State v. Miller

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 1411011958
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) ID 1411011958 v. ) ) ANTOINE MILLER, ) ) Defendant. )

Date submitted: November 13, 2024 Date decided: February 6, 2025

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SENTENCE MODIFICATION

Having considered Antoine Miller’s (“Miller”) Motion for Modification

(“Motion”), for the reasons below, the Motion is DENIED.

Background

1. After a nine day trial, Miller was found guilty of Conspiracy to Commit

Racketeering (“Racketeering”), Aggravated Possession, two counts of Conspiracy

Second Degree, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.1 Miller was sentenced on

November 18, 2015, effective October 30, 2014 as follows: Racketeering: 20 years

at Level V; Aggravated Possession: 20 years at Level V to run concurrent with the

Racketeering charge; Conspiracy 2nd (first charge): 2 years at Level V suspended for

2 years Level IV DOC Discretion; Conspiracy 2nd (second charge): 2 years Level V,

1 D.I. 52. 1 suspended for 2 years Level III; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia: 6 months Level

V, suspended for 1 year Level III.2

2. On November 18, 2015, the Court entered its sentencing order, stating

in the notes that: “[i]f defendant has a good disciplinary record, he works to further

his education imprisoned and he has a solid, verified plan for work and life after

release, he should get serious consideration. [...] Court retains jurisdiction. This

sentence should be seriously considered in five years.”3

3. On November 15, 2019, Miller filed a Motion for Modification seeking

to reduce his Level V time for Level IV Home Confinement and Level III probation.4

In support, Milled stated that per the original sentencing order, his sentence was ripe

for review now that five years had passed since being sentenced. The Court denied

the request on April 15, 2020 stating that though Miller had shown immense growth

through his completion of many programs during his incarceration, and showed

genuine remorse for his actions, Miller had repeatedly turned to a life of crime,

despite his significant criminal history and substantial periods of incarceration prior

to this sentence. The Court concluded that “if Miller seeks in the future to have his

prison sentence shortened, 11 Del. C. § 4217 is the appropriate vehicle to do so.”5

2 Id. 3 D.I. 52. 4 D.I. 80. 5 D.I. 84. 2 4. On October 31, 2024, Miller filed the Motion requesting that five years

of the Level V portion his sentence be suspended for 1 year at Level IV DOC

Discretion, followed by decreasing levels of probation.6 In support of the Motion,

Miller states that in the five years since his last modification request, he has remained

“nearly disciplinary free” and completed a plethora of programming while

incarcerated.7

Standard of Review

5. Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that the Court “may reduce a sentence of

imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the sentence is imposed.” The

purpose of the rule is to allow the sentencing judge “‘a second chance to consider

whether the initial sentence is appropriate.’”8 In this 90-day period, the Court retains

broad discretion to decide whether the sentence should be altered.9

6. To promote finality of judgments, the Court will consider a Rule 35(b)

motion after the 90-day period “only in extraordinary circumstances” or when the

DOC files an application pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217.10 A petitioner bears a heavy

burden to show “extraordinary circumstances,” which are circumstances that

“‘specifically justify the delay’, are ‘entirely beyond a petitioner’s control’; and

6 D.I. 86 7 Id. 8 State v. Tollis, 126 A.3d 1117, 1120 (Del. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). 9 Id. 10 Id. at 1121. 3 ‘have prevented the [petitioner] from seeking the remedy on a timely basis.’”11 “And

for the purposes of Rule 35(b), ‘extraordinary circumstances’ have been found only

‘when [the petitioner] faces some genuinely compelling change in circumstances

that makes a resentencing urgent.’”12 It is well-settled that “exemplary conduct

and/or successful rehabilitation while imprisoned do not qualify as ‘extraordinary

circumstances’” under Rule 35.13

7. “While participation in rehabilitation programs is commendable, it is

well-settled that such participation, in and of itself, is insufficient to merit

substantive review of an untimely motion for sentence reduction” under Rule

35(b).14 This is because “rehabilitative efforts are ‘entirely [within] a petitioner’s

control.’”15 Additionally, modification of a sentence based on “rehabilitation of the

offender” is separately provided for in Section 4217.16

8. Finally, Rule 35(b) provides that the Court “will not consider repetitive

requests for reduction of sentence.”

11 State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. 2015) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); State v. Jones, 2020 WL 4483673, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 4, 2020) (extraordinary circumstances are “[a] highly unusual set of facts that are not commonly associated with a particular thing or event.” (citation omitted)). 12 Jones, 2020 WL 4483673, at *2 (quoting State v. Thomas, 220 A.3d 257, 262 (Del. Super. 2019) (citation omitted)). 13 State v. Liket, 2002 WL 31133101, at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 25, 2002); State v. Lindsey, 2020 WL 4038015, n.23 (Del. Super. July 17, 2020) (collecting cases). 14 Redden, 111 A.3d at 607-8. 15 Id. (quoting State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1205 (Del. 2002)). 16 Id. at 608. 4 9. While Rule 35 sets a 90-day time period for filing a motion for

modification, the Court retains “‘inherent authority [independent of mechanisms

provided for by court rule or statute] to modify [its] initial sentence based on the

terms of the original sentence itself.”17 Thus, the Court may exercise its inherent

authority to modify a sentence (i) when “expressly and affirmatively” reserved, (ii)

in the “original sentencing order or first and timely Rule 35(b) motion,” (iii) the

stated conditions have occurred, and (iv) solely to ensure the primary goal of the

original sentencing is preserved.”18 In such a circumstance, Rule 35 is not

implicated.19

Analysis

10. Because jurisdiction was retained at the time of Miller’s sentencing,

Rule 35 was not implicated when he filed his first modification motion in 2019. The

Court entertained the merits of that motion under its inherent authority and the

retention of jurisdiction in the original order. The Court denied Miller’s first

modification motion and there was no further retention of jurisdiction. The Court

17 Tollis, 126 A.3d at 1120 (citation omitted); State v. Sloman, 886 A.2d 1257, 1265 (Del. 2005) (“‘This Court has consistently held that Delaware courts have the inherent power to vacate, modify or set aside their judgments or Orders.’”) (quoting State v. Guthman, 619 A.2d 1175, 1178 (Del. 1993)). 18 State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 330 (Del. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). See also State v. Johnson, 2006 WL 3872849, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2006) (the Court may modify a sentence pursuant to its inherent authority “when it expressly and affirmatively retains its authority over the original and timely filed Rule 35(b) motion to ensure that the primary goal of the sentence is preserved.”). 19 Sloman, 886 A.2d at 1265. 5 ruled that any further request for a sentence modification was governed by Section

4217.20 Accordingly, the Motion is governed by Rule 35.

11. When presented with a Rule 35 motion, the Court must first determine

whether a procedural bar applies, which includes untimeliness and repetitiveness.

The Motion was filed more than 90 days after sentencing, and it is Miller’s second

Rule 35 motion. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Kathleen M. Miller Judge Kathleen M. Miller

cc: Original to Prothonotary Antoine Miller (SBI# 330520) Department of Justice

20 See D.I. 84. 6