of ten months. Even though that sentence of imprisonment and the period of probation had also expired at the time of its modification, the State has not appealed from that order.

2 . It is worth noting that this exception under Rule 61(i)(5) is distinct from the "interest of justice" exception to Rule 61(i)(2), which bars any claim for postconviction relief not raised at a prior hearing for postconviction relief, or Rule 61(i)(4), which bars consideration of any grounds for relief that have already been adjudicated. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 61(i).

3 . The 1998 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 35 state: "[A] defendant who provides substantial assistance after the sentence has been imposed may receive a reduction of the sentence if the Government files a motion under Rule 35(b).” See also United States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945 (10th Cir.1996); White v. United States, 998 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.1993) (both stating that Rule 35(b) applies only to motions made by the government and therefore does not empower the district court to reduce a defendant's sentence on a motion by the defendant).